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Total ionizing dose, displacement damage dose, and single-event effect testing were performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA space utilization. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, bipolar devices, and FPGAs.

Total ionizing dose, displacement damage dose, and single-event effect testing were performed to characterize and determine the suitability of candidate electronics for NASA space utilization. Devices tested include optoelectronics, digital, analog, bipolar devices, and FPGAs.

The goal of this study was to perform an independent investigation of single event destructive and transient susceptibility of the Microsemi RTG4 device. The devices under test were the Microsemi RTG4 field programmable gate array (FPGA) Rev C. The devices under test will be referenced as the DUT or RTG4 Rev C throughout this document. The DUT was configured to have various test structures that are geared to measure specific potential susceptibilities of the device. DesignDevice susceptibility was determined by monitoring the DUT for Single Event Transient (SET) and Single Event Upset (SEU) induced faults by exposing the DUT to a heavy ion beam. Potential Single Event Latch-up (SEL) was checked throughout heavy-ion testing by monitoring device current.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

We present updates to the conventional methodology of triple modular redundancy (TMR) insertion as it pertains to clock domain crossings (CDCs). Three types of TMR schemes and their suggested corresponding CDC revisions are discussed.

The following are updated or new subjects added to the FPGA SEE Test Guidelines manual: academic versus mission specific device evaluation, single event latch-up (SEL) test and analysis, SEE response visibility enhancement during radiation testing, mitigation evaluation (embedded and user-implemented), unreliable design and its affects to SEE Data, testing flushable architectures versus non-flushable architectures, intellectual property core (IP Core) test and evaluation (addresses embedded and user-inserted), heavy-ion energy and linear energy transfer (LET) selection, proton versus heavy-ion testing, fault injection, mean fluence to failure analysis, and mission specific system-level single event upset (SEU) response prediction. Most sections within the guidelines manual provide information regarding best practices for test structure and test system development. The scope of this manual addresses academic versus mission specific device evaluation and visibility enhancement in IP Core testing.

The following are updated or new subjects added to the FPGA SEE Test Guidelines manual: academic versus mission specific device evaluation, single event latch-up (SEL) test and analysis, SEE response visibility enhancement during radiation testing, mitigation evaluation (embedded and user-implemented), unreliable design and its affects to SEE Data, testing flushable architectures versus non-flushable architectures, intellectual property core (IP Core) test and evaluation (addresses embedded and user-inserted), heavy-ion energy and linear energy transfer (LET) selection, proton versus heavy-ion testing, fault injection, mean fluence to failure analysis, and mission specific system-level single event upset (SEU) response prediction. Most sections within the guidelines manual provide information regarding best practices for test structure and test system development. The scope of this manual addresses academic versus mission specific device evaluation and visibility enhancement in IP Core testing.

NASA Electronic Parts and Packaging (NEPP) is developing a process to be employed in critical applications. The framework assesses levels of trust and assurance in microelectronic systems. The process is being created with participation from a variety of organizations. We present a synopsis of the framework that includes contributions from The Aerospace Corporation.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

For many years, intellectual property (IP) cores have been incorporated into field programmable gate array (FPGA) and application specific integrated circuit (ASIC) design flows. However, the usage of large complex IP cores were limited within products that required a high level of reliability. This is no longer the case. IP core insertion has become mainstream including their use in highly reliable products. Due to limited visibility and control, challenges exist when using IP cores and subsequently compromise product reliability. We discuss challenges and suggest potential solutions to critical application IP insertion.

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

We present the challenges that arise when using redundant clock domains due to their time-skew. Radiation data show that a singular clock domain provides an improved triple modular redundant (TMR) scheme over redundant clocks.

We present the challenges that arise when using redundant clock domains due to their clock-skew. Heavy-ion radiation data show that a singular clock domain (DTMR) provides an improved TMR methodology for SRAM-based FPGAs over redundant clocks.

