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A large body of evidence supports the existence of a robust handedness difference in episodic memory retrieval, with inconsistent-handedness being associated with superior memory across a wide variety of paradigms, including superior retrieval of lab-based and real world memories. Despite superior episidoc memory in inconsistent-handers, and despite neuroanatomical and neurophysiological differences in cortical regions between inconsistent- and consistent-handers, we are aware of no studies to date that have examined physiological activity in the brains of inconsistent- versus consistent-handers while engaged in memory tasks. The purpose of this paper, therefore, is to present a first look at this issue, using functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) as a simple, non-invasive measure of frontal lobe activity during encoding and recall of list words in inconsistent- and consistent-handers. Behaviourally, we replicated prior studies, finding a significant inconsistent-handed advantage in free recall. Using fNIRS-derived oxygenated haemoglobin (O

Gender differences in autobiographical memory have been widely reported; in this study, those differences were considered with regard to episodic and semantic memory, and encoding and retrieval. Participants reported memory narratives of two events that had occurred within a day of the report. They were re-tested on them 10–13 weeks later. Narratives were content coded for internal and external details, a method meant to reflect episodic and semantic memory, respectively. Results indicate gender differences in internal details at Time 1 that remained stable at Time 2, suggesting that encoding is the more promising approach to understanding gender differences in this domain and showing consistency with previous research and theory. Gender differences in external details were minimal, but implicated encoding when present.

The role of familiarity in associative recognition has been investigated in a number of studies, which have indicated that familiarity can facilitate recognition under certain circumstances. The ability of a pre-experimentally existing common representation to boost the contribution of familiarity has rarely been investigated. In addition, although many studies have investigated the interactions between semantic memory and episodic retrieval, the conditions that influence the presence of specific patterns were unclear. This study aimed to address these two questions. We manipulated the degree of overlap between the two representations using synonym and nonsynonym pairs in an associative recognition task. Results indicated that an increased degree of overlap enhanced recognition performance. The analysis of event-related potentials effects in the test phase showed that synonym pairs elicited both types of old/rearranged effects, whereas nonsynonym pairs elicited a late old/rearranged effect. These results confirmed that a common representation, irrespective of source, was necessary for assuring the presence of familiarity, but a common representation could not distinguish associative recognition depending on familiarity alone. Moreover, our expected double dissociation between familiarity and recollection was absent, which indicated that mode selection may be influenced by the degree of distinctness between old and rearranged pairs rather than the degree of overlap between representations.

There is some debate as to whether responding to objects in our environment improves episodic memory or does not impact it. Some authors claim that actively encoding objects improves their representation in episodic memory. Conversely, episodic memory has also been shown to improve in passive conditions, suggesting that the action itself could interfere with the encoding process. This study looks at the impact of attention and action on episodic memory using a novel what-where-when (WWW) task that includes information about object identity (what) and spatial (where) and temporal (when) properties. With this approach, we studied the episodic memory of 2 types of objects: a target, where attention or an action is defined, and a distractor, an object to be ignored, following 2 selective states: active versus passive selection. When targets were actively selected, we found no evidence of episodic memory enhancement compared to passive selection; instead, memory from irrelevant sources was suppressed. The pattern was replicated across a 2-D static display and a more realistic 3-D virtual environment. This selective attention effect on episodic memory was not observed on nonepisodic measures, demonstrating a link between attention and the encoding of episodic experiences. (PsycINFO Database Record

The goal of this preliminary study was to understand whether the practice of psychoanalysis implies, in the long term, modifications in an individual's structure and working of memory. The starting hypothesis was that psychoanalysts, due to specific aspects of their work, might differ in the memory component known as the “episodic buffer” from age- and education-matched controls. The episodic buffer is a recently theorized subcomponent of working (short-term) memory that binds together information coming from different sources, decodes them, and retains them in a multidimensional store that can be accessed through conscious awareness. Two measures were used: the Prose Memory Test subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale-Revised (a traditional instrument to measure the capacity of the episodic buffer) and a new test specifically built for the present investigation, the Free Associations Sentences Test (FAST). The latter test was meant, besides measuring the capacity of the buffer, to investigate differences in...

There has been a persistent debate about how to define episodic memory and whether it is a uniquely human capacity. On the one hand, many animal cognition studies employ content-based criteria, such as the what-where-when criterion, and argue that nonhuman animals possess episodic memory. On the other hand, many human cognition studies emphasize the subjective experience during retrieval as an essential property of episodic memory and the distinctly human foresight it purportedly enables. We propose that both perspectives may examine distinct but complementary aspects of episodic memory by drawing a conceptual distinction between episodic memory traces and mental time travel. Episodic memory traces are sequential mnemonic representations of particular, personally experienced episodes. Mental time travel draws on these traces, but requires other components to construct scenarios and embed them into larger narratives. Various nonhuman animals may store episodic memory traces, and yet it is possible that only humans are able to construct and reflect on narratives of their lives - and flexibly compare alternative scenarios of the remote future.

Klein's target article argues that autonoetic consciousness is a necessary condition for memory; this unusually narrow view of the scope of memory implies that only episodic memory is, strictly speaking, memory. The narrow view is opposed to the standard broad view, on which causal connection with past experience is sufficient for memory; on the broad view, both declarative (i.e., episodic and semantic) and procedural memory count as genuine forms of memory. Klein mounts a convincing attack on the broad view, arguing that it opens the 'doors of memory' too far, but this commentary contends that the narrow view does not open them far enough. It may be preferable to adopt an intermediate view of the scope of memory, on which causal connection is sufficient for memory only when it involves encoding, storage, and retrieval of content. More demanding than the simple causal condition but less demanding than the autonoesis condition, the encoding-storage-retrieval condition implies that both episodic and semantic memory count as genuine forms of memory but that procedural memory does not.

