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Previously, we demonstrated that in young adults, briefly thinking of (i.e., refreshing) a just-seen word impairs immediate (100-ms delay) perceptual processing of the word, relative to words seen but not refreshed. We suggested that such reflective-induced inhibition biases attention toward new information. Here, we investigated whether reduced accessibility of refreshed targets dissipates with a longer delay and whether older adults would show a smaller and/or delayed effect compared with young adults. Young adult and older adult participants saw 2 words, followed by a cue to refresh one of these words. After either a 100-ms or 500-ms delay, participants read a word that was the refreshed word (refreshed probe), the nonrefreshed word (nonrefreshed probe), or a new word (novel probe). Young adults were slower to read refreshed probes than nonrefreshed probes at the 100-ms, but not the 500-ms, delay. Conversely, older adults were slower to read refreshed probes than nonrefreshed probes at the 500-ms, but not the 100-ms, delay. The delayed slowing of responses to refreshed probes was primarily observed in older-old adults (75+ years). A delay in suppressing the target of refreshing may disrupt the fluidity with which attention can be shifted to a new target. Importantly, a long-term memory benefit of refreshing was observed for both ages and delays. These results suggest that a full characterization of age-related memory deficits should consider the time course of effects and how specific component cognitive processes affect both working and long-term memory. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Using the self as a reference point at encoding produces a memory advantage over other types of encoding activities. Even simply co-presenting a target item with self-relevant versus other-relevant information can produce an "incidental" self-memory advantage in the absence of any explicit task demand to evaluate the item's self-relevancy. In the present study, we asked whether an incidental self-memory advantage results from (a) the mere co-presentation of a target item with self-relevant information at encoding or (b) relational processing between a target item and self-relevant information at encoding. During incidental encoding, words were presented in two different colors either above or below a name (the participant's own or another person's). Participants judged either the location of each word in relation to the name ("Is the word above or below the name?") or the color of each word to which the name had no relevance ("Is the word in red or green?"). In a subsequent memory test, we found a self-memory advantage for both items and their associated source features in the location judgment task but not in the color judgment task. Our findings show that a memory advantage for a target item presented with self-relevant versus other-relevant information is more likely when a task agenda places, via relational processing demands, the self-relevant/other-relevant information in the focus of attention along with the target item. Potential processes that mediate this attention-dependent effect are discussed.

Face attractiveness can influence memory for previously seen faces. This effect has been shown to differ for young and older perceivers. Two parallel studies examined the moderation of both the age of the face and the age of the perceiver on the relationship between facial attractiveness and face memory. Study 1 comprised 29 young and 31 older participants; Study 2 comprised 25 young and 24 older participants. In both studies, participants completed an incidental face encoding and a surprise old/new recognition test with young and older faces that varied in face attractiveness. Face attractiveness affected memory for young but not older faces. In addition, young but not older perceivers showed a linear effect of facial attractiveness on memory for young faces, while both young and older perceivers showed a quadratic effect on memory for young faces. These findings extend previous work by demonstrating that the effect of facial attractiveness on face memory is a function of both the age of the perceiver and the age of the face. Factors that could account for such moderations of face and perceiver age on the associations between face attractiveness and face memory are discussed (e.g., age differences in social goals and face similarity/distinctiveness).

A central question for cognitive neuroscience is how feature-combinations that give rise to episodic/source memories are encoded in the brain. Although there is much evidence that the hippocampus (HIP) is involved in feature binding, and some evidence that other brain regions are as well, there is relatively little evidence about the nature of the resulting representations in different brain regions. We used multivoxel pattern analysis (MVPA) to investigate how feature combinations might be represented, contrasting two possibilities, feature-based versus holistic. Participants viewed stimuli that were composed of three source features - a person (face or body), a scene (indoor or outdoor), and an object (bike or luggage) - which were combined to make eight unique stimulus identities. We reasoned that regions that can classify the eight identities (a multiclass classification) but not the individual features (a binary classification) likely have a holistic representation of each identity. In contrast, regions that can classify the eight identities and can classify each feature are likely to contain feature-based representations of these identities. To further probe the extent of feature-based or holistic classification in each region, we developed and validated a novel approach that directly compares binary and multiclass classification. We found clear evidence for holistic representation in the parahippocampal cortex (PHC), consistent with theories that posit that pattern-separation-like binding mechanisms are not unique to the HIP. Further clarifying the mechanisms of feature binding should benefit from systematic comparisons of multi-feature representations and whether they vary with task, type of stimulus, and/or experience.

This study assessed children's preference, giving, and memory to investigate the impact of social information over time. We compared 5- and 6-year-olds' (N = 144) immediate or delayed responses to an individual who does or does not share their toy preference (similar vs. dissimilar) or an individual who treats others kindly or poorly (nice vs. mean). Immediately, children all preferred the similar or nice characters but gave more stickers to the similar character. This strong initial effect of similarity was not evident after 1 week; children's preference, giving, and memory reflected a greater long-term impact of niceness than similarity. These findings highlight the importance of using multiple features and measures to elucidate children's evolving views about others. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Refreshing is the component cognitive process of directing reflective attention to one of several active mental representations. Previous studies using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) suggested that refresh tasks involve a component process of initiating refreshing as well as the top-down modulation of representational regions central to refreshing. However, those studies were limited by fMRI’s low temporal resolution. In the present study, we used electroencephalography (EEG) to examine the timecourse of refreshing on the scale of milliseconds rather than seconds. Event-related potential (ERP) analyses showed that a typical refresh task does have a distinct electrophysiological response as compared to a control condition, and includes at least two main temporal components: an earlier (~400ms) positive peak reminiscent of a P3 response, and a later (~800ms–1400ms) sustained positivity over several sites reminiscent of the late directing attention positivity (LDAP). Overall, the evoked potentials for refreshing representations from three different visual categories (faces, scenes, words) were similar, but multivariate pattern analysis (MVPA) showed that some category information was nonetheless present in the EEG signal. When related to previous fMRI studies, these results are consistent with a two-phase model, with the first phase dominated by frontal control signals involved in initiating refreshing and the second by the top-down modulation of posterior perceptual cortical areas that constitutes refreshing a representation. This study also lays the foundation for future studies of the neural correlates of reflective attention at a finer temporal resolution than is possible using fMRI.

