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This speech highlights two channels through which globalization poses challenges for monetary policy. The first channel is through the global determination of the average world natural real rate of interest, which implies that saving and investment shifts abroad can influence the domestic interest rate setting consistent with price stability. The second channel is through global digital payments systems, which may compromise domestic policy sovereignty through effects on both monetary and financial stability.

While the globalization of production has been a prominent target of anti-globalization backlash, globalized finance has seemed to be much less in the public bull’s-eye. The blueprint for the post-war international economy agreed at Bretton Woods in 1944 envisioned nothing like today’s extensive and fluid global capital market. The demise of the 1946–73 fixed exchange rate system, however, also brought a progressive dismantling of barriers to international financial flows motivated by special-interest politics, national economic competition, and ideology—alongside the benign desire for a more efficient international allocation of capital. Unfortunately, free cross-border financial capital mobility can compromise governments’ capacities to attain domestic economic and social goals in several ways. This essay links the dynamics of financial liberalization to the Teflon-like resilience of finance to backlash so far, and suggests that stronger backlash could emerge if national governments fail to enhance multilateral cooperation to manage the financial commons.

This paper revisits the debate on ruling out speculative hyperinflations in monetary models. Although apparently a narrow issue, studying these extreme economies turns out to be quite illuminating in understanding the fundamentals of price level determination. It is also relevant in evaluating the broader claims that advocates of the fiscal theory of the price level have made. In Obstfeld and Rogoff ( 1983 , 1986 ) we show that in pure fiat money models with rational expectations, where the government gives no backing whatsoever to currency, there is in fact no reasonable way to rule out speculative hyperinflations where the value of money goes to zero, even if the money supply itself is exogenous and constant. Such perverse equilibria are ruled out, however, if the government provides even a very small real backing to the currency – a fiscal mechanism, but one that comes into play only as a backstop. Indeed that backing does not have to be certain. Cochrane ( 2011 , 2019 ), however, argues that this result is wrong, and that fractional currency backing is a Maginot line that is insufficient to rule out hyperinflation. We show here why, in fact, his analysis involves a subtle change in model specification that adds a distinct monetary fragility to our model. Our baseline analysis uses a canonical money-in-the-utility-function setup due to Brock ( 1974 , 1975 ), but following Wallace (1981) , we show the same results go through in an overlapping-generations model of money.

Recent events have highlighted areas of conflict between economic integration with the outside world and the demands of domestic electorates. Historically, the tradeoffs have always become sharper in periods of crisis, such as the present. After reviewing the U‐shaped progress of globalization since the nineteenth century, this essay reconsiders John Maynard Keynes's views on “national self‐sufficiency” in the early 1930s. I argue that the postwar Bretton Woods system he helped to create evolved from those views as a balanced middle ground between market forces and governments' desires for domestic economic stability. The gradual erosion of that balance in favor of the market has helped produce discontent over globalization and more nationalism in politics. Enhanced multilateral cooperation in key areas offers the hope of supporting globalization while better meeting voters' aspirations. Despite daunting political obstacles to global cooperation these days, collective action challenges in areas such as climate, cybersecurity, and health—alongside economic policy—are becoming only more pressing over time.

Fifty years ago, Harry G. Johnson published “The Case for Flexible Exchange Rates, 1969,” its title echoing Milton Friedman’s classic essay of the early 1950s. Though somewhat forgotten today, Johnson’s reprise was an important element in the late 1960s debate over the future of the international monetary system. The present paper has three objectives. The first is to lay out the historical context in which Johnson’s “Case” was written and read. The second is to examine Johnson’s main points and see how they stand up to nearly five decades of experience with floating exchange rates since the end of the Bretton Woods system. The third is to review the most recent academic critiques of exchange-rate flexibility and ask how fatal they are to Johnson’s basic argument. I conclude that the essential case for exchange rate flexibility still stands strong.

