Search

Moral options are permissions to do less than best, impartially speaking. In this paper, we investigate the challenge of reconciling moral options with the ideal of justifiability to each individual. We examine ex-post and ex-ante views of moral options and show how they might conflict with this ideal in single-choice and sequential-choice cases, respectively. We consider some ways of avoiding this conflict in sequential-choice cases, showing that they face significant problems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article examines questions of the family and its role and place in the system of life values in northern regions, where familial traditions have been preserved. Results of six demographic-sociological studies conducted in 1993–2011 in the Republic of Sakha (Yakutia) are presented. A broad spectrum of opinions about the value and significance of family is revealed. Three main groupings of life values established their relevance for the preservation of familial traditions. Differing views are explained concerning competition among familial, societal-labor and personal orientations as functions of the age and marital and social status of study participants. Family retains its significance in the life of northerners, given their clear child-centric priorities. The relevance for survey participants of material well-being and acceptable modern housing is understood by the authors as a base condition for the life-sustenance of families, and in such a context is not a competitor to family as a fundamental life value for northerners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does social justice lose all application in the (imaginary, of course) condition in which people are morally flawless? The answer, I will argue, is that it does not — justice might still have application. This is one lesson of my broader thesis in this paper, that there is a variety of conditions we would all regard as highly idealistic and unrealistic which are, nevertheless, not beyond justice. The idea of “circumstances of justice” developed especially by Hume and Rawls may seem to point in a more realistic direction, but we can see that this is not so once we distinguish between conditions of need for norms of justice, conditions of their emergence, and conditions of applicability of the standard of justice. Justice, I argue, can have application even in conditions where no mechanism of justice is present or needed, such as the case of internalized motives of justice. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Current debates about ideal theory and idealization in modern moral and political philosophy do not typically scrutinize the form of reflection itself. This is an unfortunate oversight: assumptions about the form of reflection shape the positions defended in those debates. I argue that the appropriate form of reflection on the nature and justification of standards of justice and morality is the form of practical reason. I further argue that the form of practical reason cannot support many of the idealizations typically deployed in modern moral and political philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Translated by Phillip Griffith [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, the author offers his opinion on moral dilemmas and analyzes its implications for the structure of normative moral systems. He examines two criteria of consistency that can be used to evaluate a given moral system. The first criterion assumes that a satisfactory moral system will not allow irresolvable moral conflicts to occur and the second criterion allows irresolvable moral conflicts to occur, but also holds that there are possible worlds in which no such conflicts occur. He believes that the second criterion is more plausible, however the respective roles that the criterions assign to moral dilemmas appear similar. He also discusses several concepts related to the issue.

In this article we defend a moral conception of cosmopolitanism and its relevance for moral education. Our moral conception of cosmopolitanism presumes that persons possess an inherent dignity in the Kantian sense and therefore they should be recognised as ends-in-themselves. We argue that cosmopolitan ideals can inspire moral educators to awaken and cultivate in their pupils an orientation and inclination to struggle against injustice. Moral cosmopolitanism, in other words, should more explicitly inform the work that moral educators do. Real-world constraints on moral action and the need to prioritise one's sometimes conflicting responsibilities will often qualify cosmopolitan justice as supererogatory. This fact does not absolve persons from aspiring to see themselves as having the moral obligation to help others in need, while recognising that their factual obligations are more modest in being bound by what they are actually able to do. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

