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Recent studies highlight positive effect of political connections on firm performance and stock returns. This paper shows that the positive effect of political connections on the cross-sectional stock returns disappears in the weak presidency period, defined as the last two years before the presidential party change, or period of low job approval ratings. The extent of the presidential party?s control over the Congress does not affect our main result. The result is driven by small firms, who typically do not have financial resources to hedge away political risks, and by the firms located in the states where residents more strongly support the president. Additional test suggests that the industries that rely on heavy government expenditure use a variety of political strategies to maintain the value of their political capital even during the weak presidency period.

We present evidence that the negative impact of CEO short-termism on firm value can be attributed to a sub-optimal exercise of real options. Accordingly, the value relevance of firms’ real options portfolios is maximized in the absence of CEO temporal myopia. Moreover, the impact of real options on firms’ stock returns’ idiosyncratic characteristics is more pronounced when CEOs’ decision horizons are longer, in line with the view that enhanced operating flexibility from longer decision horizons can amplify the convexity of real options’ payoffs. These findings have important implications regarding the impact of CEO career horizons on corporate strategies and board decisions related to CEO incentives and succession.

We define areas with strong geographic ties to powerful politicians as politically vibrant and show that they are characterized by greater value‐relevant information generation and symptomatic of equity market segmentation. Political vibrancy entails greater levels of local bias and local comovement and has two important return predictability implications. First, it enhances local institutions’ informational advantages; their trades’ ability to forecast local stock returns exceeds that of nonlocal institutions. Second, in support of the view that information diffuses slowly into prices, stock returns of firms from politically vibrant areas predict returns of similar firms in other areas.

Using data on job approval ratings of governors, U.S. senators, and the president, we find that firms located in states with high approval ratings outperform firms located in states with low approval ratings by .64% per month. Furthermore, this relationship is stronger when investors are actively involved in politics, when local politicians are closer to the center of political power, for small firms that have a larger proportion of local investors, and for financially strong areas where investors are ready to execute investments in local stocks. Overall, our study shows that investors’ political sentiment is important in determining stock returns.

We document significant heterogeneity in the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) equity incentives and firm value using quantile regression. We show that CEO delta is more effective in the presence of ample investment opportunities, while CEO vega is more beneficial for firms lacking investment opportunities. Further, Tobin's Q increases in CEO delta for more risk‐tolerant firms but increases in CEO vega for more risk‐averse firms. We also observe that higher monitoring intensity after the Sarbanes‐Oxley Act reduces CEO delta's role in compensation. Risk aversion alters the optimal incentive‐value relation, and the nature of this relation also depends on the level of Tobin's Q.

We examine whether the proportion of CEO inside debt holdings (pension and deferred compensation) to stock holdings benefit both shareholders and debtholders by relating CEO inside debt to a firm’s dividend payout policies. Based on the positive association of CEO inside debt and the propensity and the size of the dividend payout, we find that firms paying their CEOs with large inside debt present the lower cost of debt and default risk, and these benefits transfer to better firm performance and valuation. Moreover, we find that CEO inside debt is related to superior firm performance only in dividend-paying firms. Dividends tend to increase when firms with high agency costs of equity use inside debt. We conclude that dividends serve as a channel through which CEO inside debt compensation mitigates both agency costs of debt and agency costs of equity.

We assess whether observable corporate political strategies can serve as channels of value-relevant political information flow into stock prices and form the basis for profitable return predictability strategies. We document that returns of politically connected firms’ stocks lead those of their non-connected peers, suggesting that information shocks associated with new policies and other political developments become evident first in the stock prices of firms that pursue political strategies and then, with delay, in those of similar, non-connected firms.

We build on the intuitive, albeit overlooked, relationship between investor attention and investor sentiment to explore the open question of the impact of investor sentiment on aggregate stock returns. We find that investor attention causes changes in sentiment but not vice versa. Moreover, the effect of attention on sentiment is short-lived for medium and large stocks although persists for small stocks. We also document the existence of an important mediating role of attention in the link between sentiment and aggregate stock returns. Investor attention alters the predictability value of sentiment in future aggregate returns, providing new insight into the information content of investor sentiment as it relates to investor attention. We find that sentiment caused by investors’ inattentiveness mainly drives the underlying potent relationship between investor sentiment and aggregate stock returns. Our results accord with the notion that investor attention generally improves market efficiency.