In our book, Global Capital Markets: Integration, Crisis, and Growth, we traced out the evolution of the international monetary system using the framework of the “international monetary trilemma”: countries can enjoy at most two from the set {exchange-rate stability, open capital markets, and domestic monetary autonomy}. The events of the past decade or more highlight the further complications for this framework posed by financial stability issues. Here we update and qualify our prior analysis, drawing on recent experience and research. Under the classical gold standard, scant attention was paid to macro management, either to stabilize output and employment or to ensure financial stability. The interwar years highlighted the changing demands for modern central bank interventions in the economy. Financial instability, followed by WWII, left a world with sharply constricted financial markets and little private cross-border capital mobility. Due to this historical accident, the Bretton Woods system agreed in 1944 focused not at all on financial stability, and focused on issues like adjustment, exchange rate misalignment, and international liquidity (defined in terms of official, not private, capital-account transactions). Post 1970s floating rates permitted, but did not require, liberalization of the capital account. But the political equilibrium had shifted in favor of financial interests, signaled by the push toward European integration and the later reform process in emerging markets starting in the 1990s. This development, however, opened the door once again to domestic financial crises and their international transmission. Countries now become more susceptible to a new species of “capital account crises,” fueled by bank and bond lending, and its sudden withdrawal. These developments, in fact, made evident a different, “financial trilemma”: countries can pick at most two from {financial stability, open capital markets, and autonomy over domestic financial policy}. We distill the main lessons as to the interactions between the monetary and financial trilemmas, and policies that could best address the resulting weaknesses.

This paper studies how several macrofinancial factors are associated over time with the evolution of covered interest parity (CIP) deviations in the decade after the Global Financial Crisis. Changes in a number of risk- and policy-related factors have a significant association with the evolution of CIP deviations. Key measures of FX market liquidity and intermediaries' risk-taking capacity are strongly correlated with the cross-currency basis (the deviation from CIP), and the close relationship between broad U.S. dollar strength and the basis is driven mainly by a common factor depending on other safe-haven currencies' comovements. Post-crisis monetary policies also play a role, as demonstrated by the relationship between CIP deviations, central bank balance sheets, and term premia. Risk-related factors have more explanatory power than monetary policy-related factors over the entire 2010–2018 period, but they are approximately equally influential over the period's second half. Further highlighting the role of bank regulation, we offer evidence that the year-end dynamics of the three-month dollar basis depend on financial regulations targeting global systemically important financial institutions.

This speech highlights two channels through which globalization poses challenges for monetary policy. The first channel is through the global determination of the average world natural real rate of interest, which implies that saving and investment shifts abroad can influence the domestic interest rate setting consistent with price stability. The second channel is through global digital payments systems, which may compromise domestic policy sovereignty through effects on both monetary and financial stability.

On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom’s vote to leave the European Union came amid widespread professional forecasts of financial volatility, a likely growth slowdown for the United Kingdom, and potential spillovers to the rest of the EU and even to countries outside the EU’s Single Market. After a relatively brief interlude of jitters, however, equity markets recovered and interbank stains were avoided (albeit with central bank support). The main durable financial market effect has been a substantial depreciation of the pound sterling. At the same time, economic signals from the U.K. economy have been mixed, with fairly robust consumer spending and exports sustaining the economy so far. The shape of the ultimate terms of trade between Britain and its former EU partners remains unclear, however, and the uncertainty seems likely to weigh on future investment and hiring. It is unlikely that substantial U.K. control over the free movement of EU persons across its borders—a main objective of the pro-Brexit campaign—will prove compatible with anything near full access to the Single Market. Moreover, any eventual loss of access to the Single Market, including for financial services, will very likely reduce the United Kingdom’s steady-state income.

This paper considers the use of new Keynesian open economy models to evaluate monetary policy rules. While recognizing the importance policy evaluation with such models, it presents a number of criticisms about assumptions relating to wage determination, the real interest rate, divine coincidence and financial stability.

Do global current account imbalances still matter in a world of deep international financial markets where gross two-way financial flows often dwarf the net flows measured in the current account? Contrary to a complete markets or 'consenting adults' view of the world, large current account imbalances, while very possibly warranted by fundamentals and welcome, can also signal elevated macroeconomic and financial stresses, as was arguably the case in the mid-2000s. Furthermore, the increasingly big valuation changes in countries’ net international investment positions, while potentially important in risk allocation, cannot be relied upon systematically to offset the changes in national wealth implied by the current account. The same factors that dictate careful attention to global imbalances also imply, however, that data on gross international financial flows and positions are central to any assessment of financial stability risks. The balance sheet mismatches of leveraged entities provide the most direct indicators of potential instability, much more so than do global imbalances, though the imbalances may well be a symptom that deeper financial threats are gathering.

