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O presente trabalho se propõe a analisar se a pornografia consiste em um limite legítimo ao exercício do direito à liberdade de expressão e se, consequentemente, pode ser proibida a circulação de seu conteúdo. Ele se baseia na existência de uma parcela do movimento feminista que expõe a questão enquanto um problema de ordem político-igualitária, que vê na pornografia uma indústria que ameaça a busca pela igualdade entre homens e mulheres, bem como, no argumento de teóricos liberais, que se opõem a este posicionamento, acreditando que tal proibição representa uma censura. É diante disto que analisa o diálogo entre os autores norte-americanos Ronald Dworkin e Catharine MacKinnon, representantes de duas diferentes perspectivas acerca desta questão. Ambos são marcos teóricos da pesquisa. Ele se justifica pela importância da realização de estudos que discutam esse direito, bem como pelo crescimento dos movimentos feministas, os quais demonstram a sua relevância e atualidade, além da clara divergência existente a seu respeito. Para tanto adota como metodologia pesquisa bibliográfica, desenvolvendo estudo exploratório com base em material já elaborado. Diante disto, resta verificado que embora seja necessária a realização de uma crítica à cultura machista, não será por meio da proibição destes materiais que se atingirá o objetivo da igualdade de gênero. Não pode a censura ser utilizada como justificativa mesmo neste cenário, uma vez que as ideias que se acredita serem ofensivas são tão dignas de proteção quanto aquelas com as quais há concordância. This paper proposes an analysis of whether pornography constitutes a legitimate limit to the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and if the circulation of its content may be prohibited. Such research is based on the existence of a portion of the feminist movement that exposes the issue as a political-egalitarian problem, which sees in pornography an industry that threatens the pursuit of equality between men and women. As well as in the argument of liberal theorists, who oppose this position, believing that the prohibition represents a censorship. It is in face of this that an analysis is made of the dialogue between the American authors Ronald Dworkin and Catharine MacKinnon, representatives of two different perspectives on this question; therefore, being used as theoretical frameworks for the research. It is justified by the importance of carrying out studies that discuss this right,, as well as by the growth of feminist movements, which demonstrate its relevance and topicality, in addition to the clear divergence on it. For such, it adopts as methodology a bibliographical research, from the development of an exploratory study based on already elaborated material. Given this, it is evidenced that although it is necessary to make a critique of the macho culture, it will not be through the prohibition of these materials that the goal of equal gender will be achieved. Censorship cannot be used as a justification even in this scenario, since ideas believed to be offensive are as worthy of protection as those with which there is agreement.

This paper engages with the work of Catharine MacKinnon to consider three ways of understanding the phrase "judging women." First, when is it acceptable or necessary to make judgements about what women do? The paper argues that feminist analysis urges compassion and empathy for women, but also highlights the ways that choices are limited and shaped by patriarchy. Thus we cannot and should not avoid all judgment of women’s—and men’s—choices. Second, when can women engage in the act of judging? It is sometimes claimed that it is anti-feminist to engage in such judgment, and that feminists must above all else avoid being judgmental. The paper rejects this idea and argues instead that feminism should insist on women's right to exercise judgment: women’s voices matter. Third, how are we to judge who counts as a woman? MacKinnon’s work offers profound, sustained, rich analysis of these questions, but does not fully resolve them.