We find that firm value is reduced via industrial diversification and this reduction in value depends upon a firm’s technology intensity. We consider that asymmetric information problems are more severe in technology intensive industries and find that high tech industry firms present distinctly larger value reduction when compared to low tech industry firms. The negative valuation effect is greater for firms that have a relatively larger amount of intangible assets and greater R&D capital. We determine that our findings are robust to different estimation methods and alternative excess value measures.

We use the M&A setting to investigate whether corporate political strategies impact market outcomes. In line with the view that politics can complicate M&A deals, we find that firms contributing to political action committees or involved in lobbying are less likely to be acquired and their takeover process is lengthier. We provide evidence that a likely motive for politicians’ interference with the takeover process can be their career concerns, in terms of getting re-elected and raising funds for future campaigns. We also find that politically connected target firms command higher takeover premiums from bidders lacking political expertise, consistent with the notion that the market regards target firms’ connections, not easily replicable by bidders, as means to enhance growth opportunities of the merged firm. We provide a first step in documenting how political connections can become either a tool of convenience or an impediment for managers of firms involved in acquisitions.

We provide evidence consistent with the notion that prudent use of financial derivatives improves firms’ information environment. We show that firms with sophisticated and comprehensive derivatives use policies display lower levels of uncertainty about future cash flows, volatility of future income and sales growth, and equity mispricing than those that do not use derivatives. However, we also show that policies that consist of large positions in a single type of derivative contract are not likely to produce similar benefits. These results remain intact even after accounting for the endogenous nature of derivatives use policy and information risk and mispricing.

We examine the relation between CEO delta, firm locality, and firm value for a sample of 7749 firm-year observations. We find that CEO delta is more value-enhancing for rural firms, those associated with exacerbated agency conflicts resulting from decreased observability of managerial investment decisions and higher levels of information asymmetry. Further, the positive relation between CEO delta and firm value is stronger for rural firms with higher levels of information asymmetry or in less religious areas. Our findings imply that managerial ownership is more effective in mitigating agency conflicts in rural areas with higher levels of information asymmetry and lower degrees of local trustworthy constituents. Our results are robust to alternative definitions of urban/rural firms, the inclusion of additional control variables, and various tests controlling the endogeneity between firm location and value. Finally, the results do not appear to be driven by reverse causality.

Previous literature finds a positive association between short-term changes in institutional holdings (especially those of local institutions) and subsequent short-term stock performance. We contribute by investigating the importance of geographical proximity under policy uncertainty. We show that the short-term informational advantage of local institutions only thrives in areas that are either politically closely aligned with the president or where the state government (governorship and legislature) is under the control of one party. Our findings are important in understanding the avenues through which geographical proximity may provide the basis for exploitable informational advantages.

This paper studies the linkages between bank performance, connections to powerful politicians, and the degree of economic freedom in a bank’s home state. We find that bank performance is positively related to state economic freedom. We also reconfirm the finding of Gropper et al. (2013) that bank performance is improved by political connections. However, the positive effect of political connections appears to be significantly reduced when there is a higher degree of economic freedom in the state, indicating that political connections may matter less to banks when there is more economic freedom. Economic freedom in a state can have a beneficial effect on state economic growth and hence may outweigh any political connection benefits. However, the declines in state economic freedom in recent years could make political connections potentially more valuable to banks.

Firms use active political strategies not only to mitigate uncertainty emanating from legislative activity, but also to enhance their growth opportunities. We find that the impact of such policy uncertainty on systematic risk (beta) can be hedged away by employing various political strategies involving the presence of former politicians on corporate boards of directors, contributions to political campaigns, and corporate lobbying activities. In addition, we show that active political strategies can boost firms’ growth opportunities; they are associated with greater firm heterogeneity and make real options more value-relevant as potential drivers of competitive advantages in uncertain environments.

We examine how firm characteristics, particularly the degree of firm complexity and the firm’s need for specialty knowledge, affect the relationship between corporate governance and the risk of bankruptcy. We find that having larger boards reduces the risk of bankruptcy only for complex firms. Our results also suggest that the proportion of inside directors on the board is inversely associated with the risk of bankruptcy in firms that require more specialist knowledge and that the reverse is true in technically unsophisticated firms. The results further reveal that the additional explanatory power from corporate governance variables becomes stronger as the time to bankruptcy is increased, implying that although corporate governance variables are important predictors, governance changes are likely to be too late to save a firm on the verge of bankruptcy.

