Search

Corporate borrowing has substantially changed over the last two decades. In this article, we investigate changes in borrowing of US publicly listed firms along trends in five key areas: ( a) the funding mix of firms and the importance of balance-sheet versus off-balance-sheet borrowing; ( b) the costs of corporate borrowing; ( c) trends in nonprice loan terms; ( d) the importance of banks versus nonbank institutional investors; and ( e) the purpose for corporate borrowing. We explore these trends graphically over the 2002–2019 period, provide a narrative for these trends based on the theoretical and empirical literature in the respective areas, and discuss some implications for the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) pandemic. Finally, we document these trends for firms in the Eurozone countries and delineate similarities and differences.

We document a 24% decline in loan issuances in the UK syndicated loan market after the Brexit vote relative to a set of comparable loan markets. The decline in lending is driven by a pervasive reduction in demand by UK firms. Changes in GDP forecast around the Brexit vote explain about 61% of the decline in lending. We do not find evidence, however, that the United Kingdom loses its attractiveness as a financial center for cross-border lending. Our results point to the resilience of global financial centers in the face of large unexpected shocks.

We study the transmission channels from central banks’ quantitative easing programs via the banking sector when central banks start purchasing corporate bonds. We find evidence consistent with a “capital structure channel” of monetary policy. The announcement of central bank purchases reduces the bond yields of firms whose bonds are eligible for central bank purchases. These firms substitute bank term loans with bond debt, thereby relaxing banks’ lending constraints: banks with low tier-1 ratios and high nonperforming loans increase lending to private (and profitable) firms, which experience a growth in investment. The credit reallocation increases banks’ risk-taking in corporate credit.

We find that chief executive officers and chief financial officers exert significant individual effects on bank risk. Manager transitions, including transitions generated by plausibly exogenous manager departures, lead to abnormally large changes in bank risk. We demonstrate that the effects of managers on bank risk are sizable and manager-specific. The effects are also partly anticipated by the board because they are reflected in managers’ pay. However, wide-ranging personal attributes, including biographical, experience, and compensation data, only explain a small share of managers’ impact on bank risk. This implies that attempts to rein in bank risk-taking by targeting manager characteristics will be challenging for investors and regulators.

Data on firm-loan-level daily credit line drawdowns in the United States expose a corporate “dash for cash” induced by the COVID-19 pandemic. In the first phase of the crisis, which was characterized by extreme precaution and heightened aggregate risk, all firms drew down bank credit lines and raised cash levels. In the second phase, which followed the adoption of stabilization policies, only the highest-rated firms switched to capital markets to raise cash. Consistent with the risk of becoming a fallen angel, the lowest-quality BBB-rated firms behaved more similarly to non-investment grade firms. The observed corporate behavior reveals the significant impact of credit risk on corporate cash holdings. (JEL G01, G14, G32, G35)Received July 13, 2020; editorial decision July 17, 2020 by Editor Andrew Ellul

Syndication increases the overlap of bank loan portfolios and makes them more vulnerable to contagious effects. We develop a novel measure of bank interconnectedness using syndicated corporate loan portfolios, overlap based on industry and region, and different weights such as equal weights, size and relationships. We find that interconnectedness is driven mainly by bank diversification, less by bank size or overall loan market size. Interconnectedness is positively correlated with different bank-level systemic risk measures including SRISK, DIP and CoVaR, and such a positive correlation mainly arises from an elevated effect of interconnectedness on systemic risk during recessions. Overall, our results highlight that institution-level risk reduction through diversification ignores the negative externalities of an interconnected financial system.

This paper examines the dynamic allocation of control rights in private debt contracts of firms. We show that a covenant violation in the prior loan contract implies a stigma for borrowers which results in stricter loan contract terms in subsequent new loan contracts. Our analyses reject potentially other explanations such as firm characteristics or agency problems between the lender and firm management, shareholders or public debtholders. After covenant violations in the prior contract, new loans have on average 18 bps higher spreads and include more of those covenant types which also have been violated in the prior contract, with tighter thresholds.