Electronic parts (integrated circuits) have grown in complexity such that determining all failure modes and risks based on single particle event radiation testing is impossible. In this presentation, the authors will present why this is so and provide some realism on what this means to FPGAs. Its all about understanding actual risks and not making assumptions.

We present the results of single event effect (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics.This paper is a summary of test results.

We present an independent investigation of heavy-ion single event effect data for the Microsemi RTG4 field programmable gate array (FPGA).

We present the challenges that arise when using redundant clock domains due to their clock-skew. Radiation data show that a singular clock domain (DTMR) provides an improved TMR methodology for SRAM-based FPGAs over redundant clocks.

It has been shown that, when exposed to radiation environments, each Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) device has unique error signatures. Subsequently, fail-safe and mitigation strategies will differ per FPGA type. In this session several design approaches for safe systems will be presented. It will also explore the benefits and limitations of several mitigation techniques. The intention of the presentation is to provide information regarding FPGA types, their susceptibilities, and proven fail-safe strategies; so that users can select appropriate mitigation and perform the required trade for system insertion. The presentation will describe three types of FPGA devices and their susceptibilities in radiation environments.

NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment are often limited by their susceptibility to single event effects (SEE). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is and adequate understanding of the test condition is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), and single-event transient (SET). For total ionizing dose (TID) and displacement damage dose (DDD) results, see a companion paper submitted to the 2015 Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) Nuclear and Space Radiation Effects Conference (NSREC) Radiation Effects Data Workshop (REDW) entitled "compendium of Current Total Ionizing Dose and Displacement Damage for Candidate Spacecraft Electronics for NASA by M. Campola, et al.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

This presentation provides an overview of single event effects in FPGA devices 2014-2015 including commercial Xilinx V5 heavy ion accelerated testing, Xilinx Kintex-7 heavy ion accelerated testing. Mitigation study, and investigation of various types of triple modular redundancy (TMR) for commercial SRAM based FPGAs.

Electronic parts (integrated circuits) have grown in complexity such that determining all failure modes and risks from single particle event testing is impossible. In this presentation, the authors will present why this is so and provide some realism on what this means. Its all about understanding actual risks and not making assumptions.

We report low-energy proton and low-energy alpha particle single-event effects (SEE) data on a 32 nm silicon-on-insulator (SOI) complementary metal oxide semiconductor (CMOS) latches and static random access memory (SRAM) that demonstrates the criticality of using low-energy protons for SEE testing of highly-scaled technologies. Low-energy protons produced a significantly higher fraction of multi-bit upsets relative to single-bit upsets when compared to similar alpha particle data. This difference highlights the importance of performing hardness assurance testing with protons that include energy distribution components below 2 megaelectron-volt. The importance of low-energy protons to system-level single-event performance is based on the technology under investigation as well as the target radiation environment.

We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to proton and heavy ion-induced single-event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage (DD), and total ionizing dose (TID). This paper is a summary of test results.

We present results and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on a variety of candidate spacecraft electronics to proton and heavy ion induced single event effects (SEE), proton-induced displacement damage (DD), and total ionizing dose (TID). Introduction: This paper is a summary of test results.NASA spacecraft are subjected to a harsh space environment that includes exposure to various types of ionizing radiation. The performance of electronic devices in a space radiation environment is often limited by its susceptibility to single event effects (SEE), total ionizing dose (TID), and displacement damage (DD). Ground-based testing is used to evaluate candidate spacecraft electronics to determine risk to spaceflight applications. Interpreting the results of radiation testing of complex devices is quite difficult. Given the rapidly changing nature of technology, radiation test data are most often application-specific and adequate understanding of the test conditions is critical. Studies discussed herein were undertaken to establish the application-specific sensitivities of candidate spacecraft and emerging electronic devices to single-event upset (SEU), single-event latchup (SEL), single-event gate rupture (SEGR), single-event burnout (SEB), single-event transient (SET), TID, enhanced low dose rate sensitivity (ELDRS), and DD effects.

This is an independent study to determine the single event destructive and transient susceptibility of the Xilinx Virtex-5QV (SIRF) device. A framework for evaluating complex digital systems targeted for harsh radiation environments such as space is presented.

