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Dialectics is a philosophical method developed by Hegel (1770–1831), but building on an intellectual tradition whose origins can be traced back to ancient Greece. Dialectics was initially practiced as an educational technique for conducting philosophical discussions. For Hegel, however, dialectical processes can be discerned in the dramatic unfolding of nature, history and human thinking as such. The first dialectical thinker, in the genuine sense of the term, according to Hegel (1971), was Heraclitus (535 – c. 475 BC), in whose “obscure” aphorisms Hegel recognises the awareness that dialectics is more than merely a technique to foster critical reflection. Heraclitus already refers to a basic logic guiding the dynamics of nature as such, to a λόγος at work in actual processes of becoming and change, giving rise to contrasting and contradictory developments (“objective dialectics”, as Hegel phrases it). For dialectical thinkers, the dialectical method is fundamentally in tune with nature, because nature as such is inherently dialectical. Hegel considered Aristotle as ancient philosophy’s most thoroughly dialectical thinker, as we have seen, while Hegel himself is regarded as a modern Aristotle (Beiser, 2005, p. 57; Pippin, 2019, p. 301).

In terms of design and key objectives, this volume entails a triadic syllogism. Continental thinking constitutes its source material, and first of all I offer a concise exposition of the way in which Hegel, Marx, Engels, Bachelard, Lacan and Heidegger allow us to come to terms with technoscience. As indicated, notwithstanding multiple differences and interventions, I see their oeuvres as building on a common ground. I also acknowledge the second moment (the negation), however, consisting of claims (brought forward by various authors) that this corpus of literature, or parts of it, are invalid or outdated, for instance because the future belongs to neo-liberalism (as Francis Fukuyama argued), or because continental thinking is flawed by Eurocentric and androcentric biases. Rather than countering or criticising this type of criticism directly and extensively (which would result in more or less “theoretical” debates), I have adopted a more “cataphatic” course. By outlining its basic logic (its methodology) and by extrapolating it to a number of case studies, my aim is to demonstrate the viability, urgency and contemporary relevance of a continental approach (“via positiva”).

We examine the spiral structure of the thinking and the work of Marshall McLuhan, which we believe will provide a new way of viewing McLuhan’s work. In particular, we believe that the way he reversed figure and ground, reversed content and medium, reversed cause and effect, and the relationship he established between the content of a new medium and the older media it obsolesced all contain a spiral structure going back and forth in time. Finally, the time structure of his Laws of Media in which a new medium obsolesced an older medium, while retrieving an even older medium and then when pushed far enough flipped into a still newer medium has the feeling of a spiral. We will also examine the spiral structure of the thinking and work of those thinkers and artists that most influenced McLuhan such as Vico, Hegel, Marx, Freud, Joyce, TS Eliot, Wyndham Lewis and the Vorticism movement. Keywords: spiral; McLuhan; reversal; figure/ground; Laws of Media; media; environment/anti-environment; cause; effect

The article analyzes the conditions for a dialogue between Western and post-Soviet philosophy and theory of law on the nature of law (in terms of the first), or understanding of law (in terms of the second), which would create an opportunity for the organic inclusion of the “dispute about the nature of law” elements in the context of the discussion and solving issues relevant to the post-Soviet philosophy of law, including the shift of emphasis from the theoretical to the practical aspect of the problem of the nature of law. The research begins with a general description of the peculiarities of the “discourse of legal thinking (understanding of law)” inherent in post-Soviet jurisprudence and the identification of ontological and analytical criteria for classifying the types of understanding of law (natural law, positivist, sociological) as the basis for further convergence of post-Soviet and Western experience of understanding of law. Further, the meaning of the concept of validity of law in its social, moral and legal varieties for understanding the nature of law in general and the corresponding types of such understanding are revealed. In the final part, attention is drawn to the practical aspects of the study of the nature of law, carried out in the context of “extraordinary cases” existing on the verge of law and un-law. Further analysis reveals the methodological possibilities of comprehending the concept of law through the correlation with the counter-concept of “un-law” using examples: post-Soviet discussions about the relationship between law and statute, legal and non-legal law; Hegel’s concept of right and non-right; contemporary non-positivist approach by Robert Alexy in accordance with the criterion of the “limiting border” of law according to the Radbruch formula. The conclusions summarize the provisions on the general and distinctive features of the “discourse of the nature of law” and “discourse of understanding of law”, determine the prospects for their rapprochement.

It is often claimed that Hegel's philosophy cannot accept that something would remain beyond the grasp of conceptual language, and that his thought therefore systematically represses the possibility that something cannot be said. By analysing Hegel's account of the ineffable in the ‘Sense-Certainty’ chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, this article argues that Hegel does not repress, but firmly confronts the problem of what cannot be said. With the help of Giorgio Agamben's linguistic interpretation, it is shown that Hegel's conception of the ineffable must be understood from the perspective of his dialectical understanding of language. What appears to be ineffable is only the constitutive result of the dialectical negation that conceptual discourse enacts. Consequently, the ineffable in Hegel's thought cannot be said to remain external to and independent from conceptual language.