This paper explores the connection between the much-debated global current account imbalances of the past decade and the U.S. financial collapse. It argues that the connection is an intimate one, although nothing so simple as cause and effect. Instead, the imbalances were a primary symptom of forces that led directly to the financial crash. The paper goes on to examine lessons for reforming the global financial architecture. A major lesson is the need to take a systemic view of global financial stability – a view that analyzes the global economy much as one would analyze an integrated domestic economy.

In this paper we connect the events of the last twelve months, "The Panic of 2008" as it has been called, to the demand for international reserves. In previous work, we have shown that international reserve demand can be rationalized by a central bank's desire to backstop the broad money supply to avert the possibility of an internal/external double drain (a bank run combined with capital flight). Thus, simply looking at trade or short-term debt as motivations for reserve holdings is insufficient; one must also consider the size of the banking system (M2). Here, we show that a country's reserve holdings just before the current crisis, relative to their predicted holdings based on these financial motives, can significantly predict exchange rate movements of both emerging and advanced countries in 2008. Countries with large war chests did not depreciate -- and some appreciated. Meanwhile, those who held insufficient reserves based on our metric were likely to depreciate. Current account balances and short-term debt levels are not statistically significant predictors of depreciation once reserve levels are taken into account. Our model's typically high predicted reserve levels provide important context for the unprecedented U.S. dollar swap lines recently provided to many countries by the Federal Reserve.(This abstract was borrowed from another version of this item.)

Despite an abundance of cross-sectional, panel, and event studies, there is strikingly little convincing documentation of direct positive impacts of financial opening on the economic welfare levels or growth rates of developing countries. The econometric difficulties are similar to those that bedevil the literature on trade openness and growth though, if anything, they are more severe in the context of international finance. There is also little systematic evidence that financial opening raises welfare indirectly by promoting collateral reforms of economic institutions or policies. At the same time, opening the financial account does appear to raise the frequency and severity of economic crises. Nonetheless, developing countries continue to move in the direction of further financial openness. A plausible explanation is that financial development is a concomitant of successful economic growth, and a growing financial sector in an economy open to trade cannot long be insulated from cross-border financial flows. This survey discusses the policy framework in which financial globalization is most likely to prove beneficial for developing countries. The reforms developing countries need to carry out to make their economies safe for international asset trade are the same reforms they need to carry out to curtail the power of entrenched economic interests and liberate the economy's productive potential. IMF Staff Papers (2009) 56, 63–111. doi:10.1057/imfsp.2008.32

This paper revisits the sticky-price pricing-to-market model of Devereux and Engel [Devereux, M.B., Engel, C., 2003. Monetary policy in the open economy revisited: price setting and exchange-rate flexibility. Review of Economic Studies 70(4), 765–783], in which fixed exchange rates are optimal even in the face of country-specific nonmonetary shocks. We show that this result hinges critically on the Devereux–Engel model's prediction that international consumption levels are perfectly synchronized under flexible prices. Realistic modifications of the model that produce nonsynchronous consumption movements – such as, the presence of nontraded goods – upset the fixed exchange rate prescription even in the absence of an expenditure-switching role of exchange rate changes.

The exchange-rate regime is often seen as constrained by the monetary policy trilemma, which imposes a stark tradeoff among exchange stability, monetary independence, and capital market openness. Yet the trilemma has not gone without challenge. Some argue that under the modern float there could be limited monetary autonomy; others, that even under the classical gold standard domestic monetary autonomy was considerable. This paper studies the coherence of international interest rates over more than 130 years. The constraints implied by the trilemma are largely borne out by history. © 2005 President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.

