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According to a widespread view, Einstein’s definition of time in his special relativity is founded on the positivist verification principle. The present paper challenges this received outlook. It argues that Einstein’s position on the concept of time, to wit, simultaneity, is best understood as a mitigated version of concept empiricism. He contrasts his position to Newton’s absolutist and Kant’s transcendental arguments, and in part sides with Hume’s and Mach’s empiricist arguments. Nevertheless, Einstein worked out a concept empiricism that is considerably more moderate than what we find in the preceding empiricist tradition and early logical positivism. He did not think that the origin of concepts is in observations, but in conventions, and he also maintained a realist ontology of physical events, which he thought is necessary for his theory. Consequently, his philosophy of time in special relativity is not couched in terms of an antimetaphysical verificationism. peerReviewed

Nykyisessä ajan filosofiassa on tapana erottaa kaksi toisistaan poikkeavaa ja ensi näkemältä ristiriitaista ajallista sarjaa: A- ja B-sarjat. Edellinen vastaa inhimillistä kokemusta ajan kulusta, siinä missä jälkimmäinen on sopusoinnussa fysiikan kanssa. Voiko näitä kahta varsin erilaista näkökulmaa aikaan sovittaa yhteen? Väitän, että epäreduktiivinen fysikalismi tarjoaa tähän kysymykseen hyvin perustellun vastauksen.