The goal of my essay is to clarify the status of the a priori in Hegel's Science of Logic. My claim is that in order to make possible an appreciation of the originality of Hegel's position we need to map a context of discussion and to dissolve a set of preconceptions about Hegel's idea of philosophy. My argument will be articulated in two parts. In the first part, I will analyse four possible positions regarding the issue of the aprioricity of the Logic, I will defend a fifth position, and I will draw a distinction between apriorism and a priori. In the second part, I will examine three distinct charges of apriorism against Hegel's Logic: the charge of assuming God's point of view of the universe, the charge of vicious circularity between the beginning and the end of the Logic, the charge of self-sufficiency of the Logic. As a result, I hope to show that these charges are unfounded, and to clear the ground for an adequate evaluation of Hegel's own sublation (Aufhebung) of the a priori/a posteriori divide.

Beginning with Margaret Somers and Christopher Roberts’ review of the sociology of human rights and Bryan Turner and Malcolm Waters’ debate therein, the author presents some of the questions which have been so far been the focus of this sociological sub-discipline. This review raises the question of ‘rights’ as a subject of study, and the normative consequences therein. From here, the author introduces recognition theory as a potential participant in these discussions around human rights. The author traces recognition theory from its Hegelian origins to the work of Axel Honneth, and the critiques of Nancy Fraser, Frantz Fanon, and Glen Sean Coulthard. Despite Fanon and Coulthard’s critical accounts, they reinforce the value of recognition within any sociology of human rights. Lastly, the author briefly engages with Alasdair MacIntyre as both a dialogical participant, and a means towards dialogue in the first place between recognition theory and human rights. Concluding, the author argues that the normative and descriptive nature of recognition theory offers a useful tool to aid in sociological theorizations of human nature and rights, while addressing some of the problems raised by early theorists of the sub-discipline and preventing siloing of the sub-discipline within a universalist or particularist vein.

In The Form of Truth: Hegel’s Philosophical Logic, Elena Ficara offers a reappraisal of G.W.F. Hegel’s logic within the history of logic and in relation to the logics of today. She brings together ...

Most of the debate about the differences between Hegel's and Adorno's dialectical approaches focuses either on the logical structure of the dialectic or on the implications of an inversion materialist of the Hegelian idealistic dialectic. This article rehearses a detour from this discussion, suggesting that the scope of dialectics is quite different in the two authors. Besides thinking about the differences in dialectical approaches, it would be necessary to distinguish the realm and character of dialectics in each of them. In other words, to emphasize that Adorno and Hegel also differ in their understanding of what moves in a dialectical way.

This article looks at several sections of Minima Moralia where Adorno talks explicitly about the need for genuine thinking and what that might consist in. First, I argue that Hegel and Nietzsche ar...

Hegel’s doctrine in the XXI century remains relevant for the Russian politico-legal science due to the deep development of the categorical apparatus and methodological tools for expressing the value nature of law and state. Hegel's doctrine of the subject of law, especially presented in his early works, is one of the little-studied, but at the same time very significant part of his scientific work, the appeal to which should contribute to the further development of the modern system of legal categories. Purpose: to carry out a comparative analysis of the various versions of the Hegelian doctrine of the personality as a subject of law and its genesis, taking into account the peculiarities of natural law and theological pproaches. Methods: the authors use logical, historical-genetic, historical-comparative, systemic method of cognition, as well as the methodology of theoretical and legal comparative studies. Results: in the late philosophical system, Hegel develops the doctrine of the dual nature of the personality as a subject of law: as a specific subject, a person mediates his relationship with other subjects through a single objective thing (qualitative characteristics of the subject), as an abstract subject, a person bases his relations with them on recognition as equal subjects of freedom (quantitative characteristics of the subject). The way to resolve this conflict is through morality. During various periods of his scientific work, Hegel considers the genesis of the personality as a subject of law from a natural law and theological point of view, including the idea of God, while dentifying new substantive aspects of the concept of the subject of law, related to the the historical development of the state and the formation of the rule-of-law state.

I am very grateful to Karen Koch and Sebastian Rand for their generous and thoughtful engagement with some of the core arguments of my book. Whereas Koch raises a number of questions concerning the purposiveness theme and Hegel's relation to Kant, Rand's questions revolve around the interpretation of Hegel's Science of Logic, asking after the status of the a priori, singularity, and death in relation to the logical concept of life. Their critical questions provide an opportunity for me to both clarify and defend one of the central claims of my book, namely, that there is a distinctly logical concept of life at work in Hegel's philosophy that is key for understanding his philosophical method. In the book, I argue that this concept, operative in Hegel's writings from the Differenzschrift through the Phenomenology to his Science of Logic, is primarily inherited from Kant, specifically from problems surrounding the concept of inner purposiveness developed in the Critique of Judgement. I will begin by replying to Koch, followed by a response to Rand.

