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Face-to-face imitation is a unique social interaction wherein a shared action is executed based on the feedback of the partner. Imitation by the partner is the feedback to the imitatee's action, resulting in sharing actions. The neural mechanisms of the shared representation of action during face-to-face imitation, the core of inter-subjectivity, are not well-known. Here, based on the predictive coding account, we hypothesized that the pair-specific forward internal model is the shared representation of action which is represented by the inter-individual synchronization of some portion of the mirror neuron system. Hyperscanning functional magnetic resonance imaging was conducted during face-to-face interaction in 16 pairs of participants who completed an immediate imitation task of facial expressions. Paired participants were alternately assigned to either an imitator or an imitatee who was prompted to express a happy, sad, or non-emotional face. While neural activation elicited by imitating and being imitated were distinct with little overlap, on-line imitative interaction enhanced inter-brain synchronization in the right inferior parietal lobule that correlated with the similarity in facial movement kinematic profile. This finding indicates a critical role of the right inferior parietal lobule in sharing representation of action as a pair-specific forward internal model through imitative interaction.

Many species use touching for reinforcing social structures, and particularly, non-human primates use social grooming for managing their social networks. However, it is still unclear how social touch contributes to the maintenance and reinforcement of human social networks. Human studies in Western cultures suggest that the body locations where touch is allowed are associated with the strength of the emotional bond between the person touched and the toucher. However, it is unknown to what extent this relationship is culturally universal and generalizes to non-Western cultures. Here, we compared relationship-specific, bodily touch allowance maps across one Western ( N = 386, UK) and one East Asian ( N = 255, Japan) country. In both cultures, the strength of the emotional bond was linearly associated with permissible touch area. However, Western participants experienced social touching as more pleasurable than Asian participants. These results indicate a similarity of emotional bonding via social touch between East Asian and Western cultures.

A hearer's perception of an utterance as sarcastic depends on integration of the heard statement, the discourse context, and the prosody of the utterance, as well as evaluation of the incongruity among these aspects. The effect of prosody in sarcasm comprehension is evident in everyday conversation, but little is known about its underlying mechanism or neural substrates. To elucidate the neural underpinnings of sarcasm comprehension in the auditory modality, we conducted a functional MRI experiment with 21 adult participants. The participants were provided with a short vignette in which a child had done either a good or bad deed, about which a parent made a positive comment. The participants were required to judge the degree of the sarcasm in the parent's positive comment (praise), which was accompanied by either positive or negative affective prosody. The behavioral data revealed that an incongruent combination of utterance and the context (i.e., the parent's positive comment on a bad deed by the child) induced perception of sarcasm. There was a significant interaction between context and prosody: sarcasm perception was enhanced when positive prosody was used in the context of a bad deed or, vice versa, when negative prosody was used in the context of a good deed. The corresponding interaction effect was observed in the rostro-ventral portion of the left inferior frontal gyrus corresponding to Brodmann's Area (BA) 47. Negative prosody incongruent with a positive utterance (praise) activated the bilateral insula extending to the right inferior frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate cortex, and brainstem. Our findings provide evidence that the left inferior frontal gyrus, particularly BA 47, is involved in integration of discourse context and utterance with affective prosody in the comprehension of sarcasm.

Cultural factors, such as cultural group membership, have been shown to affect neural bases of face and emotion perception. However, little is known about how cultural factors influence neural processing of emotional faces expressed by in-group and out-group members. In this study, we examined cultural influences on neural activation during the intergroup perception of negative emotional faces. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to compare neural activation during intergroup emotion processing across cultures in three participants groups; two monocultural groups (i.e. Caucasian-Americans and native Japanese) and a bicultural group (i.e. Japanese-Americans). During scanning, the participants completed an emotional match-to-sample task consisting of negative facial expressions of Japanese and Caucasians. Our results show cultural modulation of neural response in the bilateral amygdala as a function of in-group biases and collectivistic values. Additionally, bicultural Japanese-Americans showed enhanced neural responses in the ventral medial prefrontal and posterior cingulate cortices, which had been related to self-related processing, during the perception of negative facial expression of Japanese. Neural activation in the ventral and posterior cingulate cortices reflected individuals’ collectivistic tendencies only in the Japanese-American group, possibly due to greater sensitivity to ingroup biases in bicultural individuals. Our results demonstrate the influence of culture on neural responses during the perception of intergroup emotion from faces.