Whether non-human animals can have episodic memories remains the subject of extensive debate. A number of prominent memory researchers defend the view that animals do not have the same kind of episodic memory as humans do, whereas others argue that some animals have episodic-like memory—i.e., they can remember what, where and when an event happened. Defining what constitutes episodic memory has proven to be difficult. In this paper, I propose a dual systems account and provide evidence for a distinction between event memory and episodic memory. Event memory is a perceptual system that evolved to support adaptive short-term goal processing, whereas episodic memory is based on narratives, which bind event memories into a retrievable whole that is temporally and causally organized around subject’s goals. I argue that carefully distinguishing event memory from episodic memory can help resolve the debate.

Episodic memory is a significant part of cognition for reasoning and decision making. Retrieval in episodic memory depends on the order relationships of memory items which provides flexibility in reasoning and inferences regarding sequential relations for spatio-temporal domain. However, it is still unclear how they are encoded and how they differ from representations in other types of memory like semantic or procedural memory. This paper presents a neural model of sequential representation and inferences on episodic memory. It contrasts with the common views on sequential representation in neural networks that instead of maintaining transitions between events to represent sequences, they are represented as patterns of activation profiles wherein similarity matching operations support inferences and reasoning. Using an extension of multi-channel multi-layered adaptive resonance theory (ART) network, it is shown how episodic memory can be formed and learnt so that the memory performance becomes dependent on the order and the interchange of memory cues. We present experiments as a proof of concepts to show that the model contrasts sequential representations in semantic memory with those in episodic memory and the model can exhibit transitive inferences consistent with human and animals data.

At its core, episodic memory requires the encoding and retention of occurrence information. one needs to remember that a particular item occurred (what) at a particular time (when) in a particular place (where). these task requirements are scale independent, meaning that they hold regardless of whether one is asked to remember over the short or the long term. in the present article, written to honor the contributions of alice Healy, i review evidence suggesting that the benchmark phenomena of short- term memory, including bow- shaped serial position curves, symmetric error gradients, and even our limited memory span, actually arise from processes associated with the recovery of occurrence information. rather than reflecting the properties of a special short- term storage system, these signature empirical patterns are characteristic of remembering over almost any time scale. more generally, i argue that occurrence information can be conceptualized as stored values along largely independent temporal and spatial dimensions. Such a framework provides a useful way of distinguishing between item and order information, although i conclude by suggesting that item memory requires more than simply the recovery of occurrence. mnemonic representations, once accessed, must be interpreted or “recovered” as well.

Colloquially, episodic memory is described as “the memory of personally experienced events”. Even though episodic memory has been studied in psychology and neuroscience for about six decades, there is still great uncertainty as to what episodic memory is. Here we ask how episodic memory should be characterized in order to be validated as a natural kind. We propose to conceive of episodic memory as a knowledge-like state that is identified with an experientially based mnemonic representation of an episode that allows for a mnemonic simulation thereof. We call our analysis the Sequence Analysis of Episodic Memory since episodes will be analyzed in terms of sequences of events. Our philosophical analysis of episodic memory is driven and supported by experimental results from psychology and neuroscience. We discuss selected experimental results that provide exemplary evidence for uniform causal mechanisms underlying the properties of episodic memory and argue that episodic memory is a natural kind. The argumentation proceeds along three cornerstones: First, psychological evidence suggests that a violation of any of the proposed conditions for episodic memory amounts to a deficiency of episodic memory and no form of memory or cognitive process but episodic memory fulfills them. Second, empirical results support a claim that the principal anatomical substrate of episodic memory is the hippocampus. Finally, we can pin down causal mechanisms onto neural activities in the hippocampus to explain the psychological states and processes constituting episodic memory.

International audience; Few studies have investigated the link between episodic memory and presence: the feeling of " being there " and reacting to a stimulus as if it were real. We collected data from 244 participants after they had watched the movie Avengers: Age of Ultron. They answered questions about factual (details of the movie) and temporal memory (order of the scenes) about the movie, as well as their emotion experience and their sense of presence during the projection. Both higher emotion experience and sense of presence were related to better factual memory, but not to temporal order memory. Crucially, the link between emotion and factual memory was mediated by the sense of presence. We interpreted the role of presence as an external absorption of the attentional focus toward the stimulus, thus enhancing memory encoding. Our findings could shed light on the cognitive processes underlying memory impairments in psychiatric conditions characterized by an altered sense of reality. " Virtual Reality is the representation of possible worlds and possible selves, with the aim of making them appear as real as possible—i-deally, by creating a subjective sense of " presence " in the user. Interestingly, some of our best theories of the human mind and conscious experience describe it in a very similar way " Thomas Metzinger, " 2016: What do you consider the most interesting recent scientific news? " Edge.org.

Music represents a special type of reward involving the recruitment of the mesolimbic dopaminergic system. According to recent theories on episodic memory formation, as dopamine strengthens the synaptic potentiation produced by learning, stimuli triggering dopamine release could result in long-term memory improvements. Here, we behaviourally test whether music-related reward responses could modulate episodic memory performance. Thirty participants rated (in terms of arousal, familiarity, emotional valence, and reward) and encoded unfamiliar classical music excerpts. Twenty-four hours later, their episodic memory was tested (old/new recognition and remember/know paradigm). Results revealed an influence of music-related reward responses on memory: excerpts rated as more rewarding were significantly better recognized and remembered. Furthermore, inter-individual differences in the ability to experience musical reward, measured through the Barcelona Music Reward Questionnaire, positively predicted memory performance. Taken together, these findings shed new light on the relationship between music, reward and memory, showing for the first time that music-driven reward responses are directly implicated in higher cognitive functions and can account for individual differences in memory performance.