Using a unique dataset of more than 1 million loans made by 296 German banks, we evaluate the impact of many aspects of customer–bank relationships on loan default rates. Our research suggests a practical solution to reducing loan defaults for new customers: Have the customer open a simple transactions account – savings or checking account. Observe for some time and then decide whether to make a loan. Loans made under this model have lower default, as banks can use historical data about their borrowers to establish a baseline against which new client-related information can be evaluated. Banks assemble this historical information through relationships of different forms. We define relationships in many different ways to capture non-credit relationships, transaction accounts, as well as the depth and intensity of relationships, and find each of these can provide information that helps reduce default – even establishing a simple savings or checking account and observing the activity prior to loan granting can help reduce loan defaults. Our results show that banks with relationship-specific information act differently compared with banks that do not have this information both in screening and subsequent monitoring borrowers which helps reduce loan defaults.

We analyze the determinants and the long-run consequences of government interventions in the eurozone banking sector during the 2008/09 financial crisis. Using a novel and comprehensive dataset, we document that fiscally constrained governments “kicked the can down the road” by providing banks with guarantees instead of full-fledged recapitalizations. We adopt an econometric approach that addresses the endogeneity associated with governmental bailout decisions in identifying their consequences. We find that forbearance caused undercapitalized banks to shift their assets from loans to risky sovereign debt and engage in zombie lending, resulting in weaker credit supply, elevated risk in the banking sector, and, eventually, greater reliance on liquidity support from the European Central Bank. Institutional subscribers to the NBER working paper series, and residents of developing countries may download this paper without additional charge at www.nber.org.

We analyze differences in the pricing of syndicated loans between U.S. and European loans. For credit lines, U.S. borrowers pay significantly higher spreads, but also lower fees, resulting in similar total costs of borrowing in both markets. For term loans, U.S. firms pay significantly higher spreads. While European firms across the rating spectrum issue terms loans, only low quality U.S. firms rely on term loans. U.S. issuers perform worse after loan origination compared to European issuers, which explains 30% of the spread differential. Increasing loan supply by institutional lenders in the U.S. since 2003 eventually fully removed the term loan pricing gap.

More than 80% of US syndicated loans contain at least one fee type and contracts typically specify a menu of spread and different types of fees. We test the predictions of existing theories about the main purposes of fees and provide supporting evidence that: (1) fees are used to price options embedded in loan contracts such as the draw-down option for credit lines and the cancellation option in term loans; and (2) fees are used to screen borrowers about the likelihood of exercising these options. We also propose a new total-cost-of-borrowing measure that includes various fees charged by lenders.

European banks are exposed to a substantial amount of risky sovereign debt. “Missing capital” in the banking system resulting from the zero-risk weight exemption for European sovereign debt amplifies the co-movement between sovereign CDS spreads and facilitates cross-border crisis spillovers. Risks spill over from risky peripheral sovereigns to safer core countries, but not in the opposite direction nor for exposures to countries not exempted from risk-weighting. Unfunded non-domestic sovereign bond exposures primarily affect CDS spreads of non-GIIPS banks, while domestic sovereign-to-bank linkages are particularly important for GIIPS banks. Spillovers are attenuated when banks fund their sovereign bond exposures with capital.

In this paper, we study the organizational form of loan syndicates, how banks choose their syndicate partners and how this affects syndicate structure, loan pricing, and borrower performance. We develop a set of novel measures in terms of the distance in lending expertise with respect to both borrower industry and borrower geographic location between any two lenders and relate these measures to the organizational form of loan syndicates. We find that lead arrangers choose banks that have a similar focus in terms of lending expertise, i.e., close competitors, and give these banks more senior roles in the syndicate. We also find that these more senior syndicate members hold larger loan shares. Borrowers, especially those presenting more severe information asymmetry, benefit from such an organizational design by paying lower interest spreads. These results support the hypothesis that syndicate members that are close to lead arrangers are delegated some responsibilities such as screening and monitoring and thus can lower the overall loan syndication costs. We do not find, however, significant evidence of more effective ex-post monitoring from such a strategy based on loan default when ex-ante borrower quality and creditworthiness is taken into account. This implies that banks collaborate to pool on screening rather than monitoring.

