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Growing work suggests that interoception, that is, representations of one's internal bodily changes, plays a role in shaping emotional experiences. Past studies primarily examine how behavioral accuracy in detecting interoceptive signals (interoceptive ability ) relates to emotional states, with less work examining self-reported interoceptive facets such as the characterizations of one's interoceptive abilities ( interoceptive sensibility ) or evaluative beliefs about the value versus danger of interoceptive signals (interoceptive beliefs ). However, existing studies rarely examine physiological reactivity, behavioral, and self-reported dimensions of interoception together in the same sample. As such, it remains unclear whether and how much individual differences in interoceptive facets uniquely and in interaction with physiological reactivity may matter for emotional experience. Herein, 250 healthy young adults completed a heartbeat detection task assessing interoceptive ability and questionnaire measures of interoceptive sensibility and beliefs during an initial laboratory visit. At a follow-up session, 227 participants returned to undergo an acute psychosocial stressor. Measures of physiological arousal such as preejection period (PEP) and heart rate variability were acquired throughout the stressor with self-reported emotions acquired immediately after. Linear regressions revealed that greater sympathetic nervous system reactivity (i.e., PEP), poorer interoceptive ability (i.e., accuracy), and less positive interoceptive beliefs were related to more intense high arousal emotions during the stressor. Importantly, across models, interoceptive beliefs was the only interoceptive facet to moderate the concordance between physiological and emotional arousal. Implications for psychological theories of emotion, stress, and interoception are discussed. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).

In the present study, we used an unsupervised classification algorithm to reveal both consistency and degeneracy in neural network connectivity during anger and anxiety. Degeneracy refers to the ability of different biological pathways to produce the same outcomes. Previous research is suggestive of degeneracy in emotion, but little research has explicitly examined whether degenerate functional connectivity patterns exist for emotion categories such as anger and anxiety. Twenty-four subjects underwent functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) while listening to unpleasant music and self-generating experiences of anger and anxiety. A data-driven model building algorithm with unsupervised classification (subgrouping Group Iterative Multiple Model Estimation) identified patterns of connectivity among 11 intrinsic networks that were associated with anger vs anxiety. As predicted, degenerate functional connectivity patterns existed within these overarching consistent patterns. Degenerate patterns were not attributable to differences in emotional experience or other individual-level factors. These findings are consistent with the constructionist account that emotions emerge from flexible functional neuronal assemblies and that emotion categories such as anger and anxiety each describe populations of highly variable instances., (© The Author(s) 2022. Published by Oxford University Press.)

Situated models of emotion hypothesize that emotions are optimized for the context at hand, but most neuroimaging approaches ignore context. For the first time, we applied Granger causality (GC) analysis to determine how an emotion is affected by a person's cultural background and situation. Electroencephalographic recordings were obtained from mainland Chinese (CHN) and US participants as they viewed and rated fearful and neutral images displaying either social or non-social contexts. Independent component analysis and GC analysis were applied to determine the epoch of peak effect for each condition and to identify sources and sinks among brain regions of interest. We found that source-sink couplings differed across culture, situation and culture × situation. Mainland CHN participants alone showed preference for an early-onset source-sink pairing with the supramarginal gyrus as a causal source, suggesting that, relative to US participants, CHN participants more strongly prioritized a scene's social aspects in their response to fearful scenes. Our findings suggest that the neural representation of fear indeed varies according to both culture and situation and their interaction in ways that are consistent with norms instilled by cultural background., (© The Author(s) 2021. Published by Oxford University Press.)