Ever since Hegel famously objected to Kant’s universalization formulations of the Categorical Imperative on the grounds that they are nothing but an empty formalism, there has been continual debate about whether he was right. In this paper I argue that Hegel got things at least half-right: I argue that even if negative duties can be derived from the universalization formulations, positive duties cannot. The paper is divided into three main sections. In the first, I set out the procedures generally accepted among Kantians for deriving positive duties from the universalization formulations. In the second, I set out the arguments from section 1 in more detail and explain why they do not work. In the third, I examine a strategy that might be used to supplement the arguments from section 2 and I argue that it goes the same way.

Hegel calls social life “the living good,” but what this means is unclear. The idea expresses an ontological claim about the kind of being that human societies possess, but it is also normatively s...

Hegel viewed the task of philosophy as not to direct the present but to grasp its fundamental commitments by uncovering its animating baselines. This led him to depict the antinomies of modern life...

Metabolic rift theory has been accused of assuming an untenable ontological dualism between nature and society. In response, two of its leading advocates, John Bellamy Foster and Andreas Malm, have tried to argue that the approach is not dualist but rather rigorously realist, nonreductively naturalist, and dialectically materialist. According to Foster and Malm, metabolic rift theory is essential because it enables eco-Marxism to make an analytic distinction between nature and society while nevertheless grasping their complex interrelation. From a Lacanian and Hegelian perspective, Foster and Malm are right to preserve the dialectical distinction between nature and society but their respective accounts of this dialectic are insufficiently materialist. Foster falls into a pre-Marxian contemplative materialism. Malm hesitates between his intended realism and Kantian idealism. For metabolic rift theory to be put on a firmer materialist footing, nature must be thought along Lacanian and Hegelian lines as incomplete, thwarted, or shot through with antagonisms out of which emerge the subject and society. To put this in dialectical terms: ontologically there is only nature, out of which society and the subject emerge as an effect of nature's failure to be fully natural.

Rereading the young Karl Marx's “Critique of Hegel's ‘Philosophy of Right’“ in light of a broader range of scholarship enables a more accurate understanding of the historical and intellectual significance of this work. Shlomo Avineri's pioneering treatment is deficient in important respects. A return to Marx's and Hegel's texts may help determine more exactly what Marx was trying to figure out through Hegel, and why he saw the need to move beyond Hegel to accomplish it. In Marx's mature writings, as Postone has shown, Marx's concept of “capital” purports to identify the real basis of Hegelian Geist. Recognizing this enables an analysis that provides a fuller view of both young and mature Marx as they relate to Hegel and to one another than is typical in the literature, which often either divides Marx into young-humanist and old-economist, or else inter-collapses old and young Marx too readily.

The hope […] is that animal creation might survive the wrong humanity has done to it, if not humanity itself, and bring forth a better species, one that finally succeeds.—Adorno, Minima Moralia §74

Hegel's integration of the concept of Life in the Logic has long been disputed and rejected by many scholars. The most common objection was that it seemed counterintuitive to integrate an empirical phenomenon such as Life into a Logic that, in fact, ought to present an immanent development of pure concepts. Hegel was often accused of bringing empirical considerations into his Logic in order to develop his logical account of Life. Consequently, there has been a great discussion about the question as to whether a Logic is an appropriate place for this concept—a discussion that did not occur with respect to other categories in Hegel's Logic. Now, in contemporary literature on Hegel, there is a surge of genuine interest in Hegel's logical account of Life, accompanied by the insight that the concept of Life plays an important and indispensable role in Hegel's philosophy. However, what this role is precisely is a controversial issue.

There are two dominant contradictory approaches towards understanding the nature of language: one, the epistemological approach; two, the ontological approach. The epistemological approach understands language as a mere tool and denies the close relationship between a word and the actual thing for which that word stands. The ontological approach, on the other hand, understands language as the disclosure of world experience and professes a close relationship between a word and the thing it signifies. However, this approach opposes the epistemological approach towards the understanding of language. In this article, we propose that Hegel, in his Phenomenology of Spirit, depicts an interesting relationship between language and spirit which points towards the consistency between the two contradictory approaches towards the nature of language. For Hegel, language not only plays a role in spirit’s pursuit of self-knowledge which signifies the epistemological approach, but also in spirit’s existence which signifies the ontological approach. Thus, in Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit, the epistemological approach and the ontological approach towards the nature of language coexist. In this article, by turning to Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit and through an analysis of the relationship between language and spirit, we not only attempt to seek some resolution to the epistemology-ontology contradiction, but we also reveal the homogeneity of language and spirit, which we take as the true nature of language in Hegel’s philosophy.