Episodic memory (EM) is defined as a long-term memory system that stores information that can be retrieved along with details of the context of the original events (binding). Several studies have shown that manipulation of attention during encoding can impact subsequent memory performance. An influential model of attention distinguishes between three partially independent attentional networks: the alerting, the orienting and the executive or conflict resolution component. To date, the impact of the engagement of these sub-systems during encoding on item and relational context binding has not been investigated. Here, we developed a new task combining the Attentional Network Test and an incidental episodic memory encoding task to study this issue. We reported that when the alerting network was not solicited, resolving conflict hindered item encoding. Moreover, resolving conflict, independently of the cueing condition, had a negative impact on context binding. These novel findings could have a potential impact in the understanding EM formation, and memory disorders in different populations, including healthy elderly people.

Self-knowledge concerns one's own preferences and personality. It pertains to the self (similar to episodic memory), yet does not concern events. It is factual (like semantic memory), but also idiosyncratic. For these reasons, it is unclear where self-knowledge might fall on a continuum in relation to semantic and episodic memory. In this study, we aimed to compare the event-related potential (ERP) correlates of self-knowledge to those of semantic and episodic memory, using N400 and Late Positive Component (LPC) as proxies for semantic and episodic processing, respectively. We considered an additional factor: time perspective. Temporally distant selves have been suggested to be more semantic compared to the present self, but thinking about one's past and future selves may also engage episodic memory. Twenty-eight adults answered whether traits (e.g., persistent) were true of most people holding an occupation (e.g., soldiers; semantic memory condition), or true of themselves 5 years ago, in the present, or 5 years from now (past, present, and future self-knowledge conditions). The study ended with an episodic recognition memory task for previously seen traits. Present self-knowledge produced mean LPC amplitudes at posterior parietal sites that fell between semantic and episodic memory. Mean LPC amplitudes for past and future self-knowledge were greater than for semantic memory, and not significantly different from episodic memory. Mean N400 amplitudes for the self-knowledge conditions were smaller than for semantic memory at sagittal sites. However, this N400 effect was not separable from a preceding P200 effect at these same electrode sites. This P200 effect can be interpreted as reflecting the greater emotional salience of self as compared to general knowledge, which may have facilitated semantic processing. Overall, our findings are consistent with a distinction between knowledge of others and self-knowledge, but the closeness of self-knowledge's neural correlates to either semantic or episodic memory appears to depend to some extent on time perspective.

Episodic memory, future thinking, and memory for scenes have all been proposed to rely on the hippocampus, and evidence suggests that these all decline in healthy aging. Despite this age-related memory decline, studies examining the effects of context reinstatement on episodic memory have demonstrated that reinstating elements of the encoding context of an event leads to better memory retrieval in both younger and older adults. The current study was designed to test whether more familiar, real-world contexts, such as locations that participants visited often, would improve the detail richness and vividness of memory for scenes, autobiographical events, and imagination of future events in young and older adults. The predicted age-related decline in internal details across all 3 conditions was accompanied by persistent effects of contextual familiarity, in which a more familiar spatial context led to increased detail and vividness of remembered scenes, autobiographical events, and, to some extent, imagined future events. This study demonstrates that autobiographical memory, imagination of the future, and scene memory are similarly affected by aging, and all benefit from being associated with more familiar (real-world) contexts, illustrating the stability of contextual reinstatement effects on memory throughout the life span. (PsycINFO Database Record

This chapter reviews some key aspects of the relationship between emotion and episodic memory, focusing on the cognitive and neural systems that underlie the relationship. We differentiate between effects of emotion on early and late long-term memory, review evidence for the selectivity of these effects, and discuss existing models that best account for them. We reflect on and evaluate current practices in emotional memory research.

Much of the richness in human life derives from episodic memory , mental representations of detailed experiences from our personal pasts. To make sense of those experiences, knowledge about the world and oneself must also exist in a form that is free of context – known as semantic memory . This chapter revisits and builds on Tulving's distinction between episodic and semantic memory, with a focus on their differences, similarities, and interactions, informed by cognitive, neuropsychological, and neuroimaging studies. Extensions of this distinction into spatial memory, and beyond memory into future thinking, are considered in the context of process views of memory organization.

This chapter provides an overview of how human memory actually works. There is a widespread, erroneous belief that everything that ever happened to us is stored somewhere in our brains. On the contrary, we tend to focus on and remember the best and worst events of our lives. Memories are not stored in discrete compartments but are spread in synaptical connections around the brain, and every time we recall something, we are reconstructing the memory, so that it is never completely accurate. Memory is subject to distortion and suggestion and is largely a matter of rehearsal. The chapter explores the different parts of the brain, including the amygdala and hippocampus, and explains explicit, declarative memory (what we can consciously recall) as well as implicit memory. It covers the issue of infantile amnesia and alleged fugue states as well. The chapter explores anecdotal evidence for “confirmed” cases of massive repression—cases in which people supposedly forgot years of traumatic events and recalled them much later. There are no such cases. The chapter concludes that there is no good evidence for the concept of repression. People sometimes forget single or limited incidents of childhood sexual abuse and remember them later, but the incidents were apparently not perceived as traumatic at the time. These are examples of ordinary memory retrieval, not of repression.

A comprehensive understanding of human memory requires both cognitive and neural descriptions of memory processes along with theories of how memory processing drives behavioral responses and subjective experiences. The electrophysiological approaches described here are highly suitable for progressing toward these goals. In particular, event-related potentials provide real-time measures of relevant memory processes, including those associated with recollection, familiarity, perceptual priming, and conceptual priming. Many challenges remain in isolating and understanding these different memory functions. Nonetheless, brain potentials can effectively be used in conjunction with other cognitive neuroscience methods to advance our understanding of remembering.

