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Climate change impact on sovereign debt management has become an issue of great concern. The aim of this paper is to analyse the changes in the traditional approach of sovereign debt managers in the face of the pursued climate policy and different scenarios of climate liabilities for 2050. We follow a novel three-fold research approach: 1) assessment of the estimated level of current climate liabilities based on the Fiscal Risk Matrix; 2) performing forward-looking climate debt projections over the timeframe 2025-2050 for the EU countries; 3) conducting case study research on EU countries, to identify the sovereign climate debt management activities undertaken so far and to define a series of good-practice guidelines. Findings indicate a growing role of the climate financial mechanisms in sovereign debt management. In particular, our climate scenario approach reveals those scenarios in which a country's fiscal position indicators are more vulnerable from the standpoint of rising public expenditure due to the country's inability to manage CO2 gas emissions. Each country is responsible for its climate pathway by 2050 and this will be mainly determined by the timeliness, efficacy and appropriateness of the public policies and measures implemented to mitigate climate change. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This study aimed to highlight the issue of climate-oriented public policy forms, scales, and means of their implementation as well as their limitations. Based on an empirical case study of the French West Indies (Guadeloupe), we analyzed climate policy integration in programmatic local policies and sectoral practices. This study sheds light on the banana sector and how climate change is mainstreamed at a local level. In Guadeloupe, the climate change paradigm is grabbed and 'invisibilized' into sectoral policies and practices. By paying attention to who implements the policies regarding the adaptation of agriculture to climate change (AACC) and how, we highlighted the capacity of the banana sector to retrieve policy instruments dedicated to the AACC to support their own agricultural and environmental agenda. We also paid attention to their local and sectoral transfer and their 'fluid' implementation: implementation is multiform, compelled by limitations. Finally, we concluded that implementation of the AACC policy depends on four variables: (a) the multilevel governance and the complex process of reinterpretation of European Union (EU) policy and rules, (b) the specific polycentric governance style (c) that is centered on a powerful banana chain, and (d) the environmental agenda that gives priority to local vulnerabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The Paris Agreement, adopted in 2015, paved the way for a new hybrid global climate governance architecture with both bottom-up and top-down elements. While governments can choose individual climate goals and actions, a global stocktake and a ratcheting-up mechanism have been put in place with the overall aim to ensure that collective efforts will prevent increasing adverse impacts of climate change. Integrated assessment models show that current combined climate commitments and policies of national governments fall short of keeping global warming to 1.5 °C or 2 °C above preindustrial levels. Although major greenhouse gas emitters, such as China, the European Union, India, the United States under the Biden administration, and several other countries, have made new pledges to take more ambitious climate action, it is highly uncertain where global climate policy is heading. Scenarios in line with long-term temperature targets typically assume a simplistic and hardly realistic level of harmonization of climate policies across countries. Against this backdrop, this article develops four archetypes for the further evolution of the global climate governance architecture and matches them with existing sets of scenarios developed by integrated assessment models. By these means, the article identifies knowledge gaps in the current scenario literature and discusses possible research avenues to explore the pre-conditions for successful coordination of national policies towards achieving the long-term target stipulated in the Paris Agreement. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

At international climate conferences, the European Union (EU) and its member states both are negotiating partners. The EU signs the treaties to protect the climate, the member states ratify and translate them into national policy. Based on the literature on actorness, we identify different dimensions in which the EU's actor quality is articulated. Actorness has internal dimensions, such as the transfer of responsibilities, and external dimensions, such as the recognition as a contracting party by other states. Actorness, however, cannot be grasped by analysing institutions alone, but also arises discursively and situationally. We trace EU actorness for four critical points in time in international climate policy and can thus show that actorness in the policy field has increased overall over time, but that the full potential has not yet been exploited. In some dimensions, a temporary decline in actorness could be observed, especially at the Copenhagen summit. The analysis of actorness can also contribute to the explanation of a possible lack of effectiveness. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This contribution investigates the strategies that environmental agencies develop to enhance their policy autonomy, in order to fulfil their organisational missions for protecting the environment. This article asks whether there are particular strategic moves that an agency can make to augment this policy autonomy in the face of the principals. Critiquing principal agent theory, it investigates the evolution of three environmental agencies (the European Environment Agency, the England and Wales Environment Agency and the United States Environmental Protection Agency), focusing on the case study of climate change. The contribution examines how the agencies influence environmental policy on domestic, regional and global levels, with a special focus on the principals that constrain agency autonomy. A greater focus on different multi-level contexts, which the three agencies face, may create other possible dynamics and opportunities for agency strategies. Agencies can use particular knowledge, network and alliance building to strengthen their policy/political positions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses findings of a survey conducted by the European Commission (EC) and other European Union (EU) environmental institutions and bodies reflecting key developments in environmental policies related to biodiversity, climate change and water policy. Topics discussed include the EC's prospective international negotiations over Sustainable Development Goals, the EU's new rules on environmental impact assessment, and Environmental Council's meeting on genetically modified organisms.