Single event upset (SEU) analysis of complex systems is challenging. Currently, system SEU analysis is performed by component level partitioning and then either: the most dominant SEU cross-sections (SEUs) are used in system error rate calculations; or the partition SEUs are summed to eventually obtain a system error rate. In many cases, system error rates are overestimated because these methods generally overlook system level derating factors. The problem with overestimating is that it can cause overdesign and consequently negatively affect the following: cost, schedule, functionality, and validation/verification. The scope of this presentation is to discuss the risks involved with our current scheme of SEU analysis for complex systems; and to provide alternative methods for improvement.

Finite state-machines (FSMs) are used to control operational flow in application specific integrated circuits (ASICs) and field programmable gate array (FPGA) devices. Because of their ease of interpretation, FSMs simplify the design and verification process and consequently are significant components in a synchronous design.

An informative session regarding SRAM FPGA basics. Presenting a framework for fault injection techniques applied to Xilinx Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs). Introduce an overlooked time component that illustrates fault injection is impractical for most real designs as a stand-alone characterization tool. Demonstrate procedures that benefit from fault injection error analysis.

In this presentation, we provide a brief glimpse at preliminary single event test results taken from two years of testing of the Xilinx V5QV Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA). This presentation includes an overview of test philosophy and implementation.

While standards and guidelines for performing SEE testing have existed for several decades, guidance for developing SEE test plans has not been as easy to find. In this presentation, the variety of areas that need to be considered ranging from resource issues (funds, personnel, schedule) to extremely technical challenges (particle interaction and circuit application), shall be discussed. Note: we consider the approach outlined here as a "living" document: Mission-specific constraints and new technology related issues always need to be taken into account.

This is a course on SEE Test Plan development. It is an introductory discussion of the items that go into planning an SEE test that should complement the SEE test methodology used. Material will only cover heavy ion SEE testing and not proton, LASER, or other though many of the discussed items may be applicable. While standards and guidelines for how-to perform single event effects (SEE) testing have existed almost since the first cyclotron testing, guidance on the development of SEE test plans has not been as easy to find. In this section of the short course, we attempt to rectify this lack. We consider the approach outlined here as a "living" document: mission specific constraints and new technology related issues always need to be taken into account. We note that we will use the term "test planning" in the context of those items being included in a test plan.

Motivation for this work is: (1) Accurately characterize digital signal processor (DSP) core single-event effect (SEE) behavior (2) Test DSP cores across a large frequency range and across various input conditions (3) Isolate SEE analysis to DSP cores alone (4) Interpret SEE analysis in terms of single-event upsets (SEUs) and single-event transients (SETs) (5) Provide flight missions with accurate estimate of DSP core error rates and error signatures.

We present the results of single event effects (SEE) testing and analysis investigating the effects of radiation on electronics. This paper is a summary of test results.

Radiation requirements and trends. TID: 1) >90% of NASA applications are < 100 krads-Si in piecepart requirements. a) Many commercial devices (NVM and SDRAMs) meet or come close to this. b) Charge pump TID tolerance has improved an order magnitude over the last 10 years. 2) There are always a few programs with higher level needs and, of course, defense needs SEL: 1) Prefer none or rates that are considered low risk. a) Latent damage is a bear to deal with. 2) As we re packing cells tighter and even with lower Vdd, we re seeing SEL on commercial devices regularly (<90nm). a) Often in power conversion, I/O, or control areas. SEU: 1) It s not the bit errors, it s the SEFIs errors that are the biggest issues. a) Scrubbing concerns for risk, power, speed.

A 1 GeV/u Fe-56 ion beam allows for true 90deg tilt irradiations of various microelectronic components and reveals relevant upset trends for an abundant element at the GCR flux energy peak.

We present radiation data, Total Ionizing Dose and Single Event Effects, on the LSI Logic 0.11 micron commercial process and two modified versions of this process. Modified versions include a buried layer to guarantee Single Event Latchup immunity.