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The concept of the person has come to be intimately connected with questions about the value of life. It is applied to those sorts of beings who have some special value or moral importance and where we need to prioritize the needs or claims of different sorts of individuals. "Person" is a concept designating individuals like us in some important respects, but possibly including individuals who are very unlike us in other respects. What are these respects and why are they important? This paper sets out to answer these questions and to develop a coherent and useful concept of the person.

The principle that each individual is entitled to an equal opportunity to benefit from any public health care system, and that this entitlement is proportionate neither to the size of their chance of benefitting, nor to the quality of the benefit, nor to the length of lifetime remaining in which that benefit may be enjoyed, runs counter to most current thinking about the allocation of resources for health care. It is my contention that any system of prioritisation of the resources available for healthcare or of rationing such resources must be governed by this principle. This can have apparently paradoxical conclusions in that it can seem wasteful to give someone with a very slim chance of a lifesaving treatment the same priority as someone with a much better chance. In an important and thoughtful recent paper, Julian Savulescu has concentrated on this apparent weakness and has argued for a particular conception of the good or benefit to be achieved by a healthcare system which purports to demonstrate the inadequacies of an equal opportunities approach to prioritisation and to replace it with an altogether better account. This paper will show that a rational 'reasons based consequentialism' is more in line with the equal opportunities approach, which I defended some time ago in these pages, than with that of Savulescu. I shall then examine more closely the conception of equal opportunities in health care and show that if we give weight to an individual's reasons, and what is expected to be good for them, we will opt for exactly the equality based account of distributive justice that I have recommended.

This paper argues that Sulmasy and Sugarman have not succeeded in showing a moral difference between withholding and withdrawing treatment. In particular, they have misunderstood historical entitlement theory, which does not automatically prefer a first occupant by just acquisition.

This paper restates some of the principal arguments against an automatic preference for the young as advocated by Kappel and Sandøe, arguments many of which have been extant for over a decade but which Kappel and Sandøe largely ignore. It then goes on to demonstrate that Kappel and Sandøe's "indifference test" fails to do the work required of it because it can be met by unacceptable conceptions of justice. The paper develops a number of new arguments against what I have called "ageist" preferences for the young or for those with long life expectancy. Finally I show that Kappel and Sandøe must believe that murdering older people is less morally wrong than murdering the young and that people relying on arguments such as theirs will have to accept the moral respectability of killing the innocent in order to maximise units of lifetime.

If, as I believe, gene therapy is in principle ethically sound except for its possible connection with eugenics then there are two obvious ways of giving a simple and straightforward answer to a question such as this. The first is to say "yes it is, and so what?" The second is to say "no it isn't so we shouldn't worry". If we accept the first of the above definitions we might well be inclined to give the first of our two answers. If on the other hand, we accept the sort of gloss that Ruth Chadwick gives on Galton's account, "those who are genetically weak should simply be discouraged from reproducing", either by incentives or compulsory measures, we get a somewhat different flavour, and one which might incline a decent person who favours gene therapy towards the second answer.

Two genetic technologies capable of making heritable changes to the human genome have revived interest in, and in some quarters a very familiar panic concerning, so-called germline interventions. These technologies are: most recently the use of CRISPR/Cas9 to edit genes in non-viable IVF zygotes and Mitochondrial Replacement Therapy (MRT) the use of which was approved in principle in a landmark vote earlier this year by the United Kingdom Parliament. The possibility of using either of these techniques in humans has encountered the most violent hostility and suspicion. However it is important to be aware that much of this hostility dates back to the fears associated with In Vitro Fertilization (IVF) and other reproductive technologies and by cloning; fears which were baseless at the time concerning both IVF and cloning the use of both of which have proved to be highly beneficial to humanity and which have been effectively regulated and controlled. This paper argues that CRISPR should by pursued through researh until it is safe enough for use in humans but there is no reason to suppose at this stage that such use will be unsafe or unethical (Collins 2015). [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents a consensus statement formulated by the Hinxton Group, which brought together scientists, ethicists, and journal editors to discuss the prospect of using genome technologies to modify the human germline. Topics mentioned include a brief biographical information about the Hinxton Group, the prospect of human genome editing for clinical reproductive purposes, and the importance of governance and meaningful engagement on the use of genome editing for basic research.