A dominant theory of humor comprehension suggests that people understand humor by first perceiving some incongruity in an expression and then resolving it. This is called "the incongruity-resolution theory." Experimental studies have investigated the neural basis of humor comprehension, and multiple neural substrates have been proposed; however, the specific substrate for incongruity resolution is still unknown. The reason may be that the resolution phase, despite its importance in humor comprehension, has not been successfully distinguished from the perception phase because both phases occur almost simultaneously. To reveal the substrate, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance study using 51 healthy participants. We used a humor-producing frame of "Given A, I'd say B, because C" so as to focus on the resolution phase independently by suspending humor processing just after the perception phase. This frame allowed us to separate the two phases. Based on our results, incongruity resolution evoked positive emotion and activated the left amygdala, which is known to be related to positive emotion. On the basis of these findings, we argue that the amygdala plays an important role in humor comprehension, considering its functional role in emotional evaluation, particularly the relevance detection for incoming stimuli.

The intrinsic value of an action refers to the inherent sense that experiencing a behavior is enjoyable even if it has no explicit outcome. Previous research has suggested that a common valuation mechanism within the reward network may be responsible for processing the intrinsic value of achieving both the outcome and external rewards. However, how the intrinsic value of action is neurally represented remains unknown. We hypothesized that the intrinsic value of action is determined by an action-outcome contingency indicating the behavior is controllable and that the outcome of the action can be evaluated by this feedback. Consequently, the reward network should be activated, reflecting the generation of the intrinsic value of action. To test this hypothesis, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) investigation of a stopwatch game in which the action-outcome contingency was manipulated. This experiment involved 36 healthy volunteers and four versions of a stopwatch game that manipulated controllability (the feeling that participants were controlling the stopwatch themselves) and outcome (a signal allowing participants to see the result of their action). A free-choice experiment was administered after the fMRI to explore preference levels for each game. The results showed that the stopwatch game with the action-outcome contingency evoked a greater degree of enjoyment because the participants chose this condition over those that lacked such a contingency. The ventral striatum and midbrain were activated only when action-outcome contingency was present. Thus, the intrinsic value of action was represented by an increase in ventral striatal and midbrain activation.

To comprehend figurative utterances such as metaphor or sarcasm, a listener must both judge the literal meaning of the statement and infer the speaker's intended meaning (mentalizing; Amodio and Frith, 2006). To delineate the neural substrates of pragmatic comprehension, we conducted functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) with 20 normal adult volunteers. Participants read short stories followed by a target sentence. Depending on the context provided by the preceding stories, the target sentences were classified as follows: (1) metaphor versus literally coherent; (2) metaphor versus literally incoherent; (3) sarcasm versus literally coherent; and (4) sarcasm versus literally incoherent. For each task pair, we directly compared the activations evoked by the same target sentences in the different contexts. The contrast images were incorporated into a 2 (metaphor and sarcasm)×2 (literal coherency and incoherency) design. Metaphor-specific activation was found in the head of the caudate, which might be involved in associating statements with potential meanings, and restricting sentence meanings within a set of possible candidates for what the speaker intended. Sarcasm-specific activation was found in the left amygdala, which is an important component of the neural substrates of social behavior. Conjunction analysis revealed that both metaphor and sarcasm activated the anterior rostral medial frontal cortex (arMFC), which is a key node of mentalizing. A distinct literal coherency effect was found in the orbital MFC, which is thought to be involved in monitoring. These mesial frontal areas are jointly involved in monitoring literal coherency and mentalizing within social contexts in order to comprehend the pragmatic meanings of utterances.