Although children's initial perceptions and judgments about sociomoral situations are being actively explored, little is known about what children remember about them. In four experiments testing over 400 children, we investigated children's memories for small acts of giving and taking. When asked to recall their own giving and taking, children were relatively accurate following a number of delays. In contrast, when asked to recall a child's giving or taking, children exaggerated the child's taking after a 1-day or 1-week delay. Notably, this pattern of misremembering occurred only when children recalled the actions of a child but not an adult. We consider the idea that children spontaneously engage in social comparison, which colors their memories of the social world.

Within a week of the attack of September 11, 2001, a consortium of researchers from across the United States distributed a survey asking about the circumstances in which respondents learned of the attack (their flashbulb memories) and the facts about the attack itself (their event memories). Follow-up surveys were distributed 11, 25, and 119 months after the attack. The study, therefore, examines retention of flashbulb memories and event memories at a substantially longer retention interval than any previous study using a test-retest methodology, allowing for the study of such memories over the long term. There was rapid forgetting of both flashbulb and event memories within the first year, but the forgetting curves leveled off after that, not significantly changing even after a 10-year delay. Despite the initial rapid forgetting, confidence remained high throughout the 10-year period. Five putative factors affecting flashbulb memory consistency and event memory accuracy were examined: (a) attention to media, (b) the amount of discussion, (c) residency, (d) personal loss and/or inconvenience, and (e) emotional intensity. After 10 years, none of these factors predicted flashbulb memory consistency; media attention and ensuing conversation predicted event memory accuracy. Inconsistent flashbulb memories were more likely to be repeated rather than corrected over the 10-year period; inaccurate event memories, however, were more likely to be corrected. The findings suggest that even traumatic memories and those implicated in a community's collective identity may be inconsistent over time and these inconsistencies can persist without the corrective force of external influences.

Decades of research suggest that encoding information with respect to the self improves memory (self-reference effect, SRE) for items (item SRE). The current study focused on how processing information in reference to the self affects source memory for whether an item was self-referentially processed (a source SRE). Participants self-referentially or non-self-referentially encoded words (Experiment 1) or pictures (Experiment 2) that varied in valence (positive, negative, neutral). Relative to non-self-referential processing, self-referential processing enhanced item recognition for all stimulus types (an item SRE), but it only enhanced source memory for positive words (a source SRE). In fact, source memory for negative and neutral pictures was worse for items processed self-referentially than non-self-referentially. Together, the results suggest that item SRE and source SRE (e.g., remembering an item was encoded self-referentially) are not necessarily the same across stimulus types (e.g., words, pictures; positive, negative). While an item SRE may depend on the overall likelihood the item generates any association, the enhancing effects of self-referential processing on source memory for self-referential encoding may depend on how embedded a stimulus becomes in one's self-schema, and that depends, in part, on the stimulus' valence and format. Self-relevance ratings during encoding provide converging evidence for this interpretation.

Using functional MRI, we investigated reality monitoring for auditory information. During scanning, healthy young adults heard words in another person’s voice and imagined hearing other words in that same voice. Later, outside the scanner, participants judged words as “heard,” “imagined,” or “new.” An area of left middle frontal gyrus (Brodmann’s area, or BA, 6) was more active at encoding for imagined items subsequently correctly called “imagined” than for items incorrectly called “heard.” An area of left inferior frontal gyrus (BA 45, 44) was more active at encoding for items subsequently called “heard” than “imagined,” regardless of the actual source of the item. Scores on an Auditory Hallucination Experience Scale were positively related to activity in superior temporal gyrus (BA 22) for imagined words incorrectly called “heard.” We suggest that activity in these areas reflects cognitive operations information (middle frontal gyrus) and semantic and perceptual detail (inferior frontal gyrus and superior temporal gyrus, respectively) used to make reality-monitoring attributions.

The concept of extended self refers to the idea that people incorporate self-relevant others or objects into one’s sense of self. Initial neural support for the notion of extended self was provided by fMRI evidence that medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC) showed greater activation while people imagined objects belonging to them compared with someone else (Kim & Johnson, 2012). This study investigated whether self-associated objects (i.e. ‘mine’) subsequently engage MPFC spontaneously when a task does not require explicit self-referential judgments. During fMRI scanning, participants detected ‘oddballs’ (objects with a specific frame color) intermixed with objects participants had previously imagined belonging to them or to someone else and previously unseen non-oddball objects. There was greater activity in MPFC and posterior cingulate cortex for those ‘self-owned’ objects that participants were more successful at imagining owning compared with ‘other-owned’ objects. In addition, change in object preference following the ownership manipulation (a mere ownership effect) was predicted by activity in MPFC. Overall, these results provide neural evidence for the idea that personally relevant external stimuli may be incorporated into one’s sense of self.

Perceptual processing of a target stimulus may be inhibited if its location has just been cued, a phenomenon of spatial attention known as inhibition of return (IOR). In the research reported here, we demonstrated a striking effect, wherein items that have just been the focus of reflective attention (internal attention to an active representation) also are inhibited. Participants saw two items, followed by a cue to think back to (i.e., refresh, or direct reflective attention toward) one item, and then had to identify either the refreshed item, the unrefreshed item, or a novel item. Responses were significantly slower for refreshed items than for unrefreshed items, although refreshed items were better remembered on a later memory test. Control experiments in which we replaced the refresh event with a second presentation of one of the words did not show similar effects. These results suggest that reflective attention can produce an inhibition effect for attended items that may be analogous to IOR effects in perceptual attention.