Objective: β-Adrenergic receptor signaling, a critical mediator of sympathetic nervous system influences on physiology and behavior, has long been proposed as one contributor to subjective stress. However, prior findings are surprisingly mixed about whether β-blockade (e.g., propranolol) blunts subjective stress, with many studies reporting no effects. We reevaluated this question in the context of an acute psychosocial stressor with more comprehensive measures and a larger-than-typical sample. We also examined the effects of β-blockade on psychophysiological indicators of sympathetic and parasympathetic nervous system reactivity, given that β-blockade effects for these measures specifically under acute psychosocial stress are not yet well established., Methods: In a double-blind, randomized, placebo-controlled study, 90 healthy young adults received 40 mg of the β-blocker propranolol or placebo. Participants then completed the Trier Social Stress Test, which involved completing an impromptu speech and difficult arithmetic in front of evaluative judges. Self-reported emotions and appraisals as well as psychophysiology were assessed throughout., Results: Propranolol blunted Trier Social Stress Test preejection period reactivity (b = 9.68, p = .003), a marker of sympathetic nervous system activity, as well as salivary α-amylase reactivity (b = -0.50, p = .006). Critically, propranolol also blunted negative, high arousal emotions in response to the stressor (b = -0.22, p = .026), but cognitive appraisals remained intact (b values < -0.17, p values > .10)., Conclusions: These results provide updated experimental evidence that β-adrenergic blockade attenuates negative, high arousal emotions in response to a psychosocial stressor while also blunting sympathetic nervous system reactivity. Together, these findings shed light on the neurophysiological mechanisms by which stressors transform into the subjective experience we call "stress."Trial Registration: ClinicalTrials.gov Identifier: NCT02972554., (Copyright © 2021 by the American Psychosomatic Society.)

Bodily sensations are closely linked to emotional experiences. However, most research assessing the body-emotion link focuses on young adult samples. Inspired by prior work showing age-related declines in autonomic reactivity and interoception, we present 2 studies investigating age-related differences in the extent to which adults (18-75 years) associate interoceptive or internal bodily sensations with emotions. Study 1 ( N = 150) used a property association task to assess age effects on adults' tendencies to associate interoceptive sensations, relative to behaviors or situations, with negative emotion categories (e.g., anger, sadness). Study 2 ( N = 200) used the Day Reconstruction experience sampling method to assess the effect of age on adults' tendencies to report interoceptive sensations and emotional experiences in daily life. Consistent with prior literature suggesting that older adults have more muted physiological responses and interoceptive abilities than younger adults, we found that older adults' mental representations (Study 1) and self-reported experiences (Study 2) of emotion are less associated with interoceptive sensations than are those of younger adults. Across both studies, age effects were most prominent for high arousal emotions (e.g., anger, fear) and sensations (e.g., racing heart) that are often associated with peripheral psychophysiological concomitants in young adults. These findings are consistent with psychological constructionist models and a "maturational dualism" account of emotional aging, suggesting additional pathways by which emotions may differ across adulthood. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2021 APA, all rights reserved).

Understanding emotion words is vital to understanding, regulating, and communicating one's emotions. Yet, little work examines how emotion words are acquired by children. Previous research in linguistics suggests that children use the sentence frame in which a novel word is presented to home in on the meaning of that word, in conjunction with situational cues from the environment. No research has examined how children integrate these cues to learn the meaning of emotion adjectives (e.g., "happy," "sad," "mad"). We conducted 2 studies examining the role of sentence frame and situational context in children's (ages 3-5) understanding of the meanings of novel words denoting emotions. In Study 1 ( N = 135) children viewed a conversation wherein a novel "alien" word was presented in 1 of 3 sentence frames that varied in how likely the word was to denote an emotion (i.e., is daxy, feels daxy, or feels daxy about ). Children selected the image that represented the meaning of the word in a picture-pointing task. Images depicted aliens experiencing an emotion, a physical state, or performing an action. In Study 2 ( N = 113) situational context was added via cartoons depicting an emotional scenario. Findings suggest that children are more likely to associate emotion images with a novel word with increasing age, more informative sentence frames, and when the situational context implies that an emotion is present. This provides important insight on how educational and clinical settings can use language and situational context to aide in emotion understanding. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Experiences of discrete emotion play important roles in a variety of psychological domains. Yet, current measures of discrete emotion face significant limitations. Biological and behavioral measures often do not capture subjective experiences related to discrete emotions, while self-reports are susceptible to reporting biases. An indirect measure of discrete emotions would help address the limitations of existing measures; however, few such measures exist. Across 4 studies, we offer an indirect measure of discrete emotion. Our results provide evidence that our measure can distinguish between participants' experiences of same-valenced emotions (Study 1), is relatively less susceptible to deliberate attempts to suppress emotional responses (Studies 2 and 3), and is also relatively less susceptible to the influence of social norms (i.e., gender stereotypes) in self-reported discrete emotions than an explicit measure (Study 4). Overall, these findings demonstrate that our measure of discrete emotions can capture discrete emotional responses above and beyond affective valence, is indirect, and measures affective processes contributing to discrete emotional responses. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2020 APA, all rights reserved).