This paper explores the materialist and the object-based dimension of “the ideal” in Evald Ilyenkov’s thought and, consequently, his speculative technique of converging matter and idea. The philosophic figures that Ilyenkov relies on to legitimate such a convergence are Hegel, Spinoza, and Marx. The paper reveals the complexities in Ilyenkov’s task to reconcile his dialectics of the ideal with Spinoza’s studies of Substance, tracing the discrepancies in Ilyenkov’s attempt to conjoin Hegelian and Marxian dialectics and Spinoza’s nonidealist immanentism. The reference to the researchers of Spinozism, such as Macherey, Deleuze, Badiou, Della Rocca, Oittinen, and Maidansky, confirms the difficulties in discerning dialectics in Spinoza’s thought. Ilyenkov managed to reveal that Hegel’s idealism was grounded in an objective materialism conditioned by the other-determined self, and merely needed Marx’s thought to complete the socialization of Subject; whereas Spinoza never truly needed to theorize the concept of the ideal. The key finding of the paper is in tracing how—due to developing Marxist epistemology out of Marxist political economy—Ilyenkov manages to consider social being and labor through noumenal parameters, proving that any material activity can be seen as thought-oriented.

In 1971, answering a question concerning one of the main motifs of his works, Derrida declared that ‘if there were a definition of différance, it would be precisely the limit, the interruption, the destruction of the Hegelian “relève” [i.e. Aufhebung] wherever it operates’. It is apparent that such an approach to Hegel is indebted to Heidegger's program of a ‘destruction’ (Destruktion) of the history of ontology. But what does Derrida's reading of Hegel owe to Heidegger exactly? In this paper, I investigate this question and the genesis of Derrida's reading of Hegel more generally by looking into the interpretation which can be found in the 1964–65 lectures about Heidegger: The Question of Being and History. In the process of interpreting Heidegger, Derrida produces extensive comments about Hegel which document the early elaboration of his perception of the author of the Phenomenology of Spirit. Here, I focus on Hegel's conception of experience, which Derrida compares to Heidegger's understanding of the historicity of Dasein. As will become clear, however, this question involves the way Derrida presents the relationship between the two thinkers throughout these lectures. Specifically, I show that Derrida significantly bases his account of Heidegger's ‘destruction’ of Hegel's philosophy on the former's interpretation of the latter's concept of experience. By examining such an interpretation, I intend to challenge the way Derrida portrays Hegel and I argue as a result that it is questionable whether Heidegger's departure from Hegel can be taken to be as ‘radical’ as Derrida makes it seem.

Hermann Cohen's Logic of Pure Knowledge and G. W. F. Hegel's Science of Logic each use in their way the means of thought of negation and contradiction to unfold the philosophical dynamic: a fragile interplay between self-endangerment and self-preservation of thought. Here, the proximity and difference of the two authors are extended. The proximity lies in methodological negativism. The difference is in the significance of the principle of continuity. According to Cohen and Hegel as well, thinking proceeds exclusively, as Kant called it, synthetically. The exclusion of contradiction, limited to analytical judgments, has only marginal significance. But the commonality does not eliminate the differences. As Hegel puts it, contradiction is a principle of mediation and finally results in "self-dissolution"; it carries within itself a direction of logical "reconciliation." Per Cohen, contradiction is a principle of "annihilation" (annihilatio) of approaches to a determination that threatens any form of "identity." The turn Hegel put in contradiction itself, regarding in it a unity of positivity and negativity, has no direct counterpart in Cohen. Nevertheless, for him, too, the "judgment of contradiction" becomes the active basis of all cognitive thought. By exercising a contradiction-destroying "activity," the judgment of contradiction "protects," indeed "generates," the real possibility of cognition. The annihilation of the non-identical sets free the fundamental "judgment of origin" with which cognition finds its beginning. The principle of continuity taken over from Leibniz corresponds to it. Just this principle has now again no direct correspondence with Hegel.

Este artículo presenta una reconstrucción argumentativa del primer capítulo de la tercera sección de la Doctrina de la Esencia de la Ciencia de la Lógica de Hegel, el cual lleva como título “Lo Absoluto”. Su hipótesis es que la crítica de la metafísica contenida en este capítulo no solo aboga por una ontología relacional del proceso, sino que también establece implícitamente una distinción entre una teoría de lo absoluto de primer orden y una de segundo orden. La teoría de lo absoluto de primer orden tiene como objetivo una exposición de lo absoluto libre de contradicciones analíticas. Por su parte, la teoría de lo absoluto de segundo orden no solo expone en qué consiste lo absoluto, sino que pretende también incluir el pensamiento y la teoría de lo absoluto en lo absoluto mismo.

