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This article proposes a sketch of a new theory of wisdom based on the tree of philosophy (TOP) model. It is argued that philosophy—love of wisdom—has developed branches over the millennia that reflect the different aspects of thought and action that need to be considered in a comprehensive theory of wisdom. Although there is not a full consensus on what these branches are, the TOP usually has as branches, at minimum, metaphysics—including epistemology and ontology—and ethics, logic, aesthetics, hermeneutics, and axiology. Each of these branches is considered, and its implications for a philosophically based theory of wisdom are considered. Whereas some other theories of wisdom attempt to synthesize recent psychological attempts to understand wisdom, the TOP theory attempts to synthesize the contribution of millennia of philosophical inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Seventy-six general education and 67 special education teachers working in the same 66 elementary schools were surveyed about their beliefs about writing. Each teacher taught writing to one or more fourth-grade students receiving special education services, including students with learning disabilities. Survey findings indicated that general education teachers believed that they were better prepared to teach writing than special education teachers, and they were more positive about their own efforts to learn to teach writing. General education teachers also held more positive attitudes about teaching writing and their own capabilities as a writer than their special education counterparts. Furthermore, general educators were more likely than special educators to indicate that writing developed through effort and process, and less likely to think that writing knowledge came from experts. Beliefs about adequacy of preparation to teach writing predicted teachers' beliefs about their level of knowledge to teach writing, efficacy to overcome students' writing difficulties, and attitudes toward teaching writing. Recommendations for future research and implications for practice are presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Mental health services are currently undergoing immense cultural, philosophical, and organisational change. One such mechanism involved in this change has been the recognition of lived experience as a knowledge subset in its own right. Within five Community Health Care Organisations [CHOs] in the Irish mental health services, 2017 marked a new era as the traditional statutory mental health service hired a total of 30 Peer Support Workers. Since then, additional Peer Support Workers were recruited along with the added addition of Family Peer Support Work. The purpose of such positions is to use their lived experiences and the knowledge subset within it to normalise experiences, break down hierarchical barriers and facilitate candid conversations that will allow the service user to progress on their own, self-defined recovery journey. Since it's inception into Irish mental health services, peer support has been line managed by a non-peer discipline. It is this where this paper highlights a potential problem. The paper raises concerns that the supervision conducted by these non-peer professionals could tamper, mutate and destroy the essence of peer support—the transfer and use of lived experience between service users. As such, a recommendation is suggested that the literature pauses discussions as to the mechanism by which lived experience is delivered and instead focus energies on identifying the ontological and epistemological position that underpins the experiences.One potential position to examine is that of constructionism as such knowledge is created or constructed through the fusion of life experiences and sub-concious thoughts and emotions experienced at a particular moment in time which are then entangled together with current information to create a narrative or story that can be therapeutic. It is through this philosophical exercise involviong/including existential themes that the essence of lived experience can be identified, protected, and nourished within mental health discourse. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Epistemology is a science that discusses human knowledge, including its nature, possibility, ways, types, territory, etc. of knowledge. It is a field that philosophers, theologians, and religious scholars have taken more effective steps in deepening and developing it. Jewish thinkers have also paid special attention to this issue. Sadia bin yusuf al-fayoumi, nicknamed Sadia Gaon, the father of Jewish philosophy and the head of the Rabbinical religious school "Sura", is considered one of the most important theologians in the history of the tradition of Rabbinical Judaism. He is known as the first Jewish philosopher and exegete in the middle centuries due to his innovative and systematic ideas. He is the first person who, in addition to his detailed views on theology and cosmology, has also raised important opinions on epistemology in two works ‘Kitab Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat (the Book of Beliefs and Opinions)’ and ‘Tafsir Sefer Yetsira (Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira)’. The two works suggest two different structures of epistemology. Sadia points out that the human mind is able to explain reality in two ways: one is based on empirical rationalism and the other is based on divine illumination and self-revelation in the mind. In other words, the human mind can act in two modes like the act of dialogue (i.e. arguing and reasoning or being silent, meditating, listening, and seeing). Considering the unique role of knowledge arising from reflection and revelation, in reaching the complete truth, Sadia plans and examines it from various angles in his important works. Along with Al-Amanat Wa'l 'tiqadat, he makes a detailed discussion in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira about epistemology. Its study helps a lot to understand his thought. Sadia's thinking in religions and beliefs has a controversial nature. In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he has relatively deep and esoteric thinking. This study, using the analytical comparative method, investigates the topics related to epistemology raised in the two mentioned