My aim is to vindicate two distinct and important moral categories - ideals and aspirations - which have received modest, and sometimes negative, attention in recent normative debates. An ideal is a conception of perfection or model of excellence around which we can shape our thoughts and actions. An aspiration, by contrast, is an attitudinal position of steadfast commitment to, striving for, or deep desire or longing for, an ideal. I locate these two concepts in relation to more familiar moral concepts such as duty, virtue, and the good to demonstrate, amongst other things, first, that what is morally significant about ideals and aspirations cannot be fully accommodated within a virtue ethical framework that gives a central role to the Virtuous Person as a purported model of excellence. On a certain interpretation, the Virtuous Person is not a meaningful ideal formoral agents. Second, I articulate one sense in which aspirations are morally required imaginative acts given their potential to expand the realm of practical moral possibility. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Nihilism as a way of thinking is the common name of views that know no value. Historically nihilism as a view that can be taken back to Sophists and especially Gorgias expresses a way of thinking and living that the feelings of meaninglessness, emptiness and nihility inspire. Nihilism in Nietzsche's system of thought appears as a historical movement, not as a way of thinking that occurs in any time of the Western thought. In fact nihilism is essentially a basic event in the Western history. It is the realization that all values have lost their values and all values must be re-evaluated. Nihilism is a philosophy upon whose shield the denial of life is inscribed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Upon close examination of Rousseau's accounts of human development, we find that Rousseau presents us with paradoxical chronologies in which the experience of supposed immediacy from which humans are said to originate always seems to be informed by, and even require, previous mediation. More specifically, reflection, comparison, and imagination are thought to exist only after the onset of perfectibility, but these mediating capacities are always already present in pity and self-love, as well as for the "independent" savage, calling into question the possibility that any human sentiment or condition could be immediately accessible and fundamentally imbuing human life with ambiguity, fluidity, and disorder. Consequently, morality and freedom for Rousseau require the negotiation, stabilization, or management of the unstable "things between" human beings and their experiences, the object world, and others, even as such management is best hidden from view and experienced as given and true. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the aspects of proportionment of happiness to virtue and the relevance of future divine justice amidst many moral difficulties surrounding the idea. It explores the transactional model of punishment and reward for those who neglect their continuing relationship with God who judges. It mentions that the idea of a proportionment of happiness to virtue represents a simplification of the on-going task human beings face in realizing morality among themselves.

The concepts of "appearance" and "reality" (in the title of the book) is a safe-conduct permitting the author to carry out a true X-ray analysis of a thought--that we commonly call "Greek philosophy"--which acknowledges that we live in a world that could be better, which assumes that anyone who wants to improve his life must aspire to certain ideals. This eminently ethical perspective appears in the section about Socratism and Plato. And perhaps unwillingly the author states the necessity to weaken, and even suppress, the so commented "separation" (khôrismós) between the intelligible and the sensible word, between epistéme and aísthesis. A detailed analysis of Plato's Sophist would enrich Boeri's thesis. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Part of being a good professional is, so we contend, to have ideals. Ideals essentially complement the deontic considerations that are usually taken as the main components of professional moral deliberation. Yet the notion of professional ideals is problematic. As professional ideals they refer to a profession collectively, while as professional ideals they are first of all strong personal commitments of individual professionals. As collective aspirations, professional ideals have a kind of external normative thrust on individual professionals, but people cannot be forced to identify with ideals on demand. Endorsing ideals can only come from within. On the basis of an analysis of 'professional ideals' and 'professional identity', we conclude that professional ideals are necessary constituents of the personal identity of professionals. This explains the dual character of professional ideals: they are pursued by a collective and constitute the group professional identity but they also need to be endorsed by individual professionals in order to be able to say that the ideals are their own. We end with a short and tentative description of some practical implications for the fostering and education of professional ideals. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the thoughts of the philosopher Charles S. Peirce on ideals and ethics. A brief overview of Pierce's phenomenological categories, and their implications for personal identity, is provided. Topics such as evolutionary love, concrete reasonableness, and the relationship between a person and the world are discussed. This leads to a discussion of objective ethical theory in Pierce's work. An argument is presented that people become authentic, and capable of living a good life, through the embodiment of ethical ideals.

In this article the author discusses the relationship between the dynamic factors affecting military options and military ethics. Factors discussed by the author include ideals, competition of wills, and physical, intellectual and moral dynamics. Also discussed is the need for military leaders to think before taking action.

