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We assess John Bishop's theory of the nature of Christian faith in God, as most recently expressed in 'Reasonable Faith and Reasonable Fideism', although we dip into other writings as well. We explain several concerns we have about it. However, in the end, our reflections lead us to propose a modified theory, one that avoids our concerns while remaining consonant with some of his guiding thoughts about the nature of Christian faith in God. We also briefly examine three normative issues Bishop's views present. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

According to Wilczewska, theistic faith 'consists of (a) a positive cognitive attitude towards the existence of God - for example, belief that God exists; (b) a positive conative attitude towards the existence of God - for example, desire for God to exist'.[4] Intuitively, faith becomes partial when both of these aspects are present but one or both only to a low degree. Many theistic religions place a high value on faith in God and some traditions regard it as a virtue. Many cases of propositional faith are plausibly interpreted as cases of interpersonal faith in someone and, he argues, the hypothesis that propositional faith just is a species of interpersonal faith would explain both why faith is frequently associated with religion and why it makes sense to ask of someone who has propositional faith whom they have faith in. Moreover, it isn't clear that one can have faith that God exists on Hazlett's view, whether God's existence is contingent or necessary, since in either case it doesn't make sense to have faith in God - or in anyone else - to bring it about that God exists. [Extracted from the article]

What are faith and faithfulness, and how are they related? We consider two views that express very different answers to these questions. On our view, faith and faithfulness are distinct and yet complement each other. Faith is resilient reliance and faithfulness is resilient reliability, both of which involve conative and/or affective elements. In contrast, while Jonathan Kvanvig also holds that faith involves conative and/or affective elements, he identifies faith with a disposition to act in service of an ideal in the face of difficulty. However, this view of faith leads to some puzzling claims about how faith relates to faithfulness. We evaluate several claims suggested by what Kvanvig says, arguing both that his view loses sight of the distinctness of faith and faithfulness and that the inferences he wants to draw from faithfulness or faithful behaviour to faith are unjustified. Instead, we aim to show how the insights he calls to our attention can be better accommodated and explained by a more comprehensive, unified theory of faith and faithfulness and their relations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is faith? Lara Buchak has done as much as anyone recently to answer this question in a sensible and instructive fashion. As it turns out, her writings reveal two theories of faith, an early one and a later one – or two versions of the same one if you like. In what follows, we aim to assess those theories with an eye to highlighting both their good- and bad-making features, marking choice points for theorizing about faith along the way, and defending the choices we make. The result is an alternative theory of faith, one that we hope extends our common pursuit of understanding what faith is. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

How does trust relate to faith? We do not know of a theory-neutral way to answer our question. So, we begin with what we regard as a plausible theory of faith according to which, in slogan form, faith is resilient reliance. Next, we turn to contemporary theories of trust. They are not of one voice. Still, we can use them to indicate ways in which trust and faith might both differ from and resemble each other. This is what we do. Along the way, we evaluate substantive issues related to these possible differences and similarities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Can fictionalists have faith? It all depends on how we disambiguate 'fictionalists' and on what faith is. I consider the matter in light of my own theory. After clarifying its central terms, I distinguish two fictionalists – atheistic and agnostic – and I argue that, even though no atheistic fictionalist can have faith on my theory, agnostic fictionalists arguably can. After rejecting Finlay Malcolm's reasons for thinking this is a problem, I use his paradigmatic agnostic fictionalist as a foil to explore a variety of ways in which to describe agnostic fictionalists, none of whom pose a problem for my theory. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On doxastic theories of propositional faith, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. On nondoxastic theories of propositional faith, it's false that, necessarily, S has faith that p only if S believes that p. In this article, I defend three arguments for nondoxastic theories of faith and I respond to published criticisms of them. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

An introduction is presented in which the editor discusses various reports within the issue on topics including the rationality and importance of faith, the comparison of two religions, and the faith of Jesus in God found in New Testament.

The article presents the response of author's response to criticisms on his stand on philosophy and religion. Particular focus is given on his trilogy, "Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion," "The Wisdom of Doubt: A Justification of Religious Skepticism" and "The Will to Imagine: A Justification of Skeptical Religion." He explains the difference between philosophy of religion and philosophy of science. He considers the thesis about a way of manifesting non-doxastic faith.

In his recent trilogy, J. L. Schellenberg presents a new religious option: to have beliefless faith in a general object of religious concern that he thinks is referenced at the core of most sectarian religions – the axiological, soteriological, and metaphysical ultimate, which I call ‘UUU’. After explaining what UUU is more fully, I argue that the claim that UUU exists should not be, as Schellenberg says, the only focus for philosophy of religion. Still, I argue that such a claim is a good basis for a new form of religion, especially if it is modified in a couple of ways. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

According to J. L. Schellenberg, sceptical faith in the Ultimate is not merely permitted, but is rationally required. It is, all things considered, the response that we should make. In this article, I assess just three of Schellenberg's arguments for this bold conclusion. I explain why I find each of them unpersuasive. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

I discuss some trends in recent philosophy of religion, focusing on J. L. Schellenberg's Prolegomena to a Philosophy of Religion. I pay special attention to Schellenberg's dual emphases on ‘the Ultimate’ as metaphysical object of inquiry and various non-doxastic states (‘faith that’, ‘faith in’) as psychological objects of inquiry. This view is contrasted throughout to what might be called a ‘liturgical’ orientation in philosophy of religion. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article assesses J. L. Schellenberg's account of propositional faith and, in light of that assessment, sketches an alternative that avoids certain objections and coheres better with Schellenberg's aims. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]