Empossado na cadeira que pertencera a Hegel na Universidade de Berlim, Wilhelm Dilthey escreve sua Introdução às Ciências do Espírito (1883). Em seu Livro I, ele disserta sobre as filosofias da História para explicitar ao leitor o que faltava ao conhecimento histórico para que viesse a adquirir sua plena justificação epistemológica. Dilthey distingue as filosofias da História em três tipos, elencando seus principais autores e teses, e especifica quais são seus equívocos e lacunas, as quais se reduzem a um ponto determinante. O presente artigo se propõe a elucidar, pelo exame do texto citado, a crítica de Wilhelm Dilthey às filosofias da História: precisamente, qual é o ponto de sua crítica. Trata-se de um estudo que extrai sua validade do mérito intelectual intrínseco à crítica em questão, cujos desdobramentos epistemológicos são úteis ainda hoje, e também de sua importância histórica, na medida em que a crítica de Dilthey às filosofias especulativas da História significa um momento originário das chamadas filosofias críticas da História.

La intención de esta presentación es ofrecer una descripción del sistema filosófico de Hegel como condicionado a una síntesis del naturalismo y la filosofía trascendental, cuyas características generales serán elaboradas. A pesar de su reputación de larga data como sucesor crítico del proyecto idealista de Kant, la comprensión de Hegel de la relación dinámica entre filosofía y ciencia empírica no puede acomodarse fácilmente dentro de los horizontes formalistas del trascendentalismo kantiano. Al mismo tiempo, sin embargo, Hegel atribuye a la razón filosófica una función sintética que pocos naturalistas contemporáneos reconocerían. Como tal, la metodología de Hegel combina características de las persuasiones filosóficas a menudo consideradas fundamentalmente irreconciliables. Tal síntesis de naturalismo y filosofía trascendental es posible gracias al rechazo de Hegel de cualquier dicotomía kantiana entre una naturaleza animal heterónoma y una libertad racional autónoma, y su propuesta de que la mente o el espíritu se entiendan como la ‘verdad’ o la autorrealización de la naturaleza. en lugar de su antítesis. Para Hegel, entonces, la conformidad de la naturaleza con los principios racionales de unidad sintética no necesita explicarse como necesariamente condicionada a criterios a priori de inteligibilidad que se originan en un sujeto no natural. Más bien, sostiene Hegel, la naturaleza fundamenta la posibilidad ontológica de un Espíritu que fundamenta la posibilidad de la naturaleza, de modo que la naturaleza y el Espíritu se fundamentan mutuamente.

In the present article we concentrate on developing what we consider the essential passages of Hegel’s political philosophy in the Philosophy of Right. Firstly, as an introductory note to the content, we analyze briefly the aims pursued by his project, both contextually and in itself. This obliges us to distinguish between the existent and the real. Secondly, we proceed to expose the concept of will, which transits from an abstract moment (the subjective will) to the concrete moment (the will in itself and for itself, which is identical to the Idea). Thirdly, we continue studying the morality by focusing on Hegel’s immanent critique of Kant, stating the idea of the autonomy of moral being on Sittlichkeit. Fourthly, the ethical Idea keeps giving itself content in the family, in civil society and in the State. Our interest focused on the last two, although family has its exiguous place in the article. The emphasis on civil society and the State lies in the moments when individuality experiences its selfish and, subsequently, universal ends. Finally, we reflect on our contemporaneity and the demands that the concept of ethicity has in a new context, namely, the differentiation of commodities that becomes the differentiation of capital. By means of the concept of differentiation of capital expounded by Pablo Levin, our intellection of capitalism is enriched. Thus, we understand that the specificity of this universal system is domination through ideology. Indeed, we use the concepts of alienation, fear of freedom and oppression developed by Paulo Freire to explain the selfish, abstract, and unreflective manifestations of the present. This task, far from distancing us from Hegel’s concept, invites us to take it up again to distinguish its limits as well as its potentiality.

Unpublished text from the beginning of the Hegel period in Jena, The German Constitution (1799-1802) analyzed the long process of degradation that the German Empire suffered at the turn of the 19th century and related it to the appearance of a “bourgeois spirit” (Burgergeist), that is, from an autonomous sphere of interests that was constituted fundamentally under the sign of commerce. We will first try to find some threads of continuity between these elements and the concept of “civil society” in the Philosophy of Right (1820), and then we will enter our fundamental question, the “problem that plagues modern societies”: the social production of poverty and of an inorganic social fringe that acts, even, against the State, the Rabble (Pobel), trying to understand it as an immanent contradiction of civil society, how Hegel tries to solve it and the historical implications of these solutions.

The Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of the State is a text of vital importance for Marx’s philosophical-political development where it criticizes Hegel’s Philosophy of Right. The article will address three main topics: 1) Marx articulates its critique by using concepts and ideas belonging to the young Hegelians, especially Feuerbach with his critique of the inversion of subject and object, i.e., the Idea in Hegel is the subject and the objects its predicates. In the reading of this unfinished draft, we can already glimpse the foundations of the methodological reformulation between Hegel and Marx. However, this critique suffers in many cases from a vision of Hegel and his theory that is certainly limited; 2) Hegel was very conscious of the new challenges presented by the incipient modern society and oriented his political philosophy to unveil the contradictions and put a solution to them under the State. However, Marx will point out that Hegel is not capable of harmonizing the particularities of civil society and that ultimately private property ends up determining the State; 3) By banishing the centrality of the Idea and its incarnation in the Hegelian State, Marx, with Feuerbach, proposes to locate human beings in its place, so that the realization of their political essence will no longer be under the constitutional monarchical State but in a democratic and republican State. The article aims to give an account of the breadth of Marx’s critique and, ultimately, to put it in relation to recent trends of «New Hegelian Marxism» by highlighting the importance of this manuscript.

O presente texto busca reconstruir as interpretações de Frank Ruda e Tomas Kristofory a respeito do conceito de plebe delineado na Filosofia do Direito de Hegel. Ambos os autores propõem interpretações fundamentalmente antípodas cujo contraste contribui decisivamente no esclarecimento do papel da plebe na tessitura do pensamento de Hegel. Após a reconstrução apresenta-se a crítica a ambas e, por fim, esboça-se uma resposta ao mesmo problema.

A bicentenária filosofia do direito de Hegel ainda contém importantes contribuições para o debate jusfilosófico contemporâneo. Essas contribuições surgem, por exemplo, ao se traçar contraposições ao juspositivismo, uma das principais correntes contemporâneas da filosofia do direito, especialmente no que diz respeito à figura de Kelsen. Enquanto o juspositivismo advoga por uma visão objetiva sobre o direito, o mais próximo possível de uma ciência, elegendo a norma como seu objeto e afastando o direito de demais esferas da vida social, especialmente a moral e a política, Hegel propõe uma visão sistemática, onde o direito é, ao lado da moralidade e da eticidade, parte do espírito objetivo, de todo o universo prático racional. A partir dessa compreensão, Hegel é capaz de explicar o direito positivo como resultado de uma evolução conceitual que pretende a universalização do direito abstrato, o qual, por sua vez, tem início na personalidade enquanto expressão mais básica da liberdade, sendo sua efetivação a categoria da propriedade. Essa universalização apenas pode ser atingida na esfera das relações éticas, quando o direito se torna positivo. Mesmo assim, Hegel ressalta que o direito positivo nem sempre é condizente com o direito racional, pois o direito positivo em determinado contexto não necessariamente corresponde à evolução da autoconsciência da liberdade. Tendo em vista a sistemática conceitual por detrás do direito, Hegel consegue superar algumas das dificuldades que o juspositivismo possui no que diz respeito à crítica de normas que claramente ferem a liberdade humana.

A pesar de haber sido formulada de la manera más completa hace casi dos siglos, la teoría hegeliana de la pena sigue siendo convincente por entender la justicia en términos de reconocimiento y no en una clave vengativa o correctiva. El problema ante el que nos encontramos se puede resumir en el sintagma de “justificación de la pena”. Lo más radicalmente novedoso en la filosofía de Hegel es que la pena, tal y como se muestra en el parágrafo 100 de los Principios de Filosofía del Derecho, es considerada como “un derecho” del delincuente. Así, la pena impuesta a la persona que decide delinquir no resultaría ser nada más que un reconocimiento a su racionalidad. Esto es así puesto que, a ojos de Hegel, de no tratarse de un ser racional, sería incoherente castigarle. Encontramos entonces una relación directa entre el castigo y una determinada concepción de la racionalidad que, como es conocido, para Hegel está relacionada con la libertad y su desarrollo en la historia. Esta concepción tiene sus dificultades, a las cuales trataremos de aproximarnos: ¿cómo puede ser algo simultáneamente un derecho y un castigo para la misma persona? En la primera parte de este artículo dibujaremos la teoría de la pena de Hegel como una que no debe ni reformar al individuo ni vengar el daño. Esto nos permite pensar la justicia en términos que dejan atrás tanto la venganza como la corrección. Una lectura de Hegel nos llevaría hoy a adoptar una perspectiva de un gran compromiso moral, que no patologice al criminal sólo por ser criminal, y que, a un mismo tiempo, no criminalice eternamente al culpable. Estamos insertos en un marco complejo de relaciones sociales donde es imposible no actuar mal a ojos de alguien. No por ello nos debemos quedar en la inacción, pues, ¿de qué serviría la autonomía para pensar la moral, si no la tenemos para actuar conforme a ella? Legislación y moral no se pueden entender completamente si prescindimos de uno de los dos términos. Por ello, en la segunda parte del trabajo se tratará de analizar este problema en clave ética, subrayando la crítica de Hegel al formalismo kantiano y al alma bella.