works of Sadia. In his works, knowledge has different meanings: in Al-Amanat Wa'l- 'tiqadat, it is shown as the correspondence between external reality and its concept in the human mind, while in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge is related to the origin and nature of creation. In ‘the Book of Beliefs and Opinions’, Sadia, in a positive answer regarding the possibility of acquiring knowledge, considers his goal to be certain and removes all doubts. In this book, while proving the same validity of knowledge and results that can be achieved through revelation and rational reasoning, he cites verses from the Bible to prove the foundations of his epistemological teachings. He considers the factor of knowledge to be the intellectual power of the soul, which only God has rightly placed in the person's existence. Despite the fact that the cognitive process relies on sensory perception, the intellect includes a system of principles and generalities that exist independently of sensory data. The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira considers the goal of the author of the book to be the representation (portrait) of how things come into being and find their existence so that the knower can understand them and the wise beings can learn them. Therefore, while confirming the possibility of acquiring knowledge, this work emphasizes the role of revelation in this connection. Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat presents the elements of the ‘cognition process’ in the form of a hierarchical model in three steps: 1) a complex and vague idea that is only a vague and confused idea of the nature of the research subject, 2) an analysis of this idea, and 3) accepting the ultimate truth by a belief freed from doubts. Here we witness a process of gradual internalization of knowledge that occurs in the mind, a process during which sensory perception turns into belief. In this process, reason gradually removes the factors that cause doubt and error, and then reaches the understanding of the truth by refining and classifying the mixed information of the external world. This is Saadia's model to reach the correct belief. The Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira does not include regular epistemological statements that describe the process of cognition in detail. But it associates three necessary factors (knowing, thinking, and believing) with the three corresponding faculties of the soul. He attributes knowledge to the power of collecting data (al-Qowwah al-Hashira) of the soul, which collects the discussed data and transmits them to the second power. The second power is the ‘discernment power’ (al-Qowwah al-Momaizah), which recognizes true and false data and verifies the facts by rejecting false data. Then, this power transfers the refined information to ‘Al-Qowwah al-Mu’taqidah’ which preserves it and becomes sure of its authenticity. In the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, along with the three general sources of knowledge, mentioned in Al-Amanat Wa'l-'tiqadat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ (Kal-barq), i.e. illumination, plays a prominent role. In complete contrast to his negative assessment of lightning-like knowledge in Al-Amanat, in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, he states that the principles of things appear in the mind like lightning, then they become clear and certain before his eyes. Of course, this duality goes back to different approaches of Sadia's epistemology in these two works as well as the related fields. In Al-Amanat, the knowledge of ‘lightning-like’ refers to sensible reality per se. But in Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, knowledge has the nature of representation. That is, the mind relies on itself in the complete absence of sensory data. Therefore, it seems that illumination is the only way to understand this ‘other reality’. In al-Amanat and beliefs, knowledge means the correspondence of external reality and its meaning in the human mind, while in the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira, it is related to the ultimate roots of creation, without considering sensory perception. Wisdom is one of the most controversial epistemological words of Sadia. Saadia's definition of wisdom is based on various biblical passages, and thus it can be seen as the result of Saadia's exegetical activities rather than independent philosophical reflection. In Al-Amanat, al-Hikmat is defined as “kawn al-ashyaʾ ʿala ḥaqaʾiqiha al-maʿluma wa-laysa-l-ḥikma an takun al-ashyaʾ ʿala tamanni mutamanin wa-la shahwa mushtahin” and the Commentary on the Sefer Yetzira defines it as “al-ḥikma hiya tartib al-ashyaʾ maratibaha wa-taqdiruha maqadiraha”. In short, according to Sadia, it should be said that reality speaks in two languages. In other words, the human mind is able to understand and express reality in two ways: one is universal and unanimous, and ultimately based on sensory and intellectual perception, and the other is based on God's self-revelation through human intuition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Probabilistic information is used increasingly, from medical research to weather forecasting. The relationship between probability and causality requires an acceptable philosophical account. Social work, which contributes to healthy wellbeing, increasingly uses language of probabilistic causal relationships between harms and subsequent limitations to healthy functioning. This paper explores causal understandings of probabilistic knowledge using concepts of the theologian, Thomas Aquinas. Social welfare terminology regarding risk (such as factors that are 'causative of' child abuse) is explored using epistemological concepts from scholastic philosophy. Aquinas' anthropological concepts related to modern 'risk science' and his concepts of rationality, harm and prudence are applied to contemporary social welfare. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interpretation of the existence and text is a type of esoteric (rational-intuitive) excavation of a subject that leads to the discovery and extraction of new propositions. Mulla Sadra, as a philosopher, is of rationally grounded principles in epistemology which have influenced his hermeneutical style. The study and analysis of these principles, the inference and identification of the rules that are based on these principles, and also the scope of the influence of these principles and rules on Sadra’s hermeneutical interpretations are among the main goals of the present essay. The methodology of the present study is descriptive-analytical focusing on Mulla Sadra’s works. The main extracted rules consist of the movement from the acquired knowledge to the knowledge by the presence of intuitive interpretation. To put it more clearly, human understanding of the text of existence can make its way from the acquired knowledge of objects to the sense of the presence of objects. This process of the reading of existence is what we refer to as the hermeneutical method that has its origin in the belief in the sacredness of the text of existence as a divine manifestation. When one encounters existence in the form of presential intelligence, a hermeneutical effort has taken place, but it is not so that this process has come to its end; because existence does not stop by its manifestations and its messages are infinite. The second rule is the active and productive role of reason in rational interpretation. Reason in this context as the source of human knowledge is indeed discursive theoretical reason which represents the stage of the acquisition of the theories and the intelligibilia (actual reason) from the meanings of the quadruple stages. In “Breaking the Idols of Ignorance”, Sadra insists that if the argumentative reason is not strengthened, imagination would get activated and thus cordial openings are replaced with imaginative pictures. The application of reason for hermeneutical interpretation consists of the supervision of the hermeneutical understanding and those requirements inferred from the surface of the text which should be correspondent to the rules of interpretation. These rules are discussed at the end of this study. Moreover, discursive reason in the course of the evolution of the epistemic foundations of interpretation can also play its role. Theories of knowledge each one of which has been rationally grounded in its particular school are theories that consider knowledge to have a process the outcome of which is knowledge or consciousness. For example, if in the knowledge we believe in the theories of intellects, in the theory of ideas, or even Kant’s epistemologic a l doctrine, each one of these understands knowledge in terms of a particular process. Accordingly, each of these epistemic perspectives respectively traces the origin of the emergence of hermeneutics or interpretation back to active intellect, ideas, or the structure of the human mind. Sadra believes that intuitive truths that are revealed to the person under particular conditions lie outside the scope of rational activity and argument in its specific sense; then, reason does not have access to the border of opening and intuition. When the soul reaches the knowledge through thinking, we call this mode of knowledge “reason” while if this knowledge is acquired directly from God it is called “heart”. Reason moves forward in the course of the acquisition of knowledge through delimitation and creation of connection and conditions while the heart traverses this course via transcending the conditions and limits. Receptivity and passivity of cordial perception in intuitive interpretation, the necessity of the harmony of rational-intuitive interpretation with the primordial perception, and the hierarchical nature of the structure of intuitive interpretation are among the other rules discussed in the present study. Dynamicity of hermeneutical interpretation is rooted in the dynamicity of truth not in our capability of arbitrary reading of truth because this dynamicity is due to the dynamicity of divine inspirations and manifestations. Human connection with the existential world is proportionate to his ascension and he will turn into the truth of that world insofar as if he reaches the world spirits, he will face the original truths. The intermediate role of the world of ideas and imagination in intuitive interpretation is the other rule. Sadra’s theory of the immateriality of imagination becomes explicated in his discussion of imagination in interpretations of purgatorial and otherworldly ideas. Moreover, according to Sadra’s theories, the intermediate role of the world of ideas and imagination is uncovered in the depiction of intuitive ideas and interpretation. The necessity of controlling the sources of knowledge in the interpretation (the necessity of regulation in particular) is the last rule which we have discussed. Sadra reiterates that the essence and secrets of the text of the Quran are not in conflict with its interpretative appearance rather complete it. In hermeneutical interpretation, metaphoric use does not occur. Therefore, the correct interpretation is the one that is in harmony with the surface of the Book and the Sunnah. The present study not only demonstrates part of the logical and philosophical rules governing the textual interpretations, but also presents an analysis of hermeneutical knowledge sources (reason and heart) which can contribute to a deeper and practical understanding of transcendent philosophy. Epistemological rules are concerned with the existential mode of human epistemic faculties in particular though these rules are mostly pre-hermeneutic. In other words, our knowledge of them can explain the substructure of Sadra’s interpretations. These rules have been inferred from Sadra’s works and enriched with the texts which are in line with Sadra’s ideas. These heptafold rules are grounded in semantic realism and textual understanding, the theory of author-centeredness and textualism, and finally in ontological realism. Sadra’s interpretations are divided into two rational and intuitive types. The reason is of an active role in these Sadraean interpretations and is concerned with production and creativity but this creativity is controlled with interpretative regulations. According to Sadra, the reason is prior to tradition and basically intuition is a level higher than discursive reason which lies over it. The results of this study show that without paying attention to the aforementioned principles and their relevant rules, one cannot reach a tridimensional and deep understanding of Sadraean interpretations. Failure of correct understanding of the place of hermeneutical interpretation in Mulla