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(Series Information) European Papers - A Journal on Law and Integration, 2024 9(2), 685-694 | Article | (Table of Contents) I. Introduction. – II. Basic principles in the negotiations. – III. Negotiating the issues deriving from Opinion 2/13. – III.1. EU-specific mechanisms of the procedure before the ECtHR. – III.2. Inter-state applications and advisory opinions. – III.3. Mutual trust and mutual recognition. – III.4. CJEU competence over EU acts in the field of CFSP. – IV. Other issues. | (Abstract) I. Introduction. – II. Basic principles in the negotiations. – III. Negotiating the issues deriving from Opinion 2/13. – III.1. EU-specific mechanisms of the procedure before the ECtHR. – III.2. Inter-state applications and advisory opinions. – III.3. Mutual trust and mutual recognition. – III.4. CJEU competence over EU acts in the field of CFSP. – IV. Other issues.

A surprising feature of Brexit has been the united front the EU-27 presented during post-referendum negotiations. This membership crisis arrived when the EU had been facing multiple overlapping political and economic crises revealing deep cleavages both between and within member states. How did negotiations prevent a widening politicisation of European integration? In this article a novel dataset is used, containing national and European newspaper Brexit coverage between 2016 and 2020 to establish how negotiating stances were formed in key EU institutions and five influential member states: Ireland, Spain, France, Germany and Poland. The results indicate that the European Commission could maintain a strong, centralised negotiating position over Brexit because the preferences of these member states were mutually inclusive, their negotiating stances aligned, and each national case was subject to generally low levels of domestic politicisation. As a result, while Brexit shocked the EU, its immediate fallout could be contained even during uncertain times. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union’s response to the war in Ukraine is perceived as swift and relatively coherent. The political willingness to support its attacked neighbour has also extended to Ukraine’s membership bid. Despite protracting war and worsening Ukraine’s position, there are no doubts over the state’s commitment to reforms. For now, it can be safely assumed that Ukraine will pursue its path towards membership. Can fighting war and pushing an arduous accession process be balanced by the political will of the EU Member States rooted in a wartime gesture of solidarity?