One of the challenges for memory researches is the study of the neurobiology of episodic memory which is defined by the integration of all the different components of experiences that support the conscious recollection of events. The features of episodic memory includes a particular object or person (“what”), the context in which the experience took place (“where”) and the particular time at which the event occurred (“when”). Although episodic memory has been mainly studied in humans, there are many studies that demonstrate these features in non-human animals. Here, we summarize a set of studies that employ different versions of recognition memory tasks in animals to study the role of the medial prefrontal cortex in episodic memory. Fil: Bekinschtein, Pedro Alejandro. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Houssay. Instituto de Biología Celular y Neurociencia "Profesor Eduardo de Robertis". Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Medicina. Instituto de Biología Celular y Neurociencia Profesor Eduardo de Robertis; Argentina Fil: Weisstaub, Noelia V.. Consejo Nacional de Investigaciones Científicas y Técnicas. Oficina de Coordinación Administrativa Houssay. Instituto de Biología Celular y Neurociencia "Profesor Eduardo de Robertis". Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Medicina. Instituto de Biología Celular y Neurociencia Profesor Eduardo de Robertis; Argentina. Universidad de Buenos Aires. Facultad de Medicina. Departamento de Ciencias Fisiológicas; Argentina

This paper provides insight into the cognitive and neural mechanisms of personal semantic memory, knowledge that is specific and unique to individuals, by reviewing neuropsychological research on stable amnesia secondary to medial temporal lobe damage. The results reveal that personal semantic memory does not depend on a unitary set of cognitive and neural mechanisms. Findings show that autobiographical fact knowledge reflects an experience-near type of personal semantic memory that relies on the medial temporal lobe for retrieval, albeit less so than personal episodic memory. Additional evidence demonstrates that new autobiographical fact learning likely relies on the medial temporal lobe, but the extent to which remains unclear. Other findings show that retrieval of personal traits/roles and new learning of personal traits/roles and thoughts/beliefs are independent of the medial temporal lobe and thus may represent highly conceptual types of personal semantic memory that are stored in the neocortex.

Our ability to remember past events requires efficient encoding and successful “re-collection” of event features, such as the time, place, people, thoughts, and feelings associated with a past experience. Neuroimaging studies have demonstrated that episodic memory depends on specific brain mechanisms within the prefrontal cortex, medial temporal lobe, and ventral posterior parietal cortex that interact with the cortical sites that store event features. In this article, I present an analysis of the neural correlates of episodic memory, along with a theoretical framework, Cortical Binding of Relational Activity (CoBRA), that integrates the dynamic links between efficient encoding and successful retrieval of episodic memory.

Previous research exploring declarative memory in Williams syndrome (WS) has revealed impairment in the processing of episodic information accompanied by a relative strength in semantic ability. The aim of the current study was to extend this literature by examining how relatively spared semantic memory may support episodic remembering. Using a level of processing paradigm, older adults with WS (aged 35–61 years) were compared to typical adults of the same chronological age and typically developing children matched for verbal ability. In the study phase, pictures were encoded using either a deep (decide if a picture belongs to a particular category) or shallow (perceptual based processing) memory strategy. Behavioural indices (reaction time and accuracy) at retrieval were suggestive of an overall difficulty in episodic memory for WS adults. Interestingly, however, semantic support was evident with a greater recall of items encoded with deep compared to shallow processing, indicative of an ability to employ semantic encoding strategies to maximise the strength of the memory trace created. Unlike individuals with autism who find semantic elaboration strategies problematic, the pattern of findings reported here suggests in those domains that are relatively impaired in WS, support can be recruited from relatively spared cognitive processes.

Recent work on the early development of episodic memory in my laboratory has been fuelled by the following assumption: if episodic memory is re-experiential memory then Kant’s analysis of the spatiotemporal nature of experience should constrain and positively influence theories of episodic memory development. The idea is that re-experiential memory will “inherit” these spatiotemporal features. On the basis of this assumption, Russell and Hanna (Mind and Language 27(1):29–54, 2012) proposed that (a) the spatial element of re-experience is egocentric and (b) that the temporal element of re-experiencing involves order/simultaneity. The first of these assumptions is immediately problematic for two reasons. In the first place, if we assume that early episodic recall mediated by processing in the hippocampus, then (a) is clearly in tension with the fact that spatial coding in the hippocampus is allocentric/environment-centred. Second, two of our own recent experiments (described here) show that when only egocentric cues are available in a What/When/Where episodic memory task it is not possible to distinguish young children’s performance from semantic memory. I argue that this tension should be resolved by recognising that the egocentric coding of the original experience as being of an objective scene relies upon allocentric representations and these are preserved in re-experiential memory, allowing a recollection of the objective nature of the scene on which one takes a subjective view.

Episodic memory is sometimes described as mental time travel. This suggests three ideas: that episodic memory offers us access to the past that is quasi-experiential, that it is a source of knowledge of the past, and that it is, at root, passive. I offer an account of episodic memory that rejects all three ideas. The account claims that remembering is a matter of representing the past to oneself, in a way suitably responsive to how one experienced the remembered episode to be. I argue that episodic memory is active, in the way this view suggests. I clarify the idea that it is, as the view also implies, not a source of knowledge but an expression of knowledge the subject already has. And I suggest the view need not limit memories to states that are in any way experience-like. This position offers a way to articulate the relations between episodic memory and related phenomena: factual memory, generic memory, remembering-how and anticipation. And it allows us to explain how we know which aspects of our episodic memory states to take seriously and which (such as the shift to an observer perspective on the remembered events) to treat as merely incidental.

