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Because harm is an important notion in ethics, it's worth investigating what it amounts to. The counterfactual comparative account of harm, commonly thought to be the most promising account of harm, analyzes harm by comparing what actually happened with what would have happened in some counterfactual situation. But it faces the preemption problem, a problem so serious that it has driven some to suggest we abandon the counterfactual comparative account and maybe even abandon the notion of harm altogether. This paper defends a version of the counterfactual comparative account that solves the preemption problem, a version called the "worse than nothing account." It says that you harm someone just in case you leave them worse off than if you'd done nothing at all. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Many important harms result in large part from our collective omissions, such as harms from our omissions to stop climate change and famines. Accounting for responsibility for collective omissions turns out to be particularly challenging. It is hard to see how an individual contributes anything to a collective omission to prevent harm if she couldn't have made a difference to that harm on her own. Some groups are able to prevent such harms, but it is highly contentious whether groups can be loci of responsibility. This paper takes an existing and plausible framework of moral responsibility—one based on abilities—and scales it up to accommodate responsibility for collective omissions. This centrally involves identifying what the relevant collective abilities are and how they work. One significant benefit of this approach is that we can do this while remaining neutral on the debates about collective agency and collective responsibility by showing how individualist and collectivist versions of the theory work. Finally, I explore several further upshots of the scaled-up ability-based account, including that degrees of responsibility can be cashed out in terms of strengths of the relevant abilities, which has both theoretical and applied implications. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The rise of public participation in policy is an integral part of the shift from government to governance, and is presented as the best and most appropriate answer to requests for democratic policymaking. Both in official accounts and in the work of scholars, participation is situated in a discourse that combines a deliberative ethics with a managerialist pathos. This discourse has two important omissions: the neglect of the role of power in participation, and the poor coverage of the activities of participants. To remedy these omissions, this paper proposes a practice based approach to the study of participation. Two case studies of participants' practices are presented: one dealing with spatial planning, the other with qualitative water policies. The case studies show similarities and differences in practices of participation. These are related to the values that participants hold, the roles they adopt, and the context in which they are situated. The paper concludes that power relations in participation are only fully understood in the light of a complex field of practice that stretches beyond formal venues and official accounts of participation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Frankfurt-type examples seem to show that agents can be morally responsible for their actions and omissions even if they could not have done otherwise. Fischer and Ravizza's influential account of moral responsibility is largely based on such examples. I examine a problem with their account of responsibility in cases where we fail to act. The solution to this problem has a surprising and far-reaching implication concerning the construction of successful Frankfurt-type examples. I argue that the role of the counterfactual intervener in such examples can only be filled by a rational agent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Discussions of the principle of alternative possibilities have largely ignored the limits of what Frankfurt-style counter-examples can show. Rather than challenging the coherence of the cases, I argue that even if they are taken to demonstrate the falsity of the principle, they cannot advance the compatibilist cause. For a forceful incompatibilist argument can be constructed from the Frankfurtian premise that agents in Frankfurtian circumstances would have done what they did even if they could have done something else. This ‘counterfactual stability’ meets the same fate under determinism as does the ability to do otherwise. Thus the cases are irrelevant to the compatibility debate. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Three experiments investigated how moral judgments of harmful acts and omissions are affected by information about social roles. Subjects were given vignettes in which the relationship between an actor and victim was varied along the dimensions of solidarity (e.g. friends versus strangers) and hierarchy (e.g. superior versus equal; the terms are from Hamilton & Sanders, 1981). Subjects were asked to judge the morality of the actor in each case, both for a harmful omission (e.g. intentionally withholding the truth) and for an equivalent act (e.g. actively lying). Subjects judged the bahaviour worse in the act than the omission. Judgements were also affected by role relationships. The act-omission difference was also greater in the low-responsibility roles. Responses to the high-responsibility roles seem to reflect in a consequentialist perspective, focusing on outcomes rather than prohibitions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]