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This article examines the impact of the introduction of a permanent chair in the area of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). The Lisbon Treaty transferred the functions of the rotating Presidency to the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, represented at lower levels by officials from the European External Action Service (EEAS). Whilst the permanent chair was intended to improve effectiveness in CFSP negotiations, recent deadlocks challenge such expectations. Drawing on sociological approaches, we show that the ability of EEAS chairs to uphold the impartiality norm has been undermined by the fact that they are perceived as 'outsiders' by national negotiators. This has had negative consequences on the chairs' capacity to fulfil key roles of organiser, broker and political leader and, in turn, negotiation dynamics. Based on these findings, we argue for the need to take norms and identity factors more seriously when designing institutions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Correlation between import and export is essential for a country's economic development and stability. Adequate management of these processes can contribute to economic growth, resource diversification, strengthening international relations and improving the quality of life for citizens. The author intends to present in this article the evolution and particularities of import and export in the Republic of Moldova in the last 10 years. During this period our country faced several events, difficult economic periods, crises, situations of force majeure, etc. But by negotiating international agreements with the European Union, international organizations, other independent states, it was possible to register a positive evolution of exports and imports. As a result, the author proposes the correlation between import and export as an essential part for economic development and stability of the Republic of Moldova. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Brexit has contributed to increased discussion of a second independence referendum in Scotland, so-called IndyRef2. A successful Yes vote would require negotiations between Scotland and the rest of the UK to settle distributional questions and coordinate on cross-border policies, but there are few precedents for this and little scholarly discussion as a result. This article argues that the lessons from Brexit can help us understand what negotiating secession might look like, insofar as British withdrawal from the European Union illustrates the specific dynamics associated with exiting a pluri-national and institutionally dense union under conditions of asymmetric interdependence. Drawing on recent research on the politics of exit, this article suggests the period following a successful independence referendum will be characterised by efforts to reinterpret the referendum mandate, political change within and between parties and institutions, altered preferences in London, and a highly asymmetric bargaining environment. Understanding the lessons of Brexit can aid our understanding of the dynamics of independence and help policymakers prepare in advance for the eventuality of a Yes vote. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article reconstructs the coming about of the 750 billion EU Covid Recovery Fund. We provide an embedded process‐tracing analysis of the dynamics from mid‐March 2020, when the idea of 'Corona‐bonds' was parachuted onto the Heads' Agenda, up until the 'historic' deal on the Multiannual Financial Framework and Recovery Fund of 21 July. Where most media accounts and scholarly assessments focus on the high‐level deal making between political leaders, we trace the proceedings inside the EU's institutional machinery, which produced the solutions and laid out the groundwork for a deal. The reconstruction assesses the role and influence of the EU institutions – the European Commission in particular – in producing this major step. We show that the process was characterized by a handicapped European Council, which hampered the ability of member states to oversee and control developments. The conclusions discuss the implications of our findings for our understanding of (institutional) leadership and policy making during crisis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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This article presents an in-depth qualitative case study on the negotiations underlying the introduction of an Independent Fiscal Institution and a Constitutional Balanced Budget Rule in Italy. The article looks at the interests of the relevant actors in the negotiation process of the Six Pack, Euro Plus Pact, Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance, and Two Pack by conducting interviews with the negotiators and analyses of parliamentary records and press declarations. The article demonstrates that functional mechanisms explain the outcome of such negotiations better than the consolidated literature of Liberal Intergovernmentalism, which expects that the preferences of the constellation of national actors are the key drivers of EU grand bargains impacting on member states' core state powers. As a matter of fact, Italian negotiators decided to accept the introduction of such instruments because they were potentially helpful in reducing macroeconomic risks both domestically and in other EU member states without having particular political costs, and not because domestic actors showcased clear preferences in favour of them. The results contribute to the academic debate on the integration of the Economic and Monetary Union by testing hypotheses deriving from traditional EU integration and International Relations literature and paves the way for future research allowing for a greater generalisation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Nowadays, the system of judicial settlement of disputes by means of conciliation correlates with the rule of law, has fundamental disagreements with extrajudicial and, accordingly, less formal instruments for resolving disputes—mediation, negotiations. Moreover, the advantage of the judicial conciliation procedure lies in the ability to ensure the implementation of the decision and its compliance with generally accepted values, and the interpretation of legal provisions is the business of officially authorized officials, and not specialists who act privately. The purpose of the paper is to conduct a comparative analysis of the legal regulation of approbation of conciliation procedures in civil proceedings. In the process of writing the paper, scientific and legal approaches to the essence of the procedure for conciliation in civil proceedings were identified; a comparative legal analysis of the specific features of legal regulation of conciliation procedures in civil proceedings in the territory of the European Union and in the post‐Soviet space was carried out; the prospects for improving the investigated procedure were outlined. It can be concluded that the comparative study of the foundations of legal regulation of conciliation procedures in civil proceedings in the territory of the European Union and in the post‐Soviet space showed the flexibility of the procedure under study, the multivariance of approaches to its implementation, and unity in supporting this method of resolving disputes. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The 2019 European Union (EU)-Japan Economic Partnership Agreement is, so far, the EU’s largest bilateral free trade agreement. While the agreement itself is an example of the growing strength of the EU-Japan relationship, it is also an example of how two vastly different trade regimes can overcome entrenched structural and administrative styles to reach a consensus. This paper analyzes one of these barriers: negotiating capital. This concept represents the political economy of how trade negotiators utilize their legal expertise, negotiating flexibility, and limited resources to maximize free trade agreement outcomes. However, trade negotiators have differing amounts of negotiating capital, which depends on their home states’ structural and administrative constraints and how the trade negotiators define and develop their trade expertise. The EU’s and Japan’s contrasting structural and administrative approaches to trade negotiations and how trade experts define and develop their expertise lend a unique opportunity to understand how changes in negotiating capital can alter free trade agreement negotiation outcomes. Ultimately, the EU’s inclusive, quasi-federal structure and the negotiators’ need to consider the limitations on their trade mandate show how their negotiating capital is relatively limited and translates into a more integrated agreement text, i.e., provisions on public opinion. On the other hand, Japan’s top-down reformist trade regime leads to a more reactive strain of negotiating capital relying heavily on adherence to hierarchy and limited inclusiveness, resulting in agreement commitments that are generally weak and narrow. Negotiating capital is an important reality that all trade negotiators face. It is politically and strategically important for parties to understand how these various factors’ political economy impacts free-trade negotiations and outcomes. Received: 10 May 2022 Accepted: 18 July 2022

