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This paper presents results from a test program carried out to determine the peak deflagration pressure achieved within a congested enclosure vented through one wall of the enclosure. The industry standard in the United States for predicting the peak pressure developed in a vented deflagration is the National Fire Protection Association's Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting (NFPA 68). The NFPA Explosion Protection Committee has compiled a database of published and unpublished explosion venting test data. This data was summarized in a 2008 report (Zalosh) that served as the foundation of the development for the vented deflagration correlations in the latest (2013) edition of NFPA 68. In this latest edition, NFPA 68 (2013), the vent area correlation accounts for varying degrees of congestion if the ratio of the obstacle surface area (A obs ) to that of the enclosure internal surface area (A s ) is greater than 0.4 (i.e., A r = A obs /A s > 0.4). Congestion is accounted for within the correlation at all values of A r , however when A r is r ratio of less than 0.4. These tests were conducted in a rig with a 48-foot width, 24-foot depth, and 12-foot height. The rig is enclosed with solid walls, roof, and floor, allowing for venting through one of the long walls (i.e., 48-foot by 12-foot). The venting face of the rig was sealed with a 6 mil (0.15 mm) thick plastic vapor barrier to allow for the formation of a near-stoichiometric propane-air mixture. The flammable gas cloud was ignited near the center of the rear wall. Steel vent panels (20-gauge, 2 lb m /ft 2 ) were installed over the plastic vapor barrier using explosion relief fasteners. The vent panels were configured to release at 0.3 psig; vent panel restraint devices were not utilized. The congestion inside the rig was provided by a regular array of vertical cylinders (2-inch schedule 40 pipe and 2-inch outer diameter cylinders) giving area and volume blockage ratios (ABR and VBR) within the congestion array of 4.9% and 0.5%, respectively. The obstacle-to-enclosure surface area ratio (A r ) is 0.3 with the array extended throughout the rig and vent panels installed, which is less than the critical value to account for congestion in the NFPA 68 correlation. Four series of tests were conducted with varying vent parameters, flammable gas cloud sizes, and congestion levels. Baseline tests were performed with the congestion array and flammable gas cloud extending throughout the entire rig without vent panels present (i.e., vapor barrier only). The second test series included the addition of vent panels for the same congestion pattern as that employed for the baseline tests. The third test series utilized a flammable gas cloud that filled only the back half of the rig. For the fourth test series, the congestion array occupied only ¼ of the rig. The peak pressures and impulses for each test series are provided, along with pressure histories internal and external to the rig for selected tests. The steel vent panel throw distance is also provided as a function of internal peak pressure. The test data were compared with the predictions of the vent area correlations provided in NFPA 68. For all but the fourth test series (i.e., congestion array occupying ¼ of the rig), the average internal peak pressures were approximately a factor of 2 larger than those predicted by NFPA 68. Adjustments to the NFPA 68 correlation were investigated to improve the agreement with the current test data.

An explosion destroyed a small “Gas House” in which aerosol cans were being filled with ethylene oxide on June 24, 1997. At issue was whether the ignition occurred in the Gas House or from a remote catalytic converter. Our investigation of the pattern of blast damage supports ignition at the catalytic converter that generated a burn-back through the ducting. A strong jet ignition reached a flammable atmosphere in the Gas House and ignited an explosion that well exceeded the yield strength of the prefabricated metal Gas House in spite of the vent panels and access doors being released and discharging of the fire suppression system. One of the doors from the Gas House flew off of the building as hazardous debris, which impacted and catastrophically failed a second door located in an adjoining occupied building. This resulted in the only fatality associated with this event. This study illustrates the damage patterns that indicate the direction of the initial explosion wave. © 2007 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2007.

Enclosed chemical processes, laboratory facilities, boilers and reformer furnaces are typical examples of facilities and equipment where an internal VCE may be postulated to occur. The applied blast load history on the enclosure surfaces is required in order to assess the response of the enclosure to the postulated VCE. The internal blast pressure history and associated applied blast loads depend on a number of factors, such as: (1) the maximum flame speed attained in a flammable cloud, (2) the ratio of the cloud volume to the total enclosure volume, (3) the cloud location within the enclosure, and (4) the environment temperature. The purpose of work described in this paper was to investigate the dependence of internal blast pressure history and applied blast loads on the aforementioned factors. It was found that the applied loads on the enclosure surfaces can be roughly classified into two regimes: quasi-static and dynamic, depending on the combination of these factors. It can be important to identify the appropriate blast loading regime in order to properly analyze the structural response of the enclosure.Copyright © 2015 by ASME

The Baker–Strehlow–Tang vapor cloud explosion (VCE) blast load prediction methodology uses flame speed as a measure of explosion severity. In previous publications, guidance has been presented for selecting flame speeds as a function of congestion, confinement, and fuel reactivity. These recommended values were based on empirical data available from the literature. Over the last 5 years, a series of medium-scale VCE tests have been conducted through a joint industry program to better understand vapor cloud explosions and to allow a more accurate definition of the flame speed applicable to a given combination of congestion, confinement, and fuel reactivity. These tests have demonstrated that the previously published flame speeds are not conservative for all configurations for the case of no confinement (3-D flame expansion). This paper provides an overview of the tests along with an update to the flame speed table where the previously published guidance was not conservative. © 2005 American Institute of Chemical Engineers Process Saf Prog, 2005

During plant start-up, a critical interface exists at block valves located at battery limits of process units. A relatively small leak at a battery-limit isolation point was established as the source of gas that caused an explosion in a 26-foot diameter fractionator on a Fluid Coker nearing the end of a maintenance turn a round. This incident could easily have occurred in any modern oil refinery or chemical plant. This paper shares the technology and learning associated with small release scenarios that are often overlooked in large-scale plant operations. The explosion event did not damage the fractionator shell, but displaced all but two of the sieve trays in the column, and produced minor damage in the overhead condensers and receiver drum. Importantly, the consequent down-time resulted in a major production loss. Damage analysis supports the proposition that a deflagration occurred in the top portion of the fractionator involving under 50 lbs. of fuel. It is believed that relatively small leaks, persisting over a period of a few hours, supplied the required amount of fuel. The accident investigation identified multiple potential pathways whereby natural gas leaking past battery limit block valves could have reached the fractionator. This incident highlights the importance of securing leak tight connections between active and inactive sections of process systems. As a result of this experience, several procedural and organizational reforms have been instituted.

A key component of explosion hazard evaluations is the determination of standoffs to given blast overpressure values. Many such evaluations use a simplified methodology that assumes that the blast wave propagates from the explosion source to the target location without interacting with intervening buildings or structures (i.e., without blast wave shielding). This is obviously a perfectly acceptable approach for a screening study, but blast wave shielding effects can be significant in certain circumstances (e.g., within a building group). A methodology was proposed by the UK Health & Safety Laboratory (HSL) in 2001 to account for blast shielding due to buildings/structures between the explosion source and target location. The HSL methodology is based on the blast waves generated by high explosives (HE). This paper extends the blast shielding evaluation to blast waves generated from pressure vessel bursts (PVB) and vapor cloud explosions (VCE). The influences of blast wave shape parameters (overpressure, duration and rise time) on blast wave shielding are examined. The results indicate that the degree of blast shielding is strongly dependent on the source of the blast wave (i.e., on the blast wave shape parameters) and that the shielding factors obtained with HE blast waves are not always directly applicable for PVB and VCE blast waves.