Examples of "nameless" virtues are discussed by Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics. They are also found in the Confucian Analects. This paper explores what makes a virtue nameless in the Nicomachean Ethics and the Analects, and then argues that restrained speech is best understood as a nameless virtue in the Analects. It further argues that the virtue of restrained speech merits careful study because it contributes to our understanding of nameless virtues generally, while also deepening our understanding of Kongzi's ethics by showing why he thought it was important to cultivate certain virtues. Indeed, many of the things that make restrained speech valuable hold in a contemporary setting as well, making restrained speech a virtue that is important for us today. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Central to Confucian teachings in the Analects is the ideal of selfcultivation-in particular that of the junzi ......(''gentleman'' ''nobleman'') ideal. At the same time that Confucius recommends that individuals follow such an ideal, he also places limits on who actually might attain it. By examining statements involving such terms as the junzi, the ''petty man'' (xiao ren ......), and the ''masses'' (min ..., or zhong ...), or common people, this essay highlights the sociopolitical and gender restrictions informing one of the most basic, yet lofty, ethical goals of the text. A new means is also offered of discussing these socially delimited discrepancies in moral cultivation by referring to leading, or self-determining agency in association with junzi on the one hand, and to conformist agency for women and common people on the other. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the psychological phenomena of "endurance" and "non-endurance," and the ethical implications of a Confucian approach, which regards non-endurance as an impulse of primary virtue. It states that human beings have indefinite desires and intentions, thus a contradiction emerged between limited resources and boundless desires. In order to achieve a balance development, various civilizations have laid down different visible and invisible rules so as to enforce restraints on people's desire with different social status. These rules are actually application of the skill of endurance, which could be a choice made due to fear of punishment. However, from Confucius' perspective, one achieves the greatest virtue-benevolence through a process of exercising self-restraint.

The term ‘knowledge economy’, like the term ‘globalisation’, has become a catchword in political and educational debate over the last decade or so, especially in debates upon educational policy where the role of education in preparing young people to take their part in the Knowledge Economy is often seen as paramount over other traditional schooling activities. It is said in such debates that the production of knowledge, information and skills, will become more valuable than traditional primary and secondary production. A lot is said about the knowledge required in the Knowledge Economy, and about how institutions, businesses, activities and human beings are to be ordered or structured in accordance with views of knowledge and new Management theories. But little is said of the young people expected to take their part in the knowledge economy. Do they have a choice? Is lying on a surfboard excluded from their life options? How will they be developed, trained or educated to take their part? Will they be committed to developing their selves in accordance with the model of the IT Knowledge Entrepreneur (hereinafter TIKE) presented as a model for education by policy makers in the Knowledge Economy? This article will argue against this latter notion of the development of the self, arguing that because knowledge is prioritised over ethics, there is both an inadequate notion of the self and the educational development of the self and, because of its implicit view only of ethics, an inadequate ethical and moral view of education [246 words]. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a social-psychological analysis on the racist value judgments. The authors argue that racist value judgments convey beliefs which are objectively false. They also note that these judgments has a content which is imprecise in principle and rational assessment. They added that their position reacts to a view that the judgments could be offensive to the mind and cuts across several metaethical debates. They further revealed that the notion of objective which they opppose in the claim that racist value judgments are false beliefs imply the idea of the falseness of racist beliefs.

The article presents the author's argument stating that Rossian duties match the moral convictions better than the rule-consequentialist principles. The author claims that the view of rule-consequentialists on whether the wrongness of acts is determined by the ideal principles for the earlier circumstances or by the ideal ones for the new circumstances is in conflict with the moral intuitions. The author further states that rule-consequentialism fails in the reflective equilibrium test of the rule-consequentialists.

The article focuses on the issues of sacredness in negotiations. According to the authors, negotiators won't negotiate if they believe that sacred values such as their safety and health and that of their children would be at stake. They add that sacred values cannot be dealt in a negotiation or be endangered, because they believed that sacred values has no monetary equivalent. Furthermore, they said that sacred values are regarded by some researchers to be a hindrance in getting an outcome in negotiations based in ideology. Other information related to sacredness are also mentioned.

