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Im Post-Konflikt-Peacebuilding wurden Eliten weitestgehend von Wissenschaft und Policy-Making als neutrale Schlüsselakteure analysiert. Zugleich wurde vernachlässigt, welche Dynamiken mit der Fokussierung auf Elitengruppen einhergehen, v.a. im Hinblick auf ihre Vermittlungsfunktion und Informationsflüsse. In diesem Beitrag wird dargelegt, dass Eliten auf nichtstaatlicher Ebene zwischen Kooperation und Widerstand agieren und soziale Hierarchien stabilisieren. Mit einem Fokus auf eine vermeintlich staatsfreie Zivilgesellschaft sowie auf religiöse und wirtschaftliche Akteure wird gezeigt, dass externe Peacebuilding-Vorhaben zu wenig auf sich überlappende und multidimensionale Konzepte von Eliten eingehen. Dies wird begleitet von äußeren Vorstellungen lokaler gesellschaftlicher Transformation. In post-conflict peacebuilding, elites have largely been analysed as neutral key actors by academia and policy-making. At the same time, the dynamics associated with focusing on elite groups have been neglected, especially with regard to their mediating function and information flows. This article argues that elites at the non-state level act between cooperation and resistance and stabilise social hierarchies. With a focus on a supposedly state-free civil society as well as religious and economic actors, it is shown that external peacebuilding projects do not sufficiently address overlapping and multidimensional concepts of elites. This is accompanied by external notions of local societal transformation.

Elitisation in Cambodian civil society and how such processes relate to holding elite status in the state, electoral politics, and economic fields, is poorly understood. This article seeks to identify different pathways to becoming an elite within and beyond Cambodian civil society. We focus on four case studies, representing different forms of organisations within the sectors of agriculture and youth. Three main questions are explored. Firstly, we identify different forms of capital needed to reach elite status in civil society. Secondly, we explore how elite status within civil society is related to elite status within other fields, by identifying three pathways of boundary-crossing (Lewis, 2008a) from civil society into the state, electoral politics, and economic fields. Thirdly, we map the perceived possibilities and limitations of each field. In exploring these questions, this article argues for a reappraisal of Cambodian civil society, shifting attention to the networks and platforms that fall outside of the dominant focus on professional NGOs. By empirically tracing how elites move between fields, it aspires to provide a better understanding of the contours of, and relations between, civil society and other fields (including government, electoral politics, and business), including in terms of what particular forms of power pertain to each.

The European-born children of immigrants, often referred to as the second generation, play an important role in the academic debate about integration and assimilation. The successful second generation, defined in terms of possessing a higher education diploma and or professional position, receives increasing attention. In this special issue, we will look at the most successful group: the upcoming “elite” among the descendants of migrants from Turkey, based on data gathered in the ELITES, Pathways to Success project. In this research project we deliberately selected on the dependent variable: being professionally successful in managerial jobs in the corporate business sector, the corporate law sector and the education sector.

“Elites and Aristocracy in Colonial and Postcolonial Sri Lanka” attempts to answer two major questions: First, what is an “elite” and how can we define one? Concentrating on aristocracy and with reference to Georg Simmel, I will describe forms of social and cultural self-aggrandisement and self-construction, which have served many elites as a model and ideal type for emulation and further development. My second question is: How did the Sinhalese up-country Kandy aristocracy in Sri Lanka react to British, colonial change and how did it interact with newly emerged and much more numerous low-country elites? This interaction will be described as a process of political marginalisation of the Kandy aristocracy and of cultural emulation on the part of the new low-country and Colombo elites., International Quarterly for Asian Studies, Bd. 48 Nr. 1-2 (2017): Cultural Elites and Elite Cultures in South Asia

International audience; Randomized controlled trials (RCTs) are a method to assess impact that has become increasingly popular over the last fifteen years, particularly as a result of the work done by Esther Duflo and her Poverty Action Lab (J-PAL), an or-ganization devoted to the promotion of randomization. This article aims to explore and understand this success by using an in-depth sociographical study of the J-PAL and a network analysis of economists who use RCT. J-PAL appears to be a concentration of educational and academic capital that give great legitimacy to the RCT method. The network is controlled by certain leaders who are able to diffuse the J-PAL approach to RCTs. Furthermore, this article argues that it is necessary to go beyond the intrinsic quality of this method to explain how it became so popular

What kind of capital does a particular group possess and how does it go about reproducing that capital? How does this capital get converted into new socio-political currencies? How do the elites grapple with competing notions of social morality and their place in it? What are the performative strategies that are at work, legitimating certain types of elites but not others? Are elites interest groups, or do they mutate into identity groups in changing social environments? Do the elites reflect a new social order or create one; are they conscience keepers of a society or do they produce a particular consciousness? How do cultural elites position themselves vis-à-vis the state, class, caste and gender or the people, the masses? The following papers of this special issue, in varying degrees, address some of these questions. They bring together scholars, junior and senior, Indian and European, who have worked intensively on the Indian subcontinent and its elites.