This paper explains the influence of the European Union (EU) in multilateral chemicals negotiations. Focusing on the Basel Convention, this paper studies two issues negotiated at the Conference of the Parties 2019. Comparing a success and a failure case for the EU, it provides explanations for the EU’s high influence in the negotiations on the management of plastic waste and its low influence in the negotiations on low Persistent Organic Pollutant content values. Using process-tracing, the paper maps the EU’s diplomatic activities from the EU’s initial position to the outcome of the negotiations. Two separate causal mechanisms outline the differences between the success and the failure of the EU. Data is collected through interviews, observations and official documents. The paper shows the crucial role of the EU’s diplomatic activities in multilateral negotiations. The EU can be influential, if it strongly engages in all negotiation forums, is able to adapt its position during the course of negotiations and can propose a compromise acceptable to all parties. It is however uninfluential, if it downscales its diplomatic activities and refuses to compromise.

Brexit makes both a direct and an indirect impact on the European Parliament (EP). The most direct consequence is the withdrawal of the 73-member strong UK contingent and the changing size of the political groups. Yet, the impact of Brexit is also felt in more oblique ways. Focussing on the role and influence of the EP in the EU–UK negotiations, and of the British delegation in the EP, this article shows that the process, and not just the outcome of Brexit, has significant organisational implications for the EP and its political groups. Moreover, it also showcases the importance of informal rules and norms of behaviour, which were affected by Brexit well ahead of any formal change to the UK status as a Member State. The EP and its leadership ensured the active involvement of the EP in the negotiating process—albeit in different ways for the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship—and sought to minimise the costs of Brexit, reducing the clout of British members particularly in the allocation of legislative reports.

This research investigates the determinants of European governments' bargaining success in negotiations related to the EU's Digital Single Market (DSM). Investigating the making process of the recent Geoblocking Regulation and the Directive establishing the Electronic Communications Code, this article shows how member states' capabilities to form coalitions at the EU level can be dependent upon their resources in Brussels and the efficiency of their coordination processes, translating in turn into asymmetries of influence. Drawing on interviews with national negotiators and EU officials, these two case studies indicate configurations in which states' varying capabilities to liaise with EU institutions may partly determine their bargaining success in the adoption process of EU digital policies. This research confirms in particular that informal coordination mechanisms mobilised by the most digitally advanced countries of the EU can grant them significant influence over the shaping process of DSM legislations. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The abject failure of British Prime Minister Theresa May to get the United Kingdom’s (UK) Withdrawal Agreement from the European Union (EU) through Parliament on 15 January 2019, with MPs overwhelmingly rejecting it by 432 votes to 202, has been put down to a variety of reasons. Primary among them has been the question of the post-Brexit status of the land border between the Republic of Ireland and the UK’s province of Northern Ireland. Although an issue which was initially seen as of minor importance, the significance of the Irish border steadily grew over time until it became the main stumbling block in UKEU Brexit negotiations brought about by the decision of the British people to leave the EU in a referendum held on 23 June 2016. Indeed, the key term of the ensuing debate, namely ‘the Irish backstop’, produced such confusion among politicians, political pundits and the general public that the House of Commons, split between so-called Brexiteers and Remainers, decided to reject May’s deal out of hand. This article seeks to argue that, from June 2016 (the time of the referendum) up to January 2019 (the time of the first vote on May’s Brexit deal in Parliament), the issue of the Irish backstop was seriously underestimated before suddenly taking centre stage and ultimately sabotaging the Withdrawal Agreement from within.