When children's self-interests are at odds with their moral considerations, what do they do? In the current study of 5- and 6-year-olds (N=160), we asked (a) whether children would select the offering of a do-gooder over a neutral individual at a personal cost, (b) whether they would reject the offering of a wrongdoer over a neutral individual at a personal cost, and (c) whether these two types of decisions involve comparable levels of conflict. In the absence of material considerations, children preferred a nice character to a neutral one, but this preference was easily overcome for material gain; children accepted a larger offering from a neutral source over a smaller offering from a nice source. In contrast, children's aversion to negative characters was largely unaffected by the same material consideration; they rejected a larger offering from a mean source in favor of a smaller offering from a neutral source. In addition, children's response times indicated that deciding whether or not to "sell out" to a wrongdoer for personal gain engenders conflict but that deciding whether to take a lesser gain from a do-gooder does not. These findings indicate that children weigh both their own material interests and others' social behaviors when selecting social partners and, importantly, that an aversion to wrongdoers is a more powerful influence on these choices than an attraction to do-gooders.

Reality monitoring refers to processes involved in distinguishing internally generated information from information presented in the external world, an activity thought to be based, in part, on assessment of activated features such as the amount and type of cognitive operations and perceptual content. Impairment in reality monitoring has been implicated in symptoms of mental illness and associated more widely with the occurrence of anomalous perceptions as well as false memories and beliefs. In the present experiment, the cognitive mechanisms of reality monitoring were probed in healthy individuals using a task that investigated the effects of stimulus modality (auditory vs visual) and the type of action undertaken during encoding (thought vs speech) on subsequent source memory. There was reduced source accuracy for auditory stimuli compared with visual, and when encoding was accompanied by thought as opposed to speech, and a greater rate of externalization than internalization errors that was stable across factors. Interpreted within the source monitoring framework (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993), the results are consistent with the greater prevalence of clinically observed auditory than visual reality discrimination failures. The significance of these findings is discussed in light of theories of hallucinations, delusions and confabulation.

In the present study, we explored how item repetition affects source memory for new item-feature associations (picture-location or picture-color). We presented line drawings varying numbers of times in Phase 1. In Phase 2, each drawing was presented once with a critical new feature. In Phase 3, we tested memory for the new source feature of each item from Phase 2. Experiments 1 and 2 demonstrated and replicated the negative effects of item repetition on incidental source memory. Prior item repetition also had a negative effect on source memory when different source dimensions were used in Phases 1 and 2 (Experiment 3) and when participants were explicitly instructed to learn source information in Phase 2 (Experiments 4 and 5). Importantly, when the order between Phases 1 and 2 was reversed, such that item repetition occurred after the encoding of critical item-source combinations, item repetition no longer affected source memory (Experiment 6). Overall, our findings did not support predictions based on item predifferentiation, within-dimension source interference, or general interference from multiple traces of an item. Rather, the findings were consistent with the idea that prior item repetition reduces attention to subsequent presentations of the item, decreasing the likelihood that critical item-source associations will be encoded.

We investigated how age of faces and emotion expressed in faces affect young (n = 30) and older (n = 20) adults’ visual inspection while viewing faces and judging their expressions. Overall, expression identification was better for young than older faces, suggesting that interpreting expressions in young faces is easier than in older faces, even for older participants. Moreover, there were age-group differences in misattributions of expressions, in that young participants were more likely to label disgusted faces as angry, whereas older adults were more likely to label angry faces as disgusted. In addition to effects of emotion expressed in faces, age of faces affected visual inspection of faces: Both young and older participants spent more time looking at own-age than other-age faces, with longer looking at own-age faces predicting better own-age expression identification. Thus, cues used in expression identification may shift as a function of emotion and age of faces, in interaction with age of participants.

This functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) study examined medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC) activity as young and older participants rated an unknown young and older person, and themselves, on personality characteristics. For both young and older participants, there was greater activation in ventral mPFC (anterior cingulate) when they made judgments about own-age than other-age individuals. Additionally, across target age and participant age, there was greater activity in a more anterior region of ventral mPFC (largely medial frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate) when participants rated others than when they rated themselves. We discuss potential interpretations of these findings in the context of previous results suggesting functional specificity of subregions of ventral mPFC.

Constructing a rich and coherent visual experience involves maintaining visual information that is not perceptually available in the current view. Recent studies suggest that briefly thinking about a stimulus (refreshing) can modulate activity in category-specific visual areas. Here, we tested the nature of such perceptually refreshed representations in the parahippocampal place area (PPA) and retrosplenial cortex (RSC) using fMRI. We asked whether a refreshed representation is specific to a restricted view of a scene, or more view-invariant. Participants saw a panoramic scene and were asked to think back to (refresh) a part of the scene after it disappeared. In some trials, the refresh cue appeared twice on the same side (e.g., refresh left–refresh left), and other trials, the refresh cue appeared on different sides (e.g., refresh left–refresh right). A control condition presented halves of the scene twice on same sides (e.g., perceive left–perceive left) or different sides (e.g., perceive left–perceive right). When scenes were physically repeated, both the PPA and RSC showed greater activation for the different-side repetition than the same-side repetition, suggesting view-specific representations. When participants refreshed scenes, the PPA showed view-specific activity just as in the physical repeat conditions, whereas RSC showed an equal amount of activation for different- and same-side conditions. This finding suggests that in RSC, refreshed representations were not restricted to a specific view of a scene, but extended beyond the target half into the entire scene. Thus, RSC activity associated with refreshing may provide a mechanism for integrating multiple views in the mind.

Recent research has demonstrated top–down attentional modulation of activity in extrastriate category-selective visual areas while stimuli are in view (perceptual attention) and after they are removed from view (reflective attention). Perceptual attention is capable of both enhancing and suppressing activity in category-selective areas relative to a passive viewing baseline. In this study, we demonstrate that a brief, simple act of reflective attention (“refreshing”) is also capable of both enhancing and suppressing activity in some scene-selective areas (the parahippocampal place area [PPA]) but not others (refreshing resulted in enhancement but not in suppression in the middle occipital gyrus [MOG]). This suggests that different category-selective extrastriate areas preferring the same class of stimuli may contribute differentially to reflective processing of one's internal representations of such stimuli.