THIS IS THE third in a series of papers we have written over the past five years about the growing U.S. current account deficit and the potentially sharp exchange rate movements any future adjustment toward current account balance might imply. (1) The problem has hardly gone away in those five years. Indeed, the U.S. current account deficit today is running at around 6 percent of GDP, an all-time record. Incredibly, the U.S. deficit now soaks up about 75 percent of the combined current account surpluses of Germany, Japan, China, and all the world's other surplus countries. (2) To balance its current account simply through higher exports, the United States would have to increase export revenue by a staggering 58 percent over 2004 levels. And, as we argue in this paper, the speed at which the U.S. current account ultimately returns toward balance, the triggers that drive that adjustment, and the way in which the burden of adjustment is allocated across Europe and Asia all have enormous implications for global exchange rates. Each scenario for returning to balance poses, in turn, its own risks to financial markets and to general economic stability. Our assessment is that the risks of collateral damage--beyond the risks to exchange rate stability--have grown substantially over the five years since our first research paper on the topic, partly because the U.S. current account deficit itself has grown, but mainly because of a mix of other factors. These include, not least, the stunningly low U.S. personal saving rate (which, driven by unsustainable rates of housing appreciation and record low interest rates, fell to 1 percent of disposable personal income in 2004). But additional major risks are posed by the sharp deterioration in the U.S. federal government's fiscal trajectory since 2000, rising energy prices, and the fact that the United States has become increasingly dependent on Asian central banks and politically unstable oil producers to finance its deficits. To these vulnerabilities must be added Europe's conspicuously inflexible economy, Japan's continuing dependence on export-driven growth, the susceptibility of emerging markets to any kind of global financial volatility, and the fact that, increasingly, the counterparties in international asset transactions are insurance companies, hedge funds, and other relatively unregulated nonbank financial entities. Perhaps above all, geopolitical risks and the threat of international terror have risen markedly since September 2001, confronting the United States with open-ended long-term costs for financing wars and homeland security. True, if some shock (such as a rise in foreign demand for U.S. exports) were to close up these global imbalances quickly without exposing any concomitant weaknesses, the damage might well be contained to exchange rates and to the collapse of a few large banks and financial firms--along with, perhaps, mild recession in Europe and Japan. But, given the broader risks, it seems prudent to try to find policies that will gradually reduce global imbalances now rather than later. Such policies would include finding ways to reverse the decline in U.S. saving, particularly by developing a more credible strategy to eliminate the structural federal budget deficit and to tackle the country's actuarially insolvent old-age pension and medical benefit programs. More rapid productivity growth in the rest of the world would be particularly helpful in achieving a benign adjustment, but only, as the model we develop in this paper illustrates, if that growth is concentrated in nontraded (domestically produced and consumed) goods rather than the export sector, where such productivity growth could actually widen the U.S. trade deficit. It is also essential that Asia, which now accounts for more than one-third of global output on a purchasing power parity basis, take responsibility for bearing its share of the burden of adjustment. Otherwise, if demand shifts caused the U. …

Prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short-term nominal interest rate renders open-market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals. In an earlier paper, we showed that this reasoning does not hold, that open-market operations can provide substantial macroeconomic benefits and facilitate the use of powerful fiscal policy tools even in a liquidity trap. In this paper, we consider an alternative approach that has been suggested for use in a liquidity trap, a scheduled increase in consumption tax rates. We find that such a policy could, indeed, increase short-run consumption, but would be less effective at increasing welfare or accelerating a country's exit from a liquidity trap. Though a variant of this tax policy might induce exit from a liquidity trap, the impact of welfare is negative in this case as well. We also argue that this alternative tax-rate-based approach is subject to more severe credibility problems than the monetary policy approach explored in our original paper.

The elasticity of substitution between goods from different countries---the Armington elasticity---is important for many questions in international economics, but its magnitude is subject to debate: the "macro" elasticity between home and import goods is often found to be smaller than the "micro" elasticity between foreign sources of imports. We investigate these two elasticities in a model using a nested CES preference structure. We explore estimation techniques for the macro and micro elasticities using both simulated data from a Melitz-style model, and highly disaggregate U.S. production data matched to Harmonized System trade data. We find that in up to one-half of goods there is no significant difference between the macro and micro elasticities, but in the other half of goods the macro elasticity is significantly lower than the micro elasticity, even when they are estimated at the same level of disaggregation.

This paper analyzes the constraints European Union law places on the 1 January 1999 choices of irrevocably fixed conversion rates between the Euro and the currencies of EMU members states. Current EU legislation, notably the Maastricht treaty, requires that the bilateral currency conversion factors implied by the 1 January 1999 choices equal closing market exchange rates on 31 December 1998. Given that legal constraint, there still exist several strategies for choosing the relative prices of EMU member currencies against the Euro. Unfortunately, most of these have potentially damaging side effects. One approach, based on official Stage 2 offers of contingent Euro forward contracts with value dates at the start of Stage 3, allows a highly credible preannouncement of the bilateral currency conversion factors to be set at the start of EMU. That approach assumes, however, that no prospective EMU members can withdraw between their selection in May 1998 and the start of Stage 3.

