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The barriers to linking greenhouse gas cap-and-trade schemes are assessed, based on an analysis of existing and emerging trading schemes, including those in the USA, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and the EU. The feasibility of different forms of linking and the time frames for their implementation are examined. In particular, the barriers to direct bilateral linking are considered. It was found that only a few direct bilateral links will be viable in the short term, due to the divergent policy priorities of different nations and regions, reflected in critical design features, such as cost-containment measures. However, in the short term, cap-and-trade markets will very likely be indirectly linked via unilateral links to the CDM or new crediting mechanisms, which may be adopted within a successor treaty to the Kyoto Protocol. In order to ensure a harmonization of critical design elements in the mid to long term, early institutional cooperation may become necessary. Necessary policy steps and the appropriate institutional framework for such harmonization and, overtime, further integration of trading schemes are briefly delineated. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We quantified the volume of free allowances that different national allocation plans proposed to allocate to existing and new installations, with specific reference to the power sector. Most countries continue to allocate based on historic emissions, contrary to hopes for improved allocation methods, with allocations to installations frequently based on 2005 emission data; this may strengthen the belief in the private sector that emissions in the coming years will influence their subsequent allowance allocation. Allocations to new installations provide high and frequently fuel-differentiated subsidies, risking significant distortions to investment choices. Thus, in addition to supplying a long market in aggregate, proposed allocation plans reveal continuing diverse problems, including perverse incentives. To ensure the effectiveness of the EU ETS in the future, the private sector will need to be shown credible evidence that free allowance allocation will be drastically reduced post-2012, or that these problems will be addressed in some other way. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]