Search

Presents a study which indicated that a probabilistic voting model allowing voters to abstain from alienation or indifference leads to a transitive ordering among candidate ideologies. Analysis of the perceptual model; Uses of the model; Optimal candidate location; Discussion on the results.

We model correlated voter-candidate issue data within the framework of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model of predictive dimensions. The empirical consequences of this model of the issue data are surprising and allow for an indirect test of the Enelow-Hinich spatial model. The central prediction of the correlated data model we construct, which depends critically on the underlying spatial model, is tested with issue data from the 1980 NES pre-election interview. The test results are highly supportive of the model's predictions. We conclude both that the spatial model of predictive dimensions is empirically supported and that candidate spatial locations estimated by the model are not an artifact of correlated voter-candidate issue data. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We build a model of two-candidate elections in which voters judge candidates on the basis of how well their announced campaign positions correspond with their records. Given different records, the candidates will adopt different campaign positions. Two types of reputational advantage are analyzed: proximity of the candidate's record to the median voter's ideal point, and the range of campaign positions that a candidate may adopt and still retain some credibility with the voters. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A random pivot model is used to expand the theory of policy-minded candidates. Previous results (Wittman, 1977, 1983; Cox, 1984; Hansson and Stuart, 1984) are derived under weaker assumptions. New results about candidate strategies in multiple elections are also obtained. The thrust of these results supports Calvert's (1985) finding that office-seeking and policy-mindedness are countervailing forces in election contests. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this paper, we construct a general probabilistic spatial theory of elections and examine sufficient conditions for equilibrium in two-candidate contests with expected vote-maximizing candidates. Given strict concavity of the candidate objective function, a unique equilibrium exists and the candidates adopt the same set of policy positions. Prospective uncertainty, reduced policy salience, degree of concavity of voter utility functions, some degree of centrality in the feasible set of policy locations, and restrictions on the dimensionality of the policy space are all stabilizing factors in two-candidate elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This essay provides an explanation for the existence of stable logrolling arrangements. The model presented assumes that issues are voted on one at a time, that people are risk averse, and that each person forecasts future issue decisions with a random variable whose mean is linear in the alternatives of the present issue. We show that under this model, the expectation that logrolling will take place stabilizes the logrolling process. For this expectation to be stable, it must be symmetric, which means that revoting of issues must be possible. Since revoting is possible in institutions such as Congress, we conclude that an important set of real world voting bodies satisfies the conditions for stable logrolling. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to offer a methodology for testing a new spatial theory of elections. Specifically, it is shown that the new spatial model of elections developed by Endow and Hinich (1984a) is statistically equivalent to assuming that a classical factor structure underlies the data that voters provide concerning the issue positions of themselves and the candidates. A factor analysis of the sample correlation matrix of candidate variables averaged over voters and issues provides consistent estimates of the candidate locations in the Space of predictive dimensions postulated by Enelow and Hinich, and the factor scores assigned to the voters can be used to project the voters onto the same predictive space with the candidates. This new scaling method is used to locate the positions of voters and candidates in the underlying predictive space of the 1980 Presidential election. Internal checks confirm the empirical adequacy of the candidate locations, and probit analysis is used as an external check On the empirical adequacy of the voter locations. For the pre-election data, no loss of accuracy in predicting voter choice was found in moving from the issue data to the estimated factor locations of voters and candidates. For the post-election data, a modest drop. in accuracy was discovered. Overall the empirical adequacy of factor analysis was confirmed as a methodOlogy for testing the new Enelow-Hinich spatial model of elections. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]