Emotions are often assumed to manifest in subcortical limbic and brainstem structures. While these areas are clearly important for representing affect (e.g., valence and arousal), we propose that the default mode network (DMN) is additionally important for constructing discrete emotional experiences (of anger, fear, disgust, etc.). Findings from neuroimaging studies, invasive electrical stimulation studies, and lesion studies support this proposal. Importantly, our framework builds on a constructionist theory of emotion to explain how instances involving diverse physiological and behavioral patterns can be conceptualized as belonging to the same emotion category. We argue that this ability requires abstraction (from concrete features to broad mental categories), which the DMN is well positioned to support, and we make novel predictions from our proposed framework., (Copyright © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Many people feel emotional when hungry-or "hangry"-yet little research explores the psychological mechanisms underlying such states. Guided by psychological constructionist and affect misattribution theories, we propose that hunger alone is insufficient for feeling hangry. Rather, we hypothesize that people experience hunger as emotional when they conceptualize their affective state as negative, high arousal emotions specifically in a negative context. Studies 1 and 2 use a cognitive measure (the affect misattribution procedure; Payne, Hall, Cameron, & Bishara, 2010) to demonstrate that hunger shifts affective perceptions in negative but not neutral or positive contexts. Study 3 uses a laboratory-based experiment to demonstrate that hunger causes individuals to experience negative emotions and to negatively judge a researcher, but only when participants are not aware that they are conceptualizing their affective state as emotions. Implications for emotion theory, health, and embodied contributions to perception are discussed. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).

Situation selection involves choosing situations based on their likely emotional impact and may be less cognitively taxing or challenging to implement compared to other strategies for regulating emotion, which require people to regulate their emotions "in the moment"; we thus predicted that individuals who chronically experience intense emotions or who are not particularly competent at employing other emotion regulation strategies would be especially likely to benefit from situation selection. Consistent with this idea, we found that the use of situation selection interacted with individual differences in emotional reactivity and competence at emotion regulation to predict emotional outcomes in both a correlational (Study 1; N = 301) and an experimental field study (Study 2; N = 125). Taken together, the findings suggest that situation selection is an effective strategy for regulating emotions, especially for individuals who otherwise struggle to do so.

Across 3 studies we show that emotion words support the acquisition of conceptual knowledge for emotional facial actions that then biases subsequent perceptual memory for later emotional facial actions. In all studies, participants first associated emotional facial actions with a word during a learning phase or completed a control task. In a target phase, participants studied slightly different category exemplars. During a final test phase, participants identified which face the individual had been making during the target phase (i.e., the learned face, the target face, or a morphed combination). Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that pairing never-before-seen "alien" facial actions with nonsense words during the learning phase biases perceptual memory for facial actions subsequently viewed during the target phase. Study 3 replicates these findings with the familiar emotion categories fear and anger. Across all 3 studies, participants were more likely to choose the face that had been linked with a word during the learning phase than the face actually studied in the target phase. These findings suggest that pairing facial actions with words can shape later perceptual memory for emotional facial actions. (PsycINFO Database Record, ((c) 2018 APA, all rights reserved).)

In this manuscript, I briefly outline contemporary psychological constructionist approaches to the study of emotion, which hypothesize that language is an 'ingredient' in the creation of emotional perceptions and experiences. I then review recent neuroimaging, behavioral, and lesion evidence that emotion words ('anger,' 'disgust,' 'fear') are crucial to the perception and experience of emotions. Finally, I look to future directions for more causal evidence that language is important in emotion., (Copyright © 2017. Published by Elsevier Ltd.)

Recent behavioral and neuroimaging studies demonstrate that labeling one's emotional experiences and perceptions alters those states. Here, we used a comprehensive meta-analysis of the neuroimaging literature to systematically explore whether the presence of emotion words in experimental tasks has an impact on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions across studies. Using a database of 386 studies, we assessed brain activity when emotion words (e.g. 'anger', 'disgust') and more general affect words (e.g. 'pleasant', 'unpleasant') were present in experimental tasks vs not present. As predicted, when emotion words were present, we observed more frequent activations in regions related to semantic processing. When emotion words were not present, we observed more frequent activations in the amygdala and parahippocampal gyrus, bilaterally. The presence of affect words did not have the same effect on the neural representation of emotional experiences and perceptions, suggesting that our observed effects are specific to emotion words. These findings are consistent with the psychological constructionist prediction that in the absence of accessible emotion concepts, the meaning of affective experiences and perceptions are ambiguous. Findings are also consistent with the regulatory role of 'affect labeling'. Implications of the role of language in emotion construction and regulation are discussed., (© The Author (2016). Published by Oxford University Press.)