The article presents an edited transcript of a debate on moral enhancement between John Harris and Julian Savulescu during the "Enhancement: Cognitive, Moral and Mood" conference held at the University of Belgrade in Serbia. Topics discussed include morality's ability to keep up with scientific change and if not, whether it should be compulsory, Harris' skepticism about moral enhancement's value and methodologies, and how to bridge the gap between what people see to be right and how people act.

The problems caused by anthropogenic climate change threaten the lives and well-being of millions, yet it seems that we, as individuals, are powerless to prevent or worsen these problems. In this essay we consider the difficulty of assigning moral responsibility in cases of collective action problems like the problem of anthropogentic climate change. We consider two promising solutions, the expected utility and rights based solution, and argue that both are incapable of explaining why individuals have moral obligations to address collective action problems. We believe, however, that this result does not justify inaction, instead it reveals a failure of moral philosophy to adequately address collective action problems. More work must be done to address the moral responsibilities that arise in cases of collective action problems and we close by pointing in the direction of some promising work in this area. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article explores the consequences of interventions to secure moral enhancement that are at once compulsory and inescapable and of which the subject will be totally unaware. These are encapsulated in an arresting example used by Ingmar Perrson and Julian Savulescu concerning a “God machine” capable of achieving at least three of these four objectives. This article demonstrates that the first objective—namely, moral enhancement—is impossible to achieve by these means and that the remaining three are neither moral nor enhancements nor remotely desirable. Along the way the nature of morality properly so called is further explored.

The author reflects on David DeGrazia's, author of the article "Moral Enhancement, Freedom, and What We (Should) Value in Moral Behaviour" criticism of moral bioenhancemnet (MB). The author highlights the claims made by DeGrazia including adults take MB in order to improve motivation and MB acts like irrational prejudice such as racism, sexism or speciesism. The author highlights the drawbacks in DeGrazia's definition of free action.

The article discusses the prospect of human reproductive cloning. The responses of members of the European Parliament and former U.S. Presidents Bill Clinton and George W. Bush on human cloning following the birth of Dolly the sheep, the first cloned animal, in 1997 are cited. The alleged threat of cloning to individuality, the right to know a person's genetic origins and the role of human reproductive cloning in eliminating disease and disability are explored.

In this article the authors discuss the concepts of moral progress and moral enhancement and their use in avoiding nuclear disaster and the article "Getting Moral Enhancement Right: the Desirability of Moral Bioenhancement" by Ingmar Perrson and Julian Savulescu. He is critical of several points which are raised in Perrson and Savulescu's article and is supportive of using education, the eradication of poverty and increasing affluence to develop moral enhancement across the globe.

The article discusses the personal and public responsibilities of ethics and of ethicists in speaking, writing and commenting publicly about issues of ethical, political and social significance. Topics include freedom of speech and of expression, the contribution of the Internet, or cloud, the limitations on these freedoms imposed by the cloud, and the moral equivalence of speech and action.

This commentary examines relationships between bioethics, research, and advances in technology. It explores the role of bioethicists in promulgating ‘blue skies’ thinking which might well be crucial in challenging the ‘received wisdom’ on how the regulation of technologies should proceed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article focuses on the article "Moral Enhancement via Direct Emotional Modulation: A Reply to John Harris" by Thomas Douglas, in which Douglas offers his opinions on moral enhancement. In the article the author offers his opinions on moral enhancement and emotional modulation and on several points which are raised in Douglas' article.

In this issue of CQ we introduce a new feature, “By Invitation,” in which noted bioethicists are invited to reflect on vital current issues. Our first invitee, John Harris, will subsequently assume editorship of this section. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The article takes issue with attacks on consequentialism launched by Robert Sparrow. In various papers Sparrow has sought to show that consequentialism dissolves into a reductio ad absurdum due to the unassailable fact that women have longer life expectancies than men. The author of the present paper makes the case that Sparrow’s arguments and reasoning fail to support his case. In the process the author aims to provide illumination into normalcy, normal species functioning, and species-type functioning as they relate to controversies over disability and enhancement.