Sadra’s philosophy is itself the source of many of the views and criticisms that are expressed by the opponents and critics of Sadraean philosophy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The conceptual lens and epistemological models employed by theorists determine their observations and conclusions. This discourse demonstrates how adopting nontraditional conceptual models can lead to better understanding of common phenomena that fall outside the purview of dominant theorizing approaches. Using the metaphors of theories as lenses, nets and maps, it articulates the significance of and approaches to theorizing outsize the dominant paradigm. It highlights the changing grounds of digital religion and popular culture in Africa as case in point for applying new theoretical tools and epistemological models. It argues for culture-relevant and culture-sensitive theorizing to better illuminate knowledge of cultural phenomena and realities beyond the West. It shows how proper theorizing can account for Africa's changing media and cultural landscape, as well as correct the myth of Africa as being stuck in the pre-Information Age. It recommends non-binary multi-modal frameworks that transcend old-new, sacred-secular, spiritual-physical, folk-popular binary thought systems. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Scoping reviews are an increasingly popular knowledge synthesis method. While knowledge synthesis methods abound in evidence-based practices, these methods are critiqued for their reliance on positivism. Drawing on a scoping review that mapped scholarly conceptualizations of family caregivers' information-related dementia care work, in this article, I reconcile institutional ethnography's epistemological and ontological assumptions with the prescribed scoping review framework. I first explore the textual organization of scoping reviews. I then unpack the process of modifying three scoping review stages in keeping with an institutional ethnography method of inquiry, and in doing so, transform the scoping review into a critical knowledge synthesis tool. Through a reflexive process, I deconstruct scoping review's textual authority and uncover that scoping reviews bring about a double decontextualization of family caregivers' information work, removing family caregivers from their experiences of their information-related care work while simultaneously reducing them to objects of techno-scientific interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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Scoping reviews are increasingly used in health professions education to synthesize research and scholarship, and to report on the depth and breadth of the literature on a given topic. In this Perspective, we argue that the philosophical stance scholars adopt during the execution of a scoping review, including the meaning they attribute to fundamental concepts such as knowledge and evidence, influences how they gather, analyze, and interpret information obtained from a heterogeneous body of literature. We highlight the principles informing scoping reviews and outline how epistemology-the aspect of philosophy that "deals with questions involving the nature of knowledge, the justification of beliefs, and rationality"-should guide methodological considerations, toward the aim of ensuring the production of a high-quality review with defensible and appropriate conclusions. To contextualize our claims, we illustrate some of the methodological challenges we have personally encountered while executing a scoping review on clinical reasoning and reflect on how these challenges could have been reconciled through a broader understanding of the methodology's philosophical foundation. We conclude with a description of lessons we have learned that might usefully inform other scholars who are considering undertaking a scoping review in their own domains of inquiry. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Copyright of European Journal of Social Work is the property of Routledge and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use. This abstract may be abridged. No warranty is given about the accuracy of the copy. Users should refer to the original published version of the material for the full abstract. (Copyright applies to all Abstracts.)

In this article, we explore knowledge creation for critical social work practice. We examine critical realism as a complementary epistemology for research with populations who experience structural inequality. The growing literature on critical realism offers helpful commentary for strengthening anti-oppressive approaches to practice. The site of clinical practice is explored as an underdeveloped location for creating case-specific knowledge that includes consideration of the structural forces that constrain people's lives. Finally, as advocates for, yet critical commentators on, evidence-based practice (EBP), we promote expanding EBP to address the external hardships and inequalities that individuals and communities routinely face. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

I want to consider puzzles that must be solved to formulate a theory of epistemology of intelligence. My aim is not to build a theory. I want to create the foundations of a good approach to an epistemological theory of intelligence. To reach this step, unsolved problems must be considered; I formulate them in an analytical manner, that is, I consider them as philosophical puzzles, similar to epistemology. This is the preliminary step toward a new way of thinking about old issues. We must face our primary difficulties in the best manner, that is, we need an epistemology of intelligence. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

