Search

Modern epistomology has been dominated by an empiricist theory of knowledge that assumes a direct individualistic relationship between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge. Truth is held to be universal, and non-individualistic social and cultural factors are considered sources of distortion of true knowledge. Since the late 1950s, this view has been challenged by a cognitive relativism asserting that what is true is socially conditioned. This volume examines the far-reaching implications of this development for the social sciences. Recently, cognitive relativism has become a key issue of debate in anthropology, philosophy, and sociology. In anthropology this is illustrated by a growing awareness of the similarity of all systems of knowledge. In philosophy it is exemplified by the realization that traditional monolithic and absolutist concepts of truth have increasingly lost any power to make sense and to convince. In sociology it is visible in a renewal of interest in a general sociology of knowledge. Yet, in spite of this convergence of interests, practitioners of these three disciplines have on the whole shown no inclination to reach a consensus on the terms of reference that could facilitate an interdisciplinary approach. "Cognitive Relativism and Social Science "aims to do just this. It is a working assumption of this volume that, as far as the subject of cognitive relativism is concerned, anthropologists, philosophers, and sociologists should join forces rather than try to deal with the challenges of cognitive relativism within strictly imposed boundaries that normally separate academic disciplines. Only when they work together will it be possible to treat the problems posed by cognitive relativism in an adequate way. This volume provides the results of attempts to communicate on cognitve relativism across disciplinary boundaries. This is must reading in the philosophy of social science and in social research theory.

In 1939 Koyre introduced the notion of the scientific revolution (SR) as a catch phrase that deals with the “[…] profonde transformation intellectuelle dont la physique modern […]” (Koyre 1939, p. 12; 1943b, p. 400) that he alleged happened at the time of Galileo. For Koyre these changes are due to “pure unadulterated thought” because, as expressed in his 1943 critique of the Olschki–Zilsel position, science “is made not by engineers or craftsmen, but by men who seldom built or made anything more real than theory” (Koyre 1943b, p. 401). We now know Galileo did quite a lot of experimentation; hence, this statement by Koyre is no longer acceptable. In this paper, I will assess the Koyre argument against the Olschki–Zilsel position. Central to my argument is that only by applying a comparative framework, such as developed in my forthcoming book The European Roots of Science, it is possible to throw light on this vexed issue.

This essay is about the ensuing problem that in general it is nothelpful to talk about non-standard knowledge practices as modeled after our Western ideas of what knowledge is. It negotiates this problem by arguing that artisanal knowledge is an independent and self-contained mode of knowledge and is arranged in three parts. In the first part an outline is given of the key assumptions of the interactionist conception of knowledge that needs to be put in place as an alternative to the basically Kantian mixture of empiricist and rationalist assumptions of the folk model of Western academic thinking about knowledge. In this interactionist conception of knowledgeartisanal knowledge gets center stage. In the second part, the notion of craftknowledge is opened up as much as possible. The third and final part takes upthe question whether craft knowledge is a cultural universal.

Investigation of physical laws is among the most important tasks of modern natural science. The naturalist observes recurrent associations of certain events or qualities. He is convinced that these regularities, observed in the past, will hold in the future as well, and he calls them “laws of nature”, especially if he has succeeded in expressing them by mathematical formulas. Knowledge of physical laws is of the greatest importance both to the theorist and to the engineer. Whoever knows a law of nature is able to predict and, consequently, to control events: without investigation of laws there is no modern technology. As Western civilization of the modern era is based materially on its technology, so it is distinguished spiritually from the cultures of all other periods and nations by making the investigation of natural laws the basic task of science. To primitive and oriental civilizations the concept of physical law is quite unknown. We shall see that it was virtually unknown to antiquity and the Middle Ages, and that it did not arise before the middle of the seventeenth century.

Modern science is accustomed to decide all questions about reality by experience and experiment. This remarkable attitude is not at all self-evident. It is rather a late achievement in the history of mankind, and its import cannot be fully understood as long as that fact is not realized. We shall start our exposition, therefore, with a retrospective view of the rise of empirical thinking and the experimental method. Though at the beginning of the modern era empirical research proceeded from certain empirical achievements of antiquity, classical empiricism can be omitted in this brief survey. In antiquity the empirical sciences were considerably surpassed in intellectual influence by metaphysics and rhetoric, and empiricists always were but a small minority among ancient philosophers and scientists. It will be sufficient, therefore, to begin with the Middle Ages.

In the period from 1300 to 1600 three strata of intellectual activity must be distinguished: university-scholars, humanists, and artisans. Both university- scholars and humanists were rationally trained. Their methods, however, were determined by their professional conditions and differed substantially from the methods of science. Both professors and humanistic literati distinguished liberal from mechanical arts and despised manual labor, experimentation, and dissection. Craftsmen were the pioneers of causal thinking in this period. Certain groups of superior manual laborers (artist-engineers, surgeons, the makers of nautical and musical instruments, surveyors, navigators, gunners) experimented, dissected, and used quantitative methods. The measuring instruments of the navigators, surveyors, and gunners were the forerunners of the later physical instruments. The craftsmen, however, lacked methodical intellectual training. Thus the two components of the scientific method were separated by the social barrier: logical training was reserved for upper-class scholars; experimentation, causal interest, and quantitative method were left to more or less plebeian artisans. Science was born when, with the progress of technology, the experimental method eventually overcame the social prejudice against manual labor and was adopted by rationally trained scholars. This was accomplished about 1600 (Gilbert, Galileo, Bacon). At the same time the scholastic method of disputation and the humanistic ideal of individual glory were superseded by the ideals of control of nature and advancement of learning through scientific cooperation. In a somewhat different way, sociologically, modern astronomy developed. The whole process was imbedded in the advance of early capitalistic society, which weakened collective-mindedness, magical thinking, and belief in authority and which furthered worldly, causal, rational, and quantitative thinking.