Asymmetric shocks Regional non-adjustment and fiscal policy How will countries handle idiosyncratic macroeconomic shocks under the single currency? Since the regional adjustment patterns currently prevailing within European currency unions are likely to prevail at the national level under the single currency, looking at the ways in which European countries react to internally asymmetric shocks today provides a good preview for the answer to that question. In this paper, we compare the USA with Germany, Italy and the UK, and with Canada, which is closer to Europe than the USA in its labour market and fiscal institutions. Europe's (and to some extent Canada's) model of regional response differs from that of the USA. Changes in regional real exchange rates are small in all countries. Outside of the USA, however, there is more reliance on interregional transfer payments, less on labour migration, and the pace of regional adjustment appears to be slower. If EMU aims at the same degree of economic and social cohesion that its constituent nations enjoy today, this suggests that its members may find it hard to resist the eventual extension of existing EU mechanisms of income redistribution - a transfer union. We propose an alternative strategy based on a relaxed Stability Pact, further strictures against central EU borrowing, labour market and fiscal reform, and the issuance by individual member states of debt indexed to nominal GDP. — Maurice Obstfeld and Giovanni Peri

This paper surveys recent research in open-economy macroeconomics, using questions raised by European economic and monetary unification to guide the topics discussed. A striking empirical regularity is the tendency for changes in the nominal exchange rate regime systematically to affect the variability of nominal and real exchange rates alike. This regularity (which disappears in high-inflation conditions) can be explained by sticky-price theories or by models of asset-market liquidity effects. But plausible liquidity models have difficulty generating enough persistence (in output and real exchange rates, in particular) to match the data. Thus the macroeconomic costs of giving up the exchange-rate realignment option, emphasized in Mundell's optimum currency area concept, seem empirically relevant. The paper discusses other possible costs of currency unification associated with a reduced number of asset markets. On the benefit side, our theories of the efficiences due to a common currency remain unsatisfactory, despite recent advances. A key motivation for the choice of a common currency over a fixed exchange rate between national currencies is the fear of speculative attack. The paper concludes by showing how self-fulfilling currency crises can occur, and describes recent progress in narrowing the range of multiple equilibria in adjustable-peg regimes.

We propose that analysis of purchasing power parity (PPP) and the law of one price should explicitly take into account the possibility of “commodity points”—thresholds delineating a region of no central tendency among relative prices, possibly due to lack of perfect arbitrage in the presence of transaction costs and uncertainty. More than 80 years ago, Heckscher stressed the importance of such incomplete arbitrage in the empirical application of PPP. We devise an econometric method to identify commodity points. Price adjustment is treated as a nonlinear process, and a threshold autoregression offers a parsimonious specification within which both thresholds and adjustment speeds are estimated by maximum likelihood methods. Our model performs well using post-1980 data, and yields parameter estimates that appear quite reasonable: adjustment outside the thresholds might imply half-lives of price deviations measured in months rather than years, and the thresholds correspond to popular rough estimates as to the order of magnitude of actual transport costs. The estimated commodity points appear to be positively related to objective measures of market segmentation, notably nominal exchange rate volatility.J. Japan Int. Econ.December 1997,11(4), pp. 441–479. Department of Economics, University of California, Berkeley, California 94720-3880; and Department of Economics, Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois 60208-2600.

This paper studies policy rules with escape clauses, analyzing as an example fixed exchange rate systems that allow member countries the freedom to realign in periods of stress. While well-designed, escape-clause rules can raise society's welfare in principle, limited credibility makes it difficult to implement such rules in practice. An EMS-type institution that imposes political costs on policymakers who realign may raise welfare, but can also produce equilibria far inferior to an irrevocably fixed exchange rate. Switches between multiple equilibria may have the character of sudden speculative attacks.

The discomfort a government suffers from speculation against its currency determines the strategic incentives of speculators and the scope for multiple currency-market equilibria. After describing an illustrative model in which high unemployment may cause an exchange-rate crisis with self-fulfilling features, the paper reviews some other self-reinforcing mechanisms. Recent econometric evidence seems consistent with the practical importance of these mechanisms.