On a traditional view of perceptual justification, perceptual experiences always provide prima facie justification for beliefs based on them. Against this view, Matthew McGrath and Susanna Siegel argue that if an experience is formed in an epistemically pernicious way then it is epistemically downgraded. They argue that "wishful seeing"—when a subject sees something because he wants to see it—is psychologically and normatively analogous to wishful thinking. They conclude that perception can lose its traditional justificatory power, and that our epistemic norms should govern how experiences are formed. To make this case, the downgrader must first isolate a feature of wishful thinking that makes it epistemically defective, then show that this feature is present in wishful seeing. I present a dilemma for the downgrader. There are two features of wishful thinking that could plausibly explain why it is irrational: the fact that a desire causes you to form a belief not supported by adequate evidence, or the mere influence that desire holds over belief formation. Each option presents formidable difficulties. Although the first “bad evidence” explanation, which McGrath employs, explains the irrationality of wishful thinking, it does not transfer to wishful seeing, since experiences are not formed in response to evidence. The second “influence of desire” explanation, which Siegel employs, fails to isolate an epistemically defective feature of wishful thinking, and also does not transfer to wishful seeing. I conclude that the downgrader’s argument from wishful seeing fails. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

When embarking on a piece of research it is important to decide on which ontological basis the researcher stands. Do they see the world in absolute terms thereby having a positivist view or do they believe in observing through the constructions of the mind like the constructionists. Because it is from the ontological position that informs the epistemology, i.e. the empiricist who believes that knowledge can be gained via the senses would therefore take on an experimental methodology. Therefore the epistemological stance of how to approach the study and interpret knowledge is key and when this is decided, then the researcher will know which method of data collection to use; is essential for a logical and correct process to be followed and adhered to in order for research into MSM and to stand up to the rigour of peer review [Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., Nicholls, C. M., & Ormston, R. (2014). Qualitative research practice: A guide for social science students and researchers. London: Sage]. Qualitatively Interpersonal Phenomenological Analysis is chosen for investigating the straight men who have sex occasionally with men (MSM) as it fits with the epistemology stance of the researcher and with the focus on trying to obtain ideas, values and beliefs of the MSM population in order to curb the spread of HIV among straight women. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I locate myself as a PhD student, of Indigenous and Settler heritages, enrolled in a first-year epistemology course. Using reflexivity as an approach in qualitative research, I take the reader on a journey of the intricate workings of my spiritual, emotional, mental, and physical experiences stemming from my grappling with the meaning of epistemology and how learning about this impacts the perspective I have in my life, social work, and for my dissertation research. Learning about knowledge and how it is conceived, impacted, and transformed through the interaction with others raises many questions about how I have come to know what I know. A question remains as to what I will know at the end of my research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A review of intelligence literature from Romania last century provides an overview of the concerns and themes addressed by the specialists in the field. The main topics are the history landing field and related case studies. Up to this point there is no major paper on the theory of scientific intelligence domain particular to Romanian historical and ideological framework, which bear the mark of identity of this nation. Lack of this theory of domain led to the evolution and development of an intelligence system based mainly on the operational or practical current activities and out of line with other competitive systems of intelligence. As a result, this development has been marked by a certain type of agnatological intelligence in detriment of an epistemological intelligence, necessary for all, especially those in the operational plan. Throughout history, these latter came to substitute, perhaps unintended, the roles of the trinominal research-education-operational, subjugating research and education tasks through operational, without distinguish existence of mental maps and different knowledge cycles. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Despite the potential of reflective thinking to help intelligence analysts avoid the potential pitfalls for intelligence analytical errors, there has been limited research on how reflective thinking can be taught to analysts. This paper aims to fill the gap by discussing how reflective thinking is essential to and applicable for intelligence analysis in the field of epistemology. Drawing upon Dewey’s conception of reflective thinking as forming conclusions that are grounded in evidence and rationality, it is argued that reflective thinking enables analysts to guard against ambiguous, deceptive, contradictory and missing information, faulty assumptions, poor critical thinking, inadequate understanding of epistemology and policy bias. Using the case study of Iraq’s alleged Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), this paper explains how the concept of knowledge as ‘justified true belief’ can be used to promote reflective thinking in intelligence analysts. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper focusses on the Rabbinic suggestion that the attitude of awe, rather than any particular belief, lies at the heart of religiosity. On the basis of these Rabbinic sources, and others, the paper puts forward three theses: (1) that belief is not a sufficiently absorbing epistemic attitude to bear towards the truths of religion; (2) that much of our religious knowledge isn’t mediated via belief; and (3) that make-believe is sometimes more important, in the cultivation of religiosity than is mere belief. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article describes and elaborates upon the theoretical model of the Mattering Map, initially introduced in Engendered Lives: A New Psychology of Women’s Experience (Kaschak, 1992). This model organizes the principles of contextual feminist theory and practice in a manner that honors the complexity, multiplicity, and morphing of the energetic field of mattering. The mattering map is more intimately related to 21st century physics, neuroscience, and constructionist thought than to the reductionist and fragmenting epistemological models of the 19th and 20th centuries. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article aims to highlight the role played by epistemology in the intelligence studies and also to contribute to the development of intelligence theory in general by consolidating this filed of research. I belive that only by theorizing intelligence we will be able to explain what it is how it can understood and what its contribution is to the actual and future social political changes. Moreover epistemology improves the process of critical thinking in intelligence studies and allows to develop comparative analysis in both idelological and scientific ways. This approch is meant to help to reduce the risk of making decisional errors and the optimize the gathering , analysis, exploitation and dissemination of operational and strategic information. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Wilfred Bion, 20th century British psychoanalyst, produced a four-book epistemological series midcentury that has deeply impacted contemporary psychoanalysis and showed unmistakable marks of being shaped decisively by Christian mystical theology. Key concepts—including reality's being incapable of being known, transformations in “O,” “at-one-ment,” incarnation, and the absence of memory and desire—draw deeply on St. John of the Cross and Meister Eckhart. Their impact has shifted normative psychoanalytic technique, raising the possibility that these changes can reciprocally contribute to theology and a life of faith. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Physical education has long suffered low status within educational institutions, due to the assumption that practical knowledge or ‘knowing how’ is somehow set apart from cognitive development and anti-intellectual. This dualistic conception of mind and body is challenged using Ryle’s conceptual account of ‘intelligent performance’, which provides a more positive account of ‘knowing how’ and in the process, dispels with an intellectualist account of education that privileges theory over practice, mental skills over physical skills. Since physical education predominantly deals with practical knowledge, the interest to physical educators is significant, because one’s knowledge of how to do something, in most cases, is a legitimate matter of evaluation. Consequently, to take intelligent performance seriously, we need to be able to ascribe know(ing) how to someone, particularly when we appraise their actions. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This paper raises questions about the epistemological foundations of evidence-based medicine ( EBM). We argue that EBM is based upon reliabilist epistemological assumptions, and that this is appropriate - we should focus on identifying the most reliable processes for generating and collecting medical knowledge. However, we note that this should not be reduced to narrow questions about which research methodologies are the best for gathering evidence. Reliable processes for generating medical evidence might lie outside of formal research methods. We also question the notion of the knower that is assumed by EBM. We argue that EBM assumes an enlightenment conception of knowers as autonomous, substitutable individuals. This conception is troubled by the way that clinicians learn the role of anecdote in health care and the role of patient choice, all of which bring into play features of clinicians and patients as situated individuals with particular backgrounds and experiences. EBM's enlightenment conception of the knower is also troubled by aspects of the way evidence is produced. Given these limitations, we argue that EBM should retain its reliabilist bent, but should look beyond formal research methodologies in identifying processes that yield reliable evidence for clinical practice. We suggest looking to feminist epistemology, with its focus on the standpoints of individual situated knowers, and the role of social context in determining what counts as knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

El artículo pone de relieve la creciente importancia que está adquiriendo en los últimos años la disciplina filosófica de la epistemología en el campo del análisis de inteligencia, bien sea ésta estratégica (ámbito de la seguridad y la defensa) o competitiva (ámbito empresarial). La epistemología se ha convertido en el sustrato sobre el que se sustentan tanto el análisis cualitativo como el análisis cuantitativo en minería de datos. Se repasan los diferentes métodos de razonamiento que ayudan al analista a escoger las técnicas más adecuadas en el análisis cualitativo y a seleccionar, descartar y transformar variables para poder construir un modelo en un proyecto de minería de datos. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Does ethnography have anything to offer to the engineering community or the computer development community? Theoretically, yes, it does. Ethnography can provide the skills and tools that will help us understand user needs and preferences, which can then be embedded into software and hardware. Still, it is difficult to find any discussion of commercial hardware or software products in which ethnography demonstratively played a decisive part, which has led some to argue that ethnography, as it is currently practiced in the computer development community, would never have any practical impact. Bader and Nyce [Bader, G. and Nyce, J.M., 1998. When only the self is real: theory and practice in the development community. Journal of Computer Documentation, 22 (1), 5–10] raised this issue a decade ago, and argued that ethnographic knowledge appeared to be largely unintelligible and inoperable to the computer development community. To date, this debate has not been taken much further, and the results of ethnographic research continue to be published in the HCI/Human Factors literature. The issues Bader and Nyce raised a decade ago have however not gone away: to what extent can ethnography make a practical contribution to the computer development community? This article picks up this discussion, re-examines the original arguments and commentary, adds a Koenian view of engineering epistemology to the analysis, and concludes that we appear to require a much improved understanding of engineering epistemology, to support interdisciplinary communication. Building on this foundation, what may furthermore be necessary is to perform an ethnographic operation twice, not just once: essentially, it is argued, it is necessary to build a kind of ethnography that takes the ‘interpretation’ of research findings to one’s clients as seriously as it does the interpretation of what goes on in a particular, ‘targeted’ workplace for end-users. By providing this kind of ‘double’ translation and interpretation, it would be possible to ‘deliver’ ethnographic findings to the engineering communities in a form they find intelligible, simply by doing what ethnography does best: the discovery and interpretation of what is taken to be self-evident and logical. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