Self-relevant thought (e.g., rating how characteristic trait adjectives are of self versus others) activates areas of medial cortex including both anterior (medial frontal gyrus and/or anterior cingulate cortex) and posterior (posterior cingulate cortex and/or precuneus) regions (for reviews, see, e.g., Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Macrae, Moran, Heatherton, Banfield, & Kelley, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005; Vogt & Laureys, 2005). Identifying the functional specificity of subregions of medial cortex in self-relevant thought is the focus of current empirical and theoretical work in social-cognitive neuroscience (e.g., Johnson et al., 2006; Schmitz & Johnson, 2007; Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007; for reviews and conceptual discussions, see, e.g., Lieberman, 2007; Mitchell, 2008; Northoff et al., 2006; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004; Olsson & Ochsner, 2008). One approach is to investigate the role(s) of medial cortex when individuals process different motivationally significant personal agendas, such as hopes and aspirations versus duties and obligations (related to a promotion or prevention self-regulatory focus, respectively, Higgins, 1997) (Johnson et al., 2006; Johnson, Nolen-Hoeksema, Mitchell, & Levin, 2008). Such agendas guide our perception, thought, and behavior, and help to define our “self”. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), Johnson et al. (2006) compared young adults’ brain activity associated with thinking about each of these agendas versus thinking about non self-relevant control topics (e.g., shape of USA). Both thinking about hopes and aspirations and thinking about duties and obligations were associated with greater activity than the control condition in an anterior medial region (medial frontal gyrus/anterior cingulate cortex) and a posterior medial region (cingulate cortex/precuneus). This was consistent with previous findings of activity in these areas during self-focused thought (for reviews, see, e.g., Cavanna & Trimble, 2006; Macrae et al., 2004; Northoff et al., 2006; Ochsner et al., 2005; Vogt & Laureys, 2005). In addition, there was a double dissociation. In anterior medial cortex, a more dorsal area (anterior cingulate/dorsomedial frontal gyrus) showed greater activity in both self-relevant conditions (which did not differ) than the control condition, and a more ventral portion of anterior cingulate showed relatively greater activity related to thinking about hopes and aspirations than to thinking about duties and obligations. In posterior medial cortex, a more superior/posterior area (posterior cingulate, cuneus, precuneus) showed greater activity in both self-relevant conditions (which did not differ) than the control condition, and a more inferior/anterior area (lingual gyrus, posterior cingulate, parahippocampus) showed relatively greater activity related to thinking about duties and obligations than hopes and aspirations. This dissociation suggests differential involvement of anterior and posterior medial cortex in self-relevant motivational thinking depending on either the content of such thought or the specific component processes called upon to generate, retrieve, or evaluate such information. Johnson et al. (2006) suggested several hypotheses, including that medial frontal cortex is associated with a more inward-directed self-focus, whereas posterior medial cortex is associated with a more outward-directed, social, or contextual focus when thinking about personal agendas (see, Northoff et al., 2006 for a similar distinction). One way to further investigate the relationship of these areas to the processing of motivationally-relevant information is to examine the pattern of brain activity associated with thinking about such agendas in populations that show reliable behavioral differences in motivational focus. Normal aging is associated with significant changes in motivational orientation. For example, there is evidence suggesting that older adults are more “other” or “outward” focused, whereas young adults are more “self” or “inward” focused in their motivational orientations. Older adults express, for instance, strong concerns for the state of the world and the future of family members and subsequent generations (McAdams & de St. Aubin, 1998) and family members make up a substantial part of their social networks (Antonucci, 2001). In addition, compared to young adults, older adults consider a more restricted range of motivational goals as self-relevant, for example, they focus on fewer, more central, goals and life domains than do young adults (Riediger & Freund, 2006; Staudinger, Freund, Linden, & Maas, 1999). Also, whereas young adults’ goals tend to center on growth and acquisition (e.g., of knowledge or physical health), older adults increasingly focus on maintenance and retention of resources and loss prevention (Ebner, Freund, & Baltes, 2006; Heckhausen, 1997; Ogilvie, Rose, & Heppen, 2001). These behavioral findings suggest that we should find age-group differences in activity in anterior and posterior medial cortex when young and older adults think about personal agendas: relatively greater activity in medial prefrontal cortex in young than older adults, related to an inward self-focus and concern for acquisition, and possibly greater activity in posterior medial cortex in older than younger adults, related to an outward-focus and concern for loss prevention. A recent fMRI study (Gutchess, Kensinger, & Schacter, 2007) did not find age-related differences in medial cortex activity when young and older participants were asked to rate the self-relevance of trait adjectives. Nevertheless, given the behavioral evidence for age-group differences in motivational focus, we would expect age-group differences in medial cortex related to differences in the processing engaged by young and older adults when they are asked to think about more motivationally relevant themes. This would support the idea that these areas are not simply “self regions”, but rather are differentially sensitive to certain types of self-focus or the particular content of self-relevant thought. Thus, the goal of the present study was to assess potential age-group differences in medial prefrontal cortex and medial posterior cortex in self-relevant thinking by examining the pattern of activity of young and older adults as they considered the motivationally significant agendas of hopes and aspirations and duties and obligations.

We explored age-related differences in executive function during selection of a target from among active representations. Refreshing (thinking briefly of a just-activated representation) is an executive process that foregrounds a target relative to other active representations. In a behavioral study, participants saw one or three words, then saw a cue to refresh one of the words, saw one word again and read it, or read a new word. Increasing the number of active representations increased response times (RTs) only in the refresh condition for young adults but increased RTs equally in all conditions for older adults, suggesting that they experienced interference from activated irrelevant information during perception and reflection. Consistent with this interpretation, in a functional magnetic resonance imaging study, young adults showed two areas of the left dorsolateral frontal cortex and a medial area of frontal cortex, including anterior cingulate, that were relatively more sensitive to number of active representations during refresh than read trials; for older adults these areas were equally sensitive to number of active items for refresh and read trials. Young and older adults showed activity associated with refreshing on trials requiring selection in left mid-ventral frontal cortex (an area associated with selection from active representations); older adults also showed activity in left anterior ventral frontal cortex (an area associated with controlled semantic activation). Our results support the hypothesis of an age-related decrease in ability to gate out activated but currently irrelevant information, and are consistent with a dissociation of function between eft mid-ventral and left anterior ventral frontal cortex.