Racial identification shapes self‐concept and how people share in and respond to the emotional states of others around them. Prior neuroimaging studies have demonstrated the role of the neural default network in self‐referential and empathic processing. However, how racial identification affects neural processing of social information remains unknown. Here, we examined the effect of racial identification on neural response related to social perception among African American and Caucasian American individuals using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Our results demonstrate that degree of racial identification predicts activity within cortical midline structures of the default network in response to viewing racial ingroup, relative to outgroup members, and activity within the medial temporal lobe subsystem of the default network in response to viewing racial outgroup, relative to ingroup members. Broadly, our findings suggest that the strength of racial identification is associated with differential recruitment of neural and cognitive processes to understand and respond to other people within and outside of one's racial group. Hum Brain Mapp, 2011. © 2011 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.

Neural correlates involved in the formation of negative impression from face were investigated using event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging and a partial conditioning paradigm. Eighteen normal volunteers underwent imaging while they viewed the faces of two unfamiliar individuals: one individual's face was partially accompanied by negative emotion but the other's was not. After the volunteers learned the relationship between the faces and the emotion, they formed a more negative impression of the person's face when the emotion was presented. Subtraction analysis of the individuals' neutral faces revealed activation in the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and superior temporal sulcus, but this activity did not correlate with the change of impression from face. On the other hand, the response in the left amygdala negatively correlated with the change of impression from face in the first run. Time modulation analysis revealed that activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex associated with negative emotion was the largest in the initial part of the acquisition. These results suggest that a negative impression from face may be formed by orchestrated activity in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and amygdala, and that the activity has a prominent role in the initial acquisition of negative emotion.

A central evolutionary challenge for social groups is uniting a heterogeneous set of individuals towards common goals. One means by which social groups form and endure is by endowing group members with extraordinary prosocial proclivities, such as ingroup love, towards other group members. Here we examined the neural basis of extraordinary empathy and altruistic motivation in African-American and Caucasian-American individuals using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Our results indicate that empathy for ingroup members is neurally distinct from empathy for humankind, more generally. People showed greater response within anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral insula when observing the suffering of others, but African-American individuals additionally recruit medial prefrontal cortex when observing the suffering of members of their own social group. Moreover, neural activity within medial prefrontal cortex in response to pain expressed by ingroup relative to outgroup members predicted greater empathy and altruistic motivation for one's ingroup, suggesting that neurocognitive processes associated with self identity underlie extraordinary empathy and altruistic motivation for members of one's own social group. Taken together, our findings reveal distinct neural mechanisms of empathy and altruistic motivation in an intergroup context and may serve as a foundation for future research investigating the neural bases of intergroup prosociality, more broadly construed.

Individualism and collectivism, or self-construal style, refer to cultural values that influence how people think about themselves and their relation to the social and physical environment. Recent neuroimaging evidence suggests that cultural values of individualism and collectivism dynamically modulate neural response within cortical midline structures, such as the medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), during explicit self-evaluation. However, it remains unknown whether cultural priming modulates neural response during self-evaluation due to explicit task demands. Here we investigated how cultural priming of self-construal style affects neural activity within cortical midline structures during implicit self-evaluation in bicultural individuals. Results indicate that ventral MPFC showed relatively less deactivation during implicit evaluation of both self- and father-relevant information as compared to control condition (e.g., information of an unfamiliar person), irrespective of cultural priming. By contrast, dorsal MPFC showed relatively less deactivation during implicit evaluation of father-relevant information, but not self-relevant information, as compared to control condition, only when they were primed with individualism. Furthermore, dorsal MPFC showed relatively less deactivation during implicit evaluation of father-relevant information as compared to self-relevant condition only when they were primed with individualism. Hence, our results indicate that cultural priming modulates neural response within dorsal, but not ventral, portions of MPFC in a stimulus-driven rather than task-driven manner. More broadly, these findings suggest that cultural values dynamically shape neural representations during the evaluation, rather than the detection, of self-relevant information.

People living in multicultural environments often encounter situations which require them to acquire different cultural schemas and to switch between these cultural schemas depending on their immediate sociocultural context. Prior behavioral studies show that priming cultural schemas reliably impacts mental processes and behavior underlying self-concept. However, less well understood is whether or not cultural priming affects neurobiological mechanisms underlying the self. Here we examined whether priming cultural values of individualism and collectivism in bicultural individuals affects neural activity in cortical midline structures underlying self-relevant processes using functional magnetic resonance imaging. Biculturals primed with individualistic values showed increased activation within medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) and posterior cingulate cortex (PCC) during general relative to contextual self-judgments, whereas biculturals primed with collectivistic values showed increased response within MPFC and PCC during contextual relative to general self-judgments. Moreover, degree of cultural priming was positively correlated with degree of MPFC and PCC activity during culturally congruent self-judgments. These findings illustrate the dynamic influence of culture on neural representations underlying the self and, more broadly, suggest a neurobiological basis by which people acculturate to novel environments.