Aristotle famously held that there is a crucial difference between the person who merely acts rightly and the person who is wholehearted in what she does. He captures this contrast by insisting on a distinction between continence and full virtue. One way of accounting for the important difference here is to suppose that, for the genuinely virtuous person, the requirements of virtue “silence” competing reasons for action. I argue that the silencing interpretation is not compelling. As Aristotle rightly saw, virtue can have a cost, and a mark of the wise person is that she recognizes it. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the prominence of the concept of virtue in contemporary ethical theory, accounts of virtue have often left readers with the impression that the virtuous person is an unattainable ideal or is just psychologically implausible. This article argues that reviving the ancient Greek idea that virtues are like practical skills can help provide a more plausible account of virtue and the virtuous person. The moral knowledge of the virtuous person is analogous to the practical knowledge of the expert in a skill. Instead of relying on a reconstruction of an ancient account of skills for the comparison to virtue, this paper adapts a modem account of skill acquisition developed by Hubert and Stuart Dreyfus in their research on artificial intelligence and human expertise. The skill model of virtue offers a promising direction for virtue theory, by using the research on skills to illuminate the otherwise murky concept of virtue. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Aquinas’s admirers, reacting against Donald Davidson’s criticisms of him, commonly argue (a) that the will does play a role in Aquinas’s account of incontinence, and (b) that his explanation of incontinent action turns on the weakness of the will. The first part of this paper argues that they are correct about (a) but wholly mistaken about (b). Aquinas rarely even mentions the weakness of the will, and he never invokes it to explain why someone acts counter to her own better judgment. In his view, such a person has the capacity for self-control but fails to exercise it. The second part of the paper considers Gary Watson’s account of incontinence, including and especially his objections to analyzing it as the failure to exercise one’s capacity for self-control. Here I argue that Aquinas’s account better serves the purposes of moral discourse and that it should not be expected to provide the kind of causal explanation Watson seeks. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Moral rules provide the baseline for ethics, proscribing unacceptable behavior; moral ideals inspire us to act in ways that improve the human condition. Whatever the moral ideals for pure research, science has a practical side so it is important to find a moral ideal to give guidance to more applied research. This article presents a moral ideal for use-inspired research based on Norman Care’s idea of shared-fate individualism This ideal reflects the observation that all human lives, both present and future are tightly coupled and, as a result, research projects should be chosen, where possible, with the goal of service to others. Together with the ideals of the habit of truth and the gift economy, shared-fate individualism provides the basis for a humane ethics of science. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses the relationship of law and morality in relation to constitutional law. Judges are expected to assure the people, by the force and virtue of their decisions, that there are no gaps in the Constitution. The moral obligation of the people is to see that judges are fully committed to the people's higher ideals. Justic Hugo Black shared his insights on the difficulty of reconciling public demands with the judge's own particular oath, during an interview in 1968.

Julia Annas is one of the few modern writers on virtue that has attempted to recover the ancient idea that virtues are similar to skills. In doing so, she is arguing for a particular account of virtue, one in which the intellectual structure of virtue is analogous to the intellectual structure of practical skills. The main benefit of this skill model of virtue is that it can ground a plausible account of the moral epistemology of virtue. This benefit, though, is only available to some accounts of virtue. Annas claims that Aristotle rejects this skill model of virtue, and so the model of virtues as a skill that Annas endorses for the modern virtue theory is Socratic.This paper argues that while Aristotle rejects the Socratic model of virtue as a skill, he does not reject the model of virtue as a skill altogether. Annas has mischaracterized Aristotle’s position on the skill model, because she has not recognized that Aristotle endorses a different account of the structure of skill than the one put forth by Socrates. In addition, recent research on expertise provides an account of skills very much at odds with the description of skills offered by Annas, but similar to the account endorsed by Aristotle.Contrary to Annas, not only is the skill model of virtue compatible with a neo-Aristotelian account of virtue, but it also appears that basing a skill model of virtue on a Socratic account of virtue is likely to prove unsuccessful. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the different type of conflicts encountered when moral values conflict. Conflicts may arise due to the occurrence of two obligations at the same period. It explores the importance of identifying the prima facie duties to be able to determine the duties to be accomplished. Moreover, conflicting rights, ideals and virtues are some of the factors that complicates the decision of fulfilling an obligation.