This paper identifies human enhancement as one of the most significant areas of bioethical interest in the last twenty years. It discusses in more detail one area, namely moral enhancement, which is generating significant contemporary interest. The author argues that so far from being susceptible to new forms of high tech manipulation, either genetic, chemical, surgical or neurological, the only reliable methods of moral enhancement, either now or for the foreseeable future, are either those that have been in human and animal use for millennia, namely socialization, education and parental supervision or those high tech methods that are general in their application. By that is meant those forms of cognitive enhancement that operate across a wide range of cognitive abilities and do not target specifically 'ethical' capacities. The paper analyses the work of some of the leading contemporary advocates of moral enhancement and finds that in so far as they identify moral qualities or moral emotions for enhancement they have little prospect of success. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The authors argue that the use of the genome-editing tool CRISPR/Cas9 in humans should be informed by views from a meeting of the network Hinxton Group on ethical and policy topics. Also addressed are the need for international regulatory cooperation, planning for basic research practices, and the need for public dialogue on ethical issues.

This paper proposes, elaborates and defends a principle of genetic equity. In doing so it articulates, explains and justifies what might be meant by the concept of 'human dignity' in a way that is clear, defensible and consistent with, but by no means the same as, the plethora of appeals to human dignity found in contemporary bioethics, and more particularly in international instruments on bioethics. We propose the following principle of genetic equity: humans are born equal; they are entitled to freedom from discrimination and equality of opportunity to flourish; genetic information may not be used to limit that equality. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article draws on ideas published in my "Intimations of Immortality" essay in Science (Vol. 288, No. 5463, p. 59, April 7, 2000) and my "Intimations of Immortality—The Ethics and Justice of Life Extending Therapies" in editor Michael Freeman's Current Legal Problems (Oxford University Press 2002: 65-97). This article outlines the ethical issues involved in life-extending therapies. The arguments against life extension are examined and found wanting. The consequences of life extension are explored and found challenging but not sufficiently daunting to warrant regulation or control. In short, there is no doubt that immortality would be a mixed blessing, but we should be slow to reject cures for terrible diseases that may be an inextricable part of life-extending procedures even if the price we have to pay for those cures is increasing life expectancy and even creating immortals. Better surely to accompany the scientific race to achieve immortality with commensurate work in ethics and social policy to ensure that we know how to cope with the transition to parallel populations of mortals and immortals as envisaged in mythology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article provides an ethical analysis in the judgment on the case of Re A conjoined twins. According to the author, the parents of the conjoined twins together with the Official Solicitor appealed to oppose the operation on religious grounds. He concludes that there is a distinction drawn by criminal Law on mercy killing and the death was not unethical.

Examines a reply of philosopher Mary Warnock on the ethical issues raised in vitro embryology. Objection of the reply on the use of the term person; Absurdity of the concept of speciesism by Warnock; Absence of the concern of the philosopher on the moral status or value of the embryo.

Two recent papers have argued that there is no such thing as negative causation or causal responsibility for omissions and consequently no such things as negative responsibility or negative actions. Philosophers Eric Mack and Elazar Weinryb thus conclude that so-called "Bad Samaritan" legislation is indefensible. Their view has dramatic consequences. If one save another persons life by telling a lie, saving his life is something he had done and can be responsible for. Conversely, if the tell the truth and as a result the other person die, then the former has caused the latter's death and can be similarly responsible.

The ethical implications of human clones have been much alluded to, but have seldom been examined with any rigour. This paper examines the possible uses and abuses of human cloning and draws out the principal ethical dimensions, both of what might be done and its meaning. The paper examines some of the major public and official responses to cloning by authorities such as President Clinton, the World Health Organisation, the European parliament, UNESCO, and others and reveals their inadequacies as foundations for a coherent public policy on human cloning. The paper ends by defending a conception of reproductive rights of "procreative autonomy" which shows human cloning to be not inconsistent with human rights and dignity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Medical Ethics has many unsung heros and heroines. Here we celebrate one of these and on telling part of her story hope to place modern medical ethics and bioethics in the UK more centrally within its historical and human contex. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article presents comments from the two authors on whether it is acceptable for people to take methylphenidate, commonly known as Ritalin, for the purpose of congitive enhancement. One author believes that it is acceptable, arguing that people should want to make gains in cognitive functioning and citing the effectiveness of the drug in healthy people and people with attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD). The second author argues against the use of the drug, highlighting methylphenidate's side effects and minimal cognitive benefits. Both authors discuss the ethics of taking a cognitive enhancer.

The article focuses on the influence of the non-medical use of cognitive-enhancing drugs including modafinil and Ritalin on the society. It cites that a better, faster and stronger mentality can obligate individuals into taking these drugs. The article states that science and technology continues to generate all sorts of new enhancers and the search for enhancement is not inevitably unethical. Moreover, it suggests that individuals must urge for more equitable access to improve the human condition.