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Anger and disgust may have distinct roles in sexual morality; here, we tested hypotheses regarding the distinct foci, appraisals, and motivations of anger and disgust within the context of sexual offenses. We conducted four experiments in which we manipulated whether mutual consent (Studies 1-3) or desire (Study 4) was present or absent within a counter-normative sexual act. We found that anger is focused on the injustice of non-consensual sexual acts, and the transgressor of the injustice (Studies 1 and 3). Furthermore, the sexual nature of the act was not critical for the elicitation of anger--as anger also responded to unjust acts of violence (Study 3). By contrast, we hypothesised and found that disgust is focused on whether or not a person voluntarily engaged in, desired or consented to a counter-normative sexual act (Studies 2-4). Appraisals of abnormality and degradation were the primary appraisals of disgust, and the sexual nature of the act was a critical elicitor of disgust (Study 3). A final study ruled out victimisation as the mechanism of the effect of consent on disgust and indicated that the consenter's sexual desire was the mechanism (Study 4). Our results reveal that anger and disgust have differential roles in consent-related sexual offenses due to the distinct appraisals and foci of these emotions.

With the recent upswing in research interest on the moral implications of disgust, there has been uncertainty about what kind of situations elicit moral disgust and whether disgust is a rational or irrational player in moral decision making. We first outline the benefits of distinguishing between bodily violations (e.g., sexual taboos, such as pedophilia and incest) and nonbodily violations (e.g., deception or betrayal) when examining moral disgust. We review findings from our lab and others' showing that, although many existing studies do not control for anger when studying disgust, disgust at nonbodily violations is often associated with anger and hard to separate from it, while bodily violations more consistently predict disgust independently of anger. Building on this distinction, we present further empirical evidence that moral disgust, in the context of bodily violations, is a relatively primitively appraised moral emotion compared to others such as anger, and also that it is less flexible and less prone to external justifications. Our review and results underscore the need to distinguish between the different consequences of moral emotions., (© 2013 American Psychological Association)

Anger may be more responsive than disgust to mitigating circumstances in judgements of wrongdoing. We tested this hypothesis in two studies where we had participants envision circumstances that could serve to mitigate an otherwise wrongful act. In Study 1, participants provided moral judgements, and ratings of anger and disgust, to a number of transgressions involving either harm or bodily purity. They were then asked to imagine and report whether there might be any circumstances that would make it all right to perform the act. Across transgression type, and controlling for covariance between anger and disgust, levels of anger were found to negatively predict the envisioning of mitigating circumstances for wrongdoing, while disgust was unrelated. Study 2 replicated and extended these findings to less serious transgressions, using a continuous measure of mitigating circumstances, and demonstrated the impact of anger independent of deontological commitments. These findings highlight the differential relationship that anger and disgust have with the ability to envision mitigating factors.

In the present research, we tested the unreasoning disgust hypothesis: moral disgust, in particular in response to a violation of a bodily norm, is less likely than moral anger to be justified with cognitively elaborated reasons. In Experiment 1, participants were asked to explain why they felt anger and disgust toward pedophiles. Participants were more likely to invoke elaborated reasons, versus merely evaluative responses, when explaining their anger, versus disgust. Experiment 2 used a between-participants design; participants explained why they felt either anger or disgust toward seven groups that either violated a sexual or nonsexual norm. Again, elaborated reasons were less prevalent when explaining their disgust versus anger and, in particular, when explaining disgust toward a group that violated a sexual norm. Experiment 3 further established that these findings are due to a lower accessibility of elaborated reasons for bodily disgust, rather than inhibition in using them when provided. From these findings, it can be concluded that communicating external reasons for moral disgust at bodily violations is made more difficult due to the unavailability of those reasons to people.

We propose that, when people judge moral situations, anger responds to the contextual cues of harm and intentionality. On the other hand, disgust responds uniquely to whether or not a bodily norm violation has occurred; its apparent response to harm and intent is entirely explained by the coactivation of anger. We manipulated intent, harm, and bodily norm violation (eating human flesh) within a vignette describing a scientific experiment. Participants then rated their anger, disgust, and moral judgment, as well as various appraisals. Anger responded independently of disgust to harm and intentionality, whereas disgust responded independently of anger only to whether or not the act violated the bodily norm of cannibalism. Theoretically relevant appraisals accounted for the effects of harm and intent on anger; however, appraisals of abnormality did not fully account for the effects of the manipulations on disgust. Our results show that anger and disgust are separately elicited by different cues in a moral situation., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2011 APA, all rights reserved.)