Aristotle's ethical theory is often seen as instructing agents in the prudent pursuit of their own well-being, and therefore labeled egoistic. Yet it is also subject to the opposing charge of failing to direct agents to their well-being, directing them instead to perfection. I am here concerned chiefly with the second criticism, and proceed as follows: I first articulate Sumner's version of the criticism, and second assess his argument for his own (subjective) account of well-being. Third, I present reasons motivating a more objective account of well-being, reasons for taking another look at Aristotle. Finally, granting that Aristotle does indeed direct agents to pursue their perfection, I argue that perfection includes well-being within it. This shows how Aristotle escapes the second criticism, while at the same time pointing the way toward a defense against the first. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper considers ethical decision making by blending three streams of related research: cognitive moral development of the decision maker, rational choice theory and a subjective expected utility model. Ethical dilemmas can be defined as situations where moral certainty is compromised by rational cognition. In this paper, the authors assume that some people use a morality-first perspective and others a rationality-first perspective. Ethical scenarios were written and used to test hypotheses derived from this perspective. The instrument developed was shown to be in need of further refinement. Results are discussed in terms of relationships between participant-characteristics variables overall and subscale responses to the ethical scenarios. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Examines the interpretation of the existence of ethical ideal by philosopher Hermann Cohen. Comparison of Cohen's philosophy on existence of ideal with the arguments of fellow philosopher Immanuel Kant; Role of sensation in the existence of ideal; Analogy between logic and ethics.

In any realm, perfection designates the highest possible satisfaction of a standard of value. Moral perfection essentially consists of a person's practicing his moral principles as fully as he is able. This paper defends moral perfection as a proper ideal. Perfection must be understood contextually, however, as relative to the capacities of a particular individual. The tendency to dismiss perfection as unattainable is problematic for three primary reasons: it undercuts morality's ability to perform its function; the corresponding failure to abide by one's principles exacts a severe psychological toll; by excusing immorality, it undermines the gravity of morality. The paper suggests two general sources of skepticism toward perfection's possibility and addresses several specific objections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article is concerned with newly qualified teachers' endeavour to reconcile their personal values and beliefs with the reality of teaching. The article arguesthat they do not only need to become experts in the technical aspects of teaching, but need also to develop the professional capability to manage conflicts arising out of the interaction of their personal and professional lives. The 10 newly qualified secondary teachers participating in this qualitative study were amongst the first cohort to undergo the statutory induction programme introduced in England in September 1999. By adopting a case-study approach, data collection took place by means of semi-structured questionnaires and interviews. Particular attention is paid to the way in which the newly qualified teachers attempted to develop into reflective-reflexive practitioners by negotiating a balance of professional autonomy and institutional conformity and by reconciling their personal beliefs and values with those expected by and of the profession. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article focuses on city officials' actions when morality issues (gay rights, pornography regulations, etc.) are at stake. Cases drawn from a systematic sample of cities reveal a continuum of local officials' actions ranging from actions unfavorable to activists to evasion of the issue to actions favorable to activists. In order to account for this variation, hypotheses are developed that identify, institutional, arrangements, ideology of issue activists, and the community's cultural context as key explanatory concepts. Empirical tests show that (a) officials m cities with more developed counter-cultural elements handle morality issues differently than officials in cities where orthodox/traditional sub-cultural elements dominate, (b) narrower measures of community demand/references specific to particular kinds of incidents are less useful in predicting governmental action on these issues, (c) institutions (ward versus at-large council elections; mayor versus city manager executive) are important in mediating the expectations or pressures stemming from the local sub-culture, and (d) official actions vary considerably depending upon the ideological stance and degree of controversiality of issue activists, but this too is contingent on the mediating effects of institutional arrangements. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on Michael Sandel's formative project about perfectionism, freedom, and virtue. With regards to perfection-based politics, Sandel works as a republicanism that is teleology or perfectionist in evaluating public rules in terms of the moral worth or intrinsic good of the ends they serve. On this view, the right is determined by what honors or advances some important human good. Furthermore, Sandel goes to defend a positive conception of freedom and the public promotion of substantive virtues linked to the realization of that freedom and that good.

