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European Union has faced a various challenge that have threatened the European integrative project as a whole. More recently, The- so called- Corona virus pandemic as a health crisis in 2020 has presented several challenges in terms of health, humanitarian and political issues between European countries and the world as a whole. This crisis, which is considered a health crisis, but its effects extended to the political relations between the European nations within the framework of European integration. In light of the pandemic and in the context of the globalization of risks. The European institutions were demanded to save the European health security, especially after the huge human losses it caused. In this crisis proved that the self-help system is the best option to confront the pandemic nationally. Accordingly, this study aims to analyze the effects of the Corona virus crisis on European regional integration focusing on the European response to the crisis and its implications for the future of the European integrated project as a whole. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyses the problems of EU risk regulation of genetically modified organisms ( GMOs) through the lens of deliberative theories of EU law and governance, such as deliberative supranationalism and experimentalist governance. Previous research had suggested that the GMO issue is not conductive to deliberation within EU institutions because of its high politicisation. This article argues that another equally salient factor is the scientification of the GMO authorisation process. Scientification stands for the Commission's overreliance on epistemic legitimacy as the basis for risk management. Given the deadlock of comitology in this field, scientification is exacerbated by a reversion to top-down regulation by the Commission. As a result, political responsibility for GMO authorisations gets lost. This article argues that both scientification and politicisation are mutually accelerative processes ultimately leading to a break down of dialogue at the EU level. This contradicts the assumption that deliberation is fostered by technocratic 'behind closed door' decision-making. In the GMO case, the top-down imposition of epistemic authority has only increased politicisation contributing to the de-legitimation of all EU institutions involved in GMO regulation. The recent EU reform on national opt-outs is not sufficient to address this problem. A successful reform should mitigate the negative effects of both politicisation and scientification. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 18 of March 2014, the Court of Justice delivered its judgment in the European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) fees case,1 the first case dealing with the problematic distinction, in practice, between delegated acts under Article 290 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and implementing acts under Article 291 TFEU. The significance of this case should be searched for in the fundamental changes brought to the hierarchy of norms and the EU's revamped arsenal of acts after the Lisbon Treaty. These changes will first be recalled before presenting the case itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lisbon Treaty reform provided an important innovation in the EU regulatory activity by differentiating between the legislative delegation (art. 290 TFEU) and the executive delegation (art. 291 TFEU). In so doing, the central role of the European Commission in the Comitology procedures as well as the power of the European Parliament and the Council to control its executive powers have been modified. The new 2011 Comitology Regulation aimed at creating a more intelligible and transparent committees' system where the EC is expected to act in a stricter framework. The paper argues that the new Regulation preserves the efficiency of the Comitology system; at the same time, however, it does not really improve the level of transparency and clarity in the way in which the committees' procedures works. Moreover, as the practice clearly shows, the EC continues to enjoy a broad discretion in the adoption of implementing acts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With and after the Lisbon Treaty Comitology experienced a surprisingly radical reform of which the winner seems to be the Commission. Most observers, however, expect the ECJ to draw a difficult line between Art. 290 and 291 TFEU. The question is why such a radical reform on treaty level was possible at all while the reform of comitology rules on a lower level turned out to be so little radical. In answering this question, rational-choice explanations conceptualizing community institutions and Member States as fully rational actors do not get very far while approaches including cultural factors and unintended consequences explain a lot more. Yet the puzzle remains how the introduction of delegated legislation including at least a partial abolition of comitology could survive two intergovernmental conferences without being withdrawn by the Member States. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Lisbon Treaty introduces a distinction between legislative, delegated and implementation acts and thus represents a new approach to delegated decision-making in the EU. This will lead to a reform of the comitology system. Against this background this contribution takes stock. What do we know about the comitology system? Can the existing literature help us understand the post-Lisbon changes? [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the accountability issues concerning the comitology commission and the role of the European Parliament. It probes the question as to whether the latest Decision on Comitology alleviate the accountability deficits of comitology. It notes that the European Commission serves as a regulator in the implementation process of European legislation and is assisted by comitology committees composed of civil servants from the administrations of Member States of the European Union.