In the model of Obstfeld (1983), a country hurt by a temporary shift in its terms of trade, whether the shift is infinitesimal or not, always runs a temporary current-account deficit. Temporary rises in relative export prices always cause surpluses in the model. This note derives these results within an analysis that clarifies how temporary terms-of-trade shocks affect the consumption-based real interest rate on external debt and, hence, the current account.

This paper examines the claim that exchange rate regimes are of little salience in the transmission of global financial conditions to domestic financial and macroeconomic conditions by focusing on a sample of about 40 emerging market countries over 1986–2013. Our findings show that exchange rate regimes do matter. Countries with fixed exchange rate regimes are more likely to experience financial vulnerabilities—faster domestic credit and house price growth, and increases in bank leverage—than those with relatively flexible regimes. The transmission of global financial shocks is likewise magnified under fixed exchange rate regimes relative to more flexible (though not necessarily fully flexible) regimes. We attribute this to both reduced monetary policy autonomy and a greater sensitivity of capital flows to changes in global conditions under fixed rate regimes.

Until now, thinking on open economy macroeconomics has been largely schizophrenic. When it comes to analyzing exchange rate dynamics, an empirically-minded economist abandons modern current account models which, while theoretically coherent, fail to address the awkward reality of sticky nominal prices. In this paper we develop an analytically tractable two-country model that marries a full account of dynamics to a supply framework based on monopolistic competition and sticky prices. It offers simple and intuitive predictions about exchange rates and current accounts that sometimes differ sharply from those of either modern flexible-price intertemporal models, or traditional sticky-price Keynesian models. The model also leads to a novel perspective on the international welfare spillovers of monetary and fiscal policies.

In a recent article, Brennan and Solnik (1989) attempt to quantify numerically the welfare benefits of risk sharing by a group of OECD economies. The result of their calculation is striking; in their words (p. 371), ‘The estimated welfare loss due to impairment of efficient risk sharing if capital flows were eliminated is of the order of 448 per cent of the level of consumption prevailing in the early 1970s.’ This note argues that the Brennan-Solnik welfare measure is faulty and leads to a substantial overstatement of the potential welfare benefits of international risk sharing within their sample of countries. For standard levels of risk aversion, the Brennan-Solnik measure may overstate these benefits by as much as two orders of magnitude. This is true even if one accepts as valid the empirical assumptions the authors make in calculating the consumption-variability estimates that underlie their welfare conclusions.

When changes in the economic policy regime occur stochastically, asset prices will reflect the possibility of such shifts. In this paper we apply techniques of regulated Brownian motion to obtain closed-form analytic price solutions when policy reaction functions are subject to prospective changes. We focus on the case in which the authorities promise to peg a currency's exchange rate once it reaches a predetermined future level. We also show how an open-ended commitment to exchange-rate targeting may lead to multiple equilibria.

This paper shows how a government that cannot make credible policy commitments might manage its exchange rate and fiscal stance in a world of rational expectations. The dynamic-game model developed here potentially can generate diverse patterns of macroeconomic behavior, patterns that differ as a result of assumed differences in government objectives. Under some types of government, the ongoing strategic interaction between the public and private sectors leads to a disinflationary outcome. Other governments may push the economy into a spiral of rising debt and inflation.

This paper develops simple geometric methods for analyzing consumer behavior under recursive but intertemporally dependent tastes. Since the preferences studied need not be time-additive, they allow the marginal utility of consumption on a given date to vary with consumption on other dates. Intertemporal dependence is induced by the presence of a variable individual rate of time preference. The optimal consumption responses to transitory and anticipated changes in incomes and interest rates are easily derived and are similar in many respects to the responses implied by the standard, constant time-preference model. Intuitive explanations of the first-order conditions describing optimal paths are provided.

Prevalent thinking about liquidity traps suggests that the perfect substitutability of money and bonds at a zero short-term nominal interest rate renders open-market operations ineffective for achieving macroeconomic stabilization goals. We show that even were this the case, there remains a powerful argument for large-scale open market operations as a fiscal policy tool. As we also demonstrate, however, this same reasoning implies that open-market operations will be beneficial for stabilization as well, even when the economy is expected to remain mired in a liquidity trap for some time. Thus, the microeconomic fiscal benefits of open-market operations in a liquidity trap go hand in hand with standard macroeconomic objectives. Motivated by Japan’s recent economic experience, we use a dynamic general-equilibrium model to assess the welfare impact of open-market operations for an economy in Japan’s predicament. We argue Japan can achieve a substantial welfare improvement through large open-market purchases of domestic government debt.