Through continuous inquiry and reflection on the roots of religion, Marx was able to understand the limits of political emancipation when the relationship between political emancipation and religion was correctly revealed. People were not only restricted by the metaphysics of ideas but in reality, they were also restricted by capital. Hegel used concepts while Feuerbach used sensibility as ways to rescue them, yet they were all still trapped in metaphysics. Marx proposed a way on the basis of sublating the two, not only in terms of metaphysics but also the capital by thoroughly criticizing reality. It is through the path of dialectics that Marx was able to introduce a higher-level communist society in the internal criticism and denial of capitalist society by profoundly revealing the theoretical dilemma and internal contradictions of the fusion of metaphysics and capital in the pursuit and realization of human freedom and liberation.

What is a damaged life? What kind of theoretical and metaphysical problems are challenged by Adorno’s moral philosophy? In this paper we argue that the reflections delivered by Adorno after the catastrophe of the Second World War must be read from the scope of a systematic use of reason present in modern enlightenment philosophy as well as in modern market society. We claim the traditional concepts of moral autonomy and ethical life (Sittlichkeit) are both guided by the exchange principle developed by bourgeois society. We focus in the systematic architecture of Hegel’s social philosophy with a view to identify an antimony shared with bourgeois society: the boundless expansion of the market and rational knowledge. The role of the synthetic concept of infinity is discussed in an ideological sense, stressing labor’s division consequences. Finally, we set forth a discussion about the limits of Adorno’s theoretical criticism, especially on his use of dialectical categories and the ways in which they can be integrated in the core of a Critical theory.

Recent scholarship has analyzed Hegel’s account of life in the Logic in some detail and has suggested that Hegel provides ways of thinking about organic phenomena that might still be fruitful for u...

The aim of this short essay is to sketch an introductory account of the concept of life in German Idealism and to argue that it is both a philosophically robust concept and a productive lens throug...

My aim in this paper is to investigate Hegel’s relation to Spinoza’s account of teleology by discussing Spinoza and Hegel’s stance to two straightforward objections against teleological views of re...

Habermas’s reception of Hegel’s and Marx’s thinking in Auch eine Geschichte der Philosophie According to Habermas, Hegel has contributed to the development of the paradigm of speech-philosophy insofar as he transformed Kant’s noumenal subject into a free subject that is related to the lifeworld. By interpreting the unity of the lifeworld by means of a philosophical conceptualization of the religious cultus, however, he re-introduces a metaphysical approach in philosophy. Habermas praises Marx because he made this metaphysical approach of the lifeworld undone. His economic determinism, however, cannot be reconciled with the free subject. Habermas’s Hegel-reception is criticized because it misunderstands Hegel’s attempt to conceptualize why it is possible at all to realize freedom in the lifeworld; his Marx-reception is criticized because it ignores that freedom for Marx is only the result of the communist revolution.

Embora para o pensamento dialético posterior e de matriz hegeliana o desenvolvimento técnico tenha sido considerado central para a compreensão da dinâmica da sociedade como um todo, esse não parece ter sido o caso para o próprio Hegel. Certamente subtematizada, a questão da técnica não esteve todavia ausente de seu pensamento. O artigo investiga duas abordagens do assunto feitas pelo filósofo, em sua obra de juventude e de maturidade, levando cada uma delas a lançar luz sobre a outra.

The relations between George Herbert Mead’s pragmatism and Wilhelm Dilthey’s hermeneutics have been examined in recent years in a new light: based on the former’s close contact with the latter during the course of his studies in Germany in the 1880s–90s. These relations seem to vanish afterward, with Mead’s return to the United States. Yet the common interests they share in the formation of a new social science keeps their respective developments in parallel; from psychology to history, they both share common interests in the reformulation of the concepts of Geist or Mind of the Hegelian legacy, through an interest in meaning and symbols as keys to the interpretation of the social world. Although there are important differences in their evaluation of the definition of the scientific enterprise that keeps natural sciences and Geisteswissenschaften apart for Dilthey, but are rather seen in their continuity for Mead, there are numerous points of intersection in their views. This article seeks to highlight those similarities, without neglecting the differences between Mead and Dilthey, in order to bring hermeneutics and pragmatism closer in their capacity to shed light on each other, and on the requirements of sociological analysis in contemporary society to be widened and deepened by adding the psychological and historical dimensions to its perspective.

