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Employing a unique dataset that covers households from six West African capitals, this paper provides new evidence on the demand for informal sector products and services. We first investigate whether demand linkages exist between formal and informal products and distribution channels, and whether there is an overlapping customer base, which would imply that both formal sector wage earners and informal workers buy both formal and informal products using both formal and informal distribution channels. In a second step, we estimate demand elasticities based on Engel curves. We find a strongly overlapping customer base and strong demand-side linkages between the formal and informal sector, with the exception that informal goods are hardly bought through formal distribution channels. The estimated demand elasticities tend to show that rising incomes are associated with a lower propensity to consume informal sector goods and to use informal distribution channels. We therefore conclude that the informal sector in West Africa is likely to be constrained from the demand side.

The authors build on the findings from an earlier analysis, adding to the evidence base for the notion that credit rating agencies contribute to fiscal sustainability. To do so, the authors focus on election periods when political pressures for fiscal expansions are heightened. The literature on political budget cycles documents the tendency for budget deficits to increase in election years as governments attempt to appear economically competent by strategically providing additional publicly financed goods or services, or by cutting taxes. A rating downgrade, however, signals the opposite of competence as it implies an increase in the probability of sovereign default. Since credit ratings are widely observed - by financial markets as well as voters - they in effect serve as a disciplining device for fiscal policy not to submit to short-term spending pressures, thus keeping it responsible. The authors find that: (1) governments going into an election year immediately after a rating downgrade are 27 percentage points more likely to lose at the polls; and (2) governments going into an election year with a negative rating outlook (indicating a higher likelihood of a near-term downgrade) run smaller budget deficits compared to cases with positive or stable outlooks. Ratings act like fiscal rules disciplining governments when they are more vulnerable to political pressures on the budget - as opposed to fiscal policies supporting longer-term economic growth and development objectives.

An integrated fiduciary assessment has been carried out to evaluate the arrangementsrelevant to the Bihar Teachers Education Program to determine whether they provide reasonableassurance that the Program funds will be used for their intended purpose. Based on theassessment and agreement on actions required to strengthen the system, which are reflected inthe DLIs and PAP the overall fiduciary framework for program are considered adequate tosupport program management and to reach the desired results. Similar to other states in India, the GoB has a well-developed budgetary framework that ensures allocation of adequate resources to departments and programs. GoB has not faced significant fund constraint and there is sufficient predictability in availability of resources, albeit fund releases tend to be significantly higher in the last quarter of the financial year; As per standard practice and in order to maintain transparency in GoBs financing, two exclusive budget lines have been allocated to this program segregating between revenue and capital expenditures; a significant proportion of the activities i.e. civil works, ICT procurement and key consultancies, under the program will be undertaken by BSEIDC which operates outside the treasury system and uses commercial banking channels for financial flows and payments. Fiduciary framework in the state and consequently the Program, are guided by several rules and legislation including the Bihar Financial Rules, Treasury Code and Budget Manual, PWD Manual and the Companies Act (2013) in case of BSEIDC.

This note presents practical guidance on how to implement a framework for managing fiscal commitments from Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs). It draws on specific regional operational experience and on World Bank Institute (WBI)'s wider thematic engagement with different partners worldwide. The note provides practical advice on how to: consistently identify and assess fiscal commitments arising from PPPs during project preparation and implementation; incorporate these into the project approval process, including budgeting for these appropriately; and strengthen the monitoring and reporting of fiscal commitments over the lifetime of the project. It explains the fiscal commitments that can arise from PPP projects; why governments may find it difficult to assess and manage these fiscal commitments and incorporate them into project selection; and the key components of an institutional framework to manage fiscal commitments at both the development and implementation stages of a project, including the roles, responsibilities, and processes for managing PPP fiscal commitments.

Micro and Small Enterprises (MSEs) in developing countries are typically considered to be severely credit constrained. Additionally, high business risks may partly explain why capital stocks of MSEs remain low. This article analyzes the determinants of capital stocks of MSEs in poor economies focusing on credit constraints and risk. The analysis is based on a unique, albeit cross sectional but backward looking, micro data set on MSEs covering the economic capitals of seven West-African countries. The main result is that capital market imperfections indeed seem to explain an important part of the variation in capital stocks in the early lifetime of MSEs. Furthermore, the analyses show that risk plays a key role for capital accumulation. Risk-averse individuals seem to adjust their initially low capital stocks upwards when enterprises grow older. MSEs in risky activities owned by wealthy individuals even seem to over-invest when they start their business and adjust capital stocks downwards subsequently. As other firms simultaneously suffer from capital shortages, such behavior may imply large inefficiencies.

Innovation is the main driver of long-term economic growth. The accumulation of capital, whether in the form of physical assets such as plants and equipment, or through better human capital, cannot indefinitely sustain growth unless new products, services, processes, and/or business models are developed and implemented. This paper describes the actors involved and the types of funding available at different stages of the innovation process, the rationales for public intervention, and the advantages and disadvantages of some of the most commonly used policy instruments. Innovation activities are more difficult to finance than other types of investment for several reasons. Innovation produces an intangible asset that does not typically constitute accepted collateral to obtain external funding. Also, the technological and market uncertainty of innovation activities makes the returns to investment highly uncertain, creating significant problems for the standard risk adjustment methods used by providers of funds. This paper uses a streamlined version of an innovation process with three stages to categorize the different sources of finance available; in reality, considerable crossover takes places among instruments because innovation processes are not discrete.