We assess the relative importance of ratings versus stock exchange listings in reducing information asymmetry using a dataset of syndicated loans to public and private firms in the UK. We find that the certification effect of ratings is largest for private firms and that syndicates are smallest if firms are privately held or unrated. Moreover, we find that the marginal effect of being stock exchange listed is insignificant once these firms are rated. Exploiting the heterogeneity among lenders, we find that especially foreign bank and non-bank investors do not provide capital if firms are unrated. Our paper highlights the information produced by rating agencies as an important mechanism by which ratings improve access to capital. Our results also emphasize the importance of syndicate moral hazard on the supply of uninformed capital: bank–borrower relationships significantly increase the loan share syndicated to investors particularly if firms are not listed and unrated.

We investigate the transmission of central bank liquidity to bank deposits and loan spreads in Europe over the period from January 2006 to June 2010. We find evidence consistent with an impaired transmission channel due to bank risk. Central bank liquidity does not translate into lower loan spreads for high-risk banks for maturities beyond one year, even as it lowers deposit spreads for both high- and low-risk banks. This adversely affects the balance sheets of high-risk bank borrowers, leading to lower payouts, lower capital expenditures, and lower employment. Overall, our results suggest that banks’ capital constraints at the time of an easing of monetary policy pose a challenge to the effectiveness of the bank-lending channel and the central bank's lender of last resort function.

In this paper we study the joint determination of loan contract terms and find that performance pricing provisions and financial covenants are complements as they protect creditors' rights and incentivize borrowers in different ways contingent upon borrower performance. We further examine how these contract terms mitigate agency problems and align borrowers' interests with creditors'. The evidence we find shows that interest-increasing performance pricing and financial covenants are used as instruments to reduce moral hazard, whereas interest-decreasing performance pricing provides incentive for borrowers to lower their default probabilities and improve credit ratings. Interestingly, borrowers strive for better performance only in the category (financial ratios or credit ratings) which their performance pricing provisions are set based upon.

This paper argues that the European banking crisis can in part be explained by a “carry trade” behavior of banks. Factor loading estimates from multifactor models relating equity returns to GIPSI (Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy) and German government bond returns suggest that banks have been long peripheral sovereign bonds funded in short-term wholesale markets, a position that generated “carry” until the GIPSI bond returns deteriorated significantly inflicting significant losses on banks. We show that the positive GIPSI factor loadings reflect actual portfolio holdings of GIPSI bonds in the cross-section of banks; and, the negative German loading reflects funding risk (flight away from bank funding to German government bonds), a risk that is increasing in the US money market mutual fund exposures of European banks as well as various proxies for bank short-term debt. Large banks and banks with low Tier 1 ratios and high risk-weighted assets had particularly large exposures and even increased their exposures between the two European stress tests of March and December 2010 taking advantage of a widening of yield spreads in the sovereign bond market. Over time, there is an increase in “home bias” – greater exposure of domestic banks to its sovereign’s bonds – which is partly explained by the European Central Bank funding of these positions. On balance, our results are supportive of moral hazard in the form of risk-taking by under-capitalized banks to exploit low risk weights and central-bank funding of risky government bond positions.

More than 80% of U.S. syndicated loans contain at least one fee type and contracts typically specify a menu of spreads and fee types. We test the predictions of existing theories on the main purposes of fees and provide supporting evidence that: (1) fees are used to price options embedded in loan contracts such as the drawdown option for credit lines and the cancellation option in term loans, and (2) fees are used to screen borrowers based on the likelihood of exercising these options. We also propose a new total-cost-of-borrowing measure that includes various fees charged by lenders.

