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Regulatory agencies in recent decades have paid increasing attention to assessment of toxic contamination of the environment, in particular the aquatic ecosystem. The evaluation of toxic impact has seen the development of various methods, including ecological indicators, bioassays and biosensors using microbial species, invertebrates and plants.

Introduction Scene setting How do we assess and manage the actual risks Real life examples Lessons learnt What can be done in future? Conclusions Subject Index

Water contamination emergencies , Water contamination emergencies , کتابخانه دیجیتالی دانشگاه علوم پزشکی و خدمات درمانی شهید بهشتی

Planning for high impact very low probability events is very difficult. This is particularly true when dealing with the analysis arising from potable water emergency pollution incidents. The main issues are: how to rapidly detect when significant contamination has occurred; to identify the cause or convincingly prove a negative in the absence of contamination and finally maintain an efficient and effective 24h/365d response system on a long-term basis for very low frequency events. This paper considers the handling of these issues for a water laboratory responsible for the regulatory analysis of drinking water for a population of over 8 million. Other key issue are how to assess the emergency response performance on a regular basis and the need to minimise operational costs. Chemical, radiological and ecotoxicological screening protocols are discussed. Microbiological emergency incidents are not covered. The numerous benefits of setting up a mutual aid laboratory response scheme are outlined.© (2005) COPYRIGHT SPIE--The International Society for Optical Engineering. Downloading of the abstract is permitted for personal use only.

International audience; Accidental or intentional contaminations by microorganisms of drinking water distribution systems impair water services for the safe use of water. These events occur more or less frequently as a result of (i) negative pressures on the network and intrusion of undesirable bugs through leaks, (ii) natural disasters associated with urban flooding, (iii) default in treatment or distribution with a risk of epidemic situations, (iv) back‐contaminations of point‐of‐use systems which may become points of nosocomial contamination in specific environments like hospital emergency services (e.g., contamination by Pseudomonas or Escherichia coli), (v) unexpected bloom of microorganisms of sanitary interest (e.g., Legionella), or (vi) intentional contamination in the framework of terroristic activities.