The early part of the twentieth century was as revolutionary in the domain of ethical ideas as in other realms. An ethical culture inherited from the preceding century was to all appearance destroyed. This culture, the high-bourgeois culture of the nineteenth century, had emerged gradually from years of revolution and counter-revolution, and seemed then to be developing steadily and expanding its reach towards the end of the century and up to the first world war. Yet what followed it, and in fact overlapped with it, being already presaged well before the war, was quite other: the mainly 20th century phase we call ‘Modernism’, acutely fragmented not only in aesthetic but also in ethical terms, marked in politics by nationalist, collectivist and populist clashes. However, Modernism too, and in particular, many of the ideas in ethics which were characteristic of it, now belongs to history. That much has for some time been clear; the change is complicated, confused, hard to outline; discernibly though, we're in a new period and have been for perhaps a third of a century—quite how long depends on which aspect of change one considers, and on how one interprets its character. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Berlin's theory of human nature is criticized on two grounds. First, within his substantive account of us, there is a tension between the Kantian vision of persons as purposive (which requires that we be free) and the Herderian pluralism (which depicts liberty as equal to other values). Second, his claim that theories of self-realization are inherently prone to rationalist perversion—and political oppression—is depicted as mistaken because it is teleology, and not the regularities of human change, that perverts our ideals. To resolve the tension within Berlin's account, a non-teleological account of our moral development is suggested: once secured, we can grow in a variety of contradictory directions. Liberty—which, along with justice and privacy, fosters security—is thus not the height of a superior morality, but a part of the psychological basis of any valid morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay explores the convergence of theoretical or foundational, historical, and comparative concerns in religious ethics through the examination of two religiously informed traditions on statecraft, that shaped by Augustine's idea of the civitas dei and that shaped by classical Islamic juristic thought on the dar al-islam. Three issues are examined for each tradition: the concept of normative political order, the nature of justified use of force, and the implications of their rival claims to universality. The essay shows how the normative logic and implications of each tradition can be properly understood only by attention to its historical development. It further argues that possibilities for conversation between these traditions, difficult or even nonexistent in terms of the original statements of the Augustinian and juristic ideals, may be identified by attention to the historical working out of these ideals in the practice of statecraft within the two cultures. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On the basis of the Weber, Jaspers, and Arendt style 'ideal types' of the manager as Eichmann, Richard III, and Faust it is explained how under strong organizational pressures to obey orders and further organizational ends, different types of managers cooperate with organization behavior that harms people. On the basis of Arendt's and Tillich's action philosophies, the manager as Institution Citizen with the courage to be both as oneself and as a part is presented as alternative, contrast, and resistance model to the other 'ideal types', particularly to the Eichmann 'ideal type'. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Geographical education and moral values education are often connected. A broad philosophical perspective is taken in order to clarify the role of the geographical educator who also dons the mantle of moral educator. An argument is outlined in favour of teaching objective substantive moral values and against teacher neutrality. The existence of tensions between geographical education and moral education is alluded to and illustrated by reference to what is meant by an environmental morality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article analyzes the use of nature as the foundation for social ideals and values. Plato and Aristotle conceived nature as representing not the beginnings of things but their ultimate purpose. Making an analysis of the purpose or end of man, of his ideals, they found it to be in a social order of an intellectually aristocratic sort. Plato's reflections drove him to the conclusion that the individual could find his ideal only in a social order. Social ideals represent the highest values which a group of individuals may attain by functioning together. Without this functioning the individual can attain nothing; with it, it is possible or each to attain his maximum happiness. Between the downfall of the Grecian state and the erection of Romanism and Christianity, individuals here and there were seeking to find some sort of ideals that might sustain them in a troubled world. The most important ideal presented was that of Stoicism. Having no social order in which their ideals might rest, the Stoics fell back upon nature. This theory of nature as moral, as a right system of laws into which man's ideals must somehow fit, was refined and enlarged as man became more sophisticated and critical. Nature came to be conceived as a vast system of morally right laws. Reason was the existence in man of divine nature, and all directions of conduct should come from it.