Gervais & Fessler argue that contempt is a natural kind and that its experience cannot be explained by a constructionist account of emotion. We dispute these claims and offer a positive constructionist model of contempt that accounts for the existing evidence and unifies conflicting findings in the literature on contempt.

Negative stimuli do not only evoke fear or disgust, but can also evoke a state of 'morbid fascination' which is an urge to approach and explore a negative stimulus. In the present neuroimaging study, we applied an innovative method to investigate the neural systems involved in typical and atypical conceptualizations of negative images. Participants received false feedback labeling their mental experience as fear, disgust or morbid fascination. This manipulation was successful; participants judged the false feedback correct for 70% of the trials on average. The neuroimaging results demonstrated differential activity within regions in the 'neural reference space for discrete emotion' depending on the type of feedback. We found robust differences in the ventrolateral prefrontal cortex, the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex comparing morbid fascination to control feedback. More subtle differences in the dorsomedial prefrontal cortex and the lateral orbitofrontal cortex were also found between morbid fascination feedback and the other emotion feedback conditions. This study is the first to forward evidence about the neural representation of the experimentally unexplored state of morbid fascination. In line with a constructionist framework, our findings suggest that neural resources associated with the process of conceptualization contribute to the neural representation of this state., (© The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Morality and emotions are linked, but what is the nature of their correspondence? Many "whole number" accounts posit specific correspondences between moral content and discrete emotions, such that harm is linked to anger, and purity is linked to disgust. A review of the literature provides little support for these specific morality-emotion links. Moreover, any apparent specificity may arise from global features shared between morality and emotion, such as affect and conceptual content. These findings are consistent with a constructionist perspective of the mind, which argues against a whole number of discrete and domain-specific mental mechanisms underlying morality and emotion. Instead, constructionism emphasizes the flexible combination of basic and domain-general ingredients such as core affect and conceptualization in creating the experience of moral judgments and discrete emotions. The implications of constructionism in moral psychology are discussed, and we propose an experimental framework for rigorously testing morality-emotion links., (© 2015 by the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc.)

Decades ago, the "New Look" movement challenged how scientists thought about vision by suggesting that conceptual processes shape visual perceptions. Currently, affective scientists are likewise debating the role of concepts in emotion perception. Here, we utilized a repetition-priming paradigm in conjunction with signal detection and individual difference analyses to examine how providing emotion labels-which correspond to discrete emotion concepts-affects emotion recognition. In Study 1, pairing emotional faces with emotion labels (e.g., "sad") increased individuals' speed and sensitivity in recognizing emotions. Additionally, individuals with alexithymia-who have difficulty labeling their own emotions-struggled to recognize emotions based on visual cues alone, but not when emotion labels were provided. Study 2 replicated these findings and further demonstrated that emotion concepts can shape perceptions of facial expressions. Together, these results suggest that emotion perception involves conceptual processing. We discuss the implications of these findings for affective, social, and clinical psychology., ((c) 2015 APA, all rights reserved).)

We tested two competing models for the brain basis of emotion, the basic emotion theory and the conceptual act theory of emotion, using resting-state functional connectivity magnetic resonance imaging (rs-fcMRI). The basic emotion view hypothesizes that anger, sadness, fear, disgust and happiness each arise from a brain network that is innate, anatomically constrained and homologous in other animals. The conceptual act theory of emotion hypothesizes that an instance of emotion is a brain state constructed from the interaction of domain-general, core systems within the brain such as the salience, default mode and frontoparietal control networks. Using peak coordinates derived from a meta-analysis of task-evoked emotion fMRI studies, we generated a set of whole-brain rs-fcMRI 'discovery' maps for each emotion category and examined the spatial overlap in their conjunctions. Instead of discovering a specific network for each emotion category, variance in the discovery maps was accounted for by the known domain-general network. Furthermore, the salience network is observed as part of every emotion category. These results indicate that specific networks for each emotion do not exist within the intrinsic architecture of the human brain and instead support the conceptual act theory of emotion., (© The Author (2015). Published by Oxford University Press. For Permissions, please email: journals.permissions@oup.com.)