Episodic memory involves the sense that it is “first-hand”, i.e., originates directly from one’s own past experience. An account of this phenomenological dimension is offered in terms of an affective experience or feeling specific to episodic memory. On the basis of recent empirical research in the domain of metamemory, it is claimed that a recollective experience involves two separate mental components: a first-order memory about the past along with a metacognitive, episodic feeling of knowing. The proposed two-tiered account is contrasted with other, reductionist two-tiered accounts as well as with reflexive accounts of episodic memory to be found in the literature.

Background and objectives Memories enter a labile state during recollection. Thus, memory changes that occur during recollection can affect future instances of its activation. Having subjects perform a secondary task that taxes working memory while they recall a negative emotional memory often reduces its vividness and emotional intensity during subsequent recollections. However, researchers have not manipulated the emotional valence of the secondary task itself. Methods Subjects viewed a video depicting the aftermath of three fatal road traffic accidents, establishing the same negative emotional memory for all subjects. We then tested their memory for the video after randomly assigning them to no secondary task or a delayed match-to-sample secondary task involving photographs of positive, negative, or neutral emotional valence. Results The positive secondary task reduced memory for details about the video, whereas negative and neutral tasks did not. Limitations We did not assess the vividness and emotionality of the subjects' memory of the video. Conclusions Having subjects recall a stressful experience while performing a positively valent secondary task can decrement details of the memory and perhaps its emotionality.

The present study aimed to explore autobiographical memories (long-lasting memories about the self) and episodic memories (memories about discrete episodes or events) within dream content. We adapted earlier episodic memory study paradigms and reinvestigated the incorporation of episodic memory sources into dreams, operationalizing episodic memory as featuring autonoetic consciousness, which is the feeling of truly re-experiencing or reliving a past event. Participants (n = 32) recorded daily diaries and dream diaries, and reported on wake-dream relations for 2 weeks. Using a new scale, dreams were rated for their episodic richness, which categorized memory sources of dreams as being truly episodic (featuring autonoetic consciousness), autobiographical (containing segregated features of experiences that pertained to waking life) or otherwise. Only one dream (0.5%) was found to contain an episodic memory. However, the majority of dreams (>80%) were found to contain low to moderate incorporations of autobiographical memory features. These findings demonstrate the inactivity of intact episodic memories, and emphasize the activity of autobiographical memory and processing within dreams. Taken together, this suggests that memories for personal experiences are experienced fragmentarily and selectively during dreaming, perhaps in order to assimilate these memories into the autobiographical memory schema.

OBJECTIVE Children with temporal lobe epilepsy are at risk for deficits in new learning (episodic memory) and literacy skills. Semantic memory deficits and double dissociations between episodic and semantic memory have recently been found in this patient population. In the current study we investigate whether impairments of these 2 distinct memory systems relate to literacy skills. METHOD 57 children with unilateral temporal lobe epilepsy completed tests of verbal memory (episodic and semantic) and literacy skills (reading and spelling accuracy, and reading comprehension). RESULTS For the entire group, semantic memory explained over 30% of variance in each of the literacy domains. Episodic memory explained a significant, but rather small proportion (< 10%) of variance in reading and spelling accuracy, but not in reading comprehension. Moreover, when children with opposite patterns of specific memory impairments (intact semantic/impaired episodic, intact episodic/impaired semantic) were compared, significant reductions in literacy skills were evident only in children with semantic memory impairments, but not in children with episodic memory impairments relative to the norms and to children with temporal lobe epilepsy who had intact memory. CONCLUSIONS Our study provides the first evidence for differential relations between episodic and semantic memory impairments and literacy skills in children with temporal lobe epilepsy. As such, it highlights the urgent need to consider semantic memory deficits in management of children with temporal lobe epilepsy and undertake further research into the nature of reading difficulties of children with semantic memory impairments.

Humans encounter a myriad of actions or events and later recall some of these events using episodic memory. New research suggests that dogs can imitate recently encountered actions using episodic memory.

Objectives. The assumption that working memory (WM) is embedded within long-term memory suggests that the effectiveness of switching information between activated states in WM (i.e., attentional refreshing) may depend on whether that information is semantically relevant. Given that older adults often have greater general knowledge than younger adults, age-related deficits in episodic memory (EM) could be ameliorated by studying information that has existing semantic representations compared with unknown information. Method. Younger and older adults completed a modified operation span task that varied the number of refreshing opportunities. The memoranda used were equally known to younger and older adults (neutral words; e.g., father), better known to older adults than younger adults (dated words; e.g., mirth), or unknown to both groups (unknown words; e.g., cobot). Results. Results for immediate and delayed recall indicated an age-related improvement for dated memoranda and no age difference for unknown memoranda. Furthermore, refreshing opportunities predicted delayed recall of neutral memoranda more strongly for younger adults than older adults, whereas older adults’ recall advantage for dated memoranda was explained by their prior knowledge and not refreshing opportunities. Discussion. The results suggest that older adults’ EM deficits could potentially be ameliorated by incorporating their superior knowledge to supplement relatively ineffective attentional refreshing in WM.

Memory for emotional events is typically more vivid and accurate than memory for neutral ones. The modulation model focuses on the consolidation of memory traces to provide a partial account of enhanced emotional memory. Mediation theory focuses on encoding and retrieval to explain the selective enhancement of memory for emotional aspects of a complex event and why emotional memory also can be enhanced immediately after the experience, before consolidation has occurred. Mediation theory can therefore complement the modulation model, and together they may provide a more comprehensive account of human emotional memory.

