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Memory for feelings is subject to fading and bias over time. In 2 studies, the authors examined whether the magnitude and direction of bias depend on the type of feeling being recalled: emotion or mood. A few days after the U.S. Presidential elections in 2008 and 2012, participants reported how they felt about the election outcome (emotion) and how they felt in general (mood). A month after the elections, participants recalled their feelings. The intensity of past emotion was recalled more accurately than the intensity of past mood. Participants underestimated the intensity of emotion but overestimated the intensity of mood. Participants' appraisals of the importance of the election, which diminished over time, contributed to underestimating the intensity of emotion. In contrast, participants' strong emotional response to the election contributed to overestimating the intensity of mood. These opposing biases have important implications for decision making and clinical assessment., ((c) 2016 APA, all rights reserved).)

In 2008, 1103 ardent Boston Red Sox fans answered questions about their team's 2003 loss and 2004 win in baseball championship games with archrival New York Yankees. Contrary to predictions based on socioemotional selectivity theory, there were no significant interactions of age and event valence for accuracy in remembering event details, or for self-reported subjective vividness and rehearsal of the memories. Fans 65 years and older tended to remember feeling only sad about the 2003 loss, whereas fans 25 years and under tended to remember feeling both sad and angry. Individuals may remember emotional feelings based on remembered goals about an event., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)

We investigated how event valence affected accuracy and vividness of long-term memory for two comparable public events. In 2008, 1,563 fans answered questions about objective details concerning two decisive baseball championship games between the Yankees (2003 winners) and the Red Sox (2004 winners). Both between- and within-groups analyses indicated that fans remembered the game their team won significantly more accurately than the game their team lost. Fans also reported more vividness and more rehearsal for the game their team won. We conclude that individuals rehearse positive events more than comparable negative events, and that this additional rehearsal increases both vividness and accuracy of memories about positive events. Our results differ from those of prior studies involving memories for negative events that may have been unavoidably rehearsed; such rehearsal may have kept those memories from fading. Long-term memory for an event is determined not only by the valence of the event, but also by experiences after the event.

People typically exaggerate the emotional impact of future events. This occurs because of focalism, the tendency to focus on one event and neglect to consider how emotion will be mitigated by the surrounding context. Neglecting context, however, should lead people to underestimate future emotion when context focuses attention on the event. In Study 1, participants underestimated the intensity of their future negative emotions when they reported reactions to a romantic break-up on Valentine's Day versus 1 week before. This relationship was mediated by how frequently they thought about the break-up. In Study 2, participants underestimated the emotional impact of a lost prize when the experimental context forced them to focus on the prize versus when the prize was less evident. Thus, failing to account for the extent to which context would focus attention on the event, a form of focalism, led to underestimation of emotional reactions to a negative event., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved.)

We investigated accuracy in recalling past emotional behaviours and emotionality. Male couples discussed the history of their relationship, and coders rated the extent to which each partner engaged in behaviours such as complimenting or criticising. These ratings were combined into dimensions representing the deeper, emotional essence of that partner's discussion (expressions of We-ness, Fondness, Negativity, and Disappointment). Four years later, participants accurately recalled some of their own and some of their partner's emotional gist-level behaviours, but their answers indicated that they also remembered the emotional essence of the conversation. We conclude that individuals can retain the emotional essence of an experience for a long time, and that they may use this memory to infer, in part, gist-level details of the experience.

In 2 studies, clients were asked, after terminating psychotherapy, to complete a measure of symptomatic distress exactly as they had in their pre-therapy assessment. Most clients overestimated their pre-therapy distress, which may lead to an illusion of positive change. A 3rd study found no overestimation of previously reported distress in a control sample. The degree of overestimation for psychotherapy clients was positively correlated with anxiety, depression, and neuroticism, and negatively correlated with ego strength, self-deception, and lying. Distress levels at termination mediated these effects of individual differences. Individual differences were also correlated with specific types of recall error, such as adding to, exaggerating, omitting, and minimizing previously reported symptoms. Misremembering prior emotions may both reflect and create individual differences.

