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The actions of pregnant women can cause harm to their future children. However, even if the possible harm is serious and likely to occur, the law will generally not intervene. A pregnant woman is an autonomous person who is entitled to make her own decisions. A fetus in-utero has no legal right to protection. In striking contrast, the child, if born alive, may sue for injury in-utero; and the child is entitled to be protected by being removed from her parents if necessary for her protection. Indeed, there is a legal obligation for health professionals to report suspected harm, and for authorities to protect the child's wellbeing. We ask whether such contradictory responses are justified. Should the law intervene where a pregnant woman's actions risk serious and preventable fetal injury? The argument for legal intervention to protect a fetus is sometimes linked to the concept of 'fetal personhood' and the moral status of the fetus. In this article we will suggest that even if the fetus is not regarded as a separate person, and does not have the legal or moral status of a child, indeed, even if the fetus is regarded as having no legal or moral status, there is an ethical and legal case for intervening to prevent serious harm to a future child. We examine the arguments for and against intervention on behalf of the future child, drawing on the example of excessive maternal alcohol intake., (© 2016 The Authors. Bioethics Published by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.)

An incompetent, terminally ill patient can be viewed in two ways--as a person who is dying, when futile, life-prolonging treatment can be lawfully withdrawn; or a person with a disability, for whom a guardian must be appointed to decide about treatment. Terri Schiavo's husband took the first view and her parents the second. Maria Korp was regarded as dying when treatment was withdrawn. The difference in conceptualising a patient's situation is critical. Where a patient is dying, treatment can be lawfully withdrawn whatever the view of the relatives; they cannot require treatment to be continued. Where a patient has a disability and a surrogate decision-maker is appointed, the focus is on what the patient would have wanted in such circumstances, so that the surrogate can act in accordance with the patient's wishes. That deflects attention from the fundamental legal principle that whatever a patient or the relatives want, they are not legally entitled to demand treatment that doctors consider futile in the circumstances.

Who owns your body and parts removed from it? Can you legally sell your bodily material--or information derived from it? Can you legally prevent other people gaining access to your excised bodily material, including your blood relatives who might need your tissue or genetic information for their own genetic tests? What legal remedies are there if people take or use your bodily material without your consent? And why are the answers to these questions vitally important for scientists?