105 The role of the ethnic factor in political processes in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia has been rather significant since these countries gained independence. The author investigates the following assumption: after the completion of major Eurointegration pro¬cedures, the ethnic factor — which became especially important in the Baltics after independence — relegated to the periphery of political life. After a period of ‘independence-induced euphoria’ faded, Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian power groups had to tackle the problem of civil society formation and the development of a political regime based on democratic procedures. In these countries the processes of elite recruitment were largely affected by the factor of ethic homogeneity of the social structure. This article analyses the process of elite group formation in the Baltics through the lens of the ethnic factor. By applying the ethnopolitical approach, the author concludes that the de facto barriers to non-titular population groups entering power structures, which exist in Latvia and Estonia, ‘freeze’ the system of elite recruitment. In the conditions of increasing social unrest, it may have an adverse effect on the overall political stability in these countries. The results obtained can be used for research, educational, and practical purposes. In the field of research and education, they can be employed in further research on the transformation of the elite structure in the Baltics in view of the ethnopolitical factor, including comparative analysis of the elite re-grouping processes, as well as in developing corresponding university courses. As to the practical aspect, the results obtained can be used by the authorities of the Russian Federation in making decisions regarding interaction with the representatives of Lithuanian, Latvian and Estonian political elites.

To identify the structure of network ties within Polish political elites; to study the features of network ties formation and the impact that both primary and labour socialisation periods and diaspora characteristics have on this process; to describe the structural features of the resultant network structures over different periods of time and analyse the structural dynamics of political elites for the purpose of forecasting major trends in the structural transformation of Polish political elites. In the course of the study, biographical data on the presidents, ministers, advisors, and party leaders of the Republic of Poland was collected and processed. The work follows the network analysis paradigm and identifies the dynamics of the key network parameters: distance, density, transitivity, and compactness. The author analyses the dynamics of representation in the structure of political territorial diaspora elites, business community members, and ‘moral politicians’. The article identifies two periods of formation of political party networks in Poland: the first period (1993—2007) saw a transition from rather weakly integrated systems to high density and cohesion networks as early as the second electoral cycle, after which a gradual decrease in the key indices of network integration was registered. A new peak of network cohesion and integration was reached in 2007—2011; however, the death of some key members of political elites in a plane crash resulted in a decrease in the network integration indices to the level of 2001—2005. On the whole, the network structure of Polish political elite is characterised by unstable dynamics relating to the crisis events of the past. However, it is established that the elites have a pronounced diaspora core and an unstable periphery; the share of businesspeople directly participating in political processes is decreasing, whereas ‘moral politicians’ usually take an active part in the formation of political elites.

The article explores the characteristic features of social development. The peculiarities of elite formation in modern society are defined. The main aspects of political managerial elite formation in the USA, Great Britain and Japan are outlined. The article formulates directions for the use of foreign experience in the mechanism of political managerial elite formation in Ukraine., Досліджено характерні риси сучасного суспільного розвитку. Визначено особливості формування еліти у сучасному соціумі. Окреслено основні аспекти формування політико-управлінської еліти у США, Великобританії та Японії. Сформульовано напрямки застосування зарубіжного досвіду в механізмі формування політико-управлінської еліти в Україні.

"The members of the 'Combat Groups of the Working Class' were considered as proletarian virtuosos because they voluntarily spent their leisure time for their commitment to the protection of the 'Socialist achievements'. This way representing Communist resilience, they were supposed to be particularly honoured and recognized. Already in the 1950s, however, it became obvious that praising violence as a political maxim was widely perceived as contradicting other programmatic aspects of SED rule. Thus, an analysis of the Combat Groups looks promising for uncovering the inner contradictions of State Socialist rule - elite consciousness vs. egalitarianism, pacifism vs. militancy, spontaneity vs. 'ruling through' - and for understanding why it finally became a failure." (author's abstract)

"Globalization has given rise to an ever-increasing number of global elites holding leadership positions in transnational institutions, corporations and NGOs. This raises questions regarding the structure and accountability of these elites. Are they just an abstract category of position-holders representing national or organizational interests in transnational decision-making or do they rather form a cohesive ruling group united by common interests, as some theoreticians of globalization have assumed? Elite theory has identified a number of relevant characteristics that can be used for assessing the nature of this nascent elite formation. These include primarily the prevailing patterns of elite recruitment with respect to the representation of societal diversity, the mechanisms of elite accountability and the existence of informal rules of conduct that enable the accommodation of conflicts of interest." (author's abstract)