Over the last decade, European Union (EU) trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations—conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing explanations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations, and on politicization of EU policy making in general.

The manoeuvring and the strategies that state actors and their delegates employ when discussing and negotiating practices at the European Union (EU) level clearly respond to their aim of attaining outcomes at that very level. Within that landscape, what makes a country more powerful and persuasive than others, why some states punch above their weight, and how the threads of European diplomacy are concretely moved are unclear processes that the practice approach promises to explain. This investigation employs the practice approach to distinguish ‘power in practice’. It considers power as a development connected to social relations. In fact, it views micro-level diplomatic dynamics as the site from which to observe power. It fills a gap in the field of adopting the practice approach in EU studies by contributing to theory through showing the approach’s policy performance. It asks the central question of ‘whether power resources emerge out of constant work and negotiation’. It applies the practice approach to the early 2020 negotiations in the EU arena on burden sharing linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. It argues that what is at stake in the course of the negotiations is a complex social game, in which manoeuvring for diplomatic competence becomes an end in itself.

The manoeuvring and the strategies that state actors and their delegates employ when discussing and negotiating practices at the European Union (EU) level clearly respond to their aim of attaining outcomes at that very level. Within that landscape, what makes a country more powerful and persuasive than others, why some states punch above their weight, and how the threads of European diplomacy are concretely moved are unclear processes that the practice approach promises to explain. This investigation employs the practice approach to distinguish 'power in practice'. It considers power as a development connected to social relations. In fact, it views micro-level diplomatic dynamics as the site from which to observe power. It fills a gap in the field of adopting the practice approach in EU studies by contributing to theory through showing the approach's policy performance. It asks the central question of'whether power resources emerge out of constant work and negotiation'. It applies the practice approach to the early 2020 negotiations in the EU arena on burden sharing linked to the Covid-19 pandemic. It argues that what is at stake in the course of the negotiations is a complex social game, in which manoeuvring for diplomatic competence becomes an end in itself. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author of the article analyzes European Union-Romania’s membership negotiations, that began on February 15, 2000 and exposes their basic problems. The author traced the dynamics of the negotiation process on the basis of EU and Romania documents and proved that the main purpose of negotiations was to comprehensively achieve Copenhagen criteria by Romania. The cooperation between EU and Romania developed on the basis of the provisions of the European Agreement within the framework of its institutions. The negotiation process of Romania’s accession to the European Union took place under the established procedure and was practically indistinguishable from the negotiations of other CEE countries. It is substantiated that despite the real reforms, increasing Romania’s promotion in the process of preparation for EU membership and real assistance to the EU to intensify Romania preparation for membership in 2004, but in October 2002 the EU institutions agreed on Romania’s joining the EU after 2004. It was established that the intensification of Romania’s efforts to implement the criteria for admission and the adoption in February 2004 of the financial package for its accession contributed to the closure of the most difficult issues of negotiations in 2004. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The distributive bargaining literature argues that Germany prevails in the European Union due to its superior power resources. This paper tests this expectation empirically by assessing Germany's success on actual EU legislation with three sources of data: Council voting records (2009–2019), decision outcomes on the most controversial proposals (1999–2009) and the outcomes of the Eurozone reform (2010–2015). The results provide no support for Germany's prevalence in daily EU lawmaking. This country is found to cast a substantive number of contestations in the Council and attain significantly lower bargaining success than other member states on key EU secondary legislation. The paper suggests that such poor showing stems from a high extremity and intensity of Germany's preferences. Generally, this study contributes to the scholarly knowledge by refuting the narrative that Germany dictates actual EU legislation and challenging the distributive bargaining argument that states with greater power resources are more successful in the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Negotiations between India and the EU for a Broad-Based Bilateral Trade and Investment Agreement (BTIA) have proven to be a complex and protracted affair. Despite both parties realising the importance of a trade agreement, neither of them intend to provide any concessions to the other party. Moreover, both parties, even after adopting different bargaining techniques, have been unable to come to an agreement. It is for this reason that scholarly interest in the study of the BTIA negotiations has grown dramatically over the last decade. Despite the interest, extant reviews have focused predominantly on the ex post economic benefits of the agreement. Rarely has the role of trust between the EU and India been analysed by the scholars. The primary aim of this article is to conceptualise the role of trust between the EU and India and summarise the bargaining strategies used previously by the parties. On the point of trust, the authors would argue that the signals provided by the leaders of India and the EU have helped in creating trust, which would in turn assist in the negotiations of the BTIA. The authors demonstrate that the presence of mere calculus-based trust led to a breakdown of the BTIA negotiations. Thereafter, attempts have been made at elite, organisational and societal levels to move towards an identification-based trust. The authors conclude that although the process of transitioning from calculus-based trust to identification-based trust is slow and costly, the benefits of the latter would not only result in the possible culmination of the BTIA, but also result in the creation of a long-term strategic partnership. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Complex negotiations are done by people and are often carried out in pursuit of culturally ingrained ideas such as international unity or national sovereignty. As such, they may be subject to the sorts of adaptive biases and reasoning heuristics that are present at the level of individual or collective decision making. The following commentary applies an influential model of intuitive ethics, The Moral Foundations Theory, to the Brexit negotiations. This framework suggests that moral intuitions reflect five adaptive psychological systems shaped by our evolutionary history. Focusing on the three most relevant foundations of Fairness/cheating, Loyalty/betrayal, Authority/subversion, I explore how both parties’ red lines and priorities are consistent with this criterion. In doing so, I hope to provide insight into how innate cognitive biases can inform legal processes with wide-ranging ramifications.