Individualism and collectivism refer to cultural values that influence how people construe themselves and their relation to the world. Individualists perceive themselves as stable entities, autonomous from other people and their environment, while collectivists view themselves as dynamic entities, continually defined by their social context and relationships. Despite rich understanding of how individualism and collectivism influence social cognition at a behavioral level, little is known about how these cultural values modulate neural representations underlying social cognition. Using cross‐cultural functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we examined whether the cultural values of individualism and collectivism modulate neural activity within medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) during processing of general and contextual self judgments. Here, we show that neural activity within the anterior rostral portion of the MPFC during processing of general and contextual self judgments positively predicts how individualistic or collectivistic a person is across cultures. These results reveal two kinds of neural representations of self (eg, a general self and a contextual self) within MPFC and demonstrate how cultural values of individualism and collectivism shape these neural representations. Hum Brain Mapp, 2009. © 2008 Wiley‐Liss, Inc.

During narrative comprehension, readers understand the emotions of the protagonist by taking the perspective of the character, which is an essential component of empathy. Spatial perspective-taking is crucial to understanding the standpoints and perceptions of others, and gives clues as to what the protagonist knows. As a default, a "here and now" point-of-view is adopted to make sense of the narrative. If the protagonist is in a different location while an event takes place ("there and now"), in order to comprehend the narrative the reader must take an allocentric perspective, which places greater demands on spatial perspective-taking. Utilizing this phenomenon, we evaluated the neural substrates of perspective-taking in emotional narrative comprehension using functional MRI in 18 normal adults. The subjects read short stories followed by a target sentence, which described an event that might evoke an emotional response in the protagonist if the character were present. The stories involved a scenario in which the character was either present at the same location ("here and now") or at a distant location ("there and now") during the event. The "there and now" scenario activated the posterior cingulate cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction more prominently than the "here and now" condition. In contrast to the control tasks, both scenarios activated the well-known mentalizing network including the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex, temporal pole, posterior cingulate cortex and temporo-parietal junction. Along with the mentalizing network, the posterior cingulate cortex and the right temporo-parietal junction are involved in spatial perspective-taking during emotional narrative comprehension.

Lie judgment is an estimation of the speaker's intention to deceive inevitably accompanied by moral judgment. To depict their neural substrates, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study. Eighteen subjects read short stories and made judgments in three different tasks: a control gender judgment task, a moral judgment task, and a lie judgment task. Compared with the control task, both the moral and lie judgment tasks activated the left temporal lobe, the medial prefrontal cortex, the lateral orbitofrontal cortex extending to the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, the caudate nucleus, the left temporo-parietal junction (TPJ), and the right cerebellum. Neural activations were greater in the left middle frontal gyrus, the bilateral TPJ, and the right superior temporal sulcus in the lie judgment condition than in the moral judgment condition. In addition, the left TPJ showed greater activation when a protagonist told lies for anti-social rather than pro-social purposes. These data suggest that the judgment of lies is mediated by the neural substrates of moral judgment (conventionality) and those involved in detecting the intent to deceive (intentionality), and that the left TPJ might play a key role in processing both the conventional and the intentional information involved in the judgment of lying.