Memory for the emotions evoked by past events guides people's ongoing behaviour and future plans. Evidence indicates that emotions are represented in at least two forms in memory with different properties. Explicit memories of emotion can be retrieved deliberately, in a flexible manner, across situations. Implicit memories of emotion are brought to mind automatically by cues resembling the context in which an emotional event occurred. One property they share, however, is that both types of memory are subject to forgetting and bias over time as people's goals and appraisals of past emotional events change. This article reviews the cognitive and motivational mechanisms that underlie stability and change in memory for emotion. We also address functions that remembering and misremembering emotion may serve for individuals and groups. Although memory bias is typically viewed as problematic, changes in representations of emotional experience often promote goal-directed behaviour and facilitate coping with challenging situations. Copyright © 2009 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Male couples (N = 53) described their relationship history during an oral history interview, and partners also provided individual self-reports about relationship satisfaction, commitment, and quality. Although couple members were similar in satisfaction levels, they differed in commitment levels. An individual's expression of positive and negative emotions during the interview predicted both his own and his partner's current satisfaction, but predicted only his partner's satisfaction four years later. Furthermore, current and future relationship satisfaction was predicted not just by one's own, but also by one's partner's, perception of equality and attachment. In contrast, current and future commitment was predicted only by one's own perception of equality and attachment. Thus, predictors of satisfaction were both personal and interpersonal, but predictors of commitment were only personal. Separable individual- and dyadic-level processes underlie intimate relationships. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Presents a study that investigated whether factors known to influence memory for events and attitudes, such as post-event knowledge and individual differences in emotional traits and states, also predict distortion in memory for emotions. Review of related literature; Comparison of the rates of anxiety and emotions among undergraduates before a midterm examination and a week after the examination; Results and implications.

In their comment on our article on affective forecasting (Levine, Lench, Kaplan, & Safer, 2012), Wilson and Gilbert (2013) criticized the meta-analysis, proposed alternative explanations for the empirical studies, and concluded that the impact bias is alive and well. Our reply demonstrates that, irrespective of the exclusion of effects and selective recoding of effects recommended for the meta-analysis, the pattern of results remains the same: Study participants' forecasts are more accurate when they report their feelings about a focal event, or immediately after a focal event, than when they report their feelings in general after a delay. New analyses rule out individual differences and focalism as alternative explanations for the results of our empirical studies. These studies show that people can accurately predict the intensity of their feelings about events. People overestimate in predicting the impact of events on their emotional state in general, but clarifying the meaning of the forecasting question reduces the magnitude of this bias. We conclude that the impact bias, which encompasses overestimating the intensity of feelings about events and overestimating the intensity of feelings in general, is both dead and alive. The importance of predicting feelings about events for decision making and the reasons people predict some features of emotion more accurately than others are discussed. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Research on affective forecasting shows that people have a robust tendency to overestimate the intensity of future emotion. We hypothesized that (a) people can accurately predict the intensity of their feelings about events and (b) a procedural artifact contributes to people's tendency to overestimate the intensity of their feelings in general. People may misinterpret the forecasting question as asking how they will feel about a focal event, but they are later asked to report their feelings in general without reference to that event. In the current investigation, participants predicted and reported both their feelings in general and their feelings about an election outcome (Study 1) and an exam grade (Study 3). We also assessed how participants interpreted forecasting questions (Studies 2 and 4) and conducted a meta-analysis of affective forecasting research (Study 5). The results showed that participants accurately predicted the intensity of their feelings about events. They overestimated only when asked to predict how they would feel in general and later report their feelings without reference to the focal event. Most participants, however, misinterpreted requests to predict their feelings in general as asking how they would feel when they were thinking about the focal event. Clarifying the meaning of the forecasting question significantly reduced overestimation. These findings reveal that people have more sophisticated self-knowledge than is commonly portrayed in the affective forecasting literature. Overestimation of future emotion is partly due to a procedure in which people predict one thing but are later asked to report another. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]