In his review of my article “Phenomenology and Natural Science” Mr. Walter Cerf does not represent the contents of the article quite correctly. My analysis had not arbitrarily picked out some phenomenological paper, especially exposed to criticism, and endeavored by “ridiculing” it to deal “a deadly stroke” to the “entire life work of Husserl”. The article had rather carefully distinguished applications of the phenomenological method to problems of logic, of psychology and sociology, and of the natural sciences. It had expressly restricted itself to analysis of this last “less known branch of phenomenology”. (Methodological objections to the other branches were indicated in the last eight lines only). It had selected the Realontologie of Hedwig Conrad-Martius as an instance because this paper is the only one in the Jahrbuch that deals with physical facts, although similar expositions are not rare in phenomenologically influenced contemporary philosophical literature. Mr. Cerf rejects Miss Conrad-Martius’ “unfortunate” paper as “romantic revelries”. For the methodological reasons pointed out in my analysis I agree with his judgment and assume it will contribute to purifications of the phenomenological method and of philosophical method in general. Before Mr. Cerf—s admission, however, the Realontologie had not been adversely criticized in the numerous articles of the Jahrbuch on phenomenological methodology. On the contrary it had been at length and rather enthusiastically reviewed by a phenomenologically influenced philosopher in the official journal of the “Gesellschaft Deutscher Naturforscher and Arzte”, (Naturwissenschaften, vol. XIV, 1926, pp. 947 f.).

Science appears, fully developed, only in Western civilization and the modern era. It is best understood if it is compared with other creations of the human mind playing analogous roles in other cultures: with the magic of the primitives, the theology of certain oriental cultures and that of the Arabic and Christian Middle Ages, the combination of metaphysics and rhetoric characteristic of education in classical antiquity, and the humanism of the Renaissance and classical China. Science shows certain differences from and certain conformities with each of them. It deals with worldly subject matters; so do magic, humanism, and classical philosophy. In contrast to magic, theology, and humanism it is not bound to authority; only classical philosophy was to a similar extent founded on individual thinking. In contrast to magic, science proceeds rationally — like the rest of its kin. But the rationality of science essentially differs from the rational methods of the classical philosophers and, particularly, the scholastics and humanists. Only science rationally investigates recurrent associations of phenomena, called “laws”, and has developed quantitative methods. And only science uses experimentation and systematically checks its findings with experience. All of these characteristics of science have been discussed in other places. Here the genesis of another trait, not less characteristic of science, is to be analyzed.

When phenomenology was introduced as a new science by Husserl its methods were applied first to objects of logic. Later phenomenological investigation expanded gradually to the fields of psychology, ethics, esthetics, and sociology (Scheler, Pfander, Hildebrand, a.o.). More rarely, objects of the natural sciences have been treated phenomenologically. Scattered indications of this kind are to be found in authors who do not belong to the most intimate circle of Husserl’s school (Helmut Plessner, Kurt Goldstein, Walter Frost, E. Buenning). Extensively, however, the phenomenological method has been applied to objects of the natural sciences once only, namely by Hedwig Conrad-Martius, a favourite pupil of Husserl’s, in her Realontologie (Ontology of Reality) and Farben (Colors). Yet this less known branch of phenomenology is particularly interesting. Husserl stressed the basic difference between phenomenological ideation (Wesensschau) on the one hand and psychological introspection and description of the immediate data of awareness on the other. The peculiarity and scientific productivity of phenomenological method, therefore, can be studied best in a field which is as far removed from psychology as possible. We shall try to analyze the papers of Conrad-Martius more fully and shall refer to other authors occasionally as illustrations.

The first representatives of worldly learning in the modern era were the Italian humanists. Humanism is older than modern science. Though they conform in some respects - both humanism and science deal with worldly subject matters and proceed rationally - the two intellectual attitudes differ hardly less from one another than science and scholasticism. Just because of this contrast an analysis of humanism can shed light on the characteristics of the scientific spirit. As the methods of the scholastics are understood best through the study of their professional tasks, so the sociological analysis of humanism must start with the occupations and professional aims of its representatives.

The greatest problem in the unification of theoretical research is the problem of unifying science and the humanistic studies. We use the term “humanistic studies” to include all branches of history and the studies of languages, literature, fine arts, and religion as they are usually prosecuted. When speaking of science we have in mind the empirical, primarily the natural sciences. In denying the name “science” to history or philology we do not wish to say that they are less valuable or interesting e.g. than physics but that they are substantially different from it.