Individuals can experience negative emotions (e.g., embarrassment) accompanying self-evaluation immediately after recognizing their own facial image, especially if it deviates strongly from their mental representation of ideals or standards. The aim of this study was to identify the cortical regions involved in self-recognition and self-evaluation along with self-conscious emotions. To increase the range of emotions accompanying self-evaluation, we used facial feedback images chosen from a video recording, some of which deviated significantly from normal images. In total, 19 participants were asked to rate images of their own face (SELF) and those of others (OTHERS) according to how photogenic they appeared to be. After scanning the images, the participants rated how embarrassed they felt upon viewing each face. As the photogenic scores decreased, the embarrassment ratings dramatically increased for the participant's own face compared with those of others. The SELF versus OTHERS contrast significantly increased the activation of the right prefrontal cortex, bilateral insular cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, and bilateral occipital cortex. Within the right prefrontal cortex, activity in the right precentral gyrus reflected the trait of awareness of observable aspects of the self; this provided strong evidence that the right precentral gyrus is specifically involved in self-face recognition. By contrast, activity in the anterior region, which is located in the right middle inferior frontal gyrus, was modulated by the extent of embarrassment. This finding suggests that the right middle inferior frontal gyrus is engaged in self-evaluation preceded by self-face recognition based on the relevance to a standard self.

Research on neural basis of inhibitory control has been extensively conducted in various parts of the world. It is often implicitly assumed that neural basis of inhibitory control is universally similar across cultures. Here, we investigated the extent to which culture modulated inhibitory-control brain activity at both cultural-group and cultural-value levels of analysis. During fMRI scanning, participants from different cultural groups (including Caucasian-Americans and Japanese-Americans living in the United States and native Japanese living in Japan) performed a Go/No-Go task. They also completed behavioral surveys assessing cultural values of behavioral consistency, or the extent to which one's behaviors in daily life are consistent across situations. Across participants, the Go/No-Go task elicited stronger neural activity in several inhibitory-control areas, such as the inferior frontal gyrus (IFG) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). Importantly, at the cultural-group level, we found variation in left IFG (L-IFG) activity that was explained by a cultural region where participants lived in (as opposed to race). Specifically, L-IFG activity was stronger for native Japanese compared to Caucasian- and Japanese-Americans, while there was no systematic difference in L-IFG activity between Japanese- and Caucasian-Americans. At the cultural-value level, we found that participants who valued being "themselves" across situations (i.e., having high endorsement of behavioral consistency) elicited stronger rostral ACC activity during the Go/No-Go task. Altogether, our findings provide novel insight into how culture modulates the neural basis of inhibitory control.

Interpersonal pain perception is a fundamental and evolutionarily beneficial social process. While critical for navigating the social world, whether or not people rely on similar processes to perceive and respond to the harm of the non-human biological world remains largely unknown. Here we investigate whether neural reactivity toward the suffering of other people is distinct from or overlapping with the neural response to pain and harm inflicted upon non-human entities, specifically animals and nature. We used fMRI to measure neural activity while participants (n=15) perceived and reported how badly they felt for the pain or harm of humans, animals, and nature, relative to neutral situations. Neural regions associated with perceiving the pain of other people (e.g. dorsal anterior cingulate cortex, bilateral anterior insula) were similarly recruited when perceiving and responding to painful scenes across people, animals, and nature. These results suggest that similar brain responses are relied upon when perceiving the harm of social and non-social biological entities, broadly construed, and that activity within the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and bilateral anterior insula in response to pain-relevant stimuli is not uniquely specific to humans.

Although psychological and computational models of time estimation have postulated the existence of neural representations tuned for specific durations, empirical evidence of this notion has been lacking. Here, using a functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) adaptation paradigm, we show that the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) (corresponding to the supramarginal gyrus) exhibited reduction in neural activity due to adaptation when a visual stimulus of the same duration was repeatedly presented. Adaptation was strongest when stimuli of identical durations were repeated, and it gradually decreased as the difference between the reference and test durations increased. This tuning property generalized across a broad range of durations, indicating the presence of general time-representation mechanisms in the IPL. Furthermore, adaptation was observed irrespective of the subject’s attention to time. Repetition of a nontemporal aspect of the stimulus (i.e., shape) did not produce neural adaptation in the IPL. These results provide neural evidence for duration-tuned representations in the human brain., A series of functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) adaptation experiments provide empirical evidence for the existence of neural populations in the human inferior parietal lobule that are tuned to specific durations of time., Author Summary The human brain has the ability to estimate the passage of time, which allows us to perform complex cognitive tasks such as playing music, dancing, and understanding speech. Scientists have just begun to understand which brain areas become active when we estimate time. However, it still remains a mystery how exactly the information about time is represented in the brain. In this study, we hypothesized that time might be represented by neurons that are specifically tuned to a specific duration, as has been known for simple visual features such as the orientation and the motion direction in the visual cortex. To test this idea, we performed multiple functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) adaptation experiments in which we sought evidence of neuronal adaptation, that is, a reduction in the responsiveness of neurons to repeated presentations of similar durations. Our experiments revealed that the level of brain activity in the right inferior parietal lobule (IPL) was strongly reduced when a stimulus of the same duration was repeatedly presented. This finding was reproduced for a range of subsecond durations. Our results indicate that neurons in the human IPL are tuned to specific preferred durations.