The article examines the period from the end of the 17th century to the beginning of the 19th century, when on the basis of deep philosophical concepts, a new vision of the development of statehood and human values raised. At this time, a certain re-thinking of the management and communication ideas of Antiquity and the Renaissance took place, which outlined the main promising trends in the statehood evolution, which to one degree or another were embodied in practice in the 19th and 20th centuries. A systematic approach and a comparative analysis of the causes and consequences of those years achievements for the present and the immediate future of the 21st century served as the methodological basis for a comprehensive review of the studies of that period. The scientific novelty of this study is the demonstration of the theoretical heritage complexity of the Enlightenment for the general history of management and communication ideas. The article presents an analysis of the views and concepts of the late 17th – early 18th century thinkers Thomas Hobbes and John Locke, who defend the right to freedom of communication and liberalization of relationships in the system: “person – society – state”, associated with their own understanding of the government role. French enlighteners François Voltaire, Denis Diderot, Jean d'Alembert, Etienne Condillac were much smaller theorists in management and communication issues, but their successful epistolary and encyclopedic communication practice, starting from the third decade of the XVIII century significantly increased the self-awareness of the masses. The influence of their ideas on the possibility of progressive development of social relations, on improving the national states manageability and on how of a new type scientists were able not only to popularize knowledge, but also to practically make it an object of public communication is shown. In this context, the author considers the importance of political and legal communication problems in the vision of Charles Louis Montesquieu and analyzes the republican governance ideas by Jean-Jacques Rousseau as an outstanding figure of the Enlightenment, who attached great importance to the forms and methods of forming of the state governance structures. At the end of the historical period under consideration, a comparative historical analysis of the most significant statements of such thinkers as Immanuel Kant and Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel is presented. These founders of the scientific discourse around the problems of power and state, war and peace, the effectiveness of government and communication in relations with the people laid the enduring foundations of the theoretical argumentation of two opposing views on the cardinal problem of our time – the possibility or impossibility of achieving mutually acceptable foundations of a new world order peacefully, excluding all types of hybrid wars. The general picture of the scientific and technological achievements of this period, influencing the level of understanding of the management and communication functions of the state of that time, is given in comparison with the present.

Existe una afinidad entre la filosofía de Hegel y el neoplatonismo que el propio filósofo se encargó de señalar. Sostenemos que esta afinidad tiene razones de orden sistemático e involucra aspectos teóricos y prácticos de ambas filosofías. Para argumentar en dicha dirección abordaremos el tratamiento de la filosofía de Plotino en las Lecciones hegelianas sobre la historia de la filosofía. Buscaremos mostrar que, para Hegel, Plotino elabora en la Antigüedad, por primera vez, una compleja síntesis de los principios filosóficos que anteceden a su propio pensamiento. Por este motivo, la exposición especulativa hegeliana adscribe al neoplatonismo la categoría lógica de totalidad. En esta síntesis de principios finitos —que buscaremos determinar en el artículo—, Hegel reconoce tareas y problemas cercanos a los de su filosofía, ¿pero podemos afirmar por esto que la filosofía de Hegel es un neoplatonismo moderno, o hay un punto en el que ambos proyectos revelan tener una incompatibilidad fundamental?

Problem setting. The thesis that modern war is a "war of consciousness" inevitably leads science to the problems of methodology in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness. This study shows that both the authors and the followers of the concept of modern continental wars in general reproduce a thoroughly forgotten (and in the history of philosophy has been overcome for two hundred years) its interpretation as tabula rasa - a blank slate that necessarily distorts the understanding of the real state of affairs. At the same time, the methodology developed by German classical philosophy, which culminated in Hegel's "Phenomenology of Spirit", reveals the true essence of both modern and historical forms of national consciousness. All this makes it possible to remove some of the tension created in the social sphere by the very formulation of the thesis about the consistent nature of modern wars. Article’s main body. In the article the authors consider modern problems of methodology in understanding the phenomenon of consciousness. It is emphasized that the very nature of consciousness is determined by the fact that it itself in its knowledge it considers true. On the basis of a thorough analysis of scientific achievements in the field of phenomenology, the authors state that the position on modern war without opponents is filled with contradictory, inconsistent grounds. The same myth of political technologists is the statement about the nature of national self-consciousness as tabula rasa. Conclusions. Historically, it is possible to trace the "steps" of the development of such units of national self-consciousness, while in modern times their existence is possible either in the form of "fragments" or in the form of "repetitions" of these steps. The phenomenon of international law is intensifying everywhere, and the phenomena of bipatrism, feminism, LGBT, etc. are following it - this is the verdict of World History, which can be reborn only in the form of philosophy. And our contemporary is right, saying that "the world exists to enter the book" [22, p. 370].

This paper investigates the compatibility of Hegel’s analyses of the mechanization of work in industrial society with Hegel’s notion of freedom as rational self-determination. Work as such is for Hegel a crucial moment on the way to a more complete realization of human freedom, but, as I maintain with Adorno, the technological developments of the last two centuries raise the question of whether the nature of work itself has changed since the industrial revolution. In his Jena lectures, Hegel recognized significant problems that the mechanization of work poses for human freedom that—on my assessment—his later, mature thought does not sufficiently address. One finds, however, a more comprehensive depiction of the same worries that Hegel mentioned in his Jena lectures in Adorno’s critique of the dominant forms of labor in contemporary society and his understanding of technological rationality, which according to Adorno, dominates the contemporary world. I suggest, furthermore, that juxtaposing Hegel’s and Adorno’s thoughts on technology and the mechanization of work reveals Adorno’s philosophy of technology to be an extension, rather than a critique, of the spirit of Hegel’s own philosophical project as immanent critique of the necessary entailments of any given concept.