We investigated self-regulatory focus (Higgins, 1997, 1998) as one source of variation in encoding of, and memory for, emotional words. Participants wrote about their hopes and aspirations (promotion focus) or duties and obligations (prevention focus). In a subsequent incidental encoding task during functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), participants evaluated emotional (positive and negative) and neutral words as either good or bad. A surprise memory test followed, outside the scanner. We observed a dissociation in posterior cingulate cortex (PCC), where activity during the evaluation task was greater when words were focus-consistent (positive for the promotion focus group, negative for the prevention focus group). Similarly, activity in a parahippocampal region was related to subsequent memory, but only for focus-consistent words. Given the role of the PCC in self-referential processing and episodic retrieval, and the parahippocampus in memory-related processing, these data suggest that regulatory focus influences which items are preferentially associated with self-referential information in memory. Such preferential processing may help explain why events are remembered differently by different individuals, which subsequently may influence interpersonal interactions.

In studies of autobiographical memory, women typically remember more emotional information than do men. The present study evaluated whether women recall more emotional information than men when the content of an event is controlled. Participants read a script containing emotional and neutral information, under instructions to prepare advice for the characters addressing either interpersonal issues (emotional focus), concrete plans (neutral focus), or with no particular topic suggested (undirected focus). After writing out advice, on a surprise memory test women recalled more emotional information than men in all focus conditions with no deficit in neutral recall. Women recalled more neutral information than men in the neutral focus condition. A measure of emotional sensitivity mediated the gender difference in emotional recall suggesting that memory for emotional information is not solely a function of gender.

Executive functions include processes by which important information (e.g., words, objects, task goals, contextual information) generated via perception or thought can be foregrounded and thereby influence current and subsequent processing. One simple executive process that has the effect of foregrounding information is refreshing ‐ thinking briefly of a just-activated representation. Previous studies (e.g., Johnson et al., 2005) identified refresh-related activity in several areas of left prefrontal cortex (PFC). To further specify the respective functions of these PFC areas in refreshing, in Experiment 1, healthy young adult participants were randomly cued to think of a just previously seen word (refresh) or cued to press a button (act). Compared to simply reading a word, refresh and act conditions resulted in similar levels of activity in left lateral anterior PFC but only refreshing resulted in greater activity in left dorsolateral PFC. In Experiment 2, refreshing was contrasted with a minimal phonological rehearsal condition. Refreshing was associated with activity in left dorsolateral PFC and rehearsing with activity in left ventrolateral PFC. In both experiments, correlations of activity among brain areas suggest different functional connectivity for these processes. Together, these findings provide evidence that (1) left lateral anterior PFC is associated with initiating a non-automatic process, (2) left dorsolateral PFC is associated with foregrounding a specific mental representation, and (3) refreshing and rehearsing are neurally distinguishable processes.

Although older adults often show reduced episodic memory accuracy, their ratings of the subjective vividness of their memories often equal or even exceed those of young adults. Such findings suggest that young and older adults may differentially access and/or weight different kinds of in- formation in making vividness judgments. We examined this idea using multivoxel pattern classification of fMRI data to measure category representations while participants saw and remembered pictures of objects and scenes. Consistent with our hypothesis, there were age-related differences in how cat- egory representations related to the subjective sense of vivid- ness. During remembering, older adults' vividness ratings were more related, relative to young adults' ,t o category rep- resentations in prefrontal cortex. In contrast, young adults' vividness ratings were more related, relative to older adults, to category representations in parietal cortex. In addition, cat- egory representations were more correlated among posterior regions in young than in older adults, whereas correlations between PFC and posterior regions did not differ between the 2 groups. Together, these results are consistent with the idea that young and older adults differentially weight different types of information in assessing subjective vividness of their memories.

The authors examined effects of age-related binding deficits on feature information in false memories for imagined objects (e.g., lollipop) that were similar in shape to seen objects (e.g., magnifying glass). In Experiment 1, location memory for seen objects was lower in older than younger adults and lower still in old-old than young-old adults. Imagined objects, when falsely called seen, were less likely to be attributed to the location of similar seen objects (i.e., congruent attributions) by old-old than young-old adults. In Experiment 2, for younger adults, displaying seen objects for less time (1 s vs. 4 s) reduced both location memory for seen objects and congruent attributions for false memories. Thus, binding deficits may influence the specific content of false memories.

The minimal cognitive operation of thinking of a just-seen stimulus (refreshing) was studied in 24 patients with schizophrenia and 24 normal controls. Verbal response times were measured when participants read a word, read a word immediately again, or refreshed a word just after it was no longer present. Patients showed equal priming as controls in reading a word for the second time and were slower than controls to say a word only in the refresh condition. On a surprise test, participants were asked to recognize the words they had seen previously and to give Remember, Know, or Guess responses according to whether they recognized words on the basis of conscious recollection, familiarity, or guessing. Although patients showed overall poorer recognition memory, the beneficial effect of refreshing on long-term memory accuracy and Remember responses was preserved, whereas they derived less benefit in familiarity from seeing an item twice than from refreshing it. These results suggest that although patients may have some difficulty engaging the refresh process, they show significant long-term memory benefits when induced to do so.

In a study of the neural components of automatic and controlled social evaluation, White participants viewed Black and White faces during event-related functional magnetic resonance imaging. When the faces were presented for 30 ms, activation in the amygdala—a brain region associated with emotion—was greater for Black than for White faces. When the faces were presented for 525 ms, this difference was significantly reduced, and regions of frontal cortex associated with control and regulation showed greater activation for Black than White faces. Furthermore, greater race bias on an indirect behavioral measure was correlated with greater difference in amygdala activation between Black and White faces, and frontal activity predicted a reduction in Black-White differences in amygdala activity from the 30-ms to the 525-ms condition. These results provide evidence for neural distinctions between automatic and more controlled processing of social groups, and suggest that controlled processes may modulate automatic evaluation.

This study investigated feature binding in a working memory task in patients with schizophrenia and in normal controls. Twenty-five patients and 25 controls participated. On each trial, three drawings of familiar objects were presented sequentially, each in a different cell of a 3 x 3 grid. In different blocks of trials, participants remembered either individual features (object and location conditions) or an object and its location (combination condition). The results showed that patients were slower and less accurate than controls under all conditions. Accuracy of both groups was reduced in the combination condition relative to the single-feature conditions, but patients showed disproportionately poorer performance in the combination condition than in the object and location conditions. Thus, patients with schizophrenia exhibit deficits in working memory, particularly when the task requires binding objects to their locations. This finding demonstrates that processes that establish coherent and temporary episodic representations in working memory are impaired in schizophrenia.