Author(s): Obstfeld, Maurice; Taylor, Alan M. | Abstract: What determines sovereign risk? We study the London bond market from the 1870s to the 1930s. Our findings support conventional wisdom concerning the low credibility of the interwar gold standard. Before 1914 gold standard adherence effectively signalled credibility and shaved up to 30 basis points from country borrowing spreads. In the 1920s, however, simply resuming prewar gold parities was insufficient to secure benefits. Countries that devalued before resumption were treated more favorably, and markets scrutinized other signals. Public debt and British Empire membership were important determinants of spreads after World War One, but not before.

Author(s): Obstfeld, Maurice; Rogoff, Kenneth | Abstract: It is well known that if international linkages are relatively small, the potential gains to international monetary policy coordination are typically quite limited. But what if goods and financial markets are tightly linked? Is it then problematic if countries unilaterally design their institutions for monetary stabilization? Are the stabilization gains from having separate currencies largely squandered in the absence of effective international monetary coordination? We argue that under plausible assumptions the answer is no. Unless risk aversion is very high, lack of coordination in rule setting is a second-order problem compared to the overall gains from monetary policy stabilization.

The central claim in this paper is that by explicitly introducing costs of international trade (narrowly, transport costs but more broadly, tariffs, nontariff barriers and other trade costs), one can go far toward explaining a great number of the main empirical puzzles that international macroeconomists have struggled with over twenty-five years. Our approach elucidates J. McCallum's home bias in trade puzzle, the Feldstein-Horioka saving-investment puzzle, the French-Poterba equity home bias puzzle, and the Backus-Kehoe- Kydland consumption correlations puzzle. That one simple alteration to an otherwise canonical international macroeconomic model can help substantially to explain such a broad arrange of empirical puzzles, including some that previously seemed intractable, suggests a rich area for future research. We also address a variety of international pricing puzzles, including the purchasing power parity puzzle emphasized by Rogoff, and what we term the exchange-rate disconnect puzzle.' The latter category of riddles includes both the Meese-Rogoff exchange rate forecasting puzzle and the Baxter-Stockman neutrality of exchange rate regime puzzle. Here although many elements need to be added to our extremely simple model, we can still show that trade costs play an essential role.

The paper develops a simple stochastic new open economy macroeconomic model based on sticky nominal wages. Explicit solution of the wage-setting problem under uncertainty allows one to analyze the effects of the monetary regime on welfare, expected output, and the expected terms of trade. Despite the potential interplay between imperfections due to sticky wages and monopoly, the optimal monetary policy rule has a closed-form solution. To motivate our model, we show that observed correlations between terms of trade and exchange rates are more consistent with our traditional assumptions about nominal rigidities than with a popular alternative based on local-currency pricing. © 2000 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved.

This paper reviews the theoretical functions, history, and policy problems raised by the international capital market. The goal is to offer a perspective on both the considerable advantages the market offers and on the genuine hazards it poses, as well as on the avenues through which it constrains national policy choices. A duality of benefits and risks is inescapable in the real world of asymmetric information and imperfect contract enforcement. I argue, however, that in confronting the global capital market there is no reason to depart from conventional economic wisdom. The way to maximize net benefits is to encourage economic integration while attacking concomitant distortions and other unwanted side-effects at, or close to, their sources.

This paper develops a dynamic model of seigniorage in which economies' equilibrium paths reflect the ongoing strategic interaction between an optimizing government and a rational public. The model extends existing positive models of monetary policy and inflation by explicitly incorporating the intertemporal linkages among budget deficits, debt, and inflation. A central finding is that the public's rational responses to government policies may well create incentives for the government to reduce inflation and the public debt over time. A sufficiently myopic government may, however, provoke a rising equilibrium path of inflation and public debt.

This paper discusses the profound difficulties of maintaining fixed exchange rates in a world of expanding global capital markets. Contrary to popular wisdom, industrialized-country monetary authorities easily have the resources to defend exchange parities against virtually any private speculative attack. But if their commitment to use those resources lacks credibility with markets, the costs to the broader economy of defending an exchange-rate peg can be very high. The dynamic interplay between credibility and commitment is illustrated by the 1992 Swedish and British crises and the 1994-95 Mexican collapse. The authors also discuss the small number of successful fixers.