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This paper disentangles resource management skills of candidates from the electoral circumstances that help them getting (re-)elected. It is first made use of the DEA method to measure candidates' resource management abilities. Second, determinants of these scores are estimated. The paper uses a database detailing the different sources of campaign funding for French members of Parliament to analyze their relative performance. Results show a large variance in campaign resource management ability, particularly between political parties, and incumbents and newcomers. They also reveal an important role of constituencies' characteristics and of politicians' experience in explaining differences between politicians' efforts. Thus, public policies could promote virtuous regulations to reduce disparities among candidates with different financial backgrounds and access to resources, to foster a fairer democracy. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper tests the hypothesis that upper-level governments can transfer the accountability of the costs of a reform to a lower one. The reform of the school week in France provides the ground for a verification of the attribution of accountability hypothesis, as it was nationally decided and locally implemented, right before a municipal election. The results confirm that local incumbents have taken the blame of the reform, especially in larger cities. In this case, thus, the cost of the reform is borne twice by the lower level of government, financially and politically. So doing, the central government does a dirty deed to the local ones, for a very cheap cost. That mayors who have announced a boycott of the reform have received electoral gains confirms that some local politicians expected to be the fall guys, bearing the brunt of the costs of the reform. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This research looks at the determinants of the adoption of the school-rhythm reform by French municipalities. The possibility opened to mayors to adopt the reform sooner (2013) or later (2014) offers the opportunity to measure how much the interests of the children have weighted on the decision. As our results reveal strong partisan biases to be prevalent, and financial reasons to be influential, it can be affirmed that the children's interest has clearly not been the only consideration in mind. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

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