Older adults are slower than young adults to think of an item they just saw, that is, to engage or execute (or both) the simple reflective operation of refreshing just-activated information. In addition, they derive less long-term memory benefit from refreshing information. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), we found that relative to young adults, older adults showed reduced refresh-related activity in an area of dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (left middle frontal gyrus, Brodmann's Area 9), but not in other refresh-related areas. This provides strong evidence that a frontal component of the circuit that subserves this basic cognitive process is especially vulnerable to aging. Such a refresh deficit could contribute to poorer performance of older than young adults on a wide range of cognitive tasks.

Neuroimaging evidence is conflicting regarding whether human prefrontal cortex (PFC) shows functional organization by type of processes engaged or type of information processed. Most studies use complex working or long-term memory tasks requiring multiple processes and the combinations of processes recruited for different materials may vary. Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) and simple tasks suggested by a component process approach, we found activity in left PFC when participants thought about (refreshed) a just-seen item and in right PFC when participants noted whether an item had been presented previously. Furthermore, the distribution of activation in left or right PFC varied with type of information. Thus, at the component process level, PFC shows functional organization by both process and type of information.

Well-being and subjective experience of a coherent world depend on our sense of ‘self’ and relations between the self and the environment (e.g. people, objects and ideas). The ventromedial prefrontal cortex (vMPFC) is involved in self-related processing, and disrupted vMPFC activity is associated with disruptions of emotional/social functioning (e.g. depression and autism). Clarifying precise function(s) of vMPFC in self-related processing is an area of active investigation. In this study, we sought to more specifically characterize the function of vMPFC in self-related processing, focusing on two alternative accounts: (i) assignment of positive subjective value to self-related information and (ii) assignment of personal significance to self-related information. During functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), participants imagined owning objects associated with either their perceived ingroup or outgroup. We found that for ingroup-associated objects, vMPFC showed greater activity for objects with increased than decreased post-ownership preference. In contrast, for outgroup-associated objects, vMPFC showed greater activity for objects with decreased than increased post-ownership preference. Our findings support the idea that the function of vMPFC in self-related processing may not be to represent/evaluate the ‘positivity’ or absolute preference of self-related information but to assign personal significance to it based on its meaning/function for the self.

This study reveals that when remembering past decisions, people engage in choice-supportive memory distortion. When asked to make memory attributions of options' features, participants made source-monitoring errors that supported their decisions. They tended to attribute, both correctly and incorrectly, more positive features to the option they had selected than to its competitor. In addition, they sometimes attributed, both correctly and incorrectly, more negative features to the nonselected option. This pattern of distortion may be beneficial to people's general well-being, reducing regret for options not taken. At the same time, it is problematic for memory accuracy, for accountability, and for learning from past experience.

Remembering a past event involves reactivation of distributed patterns of neural activity that represent the features of that event—a process that depends on associative mechanisms supported by medial temporal lobe structures. Although efficient use of memory requires prioritizing those features of a memory that are relevant to current behavioral goals (target features) over features that may be goal-irrelevant (incidental features), there remains ambiguity concerning how this is achieved. We tested the hypothesis that although medial temporal lobe structures may support reactivation of both target and incidental event features, frontoparietal cortex preferentially reactivates those features that match current goals. Here, human participants were cued to remember either the category (face/scene) to which a picture belonged (category trials) or the location (left/right) in which a picture appeared (location trials). Multivoxel pattern analysis of fMRI data were used to measure reactivation of category information as a function of its behavioral relevance (target vs incidental reactivation). In ventral/medial temporal lobe (VMTL) structures, incidental reactivation was as robust as target reactivation. In contrast, frontoparietal cortex exhibited stronger target than incidental reactivation; that is, goal-modulated reactivation. Reactivation was also associated with later memory. Frontoparietal biases toward target reactivation predicted subsequent memory for target features, whereas incidental reactivation in VMTL predicted subsequent memory for nontested features. These findings reveal a striking dissociation between goal-modulated reactivation in frontoparietal cortex and incidental reactivation in VMTL.

Items located within an array were presented to alcoholic Korsakoff and nonalcoholic mixed-etiology amnesics and to alcoholic and normal controls. Recognition memory for the locations of items was tested after incidental and intentional encoding. When equated on item recognition, neither Korsakoff amnesics nor alcoholic controls benefited from intentional, relative to incidental, encoding instructions. Furthermore, Korsakoff amnesics showed neither disproportionately impaired incidental nor intentional location recognition memory relative to alcoholic controls. In contrast, mixed-etiology amnesics profited significantly from intentional location acquisition relative to incidental instructions, and were impaired somewhat in incidental, but not intentional, location memory relative to normal controls. We discuss these data in relation to Mayes' (1992) contextual memory deficit hypothesis and Hirst's (1982) automatic encoding deficit account, and propose an alternative framework in which the location memory deficit observed in mixed-etiology amnesics is interpreted as a disruption to the ability to bind item and location information.

Age constitutes a salient feature of a face and signals group membership. There is evidence of greater attention to and better memory for own-age than other-age faces. However, little is known about the neural and behavioral mechanisms underlying processing differences for own-age vs. other-age faces. Even less is known about the impact of emotion expressed in faces on such own-age effects. Using fMRI, the present study examined brain activity while young and older adult participants identified expressions of neutral, happy, and angry young and older faces. Across facial expressions, medial prefrontal cortex, insula, and (for older participants) amygdala showed greater activity to own-age than other-age faces. These own-age effects in ventral medial prefrontal cortex and insula held for neutral and happy faces, but not for angry faces. This novel and intriguing finding suggests that processing of negative facial emotions under some conditions overrides age-of-face effects.