We show that firm headquarters’ geographic proximity to political power centers (state capitals) is associated with higher abnormal returns. Consistent with the notion that this effect is rooted in social network links, we find it is more pronounced in communities with high levels of sociability and political values’ homophily, and that it dissipates when firms move their headquarters to another state. Finally, in line with the view that investors perceive such networks to be associated with political risk, we find that this effect is particularly strong when there are substantial levels of corruption, dependency on government spending, and politicians’ turnover.

We investigate a link between agency costs and equity mispricing. We employ comprehensive, multi-dimensional measures of agency costs and mispricing, and find that mispricing is significantly and positively related to agency costs. We also explore the effect of equity-based compensation on the impact of agency costs on mispricing. Our investigation extends previous studies that do not separately account for the options and restricted stock grants components of equity-based compensation. We show that stock options, originally intended to resolve conflicts of interest, exaggerate the problem and this phenomenon is pronounced especially when firms are overvalued. Overall, our results imply that compensation packages that are not structured optimally could lead to greater mispricing.

Using a sample of 3,688 mergers and acquisitions over the period of 1992 to 2005, we find that post-merger equity risk declines roughly 18% in the year after the announcement. We find that post-merger equity risk is negatively related to the sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock return volatility (vega). The negative relation between vega and equity risk over the post-merger period is concentrated in CEOs with high proportions of options and options that are more in-the-money. The reduction in post-merger equity risk is accomplished through both industrial diversification and reduced business segment focus, with the probability of industrial diversification decreasing in vega. In addition, we find that the decline in post-merger equity risk results in a significant decrease in shareholder wealth. This decrease is concentrated among firms with CEOs having the highest delta and the highest delta and vega, with the effect of vega also conditional on option ownership characteristics. Our results suggest that the increased convexity provided by option-based compensation does not necessarily increase risk-taking behavior by CEOs.

We examine whether family ownership affects the value impact of the operational and financial dimensionsoffirms’hedgingpolicies.Weshowthatfamilyfirms’marketvaluationsarehigherthan those of non-family firms, consistent with the view that family firms benefit from family owners’ long-term perspectives and ability to monitor managers. In addition, while both operational and financial hedging policies per se are valuable in non-family firms, they do not create any value in family firms. These results support the notion that the founding families’ need to hedge the risk of their undiversified personal wealth portfolio leads to suboptimal risk management decisions. Family ownership is quite common and significant in US firms across a broad range of industries. Firms with founding families’ presence constitute about one-third of the SP Villalonga and Amit, 2006). As reported in Anderson and Reeb (2004), excluding 97 banks and public utilities, founding families are present in 141 of 403 S&P 500 firms and hold, on average, about 17.9% of equity stakes and 20% of the board seats in these firms. Prior literature has provided mixed evidence on the benefits firms derive from substantial

This paper investigates the relationship between US MNCs' valuations and anti-Americanism in countries where MNCs' foreign subsidiaries are located. We find that MNCs suffer value-destruction when they enter markets where people express severe anti-Americanism. However, we uncover that geographic diversification into these high anti-Americanism countries significantly increases firm value if the MNC has high levels of intangibles such as technological know-how and marketing expertise. Our findings are consistent with the notion that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are greater when barriers to competition are higher.

We find that excessively high levels of press coverage can significantly exaggerate stock price deviation from fundamental value. We show that being “in the news” a lot is associated with both greater liquidity and more information risk. When we examine signed mispricing, we find that the effect of abnormal press coverage is significant only for stocks with high relative valuations, consistent with the concurrent existences of media‐induced sentiment and media bias. Indeed, we uncover that the sentiment effect is attenuated when firms with low valuations receive heavy coverage in the local press.

Does a politician with power in the U.S. Congress positively affect the value of firms headquartered in their home state? We investigate this question by examining the profitability and stock performance of commercial banks. Banks can be enormously influenced by the political and regulatory environment. We find that banks headquartered in states where a Senator or member of the House of Representatives serves as the chairman on their respective banking committee in Congress outperform banks headquartered in other states. In addition, we find that this “chair effect” is more pronounced when the committee chairs are strongly aligned with other politicians in Congress, when they are more experienced, and when banks are clustered in the home state, suggesting that the potential benefits generated from chairmanship are in more demand. Overall, our results suggest that there are some important value implications of a local politician’s power in Congress.