This paper examines the broader effects of the US financial crisis on global lending to retail customers. In particular we examine retail bank lending in Germany using a unique data set of German savings banks during the period 2006 through 2008 for which we have the universe of loan applications and loans granted. Our experimental setting allows us to distinguish between savings banks affected by the US financial crisis through their holdings in Landesbanken with substantial subprime exposure and unaffected savings banks. The data enable us to distinguish between demand and supply side effects of bank lending and find that the US financial crisis induced a contraction in the supply of retail lending in Germany. While demand for loans goes down, it is not substantially different for the affected and nonaffected banks. More important, we find evidence of a significant supply side effect in that the affected banks reject substantially more loan applications than nonaffected banks. This result is particularly strong for smaller and more liquidity-constrained banks as well as for mortgage as compared with consumer loans. We also find that bank-depositor relationships help mitigate these supply side effects.

This paper analyzes the importance of discretion in bank lending decisions. We use a unique dataset of more than 1 million loan applications to customers of German savings banks and can observe accept and reject decisions as well as loan performance. We document that discretion is widespread and economically significant, in particular for customers with an existing relationship with their bank and medium credit quality. This discretion is based on soft information mainly for customers with no credit history (e.g. younger customers) and on hard information mainly for customers with a given credit history (e.g. with significant use of their credit lines). Finally, we find no evidence that loans approved based on the loan officer’s discretion perform any differently than other loans. These results help us in better understanding the loan making process and thus to shed light on an important, open question of interest to academicians, banks, consumers and regulators.

Covenants are repeatedly violated in private debt contracts by the same borrower. We use covenant violations to test predictions from the incomplete contracting literature and provide supporting evidence that lenders act as “tough principals” to address borrower moral hazard in subsequent new loans increasing loan spreads and implementing a tougher covenant structure. Alternative hypotheses related to (i) credit risk, (ii) disciplining of managers, (iii) bad luck, (iv) hold-up or (v) corporate governance cannot explain our findings. Our results suggest that covenants are important to address informational and agency problems between lenders and firms in dynamic loan contracting.

Using a unique dataset of more than 1 million loans made by 296 German banks, we evaluate the impact of many aspects of customer–bank relationships on loan default rates. Banks need historical data about their borrowers to establish a baseline against which new client-related information can be evaluated and assemble this historical information through relationships of different forms (transaction accounts, savings accounts, prior loans), scope (credit and debit cards, credit lines), and depth (relationship length, utilization of credit line, money invested in savings account). We find that banks with relationship-specific information act differently compared with banks that do not have this information both in screening and monitoring borrowers which eventually reduces loan defaults.

Although buyout investments represent a considerable proportion of private equity volume, so far little research has been done on the exit strategies of buyout investments. This article takes a step in this direction by investigating buyouts in more detail focusing particularly on the divestment process. Since exiting enables the realization of returns and is thus the most important factor for private equity investors, it is important to understand the motivation behind and the determinants influencing this decision. The authors analyze three main exit routes for exiting buyout investments: initial public offerings (IPO), sales and write-offs, using a unique data set for U.S. and European buyout transactions. They examine the determinants influencing the choice of an exit channel by employing a multinomial logit model. The results strongly support the view that private equity investors write-off investments that turn out to be non-performing early, showing their ability to filter out bad investments. They also analyze how the internal rate of return (IRR) influences which exit route is chosen. The results show that only the most profitable ventures are taken public. The results have implications for exiting buyout investments during financial crises.

Using a new dataset of UK-syndicated loans, we document a significant loan cost disadvantage incurred by privately held firms. For identification, we use the distance of a firm's headquarters to London's capital markets as a plausibly exogenous variation in corporate structure (i.e., public/private) choice. We analyze the channels of the loan cost disadvantage of being private by documenting the importance of: the higher costs of information production, the lower bargaining power, the differences in ownership structure, and the differences in secondary market trading. Interestingly, we find no evidence that lenders price expected future performance into the loan spread differential. The Author 2011. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of The Society for Financial Studies. All rights reserved. For Permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com., Oxford University Press.