Age-related source memory deficits may arise, in part, from changes in the agenda-driven processes that control what features of events are relevant during remembering. Using fMRI, we compared young and older adults on tests assessing source memory for format (picture, word) or encoding task (self-, other-referential), as well as on old–new recognition. Behaviorally, relative to old–new recognition, older adults showed disproportionate and equivalent deficits on both source tests compared to young adults. At encoding, both age groups showed expected activation associated with format in posterior visual processing areas, and with task in medial prefrontal cortex. At test, the groups showed similar selective, agenda-related activity in these representational areas. There were, however, marked age differences in the activity of control regions in lateral and medial prefrontal cortex and lateral parietal cortex. Results of correlation analyses were consistent with the idea that young adults had greater trial-by-trial agenda-driven modulation of activity (i.e., greater selectivity) than did older adults in representational regions. Thus, under selective remembering conditions where older adults showed clear differential regional activity in representational areas depending on type of test, they also showed evidence of disrupted frontal and parietal function and reduced item-by-item modulation of test-appropriate features. This pattern of results is consistent with an age-related deficit in the engagement of selective reflective attention.

Why do we lose, or have trouble accessing, an idea that was in the focus of attention only a moment ago, especially in the absence of any apparent distraction? We tested the hypothesis that accessing a single item that is already active is affected by implicit interference (interference of which we have little or no awareness). We presented masked words that were semantically related or unrelated to a single visible target word that participants were cued to think of (refresh) a half second after its offset. Masked related but not unrelated words increased time to refresh the target but did not influence time required to read a target that was physically present. These findings provide novel evidence that an item in the focus of attention is subject to semantic interference. We suggest that such implicit semantic interference may contribute to the common "lost thought" experience and to cognitive deficits in populations in which refreshing is impaired.

The idea of 'extended self' refers to the incorporation of personally relevant external stimuli into one's concept of self. The current study used a transient imagined ownership paradigm to explore brain regions that support the association between self and objects. We hypothesized that incidental associations between self and objects would be manifested by activation in a brain region, medial prefrontal cortex (MPFC), recruited in explicit self-referential processing. We further predicted that a memorial advantage for, and positivity-bias towards, self-relevant objects would be related to activity in MPFC. As anticipated, MPFC showed greater activation when objects were assigned to participants compared to when objects were assigned to another person. Activity in MPFC was also associated with superior subsequent source memory and increased preference for objects assigned to the self. These findings provide neural evidence for the incorporation of self-relevant objects into an extended self, which, in turn, increases their judged value (mere ownership effect).

The ’own-age bias’ in face processing suggests that the age of a face constitutes one important factor that influences attention to and memory for faces. The present experiment investigated electrophysiological correlates of processing faces of younger and older individuals. Younger participants were presented with pictures of unfamiliar younger and older faces in the context of a gender categorization task. A comparison of event-related potentials showed that early components are sensitive to faces of different ages: (i) larger positive potential peaking at 160 ms (P200) for older than younger faces at fronto-central electrodes; (ii) larger negative potential peaking at 252 ms (N200) for younger than older faces at fronto-central electrodes; (iii) larger negative-going deflection peaking at 320 ms (N250) for younger than older faces at occipito-temporal electrodes; and (iv) larger late positive potential peaking at 420 ms (LPP 420) for older than younger faces at parietal and other electrodes. We discuss similarities between the present study and a previously published study of faces of different races as suggesting involvement of comparable electrophysiological responses when differentiating between stimulus categories.

This functional magnetic resonance imaging study presented participants with a face and scene simultaneously on each trial, and assessed the impact of perceptual versus reflective selective attention on activity in parahippocampal place area. Young and older adults showed equivalent activation in parahippocampal place area when cued to attend to the scene when the stimuli were perceptually present and when cued to refresh (briefly think about) the scene after the stimuli were no longer present. The groups also showed equivalent deactivation when cued to attend to the face when the stimuli were perceptually present. However, older adults showed less deactivation than young adults when cued to refresh the face, providing evidence for greater age-related disruption of reflective than perceptual selective attention.

Using functional magnetic resonance imaging, we investigated neural activity associated with self-reflection in depressed [current major depressive episode (MDE)] and healthy control participants, focusing on medial cortex areas previously shown to be associated with self-reflection. Both the MDE and healthy control groups showed greater activity in anterior medial cortex (medial frontal gyrus, anterior cingulate gyrus) when cued to think about hopes and aspirations compared with duties and obligations, and greater activity in posterior medial cortex (precuneus, posterior cingulate) when cued to think about duties and obligations (Experiment 1). However, the MDE group showed less activity than controls in the same area of medial frontal cortex when self-referential cues were more ambiguous with respect to valence (Experiment 2), and less deactivation in a non-self-referential condition in both experiments. Furthermore, individual differences in rumination were positively correlated with activity in both anterior and posterior medial cortex during non-self-referential conditions. These results provide converging evidence for a dissociation of anterior and posterior medial cortex depending on the focus of self-relevant thought. They also provide neural evidence consistent with behavioral findings that depression is associated with disruption of positively valenced thoughts in response to ambiguous cues, and difficulty disengaging from self-reflection when it is appropriate to do so.

We compared two attentional executive processes: updating, which involved attending to a perceptually present stimulus, and refreshing, which involved attending to a mentally active representation of a stimulus no longer perceptually present. In separate blocks, participants either replaced a word being held in working memory with a different word (update), or they thought back to a just previously seen word that was no longer perceptually present (refresh). Bilateral areas of frontal cortex, supplementary motor area, and parietal cortex were similarly active for both updating and refreshing, suggesting that a common network of areas is recruited to bring information to the current focus of attention. In a direct comparison of update and refresh, regions more active for update than refresh included regions primarily in right frontal cortex, as well as bilateral posterior visual processing regions. Regions more active for refresh than update included regions primarily in left dorsolateral frontal and left temporal cortex and bilateral inferior frontal cortex. These findings help account for the similarity in areas activated across different cognitive tasks and may help specify the particular executive processes engaged in more complex tasks.