Human memory is often inaccurate. Similar to words and figures, new faces are often recognized as seen or studied items in long- and short-term memory tests; however, the neural mechanisms underlying this false memory remain elusive. In a previous fMRI study using morphed faces and a standard false memory paradigm, we found that there was a U-shaped response curve of the amygdala to old, new, and lure items. This indicates that the amygdala is more active in response to items that are salient (hit and correct rejection) compared to items that are less salient (false alarm), in terms of memory retrieval. In the present fMRI study, we determined whether the false memory for faces occurs within the short-term memory range (a few seconds), and assessed which neural correlates are involved in veridical and illusory memories. Nineteen healthy participants were scanned by 3T MRI during a short-term memory task using morphed faces. The behavioral results indicated that the occurrence of false memories was within the short-term range. We found that the amygdala displayed a U-shaped response curve to memory items, similar to those observed in our previous study. These results suggest that the amygdala plays a common role in both long- and short-term false memory for faces. We made the following conclusions: First, the amygdala is involved in detecting the saliency of items, in addition to fear, and supports goal-oriented behavior by modulating memory. Second, amygdala activity and response time might be related with a subject's response criterion for similar faces.

The high-dose, alcohol-induced influences on risk perception and loss aversion depend on sex. On the other hand, low-dose alcohol has less effect on risky behavior. However, the effect of low-dose alcohol on subjective valuation of gain or loss and also the effect of placebo (expectancy of alcohol) on risk perception have not been fully investigated. We investigated the effects of low-dose alcohol (0.02 g/100 ml blood alcohol concentration) and placebo effects on subjective risk perception and subjective valuation of uncertain gain and loss in females and males. Participants in the control group and the placebo group were served alcohol-free, wine-flavored beverage and participants of alcohol group were served wine (14% alcohol). The placebo group was not informed that the drink was not alcohol but the control group was informed. Then paper-pencil tasks for subjective risk perception and valuation of gain or loss were performed 45 min after drinking the beverage. The participants were asked to draw the line on a 180 mm scale for each question. The placebo effects as well as the low-dose alcohol effects were observed in subjective valuations of gain or loss. Except for effect of beverages, a gender difference was also observed for subjective likelihood. The females estimated a low-probability loss as more likely and estimated a high-probability gain as less likely than did the males. From the Stevens' law fitting analysis, the placebo, not alcohol, significantly induced the psychophysical effect of the subjective valuation of gain or loss. These results indicate that the psychological effects of expectancy of alcohol (placebo) could be a major factor in changing the subjective valuation of gain or loss over the pharmacological effects of a small amount of alcohol (like a glass of wine). Furthermore, these results also indicate that gender differences should be taken into account when investigating pharmacological or psychological effect on decision-making.

Cultures vary in the extent to which they emphasize group members to habitually attend to the needs, perspectives, and internal experiences of others compared to the self. Here we examined the influence that collectivistic and individualistic cultural environments may play on the engagement of the neurobiological processes that underlie the perception and processing of emotional pain. Using cross-cultural fMRI, Korean and Caucasian-American participants passively viewed scenes of others in situations of emotional pain and distress. Regression analyses revealed that the value of other-focusedness was associated with heightened neural response within the affective pain matrix (i.e. anterior cingulate cortex and insula) to a greater extent for Korean relative to Caucasian-American participants. These findings suggest that mindsets promoting attunement to the subjective experience of others may be especially critical for pain-related and potentially empathic processing within collectivistic relative to individualistic cultural environments.