Several studies have investigated the neural basis of effortful emotion regulation (ER) but the neural basis of automatic ER has been less comprehensively explored. The present study investigated the neural basis of automatic ER supported by 'implementation intentions'. 40 healthy participants underwent fMRI while viewing emotion-eliciting images and used either a previously-taught effortful ER strategy, in the form of a goal intention (e.g., try to take a detached perspective), or a more automatic ER strategy, in the form of an implementation intention (e.g., "If I see something disgusting, then I will think these are just pixels on the screen!"), to regulate their emotional response. Whereas goal intention ER strategies were associated with activation of brain areas previously reported to be involved in effortful ER (including dorsolateral prefrontal cortex), ER strategies based on an implementation intention strategy were associated with activation of right inferior frontal gyrus and ventro-parietal cortex, which may reflect the attentional control processes automatically captured by the cue for action contained within the implementation intention. Goal intentions were also associated with less effective modulation of left amygdala, supporting the increased efficacy of ER under implementation intention instructions, which showed coupling of orbitofrontal cortex and amygdala. The findings support previous behavioural studies in suggesting that forming an implementation intention enables people to enact goal-directed responses with less effort and more efficiency.

For decades, psychologists and neuroscientists have hypothesized that the ability to perceive emotions on others' faces is inborn, prelinguistic, and universal. Concept knowledge about emotion has been assumed to be epiphenomenal to emotion perception. In this article, we report findings from 3 patients with semantic dementia that cannot be explained by this "basic emotion" view. These patients, who have substantial deficits in semantic processing abilities, spontaneously perceived pleasant and unpleasant expressions on faces, but not discrete emotions such as anger, disgust, fear, or sadness, even in a task that did not require the use of emotion words. Our findings support the hypothesis that discrete emotion concept knowledge helps transform perceptions of affect (positively or negatively valenced facial expressions) into perceptions of discrete emotions such as anger, disgust, fear, and sadness. These findings have important consequences for understanding the processes supporting emotion perception.

Many scientific models of emotion assume that emotion categories are natural kinds that carve nature at its joints. These beliefs remain strong, despite the fact that the empirical record on the issue has remained equivocal for over a century. In this research, the authors examined one reason for this situation: People essentialize emotion categories by assuming that members of the same category (e.g., fear) have a shared metaphysical essence (i.e., a common causal mechanism). In Study 1, the authors found that lay people essentialize emotions by assuming that instances of the same emotion category have a shared essence that defines them, even when their surface features differ. Study 2 extended these findings, demonstrating that lay people tend to essentialize categories the more a category is of the body (vs. the mind). In Study 3, we examined the links between emotion essentialism and the complexity of actual emotional experiences. In particular, we predicted and found that individuals who hold essentialist beliefs about emotions describe themselves as experiencing highly differentiated emotional experiences but do not show evidence of stronger emotional differentiation in their momentary ratings of experience in everyday life. Implications for the science of emotion are discussed., (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved.)

For the last century, there has been a continuing debate about the nature of emotion. In the most recent offering in this scientific dialogue, Lench, Flores, and Bench (2011) reported a meta-analysis of emotion induction research and claimed support for the natural kind hypothesis that discrete emotions (e.g., happiness, sadness, anger, and anxiety) elicit specific changes in cognition, judgment, behavior, experience, and physiology. In this article, we point out that Lench et al. (2011) is not the final word on the emotion debate. First, we point out that Lench et al.'s findings do not support their claim that discrete emotions organize cognition, judgment, experience, and physiology because they did not demonstrate emotion-consistent and emotion-specific directional changes in these measurement domains. Second, we point out that Lench et al.'s findings are in fact consistent with the alternative (a psychological constructionist approach to emotion). We close by appealing for a construct validity approach to emotion research, which we hope will lead to greater consensus on the operationalization of the natural kind and psychological construction approaches, as well as the criteria required to finally resolve the emotion debate., ((PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2013 APA, all rights reserved).)