This Article highlights the legal and procedural restrictions a Member States faces during its withdrawal from the EU and subsequent talks on a future trade relationship by analyzing the unprecedented case of the UK. One such restriction consists of an obligation to negotiate withdrawal as a result of the principle of sincere cooperation. Other limits derive from the withdrawal process itself, designed as it was by the European institutions on the basis of a very scant Article 50 TEU. By then comparing the three substantive pillars of the EU-UK WA—citizens' rights, the financial settlement, and the Irish border— with the UK's initial negotiating red lines, I offer two conclusions: That the aforementioned constraints on the withdrawing state can significantly weaken the defense of its interests during its withdrawal process and that having to agree to important issues in a first and separate stage of "orderly withdrawal" talks also diminishes the state's bargaining power with regards to the next stage of negotiating a future partnership with the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explains why the European Union has remained strikingly cohesive during the Brexit withdrawal negotiations by focussing on the role played by its negotiator: the European Commission''s Task Force 50. The analysis demonstrates that the Task Force 50 set out to forge unity among the EU27 by exercising both subtle instrumental and direct political leadership. The Commission significantly influenced the outcome of the negotiations by shaping the agenda and process, brokering deals, and ultimately achieving a withdrawal agreement that all member states signed up to. Its transparent and consultative behaviour generated trust among member states, which allowed the Commission to play such a prominent role. These findings challenge the prevailing view that the EU has become increasingly intergovernmental at expense of the Commission. Drawing on original interviews, the article substantiates this argument by tracing the Commission's leadership activities in the run‐up to and throughout the withdrawal negotiations (2016–20). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article is devoted to the analysis of the consequences of the referendum on the UK’s membership in the European Union. The causes that contributed to the radical transformation of political processes and crisis phenomena in the framework of European integration processes are revealed. It is noted that the crisis of the British model of democracy and the rise of “monitoring democracy”, as well as the constitutional reforms in the UK, which were not brought to a logical conclusion, influenced the effectiveness of political institutions. The range of new complex issues of constitutional, legal, financial, economic, social and humanitarian nature that need to be addressed in the context of brexit is determined.The features of the development and implementation of the strategies of the United Kingdom and the European Union on the negotiation process are considered. The most important stages of negotiations on the problem of developing an agreement defining the conditions and principles of relations between the parties in the post-brexit period are studied. Particular attention is paid to the key controversial issues - the implementation of the financial obligations of the United Kingdom to the EU, guarantees the rights of EU citizens and their families living in the UK, as well as the preservation of the free movement of people, goods, services and capital between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland.The author analyzes internal and external factors that have a direct impact on the course of the dialogue, arguments and counter-arguments of the parties, the reasons for the change in the positions of the United Kingdom and EU leaders on key issues of cooperation in the new historical conditions. There is a deep split between British society and the main political forces of the country on the issue of withdrawal from the EU. The factors that led the UK to a serious political crisis and the inability to develop an adequate and effective brexit strategy are considered.