Episodic memory allows us to re-experience the past by recovering the sequences of events that characterize those prior experiences. Interestingly, although experience is continuous, we are able to selectively retrieve and re-experience more discrete episodes from our past, raising the possibility that some elements become tightly related to each other in memory, while others do not. The current series of experiments was designed to ask how shifts in context during an experience influence how we remember the past. Specifically, we asked how context shifts influence our ability to remember the relative order of past events, a hallmark of episodic memory. We found that memory for the order of events was enhanced within, as compared to across, context shifts, or ‘boundaries’ (Experiment 1). Next, we showed that this relative enhancement in order memory was eliminated when across-item associative processing was disrupted (Experiment 2), suggesting that context shifts have a selective effect on sequential binding. Finally, we provide evidence that the act of making order memory judgments involves the reactivation of representations that intervened, or bridged, the tested items (Experiment 3). Together, these data suggest that boundaries may serve to parse continuous experience into sequences of contextually related events and that this organization facilitates remembering the temporal order of events that share the same context.

Human memory is not a unitary entity; rather it is thought to arise out of a complex architecture involving interactions between distinct representational systems that specialize in perceptual, semantic, and episodic representations. Neuropsychological and neuroimaging evidence are combined in support of models of memory systems, however most models only capture a 'mature' state of human memory and there is little attempt to incorporate evidence of the contribution of developmental and senescence changes in various processes involved in memory across the lifespan. Here we review behavioral and neuroimaging evidence for changes in memory functioning across the lifespan and propose specific principles that may be used to extend models of human memory across the lifespan. In contrast to a simplistic reduced version of the adult model, we suggest that the architecture and dynamics of memory systems become gradually differentiated during development and that a dynamic shift toward favoring semantic memory occurs during aging. Characterizing transformations in memory systems across the lifespan can illustrate and inform us about the plasticity of human memory systems.

Contextual change or constancy between occasions of memory formation and retrieval are commonly assumed to affect retrieval success, yet such effects may be inconsistent, and the processes leading to the pattern of effects are still not well understood. We conducted a systematic investigation of environmental context effects on memory, using a range of materials (common objects, pictures of familiar and unfamiliar faces, words, and sentences), and four types of retrieval (free recall, cued recall, recognition, and order memory), all assessed within participants. Additionally, we examined the influence of mnemonic challenge on context effects by examining both healthy participants and a group of patients in rehabilitation following traumatic brain injury (TBI). We found no effects of contextual factors on tests of recognition for either group of participants, but effects did emerge for cued and free recall, with the most prominent effects being on memory for objects. Furthermore, while patients’ memory abilities in general were impaired relative to the comparison group, they exhibited greater influences of contextual reinstatement on several recall tasks. These results support suggestions that environmental context effects on memory are dependent on retrieval mode and on the extent to which retrieval is challenging because of neurocognitive status. Additionally, findings of environmental context effects in memory-impaired TBI patients suggest that by harnessing such preserved indirect memory (e.g., using reminder technologies), it may be possible to ameliorate TBI patients’ difficulties in explicit remembering.

Episodic memory involves the formation of relational structures that bind information about the stimuli people experience to the contexts in which they experience them. The ability to form and retain such structures may be at the core of the development of episodic memory. In the first experiment reported here, 4- and 7-year-olds were presented with paired-associate learning tasks requiring memory structures of different complexity. A multinomial-processing tree model was applied to estimate the use of different structures in the two age groups. The use of two-way list-context-to-target structures and three-way structures was found to increase between the ages of 4 and 7. Experiment 2 demonstrated that the ability to form increasingly complex relational memory structures develops between the ages of 4 and 7 years and that this development extends well into adulthood. These results have important implications for theories of memory development.

Relations between memory and the self are framed from a number of perspectives—developmental aspects, forms of memory, interrelations between memory and the brain, and interactions between the environment and memory. The self is seen as dividable into more rudimentary and more advanced aspects. Special emphasis is laid on memory systems and within them on episodic autobiographical memory which is seen as a pure human form of memory that is dependent on a proper ontogenetic development and shaped by the social environment, including culture. Self and episodic autobiographical memory are seen as interlocked in their development and later manifestation. Aside from content-based aspects of memory, time-based aspects are seen along two lines—the division between short-term and long-term memory and anterograde—future-oriented—and retrograde—past-oriented memory. The state dependency of episodic autobiographical is stressed and implications of it—for example, with respect to the occurrence of false memories and forensic aspects—are outlined. For the brain level, structural networks for encoding, consolidation, storage, and retrieval are discussed both by referring to patient data and to data obtained in normal participants with functional brain imaging methods. It is elaborated why descriptions from patients with functional or dissociative amnesia are particularly apt to demonstrate the facets in which memory, self, and personal temporality are interwoven.

Episodic memory is defined as the conscious recollection of a personal event (What) in its spatial (Where) and contextual (Which context) environment. In existing approaches, human episodic memory is either explored separately from real-life situations or is not fully controlled. In this study, we propose an intermediate approach, inspired by animal studies, that permits the control of the encoding and recall phases, while still being ecologically valid. As odors are known to be especially evocative reminders, we explored the memory of olfactory episodes. During trial-unique encoding, participants freely explored three episodes, one episode per day, each composed of three unnamable odors (What) that were positioned at specific locations on a board (Where) within a visual context (Which context). On the fourth day, both old and new odors were presented, and when an odor was recognized, the participants had to remember both its spatial location and the visual context in which it occurred. In Experiment 1, the participants were highly proficient at recognizing odors, and they recall the spatio-contextual environment associated with these odors in approximately half of the trials. To adapt the recall procedure to the constraints of fMRI, we conducted Experiment 2 demonstrating that trial repetition did not disturb the memory process. Thus, we first validated our protocol, which investigates the memory of olfactory episodes in a fully controlled way that is as close as possible to real-life situations. Then, we demonstrated the adaptability of our protocol for the future exploration of the neural networks implicated in episodic recall.