Interactions between romantic partners may be disturbed by a co-present mobile phone use when a partner ignores their interaction partner in favor of a smartphone. This common practice, called phubbing, promotes social rejection and exclusion, hence the partner who gets phubbed may report negative emotional experiences. However, these experiences may be buffered by a cognitive perception mechanism, when the partner's behavior is still perceived as responsive (i.e., understanding or validating). Thus, we hypothesize that feeling understood or validated moderate the link between phubbing intensity and negative emotions. To test our hypotheses, we conducted a daily diary study over seven days, using a sample of N = 133 participants living with their partner. Multilevel modeling was applied, to examine between- and within-person processes. The findings indicate that perception of the partner as understanding and validating, despite the co-present mobile phone use, reduces the negative emotional experiences during phubbing, and the interaction effects indicate nuances between phubbing and understanding and validation by partner, which extend our theoretical comprehension and distinguish between the two as separate relationship-related constructs. Our research provides a unique insight into how mechanisms related to couple interactions may reduce negative experiences, a finding that may be useful in future interventions and couples' therapy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Breastfeeding has many known benefits, but rates vary globally. We propose two main reasons why psychological theory and interventions have not been successful to date in explaining breastfeeding behaviours. Specifically, prior research underestimates the importance of (1) specific emotions and (2) wider injunctive influences (i.e., societal and moral norms about what women feel they ought to be doing) in the breastfeeding experience. Therefore, we conducted a systematic review of quantitative, qualitative, and mixed-methods studies that explored whether injunctive norms and/ or specific emotions are associated with breastfeeding behaviours (i.e., intentions, initiation and duration). Seventy-two papers were included in this review; data were extracted and quality appraisals conducted for all included studies. A meta-analysis of effect sizes was performed with the quantitative data. A convergent qualitative synthesis of the data was conducted, resulting in the following line of argument: Breastfeeding is a social behaviour and not a personal/individual behaviour. From this line of argument, three themes with associated sub-themes were developed, highlighting the importance of both specific emotions and injunctive norms on breastfeeding behaviours. These influences are discussed in relation to both theoretical and practical implications, as well as future research. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Anger is typically thought to be an emotion that is associated with negative outcomes, such as aggression; however, evidence shows that anger can be related to positive outcomes as well, such as making amends and reparations. Two studies examined the role of anger, contempt, and disgust on behavioural tendencies (i.e., reparative action, avoidance versus aggression) in two contexts: romantic relationships (Study 1) and friendships (Study 2). We also tested whether various individual differences may impact these relationships. It was found that anger was associated with reparative action in both contexts and disgust was related to less reparative action in friendships. All three emotions were positively connected to aggression in romantic relationships (Study 1), but only disgust was related to aggression in friendships (Study 2). Disgust was positively related to avoidance in both studies. The results suggest that anger is an approach emotion, being consistently associated with the positive outcome of reparative action, and disgust is more consistently related to behavioural tendencies in close relationships than contempt. Future research should endeavour to examine when and how the positive behavioural effects of anger can be fostered in close relationships. • Anger predicted reparative action and aggression in close relationships. • Disgust predicted avoidance and aggression in close relationships. • Disgust is a more consistent predictor of behaviour than contempt. • Trait emotions showed different relationships with behaviour than state emotions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Interactions between intimate partners are important for the maintenance of a healthy relationship. However, the practice of snubbing one partner in favor of a mobile phone (phubbing), may undermine interactions. Thus far, research has mainly investigated between-person differences, i.e., people experiencing more partner phubbing report lower relationship satisfaction. However, phubbing is linked to processes which unfold within-person and might trigger different appraising mechanisms across different phubbing situations. This study examined participants in intimate relationships (N = 133) over seven days. Results based on multilevel modelling demonstrate that participants did not report lower relationship satisfaction on days when phubbing occurred compared to days without phubbing. However, on days when people experienced partner phubbing, higher phubbing intensity was associated with stronger appraisals reactions: participants reported lower perceived partner responsiveness, more negative and less positive moral judgment of partner's phubbing behavior. These appraisal mechanisms were significantly associated with end-of-day relationship quality. This evidence highlights the importance of appraisal mechanisms in phubbing situations, in other words how the phubbing is perceived is important. • A daily diary study examined the impact of phubbing in 133 participants in intimate relationships. • Multilevel modelling analysis indicates no impact of phubbing on daily relationship quality. • Results indicated the importance of appraisal mechanisms in face-to-face interactions, over the phubbing behavior itself. • This study grounds phubbing as morally relevant in intimate relationships, which constitutes a new theoretical addition. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]