The European Union's (EU) decision to include aviation into the Emissions Trade Scheme was heatedly contested. Countries around the world, but mainly the Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa group (BRICS) and the US, denounced the EU's initiate as illegal and unilateral. Following a decade of frustrated negotiations at the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), this paper interrogates why such measure, in principle climate-friendly, inspired so much global resentment. I argue that concerns with competitiveness and risks of legal inconsistency are important, but insufficient elements to explain the core of the conflict. The paper suggests that the EU was strongly criticized because third countries perceived this action as an imposed solution, which fostered an environment of distrust. Therefore, I claim that the problem has more to do with a normative divide than with a substantive divergence on what should be done regarding aviation emissions. My analysis is informed by the present literature on the links between trade and climate change, but gives particular weight to first-hand information through interviews with key stakeholders. The paper is divided in three parts. First, it presents the scope of the EU directive in historical perspective. Second, it explores the EU's measure through three different angles: legal, economical and political. The final part explores some possible solutions to overcome these divergences. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The European Union (EU) Emission Trading System (ETS) has been a major tool of the EU climate policy. Despite its significance, the EU ETS faces serious challenges regarding its function. One of the major issues that encumber its contribution in EU climate policy is value added tax (VAT) carousel fraud within it. This paper examined the ways this type of swindle is conducted and its economic impact. It analyses the parameters that facilitate it and evaluates the responses of the EU and its Member States and mainly the introduction of the reverse charge mechanism. It finally highlights the need to implement some changes to the EU ETS, the VAT provisions, and the way the national tax authorities and the EU coordinate. Finally, it suggests the introduction of a real-time VAT collection mechanism that can be an effective and feasible solution to the problem in general. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the international trade and climate change joint agenda. It states that trade-climate change intersection policies expanded to the European Union, World Trade Organization (WTO) and U.S. It notes that modern research contributions on the possible interactions between international climate and trade government are focused on international competitiveness, issues on greenhouse gas leakage, and problems related to the multilateral climate change contracts. It mentions that the agenda includes counteracting border measure that deals with international competition and free-rider problems, tariffs and non-tariff barriers to trade, investment and technology transfer of climate-friendly goods and services, and international aviation and maritime shipping industries issues.

At the European Council's December 2008 summit and with the European Parliament's decision a week later, a political agreement was reached on the Commission's Climate-Energy package of January 2008, which will profoundly shape Europe's climate policy for the next decade. Europe is therefore the first actor in the run up to the global climate negotiations in Copenhagen to come forward with a detailed program confirmed by parliament. Center of attention in the negotiations was the EU's emissions trading system. From 2013 this will be centrally administered by the European Commission and so guarantee the same conditions throughout Europe. In order to get all the member states to agree, however, the French Council presidency had to include numerous derogations in a compromise package: the promised reduction targets were not changed, but the effectiveness of the instruments was weakened. Alongside the Directive on emissions trading a decision was passed that imposes limits on member states' discharge of greenhouse gases in the sectors not covered by the emissions trading regime. These targets are legally binding by 2020. Though only mentioned in passing in the media a Directive on renewable energy was passed that for the first time includes all sectors - that is, electricity generation, transport, and heating / cooling - and also lays down binding national levels by 2020. Alongside these central aspects of future European climate policy outline conditions and financing mechanisms for carbon capture and storage technology and for emissions caps for new cars were legally enshrined. While its final compromise means that the European Union formally retains its leadership role in the campaign against climate change, at the same time it has left a number of losers at various levels. One of them is the European Parliament. Under pressure of time and the member states' entrenchment, MEPs were confronted with a matter of conscience but were severely constrained in bringing to bear their own long nurtured and ambitious position. The developing countries may be regarded as the second losers. They are largely innocent victims of anthropogenic climate change, yet for the most part they are excluded from relief measures within the framework of Western climate policy. The EU heads of state and government denied them financial aid from the emissions trading system and technological support. Despite its flaws, the scope of the compromise package is of enormous significance and its targets are ambitious. Europe is therefore entitled to claim its exemplary role. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article evaluates the cooperative federalism models. It mentions that the Warner-Lieberman bill is the most important federal legislation because it provides only a limited role for the states. Among the cooperative federalism models are the decentralized approaches taken by the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, the Emissions Trading Systems of the European Union, and the Clean Air Act.

The neoliberalisation of international climate policy through devices such as emissions trading has led to a significant restructuring of governance competencies between supranational, national and non-state actors. This article explores the implications of this restructuring for the scalar politics of climate governance by examining the European Union emissions trading scheme, the world's largest multi-state carbon-trading scheme. Analysis shows that although the member states were prepared to accede to a common legal framework for emissions trading, its implementation has been characterised by intense sovereignty disputes over emissions allowances. The article concludes by reflecting on the scalar politics of international climate governance in an unevenly regulated and competitive world. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The author discusses the controversy behind European Union Emissions Trading Scheme as a European climate policy to address climate change and reduce emissions of industrial greenhouse gas. He says that the carbon price that the scheme sets is too low to incentivize a switch from coal to low- or zero-emission alternatives. He also emphasizes that as an intertemporal trading scheme, prices of carbon should reflect expectations of future allowance scarcities in times of non-binding caps.