The article reflects on the negotiations on the EU's 2021-2027 Multiannual Financial Framework and the European Union Recovery Instrument. It gives an overview of exceptional circumstances surrounding the negotiations, broad scope of the legislative package negotiated, and complex decision-making process. The paper also examines the final agreement, in particular as regards the size of the new long-term budget, the shift in spending priorities, and changes in the way the EU actions are financed. The author concludes that despite many difficulties on the road to the agreement, some elements of the outcome can be characterised as groundbreaking. She gives some arguments that a departure from path dependency in financing of the EU is possible. However, whether or not the change is permanent, depends on the successful implementation of the decisions made. The Conference on the Future of Europe gives an opportunity to continue the debate on further reform of the EU finances. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper analyzes the attitude of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland towards European integration before and after the referendum on 23 June, in which the citizens of Great Britain voted to leave the full membership of the European Commonwealth. The paper points out that Great Britain had certain reservations about the realization of the plan for European integration, and it underlines the complexity of Great Britain's attitude towards European integration, which can be most clearly shown through the analysis of its traditional geographical and cultural isolationism, but also through integration, before and after its accession to the European Community in 1973. In the end, it is concluded that Brexit surprised the ruling elite in both Great Britain and the EU and it is emphasized that it is a historical event of first-class importance for the country itself, which produces numerous economic and geopolitical consequences for Europe and the whole world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Brexit makes both a direct and an indirect impact on the European Parliament (EP). The most direct consequence is the withdrawal of the 73-member strong UK contingent and the changing size of the political groups. Yet, the impact of Brexit is also felt in more oblique ways. Focussing on the role and influence of the EP in the EU--UK negotiations, and of the British delegation in the EP, this article shows that the process, and not just the outcome of Brexit, has significant organisational implications for the EP and its political groups.Moreover, it also showcases the importance of informal rules and norms of behaviour, which were affected by Brexit well ahead of any formal change to the UK status as a Member State. The EP and its leadership ensured the active involvement of the EP in the negotiating process--albeit in different ways for the withdrawal agreement and the future relationship--and sought to minimise the costs of Brexit, reducing the clout of British members particularly in the allocation of legislative reports. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the substantial academic tradition of studies of the rotating Presidency of the Council of the European Union, so far there have been few research efforts towards developing a comprehensive, methodologically sound framework for evaluating the performance and achievements of the Presidency of the Council of the EU, based on objective indicators. The paper aims to contribute towards this under-researched area by proposing a framework of indicators for empirical analysis and evaluation of the performance of the Presidency. The set of indicators is elaborated on the basis of examination of existing normative framework and procedural rules of the Council of the EU and on an in-depth review of the programmes, activities and results of the Trio Presidencies Estonia-Bulgaria-Austria (1 July 2017–31 December 2018). The paper concludes with a discussion and suggestions for further research. The proposed methodological framework can be implemented through the elaboration of indexes for measuring and quantifying the Presidency performance, which is a step towards overcoming the descriptive bias in many of the existing assessments of the Council of the EU. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Turkish Studies - Economics, Finance, Politics is the property of Electronic Turkish Studies and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Politicians on all sides failed to engage in serious debate about trade policy in the referendum. The ensuing debates on the implementation of Brexit lacked clarity on trade policy, processes, and the implications of these for business, consumers and the ability to negotiate new deals. The UK Government has only been consistent in its ability to frequently change its trade policy demands. The meaning of Single Market, Free Trade Agreement, Customs Union etc were widely misunderstood. Mrs May tried to preserve 'Frictionless trade'. More recently the ability to 'strike new trade deals' has become the most advertised 'gain' from Brexit. But the argument has focussed entirely on the ability to exercise sovereignty. Economic costs, including the impact of Coronavirus Disease (COVID) and its implications for trade rules, are hardly discussed on the UK side but the EU has also taken a fairly principled stand. We are not in a position to predict the final outcome but would argue that if there were to be no deal it would not be an accident but rather a logical consequence of the British view emphasizing sovereignty above all else. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On 31 January 2020, the UK left the European Union after 47 years of membership. This paper uses the conceptual distinction between integrative and distributive bargaining to compare the EU's and the UK's approaches in the negotiations that led to the Withdrawal Agreement, setting out the terms of the UK's exit, and the Political Declaration on the framework for the future EU–UK relationship. While it would be rational to expect both parties to adopt integrative approaches given the nature of the issues, the long history of cooperation, and the parties' mutual interest in maintaining a close relationship in the future, the comparison demonstrates that it was mainly the EU that leaned towards the integrative end of the negotiating spectrum, with extensive internal consultations, a willingness to engage in open and interest-based discussions aimed at problem-solving, and high levels of transparency, whereas the UK leaned further to the distributive end, reflecting less engagement and consultation with domestic constituents, a focus on pre-determined positions that need defending, and lower levels of transparency. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Central European Political Studies / Środkowoeuropejskie Studia Polityczne is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Over the last decade, European Union (EU) trade agreement negotiations in the form of the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Canada have been strongly contested. By contrast, many other EU trade negotiations have sailed on with far less politicization, or barely any at all. In this contribution, we assess a series of plausible explanation for these very varying degrees of politicization across EU trade agreement negotiations--conceived of as the combination of polarization of opinions, salience given to them in public debate, and the expansion of the number of societal actors involved therein. Through a review of existing explanations, we show how each of these explanations faces a set of challenges. In the third section, we argue it is useful to conceive of these existing explanations as structural background conditions enabling agency on the part of interest group and civil society organizations. We therefore close by sketching how literature on the relationship between interest group mobilization and public opinion could inform further comparative research on trade policy negotiations, and on politicization of EU policy making in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