Politics can interfere with capital markets. We show that political interference is a necessary condition for local bias in the stock market. We extend the framework of Hong, Kubik and Stein (2008) and find that the inverse relation between market-to-book ratios and the ratio of the aggregate book value of firms to the aggregate risk tolerance of investors in a state (RATIO) is only prevalent among firms located in areas where politics has substantial influence on local markets. Our results indicate that the impact of politically induced local bias is primarily demand driven and stronger among firms that are less visible.

Previous literature provides multiple conflicting arguments on why and when multinationality should enhance or impede the value-relevance of firms' real options. We address this issue by examining whether the relationship between stock returns and changes in return volatility varies with multinationality. Our results indicate that multinationality does indeed act as a real option facilitator. Furthermore, we show that, consistent with the notion that there are limits to the operating flexibility associated with multinationality this benefit only accrues fully if the firm is not financially constrained and stabilizes at very high degrees of multinationality.

We examine the performance of several types of the consumption-based CAPM (C-CAPM) models to explore if consumption factors matter for determining excess returns across 17 MSCI country indexes. While the classic world C-CAPM does exhibit some power in explaining cross-sectional variations of expected excess returns, the model seems to require an implausibly large coefficient of risk aversion. The more sophisticated models including the heterogeneous C-CAPM, the world surplus consumption and the habit-formation models provide more reasonable estimates and add substantial explanatory power for the variation in the cross section of excess stock returns. Our results suggest that country-specific consumption risk is not fully diversified thus implying that stock returns are related to idiosyncratic consumption risk.

We study the research productivity of new finance Ph.D.s as measured by the number of quality publications. A commonly accepted notion is that the highest ranked schools produce the candidates with the greatest potential for high-quality publications. Our results, however, find publications or revisions in top-tier journals during the doctoral program are a stronger measure of potential research productivity than the school attended. Our findings demonstrate how candidates outside of the top schools can signal their future research productivity. Even though we examine the specialized labor market, our results have broader implications for markets outside academics. Employee productivity is a much discussed topic in both economics and finance. The typical question posed by researchers or anyone hiring an employee is what characteristics lead certain employees to be more productive than others? This question has puzzled employers for years. To answer this question, we turn to signaling theory. Signaling theory suggests that under uncertain conditions, where information asymmetries exist between parties, one party can signal

We show that firms’ use of derivatives is negatively associated with stock mispricing. This result is consistent with the notion that hedging improves the transparency and predictability of firms’ cash flows resulting in less misvaluation. Furthermore, we show that the negative relationship between mispricing and hedging is particularly strong when market value is below fundamental value, which is consistent with prior evidence that hedging has a positive impact on firm valuation. Finally, we provide evidence that a “spread-out” hedging policy that entails the use of a variety of derivative contracts can be more effective in reducing mispricing.

We investigate the effect of top managers' myopia on firms' market valuation. We devise a measure of expected CEO tenure as a proxy of the length of CEO decision horizon. After accounting for the endogenous nature of CEO horizon, our empirical tests show that it is significantly associated with agency costs and provide strong support for the hypotheses that the length of CEO decision horizon has a positive influence on firm value and a negative effect on information risk. The results are consistent with the notion that a short CEO decision horizon is indicative of preference for investments that offer relatively faster paybacks at the expense of long-term value creation.

We investigate whether and how well firms’ stock market valuations reflect their employees’ collective skills and effectiveness relative to that of their industry peers and competitors. We devise a relative stock market valuation measure of human capital intangibles (EVHC) and find that portfolios of low EVHC firms systematically outperform portfolios of high EVHC firms by an average 1.34% per month. However, this is primarily a small firms effect, because for large firms the excess returns of the arbitrage portfolio that is long on the low EVHC stocks and short on the high EVHC stocks is zero. Our results suggest that reliance on human capital intangibles may proxy for risk not fully accounted for by conventional asset pricing models, or alternatively, that the market cannot correctly price human capital intangibles for small size firms.