自传体记忆作为一个复杂的，涉及众多因素的长时记忆成分，具有独特的记忆结构；相应地，自传体记忆的神经机制也包括了众多脑区。基于自传体记忆的复杂性，本文总结了先前对于自传体记忆及其神经机制的研究，从记忆系统的角度对自传体记忆包含的认知加工成分及相应的神经机制进行了归纳总结，并就各认知加工成分间的相互联系和相互作用进行了详尽的分析；同时分析了目前自传体记忆神经机制研究存在的一些局限性，包括偏重强调实验条件间差异性而对不同认知加工成分脑机制间的相互联系分析不足，只关注脑区激活的空间定位而忽视时间维度的差异信息等。最后本文提出在将来的研究中需要更多地从系统的观点出发，重视认知加工成分间的相互联系，引入多体素分析和时间序列分析以便能为自传体记忆神经机制研究提供更深入的证据。 Autobiographical memory, with special inherent structure, is a complex component of long-term memory. It has a close relationship with semantic memory and episodic memory and is also connected with many other psychological cognitive processes, such as the emotional process, self-referential process etc. Accordingly, the neural correlates of autobiographical memory consist of many brain areas, including the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, superior parietal lobe and the adjacent occipital area etc. All of the brain areas mentioned above are mainly on the left hemisphere. This article summarizes the previous researches on autobiographical memory and its neural correlates. Given the complexity of autobiographical memory, we divide different cognitive processes of autobiographical memory into 5 operating components from the perspective of memory-system. These operating components include semantic component, episodic component, self-referential component, emotional component and general cognitive processing component (cognitive process related to general memory retrieval), and each component has its underlying neural correlates. What is more important, these operating components interact with each other coherently within the autobiographical memory system and this article discusses these interactions and connections in depth. These interactions analyzed in this article includes the semantic & episodic interaction, the self-referential processing & general cognitive processing interaction, the emotional & episodic interaction, the general cognitive processing & episodic interaction and the general cognitive processing & emotional interaction. By taking the interactions among the operating components into consideration, different ideas and opinions to integrate the experiment findings are offered, and new ways and solutions to settle some heating debates in the field of autobiographical memory are proposed. Furthermore, this article points out that even though the operating components of autobiographical memory system are closely connected with one another, the previous researches didn’t pay enough attention to it. This article analyzes two problems existing in the previous studies. First, most of the previous researches spent much effort in analyzing the different activated brain areas among different experiment tasks, while leaving the common brain activation alone, which might reflect the interaction and connection among the operating components. Second, those studies investigating neural correlates of autobiographical memory using brain imaging techniques tended to overlook the different brain activations at different time points, and these temporal differences may carry important information about the neural mechanism of autobiographical memory. Finally, the article proposes two analytical methods in order to solve the problems mentioned above to some extent. First is using multi-voxel analysis instead of the conventional analysis method to reveal the useful information held by the common activated brain areas, second is employing time series analysis to analyze the changes of brain activation pattern in the temporal dimension. In sum, if researchers are going to investigate the neural mechanism of autobiographical memory thoroughly and offered more convincing evidence, they should treat the various cognitive processes of autobiographical memory as a whole, take the interactions among different components into consideration and pay more attention to the neural correlates underlying these interactions.

The cognitive approach to depressive disorders has generally focused on memory problems. In recent years, research conducted in this field has been based on new cognitive theories of memory that distinguish between implicit memory, i.e. an unconscious memory that promotes the use of automatic processes, and explicit memory, i.e. a conscious memory based on the use of controlled processes. Here, we propose a review of the literature concerning the studies of depressive pathology. The initial results suggested a specific impairment of the explicit memory and thus brought depressive pathology into the realm of the pathologies of consciousness. More recent results and/or a consideration of divergent findings have led researchers to revise this interpretation. After looking at the various studies, we shall point out certain divergent results that will allow us to propose some new explanations and, finally, some new avenues of research based on the consideration of clinical and methodological elements. This approach is based on a cognitive and clinical examination of depressive disease. We examine the role of the processes—data—or conceptually driven processes, the role of the paradigm used, and clinical profile with a special interest for the presence of anxious or psychotic symptoms, and for the emotional profile.

As humans, we are consciously aware of unobservable mental states, including our own during episodic memory and other people's by having a "theory of mind" (ToM). Episodic memory and ToM are closely related: they share a neural substrate and emerge close in time in ontogenetic development. This relationship is central to prominent child development and cognitive neuroscience theories of ToM, but its causal nature has not been tested empirically. The current study examined whether normal episodic memory development is necessary for normal ToM development. To investigate this, we tested H.C., a young woman with impaired episodic memory development due to early hippocampal damage, on a wide range of ToM measures. H.C.'s performance was indistinguishable from that of controls on all tests of ToM suggesting that, contrary to theoretical claims in the literature, normal episodic memory development and hippocampal function are not essential for the development of ToM.

This articles develops a taxonomy of memory errors in terms of three conditions: the accuracy of the memory representation, the reliability of the memory process, and the internality (with respect to the remembering subject) of that process. Unlike previous taxonomies, which appeal to retention of information rather than reliability or internality, this taxonomy can accommodate not only misremembering (e.g., the DRM effect), falsidical confabulation, and veridical relearning but also veridical confabulation and falsidical relearning. Moreover, because it does not assume that successful remembering presupposes retention of information, the taxonomy is compatible with recent simulation theories of remembering.