Discussion of development strategies in Mozambique reveals three main perspectives on the role of elites in the policy process: donor dominance, political dominance over technocracy, and the emergence of non-state (economic and civil society) actors as players in the policy process, although still with a marginal role. These analyses tend to see the identity of these actors as monolithic and clearly identifiable. The identities condition the involvement of these actors in a set of dichotomous relations, such as politicians versus technocrats, donors versus internal actors, and state versus non-state actors. Based on this understanding, this paper analyses the role of elites in policy processes, focusing on elite formation and power relations in Mozambique in a context of an economically dependent country undergoing democratization. The paper shows that the dominant analyses of the role of the elites in the policy process in Mozambique overlook the process of elite formation, which contributes to the existence of multiple and overlapping elite identities in the policy process. In this regard, the paper concludes that, despite the emergence of new elites (economic, societal and bureaucratic) resulting from economic and political liberalization and as an aspect of pro-poor policies, the differentiation between these elitesis more apparent than real because of the strategies they have adopted to maintain their dominance in a context of the increasing importance of electoral politics. Further, the paper concludes that the political elite still dominates the process, even with donor dependence, but that nonetheless this dominance is being challenged by an erosion of legitimacy caused by the low effectiveness of the development strategies, reflected in increasing public contestation over government policies, which opens up a space for changes in the current pattern of elite relations.

"Max Weber's portrayal of modern elftes shows clear proximity to 'classical elite theory,' modern 'elite perspective,' and 'democratic elitism.' This portrayal - stressing power concentration in the state apparata, legitimacy of rule, centrality of leadership groups, and the capacity of these groups to form cohesive power actors - anticipates many central themes in the work of contemporary elite theorists, such as John Higley, whose theoretical attention focuses on patterns of elite integration and ruling consensus as the key 'elite variables.' Higley's seminal studier, especially those linking such elite integration and ruling consensus with political outcomes and regime types, combine the classical elite-theoretical heritage with the Weberian 'supplements,' the latter stressing the variable internal structure of 'ruling minorities' that form in modern nation states. The Weberian elite perspective and theoretical model have been substantiated, elaborated and extended in research undertaken by John Higley and his collaborators." (author's abstract)

'Despite several attempts in the eighteenth century to re-establish the University of Dorpat, the Baltic Germans succeeded only in 1802 in re-founding this precious institution meant for the education of the local German-speaking elite. The Baltic German nobility had power over the whole area, ruling it in political, religious, economic and cultural respect. In return for their numerous privileges, they demonstrated an almost proverbial loyalty to the Russian tsar. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, several high posts in the Russian government and in the Russian army were taken by members of the Baltic German nobility. A similar ambiguity characterized the attitude of the Finnish elite. On the one hand, the exceptionally privileged position of the Grand Duchy of Finland within the Russian empire forced them to act loyally towards their occupier. On the other hand, Finnish national awareness increased from the 1820's, a development towards which the university contributed to a large extent. As the Baltic German elite was educated at the University of Dorpat, the Finnish elite had its own university, first in Turku/ Abo and, from 1827, in Helsinki. Certainly when the university moved to the new capital, it was given explicit instructions to 'build the nation'. Also the location of the new imperial university was significant in this respect: on the Senate's square with at the opposite side of the square the government and next to it the imposing cathedral.' (author's abstract)

Universities and 'gymnasias' were the two main types of institutions in the Russian educational system of the 19th century. However between these two there was a group of 7 special institutions destined mainly for nobles. In their middle position these institutions were endowed with some particular privileges that made their graduates students equal to those of the universities and contributed to the formation of elites. They were: the noble pensions of Moscow and Saint-Petersburg Universities and 5 Lyceums (situated in Russian cities without Universities: Bezborodko Lyceum (Nezhin), Richelieu Lyceum (Odessa), Volynsky Lyceum, Demidov Lyceum (Yaroslavl) and Lyceum in Tsarskoe Selo). They were state institutions (but several were founded thanks to the donations of noble families) functioned in the first half of the 19th century and were closed or reformed in the 1830-40s because of the unifications of the educational system in Russia. Hundreds of noble students got their education in these institutions. We base our research on the lists of students who graduated from these institutions. We have accomplished a prosopographical study, tracing the careers of these students and estimating their contribution to the national elites. We also point out their membership in the reputational elites (according to the national biographical dictionaries and encyclopaedias).We evaluate their success in the military or civil service, model different types of careers and describe the contribution of this noble elite to the nation building process., Historical Social Research Vol. 33, No. 2 (2008): Special Issue: Elite Formation in the Other Europe (19th-20th Century) Starting Point and Frequency: Year: 1979, Issues per volume: 4, Volumes per year: 1

