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The article traces the development of "spot pricing" for electrical power, which has provided the technique for calculating electricity prices in wholesale markets in most of the United States, and is rapidly becoming the standard in many other countries. The model was first formalized by a group of engineers and economists associated with the engineering professor Fred Schweppe, at MIT. From his position as a leading control theorist, well known in the industry, Schweppe proposed an expansion of control theory that he argued would help break the deadlock in regulatory politics and benefit producers and consumers of power alike. He introduced the approach, which he called "homeostatic control," around 1978 in a seminar of the MIT Energy Lab. Derived by way of a biological metaphor, homeostatic control conceives of a self-correcting system that maintains its equilibrium state in the face of a changing environment. Schweppe's group envisioned bringing consumers of power into the control system by constantly feeding them signals in the form of prices. The MIT team discovered through the contact between economists and engineers that the calculation for determining efficient prices is identical to the calculation used by engineers for meeting system load while minimizing costs. The Lagrange multipliers, or lambdas, derived from the engineering optimization are the best estimates of the marginal cost, and therefore the efficient prices, at each node of the system. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper introduces a decentralized market design, which allows a distribution system operator to manage local demand constraints by obtaining flexibility from competing aggregators, which must in-turn incentivize prosumers to provide this flexibility. The novel networked market structure accounts for distribution system operator-to-aggregator and aggregator-to-prosumer ICT infrastructure and contractual arrangements, which may limit which participants can negotiate transactions with one another. The proposed flexibility market is opt-in for prosumers, which continue to obtain energy within the existing retail electricity market. At the same time, it is underpinned by bilateral energy transactions, and could be integrated into future peer-to-peer electricity markets. Through the market, the distribution system operator, aggregators, and prosumers reach agreement on a stable outcome–a set of individually beneficial transactions no group wishes to mutually deviate from. Market outcomes also satisfy Pareto efficiency, meaning that it is not possible to make a participant better off, without making another worse off. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

There is an ongoing debate on the introduction of capacity markets in most European countries while a few of them have already established capacity markets. Since the implementation of independent national capacity markets is not in line with the target of a pan-European internal electricity market we investigate the impacts of uncoordinated capacity markets compared with coordinated capacity markets. A probabilistic approach for the determination of capacity requirements is proposed and a European electricity market model (E2M2s) is applied for evaluation. The model simultaneously optimizes investments and dispatch of power plants. Besides the impact on generation investments, market prices and system costs we analyze effects on production and security of supply. While coordinated capacity markets reveal high potentials for cross-border synergies and cost savings, uncoordinated and unilateral implementations can lead to inefficiencies, in particular free riding effects and endanger security of supply due to adverse allocation of generation capacity. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Electricity markets are designed to provide reliable electricity at least cost to consumers. This paper describes how the best designs satisfy the twin goals of short-run efficiency—making the best use of existing resources—and long-run efficiency—promoting efficient investment in new resources. The core elements are a day-ahead market for optimal scheduling of resources and a real-time market for security-constrained economic dispatch. Resources directly offer to produce per their underlying economics and then the system operator centrally optimizes all resources to maximize social welfare. Locational marginal prices, reflecting the marginal value of energy at each time and location, are used in settlement. This spot market provides the basis for forward contracting, which enables participants to manage risk and improves bidding incentives in the spot market. There are important differences in electricity markets around the world, reflecting different economic and political settings. Electricity markets are undergoing a transformation as the resource mix transitions from fossil fuels to renewables. The main renewables, wind and solar, are intermittent, have zero marginal cost, and lack inertia. These challenges can be met with battery storage and improved demand response. However, good governance is needed to assure the market rules adapt to meet new challenges. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

• We used EMIS-AS model to explore various market structures and clean energy targets. • Energy-only markets can achieve same clean energy goals as capacity markets. • ORDC scarcity pricing exhibits substitutional relationship with capacity markets. • Even one well-designed market mechanism can achieve desired clean energy targets. • Capacity/reserve eligibility rules for one technology or product can impact others. Competitive wholesale electricity markets can help facilitate energy system decarbonization by incentivizing investments in clean energy technologies that meet evolving system needs. We explore market structure impacts on generator operations and deployment by risk-averse, heterogeneous investor firms using the Electricity Markets and Investment Suite – Agent-based Simulation (EMIS-AS) model. We apply clean energy targets of 45%–100% by 2035 considering energy, ancillary services, capacity, and clean energy credit products and pricing and eligibility rules. Results highlight a complexity conundrum, whereby finding the "right" market design to achieve decarbonization goals and avoid unintended consequences can be a highly-nuanced, non-incremental challenge. Carefully designed energy-only markets can achieve the same clean energy targets as capacity market structures but with different revenue and profitability outcomes. Operating reserve demand curve-based scarcity pricing can substitute capacity markets for similar deployment outcomes. Carbon pricing alone is most effective at achieving decarbonization levels at low clean energy targets, and clean energy credit markets and carbon pricing are substitutionary at high clean energy targets. Restricting technology participation in capacity and operating reserve markets can impact deployment and operations, even for nonrestricted technologies. Adding an inertia product with fast frequency response yields insufficient provision at high clean energy targets, but work is needed to understand frequency requirements and capabilities. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

To identify the trends in new flexibility markets, a set of market and aggregator platforms were selected and compared. The analyzed initiatives are relevant to consider alternative designs for European electricity markets. This review proposes a common methodology for analyzing these market models by comparing their description, market structure, market timing, and implementation. Furthermore, a range of policy implications and future research directions towards implementing these markets are presented. The results provide compelling evidence that the new market models represent a promising business with technical and economic justification, as they incentivize the uptake of flexibility from distributed resources by providing services to Distribution System Operators (DSOs) in coordination with Transmission System Operators (TSOs). Moreover, the interactions between these new market platforms and existing markets are of particular interest, and the contributions from aggregator platforms are also relevant to enhance the political vision of empowering the customers through their active participation in markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Different market designs may create distortions on spot pricing equilibrium, thus providing different signals for market agents and investment decisions on new generation assets. Also, demand flexibility market value may differ according to market characteristics. This paper aims to study the demand response (DR) – market design – risk nexus. According to our findings, despite the design differences among MIBEL, EEX and Nord Pool, some variables are common to all while those associated with risk premia might differ. This is due to the mismatch between the specific market structure characteristics and premises, particularly in what concerns the supply generation portfolio composition in the day-ahead markets. • Different market designs may create distortions concerning pricing equilibrium. • Seasonality and inconstant demand are associated with risk premia in all markets. • Other variables were found to be related to risk premia in different market structures. • A critical survey of the literature that supports the debate on Demand Response – Market Design - Risk nexus is presented. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]