Increasing evidence indicates that episodic future thinking (EFT) relies on both episodic and semantic memory; however, event familiarity may importantly affect the extent to which episodic and semantic memory contribute to EFT. To test this possibility, two behavioral experiments were conducted. In Experiment 1, we directly compared the proportion of episodic and semantic memory used in an EFT task. The results indicated that more episodic memory was used when imagining familiar future events compared with novel future events. Conversely, significantly more semantic memory was used when imagining novel events compared with familiar events. Experiment 2 aimed to verify the results of Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, we found that familiarity moderated the effect of priming the episodic memory system on EFT; particularly, it increased the time required to construct a standard familiar episodic future event, but did not significantly affect novel episodic event reaction time. Collectively, these findings support the hypothesis that event familiarity importantly moderates episodic and semantic memory’s contribution to EFT.

Summary Vivid episodic memories in people have been characterized as the replay of unique events in sequential order [1–3]. Animal models of episodic memory have successfully documented episodic memory of a single event (e.g., [4–8]). However, a fundamental feature of episodic memory in people is that it involves multiple events, and notably, episodic memory impairments in human diseases are not limited to a single event. Critically, it is not known whether animals remember many unique events using episodic memory. Here, we show that rats remember many unique events and the contexts in which the events occurred using episodic memory. We used an olfactory memory assessment in which new (but not old) odors were rewarded using 32 items. Rats were presented with 16 odors in one context and the same odors in a second context. To attain high accuracy, the rats needed to remember item in context because each odor was rewarded as a new item in each context. The demands on item-in-context memory were varied by assessing memory with 2, 3, 5, or 15 unpredictable transitions between contexts, and item-in-context memory survived a 45 min retention interval challenge. When the memory of item in context was put in conflict with non-episodic familiarity cues, rats relied on item in context using episodic memory. Our findings suggest that rats remember multiple unique events and the contexts in which these events occurred using episodic memory and support the view that rats may be used to model fundamental aspects of human cognition.

The Memory NEo-Structural Inter-Systemic model (MNESIS; Eustache and Desgranges, Neuropsychology Review, 2008) is a macromodel based on neuropsychological data which presents an interactive construction of memory systems and processes. Largely inspired by Tulving's SPI model, MNESIS puts the emphasis on the existence of different memory systems in humans and their reciprocal relations, adding new aspects, such as the episodic buffer proposed by Baddeley. The more integrative comprehension of brain dynamics offered by neuroimaging has contributed to rethinking the existence of memory systems. In the present article, we will argue that understanding the concept of memory by dividing it into systems at the functional level is still valid, but needs to be considered in the light of brain imaging. Here, we reinstate the importance of this division in different memory systems and illustrate, with neuroimaging findings, the links that operate between memory systems in response to task demands that constrain the brain dynamics. During a cognitive task, these memory systems interact transiently to rapidly assemble representations and mobilize functions to propose a flexible and adaptative response. We will concentrate on two memory systems, episodic and semantic memory, and their links with autobiographical memory. More precisely, we will focus on interactions between episodic and semantic memory systems in support of 1) self-identity in healthy aging and in brain pathologies and 2) the concept of the prospective brain during future projection. In conclusion, this MNESIS global framework may help to get a general representation of human memory and its brain implementation with its specific components which are in constant interaction during cognitive processes.

Participant payment was provided by the School of Psychology and Neuroscience ResPay scheme. Current animal models of episodic memory are usually based on demonstrating integrated memory for what happened, where it happened, and when an event took place. These models aim to capture the testable features of the definition of human episodic memory which stresses the temporal component of the memory as a unique piece of source information that allows us to disambiguate one memory from another. Recently though, it has been suggested that a more accurate model of human episodic memory would include contextual rather than temporal source information, as humans’ memory for time is relatively poor. Here, two experiments were carried out investigating human memory for temporal and contextual source information, along with the underlying dual process retrieval processes, using an immersive virtual environment paired with a ‘Remember-Know’ memory task. Experiment 1 (n = 28) showed that contextual information could only be retrieved accurately using recollection, while temporal information could be retrieved using either recollection or familiarity. Experiment 2 (n = 24), which used a more difficult task, resulting in reduced item recognition rates and therefore less potential for contamination by ceiling effects, replicated the pattern of results from Experiment 1. Dual process theory predicts that it should only be possible to retrieve source context from an event using recollection, and our results are consistent with this prediction. That temporal information can be retrieved using familiarity alone suggests that it may be incorrect to view temporal context as analogous to other typically used source contexts. This latter finding supports the alternative proposal that time since presentation may simply be reflected in the strength of memory trace at retrieval – a measure ideally suited to trace strength interrogation using familiarity, as is typically conceptualised within the dual process framework. Postprint

Prior research illustrates that memory can guide value-based decision-making. For example, previous work has implicated both working memory and procedural memory (i.e., reinforcement learning) in guiding choice. However, other types of memories, such as episodic memory, may also influence decision-making. Here we test the role for episodic memory—specifically item versus associative memory—in supporting value-based choice. Participants completed a task where they first learned the value associated with trial unique lotteries. After a short delay, they completed a decision-making task where they could choose to re-engage with previously encountered lotteries, or new never before seen lotteries. Finally, participants completed a surprise memory test for the lotteries and their associated values. Results indicate that participants chose to re-engage more often with lotteries that resulted in high versus low rewards. Critically, participants not only formed detailed, associative memories for the reward values coupled with individual lotteries, but also exhibited adaptive decision-making only when they had intact associative memory. We further found that the relationship between adaptive choice and associative memory generalized to more complex, ecologically valid choice behavior, such as social decision-making. However, individuals more strongly encode experiences of social violations—such as being treated unfairly, suggesting a bias for how individuals form associative memories within social contexts. Together, these findings provide an important integration of episodic memory and decision-making literatures to better understand key mechanisms supporting adaptive behavior.