Der Übergang vom Sozialismus zur Marktwirtschaft hat in allen betroffenen Staaten zu mehr oder weniger tiefen Verwerfungen geführt. Dabei ähneln sich die Entwicklungspfade der verschiedenen Länder, besonders der europäischen, in vielerlei Hinsicht, da alle unter dem vierzigjährigen Einfluss des Sozialismus standen. Eine Ausnahme stellt hier wohl die ehemalige DDR dar, deren Transformation als "Wiedervereinigung" bekannt wurde. Was darunter zu verstehen ist, kann erstaunlich unterschiedlich interpretiert werden. Bis in die Gegenwart existieren zwei Wirtschaftsgebiete, zwei Ausbildungs- und Arbeitsmärkte, zwei Rentenrechtsgebiete, zwei Tarifgebiete, zwei Gebiete mit unterschiedlichen Wertestrukturen. Die Zusammensetzung des Führungspersonals, vor allem in Ostdeutschland, hat sich seit dem Ende des real existierenden Sozialismus stark verändert. Die wenigen Studien, die diese Entwicklungen empirisch untersuchten, stammen aus den neunziger Jahren, als die meisten Erkenntnisse, vor allem die unbequemen, als vereinigungsbedingte Übergangserscheinungen interpretiert worden sind. Mit einer aktuellen Erhebung möchte diese Arbeit dazu beitragen, einen möglichst objektiven Einblick in die langfristige Entwicklung der deutschen Elite zu ermöglichen. Dabei stehen folgende Fragen im Zentrum: Ist der Anteil ostdeutschen Personals in der gesamtdeutschen Elite seitdem gestiegen oder eher gesunken? Wie hat sich die Ost-West Verteilung in den Neuen Bundesländern (NBL) und Alten Bundesländern (ABL) entwickelt? Wie variierte das Verhältnis von ost- zu westdeutschem Personal in verschiedenen Sektoren? (ICD2)

Despite several attempts in the eighteenth century to re-establish the University of Dorpat, the Baltic Germans succeeded only in 1802 in re-founding this precious institution meant for the education of the local German-speaking elite. The Baltic German nobility had power over the whole area, ruling it in political, religious, economic and cultural respect. In return for their numerous privileges, they demonstrated an almost proverbial loyalty to the Russian tsar. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, several high posts in the Russian government and in the Russian army were taken by members of the Baltic German nobility. A similar ambiguity characterized the attitude of the Finnish elite. On the one hand, the exceptionally privileged position of the Grand Duchy of Finland within the Russian empire forced them to act loyally towards their occupier. On the other hand, Finnish national awareness increased from the 1820's, a development towards which the university contributed to a large extent. As the Baltic German elite was educated at the University of Dorpat, the Finnish elite had its own university, first in Turku/ Abo and, from 1827, in Helsinki. Certainly when the university moved to the new capital, it was given explicit instructions to 'build the nation'. Also the location of the new imperial university was significant in this respect: on the Senate's square with at the opposite side of the square the government and next to it the imposing cathedral., Historical Social Research Vol. 33, No. 2 (2008): Special Issue: Elite Formation in the Other Europe (19th-20th Century) Starting Point and Frequency: Year: 1979, Issues per volume: 4, Volumes per year: 1

In seinem Aufsatz befasst sich der Autor mit der Frage, wer die von Präsident Putin angestrebten bzw. versprochenen Reformen in Russland unterstützt und voranbringt. Die thematische Auseinandersetzung gliedert sich in zwei Abschnitte: Das erste Kapitel vermittelt einen Überblick über den derzeitigen Forschungsstand. Dabei werden die bislang offenen Aspekte hervorgehoben und jene Trends betrachtet, die noch nicht ausreichend erklärt sind. Dazu zählen die Erörterung (1) der Gewinner und Verlierer, (2) die Transformation der wirtschaftlichen und politischen Eliten und (3) die Entwicklung nach der Wirtschaftskrise Ende der 1990er Jahre. Das zweite Kapitel diskutiert die Entwicklung der Interessen einflussreicher sozialer Gruppen in der Post-Reform-Periode. Zudem wird der positive Einfluss der Finanzkrise von 1998 auf die Motivation wirtschaftlicher Kompetenzträger aufgezeigt und erklärt, warum die Schlüsselpersonen anschließend ihre Entwicklungs- bzw. Expansionsanreize verlieren. In einer Schlussbetrachtung präsentiert der Autor jene Gruppen, die zu einer Unterstützung der politischen Reformen unter den derzeitigen Bedingungen fähig sind, indem die Implementierung wettbewerbsfähiger Institutionen und Mechanismen in die ökonomische und politische Landschaft Russlands angestrebt wird. (ICG2)