The recognition of threatening faces is important for making social judgments. For example, threatening facial features of defendants could affect the decisions of jurors during a trial. Previous neuroimaging studies using faces of members of the general public have identified a pivotal role of the amygdala in perceiving threat. This functional magnetic resonance imaging study used face photographs of male prisoners who had been convicted of first-degree murder (MUR) as threatening facial stimuli. We compared the subjective ratings of MUR faces with those of control (CON) faces and examined how they were related to brain activation, particularly, the modulation of the functional connectivity between the amygdala and other brain regions. The MUR faces were perceived to be more threatening than the CON faces. The bilateral amygdala was shown to respond to both MUR and CON faces, but subtraction analysis revealed no significant difference between the two. Functional connectivity analysis indicated that the extent of connectivity between the left amygdala and the face-related regions (i.e. the superior temporal sulcus, inferior temporal gyrus and fusiform gyrus) was correlated with the subjective threat rating for the faces. We have demonstrated that the functional connectivity is modulated by vigilance for threatening facial features.

We often mistake an unknown person for a familiar person because of the similarities in facial features. This phenomenon, known as false memory, has been investigated mainly using words, pictures, and shapes. Previous neuroimaging studies on false memory have shown that both true and false memories trigger a similar activation in the medial temporal lobe, suggesting that it plays a common role in both. However, no study to date has investigated neural substrates of false memories for faces. In the present fMRI study, we applied a modified version of the standard false memory paradigm, using morphed pictures of faces, to induce false memory in an MRI environment. We found that activity in the amygdala and orbital cortices was associated with the degree of familiarity of items. In particular, false responses to “lure” items evoked a level of activity in the amygdala between that evoked for correct or incorrect responses to “true” items. This indicates a possible role of the amygdala in false memory. A specific region in the anterior cingulate cortex was involved in false recognition; the activity being correlated to reaction times for the response types. These results suggest that the amygdala is involved in determining the relevance of items; therefore, ambiguousness of lure items in terms of familiarity and novelty may be related to decreased activity in the amygdala. The anterior cingulate activity in false memory may be caused not only by increased effort and motor demand but also by higher mnemonic processing of lure items.

Growing evidence suggests that autistic traits, such as reduced social and communication skills, exist along a continuum between healthy and pathological conditions. Thus, functional and structural investigations of neuroanatomical substrates that significantly correlate with autistic tendency in healthy human subjects are critical for understanding this disorder. To accomplish this goal, we performed functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in combination with diffusion tensor imaging (DTI) in 30 healthy young subjects. The subjects were evaluated using the Autistic-Spectrum Quotient (AQ), which was designed to measure autistic traits in healthy and autistic spectrum disorder (ASD) subjects. Face-specific brain activation in the superior temporal sulcus (STS) and amygdala (AMG) was identified using fMRI and passive viewing of faces. In addition, probabilistic tractography performed in each subject by using DTI showed a white matter pathway between the face-specific regions of interest in the STS and AMG. The volume of connectivity between the STS and AMG correlated positively with the total AQ score (Spearman's ρ=0.38, p

Face representation, which is believed to be processed in the temporal visual pathway, has been extensively investigated in humans and monkeys through neuroimaging and electroneurophysiology. Lesion studies in monkeys indicate that simple facial features are processed in the caudal regions, and that the combined and integrated features of the face are stored in the perirhinal cortex (PRC). However, this hypothesis still lacks experimental evidence in normal human subjects; therefore, we conducted 2 functional magnetic resonance imaging experiments to investigate whether the function of the PRC differs from that of conventional face-related areas during face recognition tests. In experiment 1, normal subjects learned 6 facial identity–figure associations before scanning, and their brain activity was measured during recognition testing of correct and incorrect face–figure pairs in 3 different angles. The degree of activation in the PRC differed among the facial angles, and activation in response to frontal views was greater than that to other views. In experiment 2, where face angle, but not identity, was paired with an abstract figure, activation was significantly greater in response to the frontal view than that to other views. In contrast, the degree of activation in conventional face-related areas, i.e., the fusiform gyrus, did not differ among viewing angles in both experiments. The results indicate that the function of face representation in the PRC differs from that in the conventional face-related areas, and that a frontal view of the face plays a role in the activation of face representation stored in the PRC.