This article presents Jürgen Habermas’s view on the foundation of knowledge, the objectivity of reason and the universality of normative judgments, along with critiques from Richard Rorty and Slavoj Zizek. It is intended to bring about a dialogue in this debate, considering Habermas’s thoughts on science and technology and the controversy within STS studies about the role of expert knowledge and public participation in science and technology policy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Quality measures are often used to judge research. This paper looks at what measures have been used in the human factors community to evaluate qualitative research and suggests some alternatives. Using ethnography as a test case, the paper raises the question of whether it is appropriate to use measures derived from quantitative and experimental research to judge the quality of qualitative studies, regardless of the subject and problem domain. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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One of the tenets of holism is that the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. Applying this theorem epistemologically, we could say that a holistic view is greater than the sum of the specialized views that contribute to it. Within the framework of three divergent worldviews (mechanistic, organismic and contextual) as originally proposed by Pepper (World hypotheses: A study in evidence, University of California Press, Los Angeles, ), holism as both a philosophical position and a practical approach to research is applied to the study of adult human development. Because spiritual development has received less scholarly attention than biological, cognitive, or emotional functioning, topics such as meditation research, non-religious spirituality, and the concept of soul are covered to promote a balanced developmental perspective. Historical and philosophical factors leading to holism are described, a sampling of interdisciplinary dialogue between psychology and theology is presented, and conclusions regarding the need for holistic thinking and the relationship between religion and spirituality are offered. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Unger (1974/2000 ) presents an argument for skepticism that significantly differs from the more traditional arguments for skepticism. The argument is based on two premises, to wit, that knowledge would entitle the knower to absolute certainty, and that an attitude of absolute certainty is always inadmissible from an epistemic viewpoint. The present paper scrutinizes the arguments that Unger provides in support of these premises and shows that none of them is tenable. It thus concludes that Unger's argument for skepticism fails to threaten the possibility of knowledge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

What is it to have a reason? According to one common idea, the Factoring Account, you have a reason to do A when there is a reason for you to do A which you have—which is somehow in your possession or grasp. In this paper, I argue that this common idea is false. But though my arguments are based on the practical case, the implications of this are likely to be greatest in epistemology: for the pitfalls we fall into when trying to defend the Factoring Account reflect very well the major developments in empiricist epistemology during the 20th century. I conjecture that this is because epistemologists have been—wrongly—wedded to the Factoring Account about evidence, which I conjecture is a certain kind of reason to believe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Bevir and Rhodes' interpretive approach underpins the Differentiated Polity Model (DPM) which has replaced the Westminster Model as the dominant model of British politics. This article critiques both the interpretive approach and the DPM, arguing that the latter fails to recognise the continued importance of the role hierarchy, inequality and a dominant political tradition play in British politics, omissions which result, in large part, from its roots in an interpretist position. As such, the main aim of the article is to defend an alternative conception of British politics, the Asymmetric Power Model (APM), by considering three empirical areas in which these two models differ substantially: whether hierarchy or networks are the dominant mode of governance in the UK; the extent and importance of structured inequality in the UK; and whether there is a dominant tradition in British politics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information about the theory on the cultivation of cognitive subjects which is given significance in the epistemology in Chinese philosophy. According to it, intelligence comes from benevolence, and in order to possess knowledge, morality should be valued. The theory focuses in stance, attitudes, ways of thinking and feeling of a cognitive subject. On the other hand, it is suggested that the improvement of the said theory is significant for the structure of a modern Chinese-style Marxist philosophy system.

The article offers information on cooperative naturalism. It is posed that the radical forms of naturalistic epistemology appear more like revolutionary manifestos than reasonable alternatives. Moreover, it is mentioned that a modest form of naturalism is worth promoting. It is also stated that this modest form can work with hermeneutics to solve epistemic problems. Relative to this, it is forwarded that seemingly cooperative naturalism connects the gap between analytic and continental philosophy.