The neural correlates of the perception of faces from different races were investigated. White participants performed a gender identification task in which Asian, Black, and White faces were presented while event-related potentials (ERPs) were recorded. Participants also completed an implicit association task for Black (IAT-Black) and Asian (IAT-Asian) faces. ERPs evoked by Black and White faces differed, with Black faces evoking a larger positive ERP that peaked at 168 ms over the frontal scalp, and White faces evoking a larger negative ERP that peaked at 244 ms. These Black/White ERP differences significantly correlated with participants' scores on the IAT-Black. ERPs also differentiated White from Asian faces and a significant correlation was obtained between the White-Asian ERP difference waves at approximately 500 ms and the IAT-Asian. A positive ERP at 116 ms over occipital scalp differentiated all three races, but was not correlated with either IAT. In addition, a late positive component (around 592 ms) was greater for the same race compared to either other race faces, suggesting potentially more extended or deeper processing of the same race faces. Taken together, the ERP/IAT correlations observed for both other races indicate the influence of a race-sensitive evaluative process that may include early more automatic and/or implicit processes and relatively later more controlled processes.

We examined the effect of competition on briefly thinking of just-seen items. In Experiment 1, participants saw a set of either three related or three unrelated words and then read one of the words again (repeat) or thought briefly of one of the words (refresh). Participants read the set a second time, after which they either refreshed a second word from the set or read a new word. In comparison with reading a new word, response times were slower for refreshing the second item when participants had just refreshed than when they had just repeated the first item. This increase was larger for related words than for unrelated words and for older adults than for younger adults. In Experiment 2, a negative impact of refreshing was observed when participants repeated a different word from the set. The pattern of findings suggests that the negative impact of refreshing comes from increased competition from the refreshed item, rather than from inhibition of the nonrefreshed items.

Our environment contains regularities distributed in space and time that can be detected by way of statistical learning. This unsupervised learning occurs without intent or awareness, but little is known about how it relates to other types of learning, how it affects perceptual processing, and how quickly it can occur. Here we use fMRI during statistical learning to explore these questions. Participants viewed statistically structured versus unstructured sequences of shapes while performing a task unrelated to the structure. Robust neural responses to statistical structure were observed, and these responses were notable in four ways: First, responses to structure were observed in the striatum and medial temporal lobe, suggesting that statistical learning may be related to other forms of associative learning and relational memory. Second, statistical regularities yielded greater activation in category-specific visual regions (object-selective lateral occipital cortex and word-selective ventral occipito-temporal cortex), demonstrating that these regions are sensitive to information distributed in time. Third, evidence of learning emerged early during familiarization, showing that statistical learning can operate very quickly and with little exposure. Finally, neural signatures of learning were dissociable from subsequent explicit familiarity, suggesting that learning can occur in the absence of awareness. Overall, our findings help elucidate the underlying nature of statistical learning.

A short-term source monitoring procedure with functional magnetic resonance imaging assessed neural activity when participants made judgments about the format of 1 of 4 studied items (picture, word), the encoding task performed (cost, place), or whether an item was old or new. The results support findings from long-term memory studies showing that left anterior ventrolateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) is engaged when people make source attributions about reflectively generated information (cognitive operations, conceptual features). The findings also point to a role for right lateral PFC in attention to perceptual features and/or familiarity in making source decisions. Activity in posterior regions also differed depending on what was evaluated. These results provide neuroimaging evidence for theoretical approaches emphasizing that agendas influence which features are monitored during remembering (e.g., M. K. Johnson, S. Hashtroudi, & D. S. Lindsay, 1993). They also support the hypothesis that some of the activity in left lateral PFC and posterior regions associated with remembering specific information is not unique to long-term memory but rather is associated with agenda-driven source monitoring processes common to working memory and long-term memory.

Cognition constantly involves retrieving and maintaining information that is not perceptually available in the current environment. Studies on visual imagery and working memory suggest that such high-level cognition might, in part, be mediated by the revival of perceptual representations in the inferior temporal cortex. Here, we provide new support for this hypothesis, showing that reflectively accessed information can have similar consequences for subsequent perception as actual perceptual input. Participants were presented with pairs of frames in which a scene could appear, and were required to make a category judgment on the second frame. In the critical condition, a scene was presented in the first frame, but the second frame was blank. Thus, it was necessary to refresh the scene from the first frame in order to make the category judgment. Scenes were then repeated in subsequent trials to measure the effect of refreshing on functional magnetic resonance imaging repetition attenuation—a neural index of memory—in a scene-selective region of the visual cortex. Surprisingly, the refreshed scenes produced equal attenuation as scenes that had been presented twice during encoding, and more attenuation than scenes that had been presented once during encoding, but that were not refreshed. Thus, the top-down revival of a percept had a similar effect on memory as actually seeing the stimulus again. These findings indicate that high-level cognition can activate stimulus-specific representations in the ventral visual cortex, and that such top-down activation, like that from sensory stimulation, produces memorial changes that affect perceptual processing during a later encounter with the stimulus.

Misattribution of remembered information from one source to another is commonly associated with false memories, but we demonstrate that it also may underlie memories that accord with past events. Participants imagined drawings of objects in four different locations. For each, a drawing of a similarly shaped object was seen in the same location, a different location, or not seen. When tested on memory for objects’ origin (seen/ imagined) and location, more false “seen” responses, but also more correct location responses, were given to imagined objects if a similar object had been seen, versus not seen, in the same location. We argue that misattribution of feature information (e.g., shape, location) from seen objects to similar imagined ones increased false memories of seeing objects but also increased correct location memories, provided the misattributed location matched the imagined objects’ location. Thus, consistent with the source-monitoring framework, imperfect source-attribution processes underlie falseand true memories.

Refreshing is a basic reflective component process that can serve to prolong activation of task-relevant information. Neuroimaging work has shown that left middle frontal gyrus (MFG) and supramarginal gyrus (SMG) are selectively engaged during refreshing. Functional MRI (fMRI), however, is not able to determine if these regions are necessary for refreshing. In this experiment, we utilize repetitive transcranial magnetic stimulation (rTMS) to assess the behavioral effect of functionally deactivating these regions. We report a selective slowing of response times (RTs) to refresh words following MFG stimulation, consistent with a role of lateral prefrontal cortex (PFC) in top-down control mechanisms necessary for refreshing. In contrast, SMG stimulation slowed participants in both refreshing and repeating words, indicating a more general role of SMG in verbal processing.