Cultures vary in the extent to which people prefer social hierarchical or egalitarian relations between individuals and groups. Here we examined the effect of cultural variation in preference for social hierarchy on the neural basis of intergroup empathy. Using cross-cultural neuroimaging, we measured neural responses while Korean and American participants observed scenes of racial ingroup and outgroup members in emotional pain. Compared to Caucasian-American participants, Korean participants reported experiencing greater empathy and elicited stronger activity in the left temporo-parietal junction (L-TPJ), a region previously associated with mental state inference, for ingroup compared to outgroup members. Furthermore, preferential reactivity within this region to the pain of ingroup relative to outgroup members was associated with greater preference for social hierarchy and ingroup biases in empathy. Together, these results suggest that cultural variation in preference for social hierarchy leads to cultural variation in ingroup-preferences in empathy, due to increased engagement of brain regions associated with representing and inferring the mental states of others.

To investigate the neural substrates of the perception of audiovisual speech, we conducted a functional magnetic resonance imaging study with 28 normal volunteers. We hypothesized that the constraint provided by visually-presented articulatory speech (mouth movements) would lessen the workload for speech identification if the two were concordant, but would increase the workload if the two were discordant. In auditory attention sessions, subjects were required to identify vowels based on auditory speech. Auditory vowel stimuli were presented with concordant or discordant visible articulation movements, unrelated lip movements, and without visual input. In visual attention sessions, subjects were required to identify vowels based on the visually-presented vowel articulation movements. The movements were presented with concordant or discordant uttered vowels and noise, and without sound. Irrespective of the attended modality, concordant conditions significantly shortened the reaction time, whereas discordant conditions lengthened the reaction time. Within the neural substrates that were commonly activated by auditory and visual tasks, the mid superior temporal sulcus showed greater activity for discordant stimuli than concordant stimuli. These findings suggest that the mid superior temporal sulcus plays an important role in the auditory-visual integration process underlying vowel identification.

This is the first functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study to investigate the hemodynamic response related to somatosensory spatial discrimination, so-called two-point discrimination. During scanning, we examined two discrimination tasks using four types of electrical stimuli applied to one or two points with strong or weak intensity on the right and left forearm, respectively. In the two-point discrimination task (TPD), subjects reported whether they thought the stimulus was applied to one point or two. In the intensity discrimination task (ID), subjects were required to judge whether the stimulus was strong or weak. In each task, they pressed a button to report their choice. Comparing TPD with the control, we found activated regions in the inferior parietal lobule (IPL) around the supramarginal gyrus (SMG) (Brodmann's area 40) and anterior cingulate cortex (ACC). These areas were significantly activated irrespective of the forearm stimulated. Comparing ID with the control, there were no significantly activated regions. By comparing the TPD and ID, we identified that the left IPL was significantly activated, specifically in TPD, irrespective of the forearm stimulated. In contrast, there were no significantly activated regions in the ID task. Therefore, the left IPL is considered to play an important role in two-point discrimination.

The left-hand advantage seen during tactile discrimination tasks suggests hemispheric-processing asymmetry, although its neural substrates are not well known. We used functional magnetic resonance imaging to evaluate the laterality of the neural substrates involved in tactile discrimination in 19 normal volunteers. Passive tactile discrimination tasks, along with appropriate control tasks, were performed with both the right and left hands to evaluate the effects of the hand used and hemispheric effects (i.e., laterality of the activation pattern). Regardless of the hand used, the right dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, posterior parietal cortex, pre-supplementary motor area, and rostral portion of the dorsal premotor cortex (PMdr) were activated asymmetrically during tactile discrimination. This confirms the previous finding of a right-sided asymmetry for tactile shape discrimination. Hand effects were found in the left caudal portion of PMd (PMdc) adjacent to the central sulcus, which showed prominent activation during right-handed but not left-handed discrimination tasks. This asymmetric activation in the left PMdc might be related to the asymmetric interhemispheric interaction during right-handed tactile discrimination.