The 'faculty psychology' approach to the mind, which attempts to explain mental function in terms of categories that reflect modular 'faculties', such as emotions, cognitions, and perceptions, has dominated research into the mind and its physical correlates. In this paper, we argue that brain organization does not respect the commonsense categories belonging to the faculty psychology approach. We review recent research from the science of emotion demonstrating that the human brain contains broadly distributed functional networks that can each be re-described as basic psychological operations that interact to produce a range of mental states, including, but not limited to, anger, sadness, fear, disgust, and so on. When compared to the faculty psychology approach, this 'constructionist' approach provides an alternative functional architecture to guide the design and interpretation of experiments in cognitive neuroscience., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.)

Scientists have traditionally assumed that different kinds of mental states (e.g., fear, disgust, love, memory, planning, concentration, etc.) correspond to different psychological faculties that have domain-specific correlates in the brain. Yet, growing evidence points to the constructionist hypothesis that mental states emerge from the combination of domain-general psychological processes that map to large-scale distributed brain networks. In this paper, we report a novel study testing a constructionist model of the mind in which participants generated three kinds of mental states (emotions, body feelings, or thoughts) while we measured activity within large-scale distributed brain networks using fMRI. We examined the similarity and differences in the pattern of network activity across these three classes of mental states. Consistent with a constructionist hypothesis, a combination of large-scale distributed networks contributed to emotions, thoughts, and body feelings, although these mental states differed in the relative contribution of those networks. Implications for a constructionist functional architecture of diverse mental states are discussed., (Copyright © 2012 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.)

In our response, we clarify important theoretical differences between basic emotion and psychological construction approaches. We evaluate the empirical status of the basic emotion approach, addressing whether it requires brain localization, whether localization can be observed with better analytic tools, and whether evidence for basic emotions exists in other types of measures. We then revisit the issue of whether the key hypotheses of psychological construction are supported by our meta-analytic findings. We close by elaborating on commentator suggestions for future research.

Researchers have wondered how the brain creates emotions since the early days of psychological science. With a surge of studies in affective neuroscience in recent decades, scientists are poised to answer this question. In this target article, we present a meta-analytic summary of the neuroimaging literature on human emotion. We compare the locationist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories consistently and specifically correspond to distinct brain regions) with the psychological constructionist approach (i.e., the hypothesis that discrete emotion categories are constructed of more general brain networks not specific to those categories) to better understand the brain basis of emotion. We review both locationist and psychological constructionist hypotheses of brain-emotion correspondence and report meta-analytic findings bearing on these hypotheses. Overall, we found little evidence that discrete emotion categories can be consistently and specifically localized to distinct brain regions. Instead, we found evidence that is consistent with a psychological constructionist approach to the mind: A set of interacting brain regions commonly involved in basic psychological operations of both an emotional and non-emotional nature are active during emotion experience and perception across a range of discrete emotion categories.

People believe they see emotion written on the faces of other people. In an instant, simple facial actions are transformed into information about another's emotional state. The present research examined whether a perceiver unknowingly contributes to emotion perception with emotion word knowledge. We present 2 studies that together support a role for emotion concepts in the formation of visual percepts of emotion. As predicted, we found that perceptual priming of emotional faces (e.g., a scowling face) was disrupted when the accessibility of a relevant emotion word (e.g., anger) was temporarily reduced, demonstrating that the exact same face was encoded differently when a word was accessible versus when it was not. The implications of these findings for a linguistically relative view of emotion perception are discussed., ((PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2012 APA, all rights reserved).)

In the blink of an eye, people can easily see emotion in another person's face. This fact leads many to assume that emotion perception is given and proceeds independently of conceptual processes such as language. In this paper we suggest otherwise and offer the hypothesis that language functions as a context in emotion perception. We review a variety of evidence consistent with the language-as-context view and then discuss how a linguistically relative approach to emotion perception allows for intriguing and generative questions about the extent to which language shapes the sensory processing involved in seeing emotion in another person's face.

Three studies assessed the relationship between language and the perception of emotion. The authors predicted and found that the accessibility of emotion words influenced participants' speed or accuracy in perceiving facial behaviors depicting emotion. Specifically, emotion words were either primed or temporarily made less accessible using a semantic satiation procedure. In Studies 1 and 2, participants were slower to categorize facial behaviors depicting emotion (i.e., a face depicting anger) after an emotion word (e.g., "anger") was satiated. In Study 3, participants were less accurate to categorize facial behaviors depicting emotion after an emotion word was satiated. The implications of these findings for a linguistically relative view of emotion perception are discussed.