After the Lisbon Treaty has entered into force, the process of concluding treaties between the EU and third countries or international organizations has sustained significant changes. The most important procedural novelty is the establishment of the ordinary procedure that covers almost all agreements the EU concludes with third parties. Under the Lisbon Treaty, this procedure involves a number of stages: negotiations, signing the agreement, and decision to conclude the agreement. For agreements whose subject matter exclusively or predominantly falls into the domain of common foreign and security policy, there are several derogations from the uniform rules of the ordinary procedure. The same provision of the founding treaty regulates the procedures for amending and suspending the agreement in force, as well as the judicial control procedure of those agreements that are yet to be concluded. The ordinary procedure does not cover two subject-specific proceedings pertaining to relatively narrow areas of EU action. More specifically, they refer to the conclusion of agreements in the area of common trade policy and agreements on the exchange rate of the Euro against the currencies of non-member states. The exclusion of trade agreements is probably the result of the differences that still exist in the division of competencies between the Member States and the EU regarding trade in the area of some services. On the other hand, the enactment of a special procedure for agreements on the Euro exchange rate in relation to the national currency rates of third countries stems from the need to ensure the Union's unique position in this field. On the institutional level, the most important actors in the process of concluding EU agreements are the Council, the Commission and the European Parliament. The Council has retained the central role in all types of treaty procedures, and it decides on essential issues related to the course and outcome of the process. The Commission has retained the major role in initiating and negotiating the agreements, but it is no longer the exclusive initiator and negotiator in the agreement process. Namely, depending on the subject of the treaty, new entrants in that role are the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, and the European Central Bank. The European Parliament has strengthened its position in the procedure for concluding EU agreements and can, therefore, be considered the largest 'net' winner of the Lisbon Treaty reform. This is partly due to its new role in the course of negotiations, which implies the right to be immediately and fully informed about all stages of the proceedings, but to a much greater extent it refers to the powers that this body has in the final stage preceding the conclusion of the agreement. Finally, the EU Court of Justice has an important role in this process; its task is to control the compliance of the EU agreements with the founding treaties prior to their conclusion.