This paper argues that the best way to think about intellectual norms, or an ethics of belief, is by reflecting on the virtues and vices of inquiry. A theory of intellectual virtue provides a promising framework for evaluating different practices of inquiry in relation to the generic aim of truth. However, intellectual virtues are too often conflated with measures of reliability in mainstream epistemology, resulting in an overly narrow conception of epistemic value. Prominent reliabilists such as Alvin Goldman state that a practice of inquiry is virtuous just in case it maximizes true belief. I argue that this reliabilist interpretation of virtue lacks the resources to explain evaluative distinctions between ways of maximizing true belief, such as the difference between maximizing accuracy and maximizing precision. With the aid of examples, I show that praiseworthy attributions of reliability are parasitic on attributions of topic-specific aims and skills that constitute their own characteristic standards of success, suggesting that bare truth-maximization is not the fundamental criterion of epistemic value. To accommodate the full range of intellectual norms that shape our practices, I conclude that we need a concept of virtue thicker than mere reliability. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal I pursue is to redefine the study of religious epistemology on the basis of an ethnomethodological extension of Wittgenstein. This approach shows that the nature of religious belief and its relation to facts, proofs, and empirical reality are matters that are dealt with by ordinary members of society. The examination of this lay epistemology reveals that - far from being a settled and established entity - religious belief is a polymorphous phenomenon. Religious belief is a pragmatic resource whose configuration is shaped to allow the accomplishment of interactional moves within specific contexts. I defend this thesis by analyzing accounts pertaining to a contemporary religious apparition claim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The goal I pursue is to redefine the study of religious epistemology on the basis of an ethnomethodological extension of Wittgenstein. This approach shows that the nature of religious belief and its relation to facts, proofs, and empirical reality are matters that are dealt with by ordinary members of society. The examination of this lay epistemology reveals that - far from being a settled and established entity - religious belief is a polymorphous phenomenon. Religious belief is a pragmatic resource whose configuration is shaped to allow the accomplishment of interactional moves within specific contexts. I defend this thesis by analyzing accounts pertaining to a contemporary religious apparition claim. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Through the concept of the schema, as elaborated in The Critique of Pure Reason, and then refined in The Critique of Judgement, Kant tried to find an answer to the problem surrounding the epistemological relationship between symbol and object. In his answer, Kant combined elements from both the empiricism and rationalism of his time in such a way that its theory of knowledge cannot overcome an irreducible duality between intellectual activity and sensory activity. In trying to abolish this duality Cassirer--just like Piaget, although taking a different path--developed a genetic theory around a reformulation of the Kantian concept of the schema. The goal of the present article is to analyze Cassirer's genetic theory of conceptualization and to present, in the end, a brief comparison with Piaget's genetic epistemology. The Kantian source common to both thinkers allows us to evaluate the reach of Kantian constructivism more clearly and to better understand its limits and possibilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From carbon-based organic molecules to body plans and thought, most living beings are built on linear structures that can be adequately described by unidimensional variables. Among known physical phenomena, electrical polarization is identified as a possible mechanism that assembles ordinary atoms into linear structures. Morphodynamics then is the general theory that predicts the statistical properties of systems made of such structures. Within this theory, unidimensionality appears as the common foundation of many enigmatic features observed for evolution in life sciences, including symbolic representation at genetic or mental levels, even consciousness and boundless innovation. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To explore, from a philosophy of knowledge perspective, the contribution of the guideline development process to reducing epistemic uncertainty in clinical decision-making – defined as the challenge of applying evidence to patients, dealing with conflicting information and determining the level of confidence in a medical conclusion. Longitudinal ethnographic study of national guideline development panels. Fieldnotes were collected from 19 panel meetings in UK, Netherlands and Norway (~120 h of observation) between September 2016 and February 2019. Draft guidelines, review protocols and background material were collated (~200 documents). Data were analyzed thematically to gain familiarity and then theorized using concepts of knowledge development and use and clinical decision-making. Guideline development panels in all three countries wrestled with epistemic tensions – notably between the desire to "purify" an assumed external truth (for example by limiting included evidence to high-quality randomized controlled trials) and a more pragmatic and pluralist approach that drew on a wider range of evidence including qualitative research, real-world data, clinical experience and patient testimony. Detailed analysis of the process by which particular guideline recommendations were constructed allowed us to draw out the implications of these tensions for guideline users in clinical practice. Guideline development panels apply multiple – often conflicting – understandings of knowledge, inference and truth in an attempt to reduce epistemic uncertainty. Guidelines makers, clinicians, scientists and students should engage critically and reflexively with the philosophical assumptions that underpin guideline development and inductive inference to build capability to deal with clinical complexity. • Ethnographic study of guideline development panels. • Informed by philosophical notions of the nature of knowledge, inference and truth. • Panel discussions included clinical experience and a broad range of knowledge. • Panels wrestled with tensions between purist and pluralist approaches of EBM. • Our findings question the philosophical assumptions of guideline development panels. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]