(english) This paper investigates the dynamics of the informal sector in Madagascar during a period of fragile growth. Overall, the behavior of informal firms in terms of earnings, employment and capital accumulation points to a degree of heterogeneity which goes beyond a simple dualistic model and even a more refined model that would distinguish between an upper entrepreneurial and a lower subsistence tier within the informal sector. However, in line with the dualistic model, the informal sector indeed fulfils a labor absorbing function in times of crisis. During the growth period we see capital accumulation in most of the sectors and lots of evidence that households expand their activities. However, this happens mainly through the creation of new firms instead of the expansion of existing ones, which is consistent with much higher returns at very low levels of capital. More rapid expansion can be observed in sectors that operate with lower capital intensity, which is also consistent with risk or credit constraints as major deterrents to expansion. While there is some indication that total factor productivity increased over time, returns to capital and labor where not higher at the end of the observation period than at the beginning. Returns are also rather low at high levels of capital. These findings point to a limited growth potential of the informal sector as a whole. The heterogeneity in capital returns hints at large inefficiencies in allocating capital across informal firms. _________________________________ (français) Cet article examine la dynamique du secteur informel à Madagascar pendant une période de croissance fragile. Le comportement des firmes informelles en termes de revenus, d’emploi et d’accumulation du capital suggère un degré d’hétérogénéité allant au-delà du modèle dualiste classique, et même d’un modèle plus fin distinguant, au sein du secteur informel, un segment entrepreneurial et un segment de subsistance. Cependant, conformément au modèle dualiste, le secteur informel a absorbé le surplus de travail en temps de crise. Pendant la période de croissance, on constate une accumulation de capital dans la plupart des secteurs d’activité et une expansion des activités des ménages. Ceci se traduit pourtant principalement par la création de nouvelles firmes plutôt que par la croissance de firmes existantes, en lien avec des rendements beaucoup plus élevés à des faibles niveaux de capital. Une expansion plus rapide peut être observée dans les secteurs à faible intensité capitalistique, ce qui tend également à confirmer que le risque et les contraintes de crédit sont des obstacles à l’expansion. Alors que les résultats montrent que la productivité totale des facteurs a augmenté, les rendements du capital et du travail ne sont pas plus élevés à la fin de la période étudiée qu’au début. Les rendements sont également plutôt faibles à des niveaux élevés de capital. Ces résultats indiquent un potentiel de croissance globalement limité des firmes informelles. Enfin, l’hétérogénéité des rendements du capital plaide en faveur d’une allocation sous-optimale du capital dans le secteur informel.

Social reproduction is the highest for self-employed as shown by an extensive literature from developed and developing countries. Very few studies however document the reason for this high intergenerational correlation of the self-employed status. The rare studies that have been done concern the US and show that children of self-employed benefit from an advantage when they are themselves self-employed. The purpose of this paper is to test if the second-generation of self-employed has an advantage related to the first-generation in the African context. It aims at highlighting the debate on firms heterogeneity in the informal sector, and seeks to contribute to understand the intergenerational transmission of inequalities. Using 1-2-3 surveys collected in the commercial capitals of seven West African countries in 2001-2002, this paper shows that the second-generation of informal selfemployed does not have better outcomes than the first one, except when they choose a familial tradition in the same sector of activity. Thus, in the African context, having a self-employed father does not provide any advantage in terms of profit or sales and is not sufficient for the transmission of valuable skills. On the other hand, informal entrepreneurs who have chosen a specific enterprise based on familial tradition have a competitive advantage. Their competitive advantage is partly explained by the transmission of enterprise-specific human capital, acquired through experiences in the same type of activity and by the transmission of social capital. _________________________________ Très peu d’études documentent les raisons de la très forte reproduction sociale observée parmi les entrepreneurs, aussi bien dans les pays développés que dans les pays en développement. Les rares études, portant sur les E.U, montrent que les enfants d’entrepreneurs ont de meilleures performances quand ils sont eux-mêmes entrepreneurs que les enfants de salariés. Cet article teste si ce résultat se vérifie dans le contexte du secteur informel ouest-africain et cherche à en comprendre les raisons. Il vise par conséquent à éclairer le débat portant sur l’hétérogénéité des entreprises informelles, en identifiant des facteurs de succès, mais il cherche aussi à mieux comprendre les mécanismes à l’origine de la transmission intergénérationnelles des inégalités en Afrique. En se basant sur les enquêtes 1-2-3 collectées dans sept capitale ouest-africaines, cet article montre que la seconde génération d’entrepreneurs informels ne bénéficient pas d’un avantage comparatif, sauf s’ils bénéficient d’une tradition familiale dans leur secteur d’activité. Ainsi, dans le contexte ouest-africain, avoir un père entrepreneur ne suffit pas à la transmission de compétences managériales. En revanche, les entrepreneurs qui ont choisi leur secteur d’activité par tradition familiale ont un avantage qui s’explique principalement par la transmission de compétences spécifiques au secteur d’activité et par la transmission d’un capital social.

This paper analyses the impact of a microfinance institution (MFI) serving small informal enterprises in Antananarivo (Madagascar). The methodology consists of comparing over time the situation of a representative sample of clients' enterprises with a control group, constructed in an almost experimental way through a standard propensity-score matching technique. Overall, the results indicate a positive impact of the project. Taken as a snapshot, the evaluations successively conducted in 2001 and 2004 indicate that the clients' enterprises recorded better average performance than enterprises without funding. With a dynamic perspective however, the results are more nuanced. If the positive effect of the project is clear during growth phases, its effect during economic recessions appears less certain.