The paper focuses on emphasising the role that internal constraints and domestic political events play in designing the strategic behaviour and position of the EU in the negotiation process of The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership - TTIP. The paper pursues a three-pronged approach in order to: (1) identify and define the set of domestic constraints, (2) assess their influence on EU’s strategic position, and (3) suggest both available and desirable future courses of action to improve the negotiation outcome. The results should inform the approach towards the general structure of negotiations to be accomplished through a multi-level analysis: starting from a broad EU perspective on the deal, complemented by a disaggregated domestic level perspective that will emphasize EU members’ position and interests in the agreement, as well as an industry/sector-based implications of each item on the negotiations agenda.

International negotiations are an essential part of the European Union’s (EU) external affairs. A key aspect to negotiations is access to and sharing of information among the EU institutions involved as well as to the general public. Oversight of negotiations requires insight into the topics of negotiation, the positions taken and the strategies employed. Concurrently, however, some space for confidentiality is necessary for conducting the negotiations and defending EU interests without fully revealing the limit negotiating positions of the EU to the negotiating partner. Hence, attaining a balance between the necessities of oversight and confidentiality in negotiations is the subject of a dynamic debate between the EU institutions. This paper provides a joint analysis on EU oversight institutions’ position on transparency in international negotiations. We set out to answer whether parliamentary, judicial and administrative branches of oversight are allies in pursuing the objectives of transparency but also examine when their positions diverge.

The reality is that we have witnessed in the last 4 years, since the procedure of negotiating the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union in 2016 has started, a real political impasse on the stage of European relations. Who would have imagined on the 1st of January 1973, when England became a member of the European Union after many indecisions -- some of them more arrogant than others that in 47 years' time it will be the first Member State to avail itself of Article 50 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which for the first time provided for the right of a Member State to withdraw voluntarily from the European Union? If we look a little at the historical context of England's accession to the EU, we may see similar hesitations that have delayed it so much in joining the EU. Although after the end of the Second World War the economic situation of England was precarious, it still manages to become one of the great world powers. However, in 1951 it refused to join the founding group of the ECSC and also refused to sign the Treaty of Rome in 1957. England believed that the status of leader of the Commonwealth offered you a privileged status compared to other European states in international affairs, especially those with the United States of America, but, nevertheless, it did not bring benefits in the relations with the 6 European states, that were going to establish the European Union. When it realized that this was not a good way for things to happen, in 1961 announced its intention to join the European Economic Community, only that in 1963 France voted against the request. It was only after Charles de Gaulle's resignation in 1969 that the United Kingdom's path to accession was opened. Political and economic integration seemed to be the best solution for achieving a stable economic future. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of Yearbook of European Integration / Rocznik Integracji Europejskiej is the property of Faculty of Political Science & Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

Copyright of Journal of Political Sciences is the property of Republic of Iraq Ministry of Higher Education & Scientific Research (MOHESR) and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

After the negotiations for the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) triggered massive public mobilization in the European Union (EU), literature emerged on the novel 'politicization' of trade in Europe. To be sure, public salience was high around the TTIP negotiations. However, public salience over EU trade and investment negotiations has varied considerably over the past two decades. The objective of this paper is to stimulate a research agenda explaining such variation. After presenting evidence of variation (over time, across contemporaneous negotiations, and across Member States), we review a diverse set of literature to lay out six complementary explanations for why some trade deals provoke public salience, while others do not: changing nature of trade and investment negotiations; growing discontent with globalization; transformation of the media landscape; institutional changes brought about by the 2009 Lisbon Treaty; the role of the United States; and foreign interference. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]