In examining takeovers of foreign targets by U.S. firms, we investigate the effect of the target country's legal environment on acquiring firm value. Our results indicate that acquirers of target firms located in civil law countries experience significant positive abnormal returns, especially when the acquirer possesses a high level of intangibles. Furthermore, we find that acquirers with high levels of intangibles are more likely to acquire target firms in civil law countries. These findings suggest that the transfer of intangibles overseas provides relatively larger efficiency benefits for multinational corporations in cases where the alternative, contracting in external markets, is more difficult.

This paper examines the relationship between U.S. MNCs' valuation and corruption in countries where the MNCs' foreign subsidiaries are located. We uncover that country-level corruption has a multi-dimensional impact on MNCs' valuation. We find that the impact of intangibles is less pronounced for MNCs operating primarily in corrupt countries, consistent with the view that the lack of property rights protection and information asymmetry problems are more prevalent in corrupt environments. We also find that the expansion of a MNC network dominated by corrupt countries negatively affects MNCs' valuation, suggesting that investors may recognize it as an additional risk. However, more importantly, we find that geographic diversification in corrupt countries significantly increases firm value if the MNC has high levels of intangibles such as technological know-how and marketing expertise. Assuming that transactions costs in corrupt countries are higher, our findings are consistent with the notion that the advantages from internalizing the cross-border transfer of intangibles are greater in the presence of corruption. Our findings remain unchanged when we account for endogeneity at the country-and firm-level, when we use alternative corruption measures, and when we re-estimate models by omitting MNCs with operations in locations with big “negative” shocks during the sample period. Moreover, we show that firms with expertise in dealing with corruption enjoy greater benefits from internalization.

We provide a link between diversification discount and corporate use of financial derivatives. We show that diversified firms benefit from financial risk management. Our findings are consistent with the notion that derivative usage lowers information asymmetry and thereby reduces the negative valuation effects of diversification. Our evidence complements the earlier findings of both the risk management literature and diversification discount literature and is robust to controls for endogeneity and information asymmetry levels.

We investigate whether and how multinationality affects the opaqueness of the firm. We use multiple alternative measurements of multinationality and opaqueness. Spanning nearly three decades for a large sample of US non-financial firms, we find a statistically and economically significant, positive relationship between multinationality and opaqueness. We find that this positive relationship hinges on whether or not the degree of foreign involvement is compatible with the structure of the firm’s foreign operations network. Our results imply that multinationality’s impact on opaqueness is alleviated when there is harmony between the size of foreign involvement and the extent of the MNC network’s geographic dispersion. Previous literature has implicitly assumed a simple, positive relationship. This is the first study to explicitly address the question in a comprehensive manner. We investigate whether and how multinationality affects the opaqueness of the firm. We use multiple alternative measurements of multinationality and opaqueness. Spanning nearly three decades for a large sample of US non-financial firms, we find a statistically and economically significant, positive relationship between multinationality and opaqueness. We find that this positive relationship hinges on whether or not the degree of foreign involvement is compatible with the structure of the firm's foreign operations network. Our results imply that multinationality's impact on opaqueness is alleviated when there is harmony between the size of foreign involvement and the extent of the MNC network's geographic dispersion. Previous literature has implicitly assumed a simple, positive relationship. This is the first study to explicitly address the question in a comprehensive manner.

We investigate whether diversity in points of view within corporate boards, as captured by the diversity in political ideology of board members, can affect a firm's performance. We employ personal political contributions' data to measure political ideology distance among groups of inside, outside directors and the CEO. Our empirical evidence strongly supports the notion that outside directors' monitoring effectiveness is more likely to be enhanced when their viewpoints are distinct from those of management. We find that ideologically diverse boards are associated with better firm performance, lower agency costs and less insiders' discretionary power over the firm's Political Action Committee (PAC) spending. Taken together, our results lead us to conclude that multiplicity of standpoints in corporate boardrooms is imperative for board effectiveness.

We utilize a sample of US acquiring firms that engaged in international M&As to document the effects of corporate derivatives use on post-M&A long-term performance. We find that derivatives users outperform nonusers. Furthermore, we find that acquirers with derivative policies that are more comprehensive and sophisticated outperform those with less comprehensive and sophisticated policies. They, in turn, outperform acquirers with no existing policies in place. Our results are consistent with the notion that the use of derivatives lowers information asymmetry related agency problems. Furthermore, our evidence indicates that derivatives use is an important corporate activity that has a profound effect on post-M&A performance.