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There are different theories that try to give a satisfactory answer to the question of why people should obey the law. One of these proposals is the principle of fair play (or fairness). It says that if a person, who is part of a social cooperation scheme, benefits from the efforts of the other participants he/she is bound to do his part; otherwise, he/she acts unfairly. Several scholars have recognized the value of the principle, but others have demonstrated with good arguments that it has many difficulties to justify a general duty of obedience in complex schemes such as the State. The main objective of the paper is to assess, by using the literature review method, the virtues and weaknesses of the principle of fair play as a theory of political obligation. The obtained conclusion is that this theory could be an appropriate proposal as long as it satisfies some requirements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Traditional accounts of the fair play principle suggest that, under appropriate conditions, those who benefit from the cooperative labor of others acquire an obligation of repayment. However, these accounts have had little to say about the nature of such obligations within morally or legally problematic cooperative schemes, taking the matter to be either straightforward or unimportant. It is neither. The question of what sorts of fair play obligations obtain for those who benefit from illicit cooperative activity is a matter of great complexity and consequence with implications for, inter alia, global economic justice. In this essay, I explore the nature of this obligation within illicit cooperative schemes, specifically those with so-called negative externalities, or deleterious effects on non-members of the scheme. I conclude that the willing beneficiaries of such schemes acquire a fair-play obligation to recognize and respond to their culpability. This reconceptualization of the fair play principle opens up new avenues for exploring the obligations of those who benefit from acts of collective wrongdoing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]