Der Beitrag wendet sich der politischen Unzufriedenheit in den Neuen Bundesländern zu. Die Ostdeutschen beklagen einerseits, dass zu viele "Westeliten" in den Osten gekommen sind, andererseits aber wird geklagt, dass die alten "Osteliten" noch in Machtpositionen sind. Es zeigt sich, dass nach der "Wende" viele hohe Positionen von "Westlern" besetzt wurden, wodurch westdeutsche Politiker der zweiten Reihe eine Chance bekamen. Auf unteren Verwaltungsebenen aber konnten sich viele "alte Kader" behaupten. Die Entwicklung der neuen Bundesländer unterschied sich deutlich von der in den anderen osteuropäischen Reformstaaten, da die Ostdeutschen an das bundesrepublikanische System "andocken" konnten. Der Artikel erläutert, dass es im Verlauf der Jahrzehnte zu abgeschlossenen elitären Klassen in der DDR kam, die häufig ihren eigenen Nachwuchs nachzogen und Machtpositionen gegen die "Arbeiterklasse" abschotteten. Auch Frauen wurden aus Machtpositionen üblicherweise ferngehalten: Die sozialistische Ideologie wurde zunehmend unwichtig, die Binnendifferenzierung in der DDR-Gesellschaft ("Ungleichheit") nahm hingegen zu. Die Entwicklung fachlicher Expertise auf mittleren oder unteren Ebenen konnte nun den Erhalt einer Position rechtfertigen. Auf höherer Ebene blieb aber "politische Loyalität" das Entscheidende. Es wird ausgeführt, dass politische Loyalität in unterschiedlichen Feldern und Positionen unterschiedlich bedeutsam war. Beim Militär oder im "Außenhandel" war sie zum Beispiel wichtiger als im "Binnenhandel". Nach der "Wende" musste auf nachgeordneten politischen Machtpositionen häufig auf die "alten Kader" zurückgegriffen werden, da sie Erfahrung hatten. Bürgerrechtler hingegen hatten keine Chance. Der Artikel erläutert die Struktur der "Eliten" in den Neuen Bundesländern und geht auf Ähnlichkeiten in Ost und West ein. In beiden deutschen Staaten gab es auf der Verwaltungsebene eine Mischung von politischer Loyalität und fachlicher Expertise, die zur Erlangung von Führungspositionen beitragen konnte. Abschließend wird noch kurz auf ein neues ostdeutsches Selbstbewusstsein (den "Ostimismus") eingegangen. (ICB)

'Das Gelingen der Transformation in Übergangsdemokratien, die auf die Ablösung totalitärer Systeme folgen, hängt nicht zuletzt vom Ausmaß des Elitenwechsels und von der Qualität der eine große Rolle spielenden professionellen Politiker ab. Formiert sich in Rußland eine neue politische Elite? Wenn ja, woher kommt sie? Die Beantwortung dieser Fragen wird in der folgenden Ausarbeitung in verschiedenen Schritten versucht. Der Autor stützt sich dabei auf die wenigen russischen Untersuchungen, und führt zugleich eigene empirische Analysen sowohl der zentralen (Regierung, Staatsduma) als auch der regionalen politischen Elite (Föderationsrat) durch. Diese Studie ist die erweiterte Fassung eines Papers, das der Autor auf dem XVII. Weltkongreß der International Political Science Association im Research Committee 'Political Elites' am 19. August 1997 in Seoul vorgelegt hat.' (Autorenreferat), 'The success of transformation in transitional democracies that follow the breakdown of totalitarian systems ultimately depends on the extent to which the old elite is replaced and on the quality of the professional politicians that play the major roles. Is a new political elite forming in Russia? If so, where is it coming from? The present paper attempts to answer these questions in a number of steps. The author draws upon the findings of the few Russian studies conducted to date and at the same time performs his own empirical analyses of both the central (the Government, the State Duma) and the regional (Federation Council) political elites. This study is an extended version of a paper presented by the author in the 'Political Elites' Research Committee at the XVIIth World Congress of the International Political Science Association, held in Seoul on l9th August 1997.' (author's abstract)