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Intangible assets are a large and growing part of firms’ capital stocks. Intangibles are accumulated via investment—foregoing consumption today for output in the future—but they lack a physical presence. Rather than stopping with this “lack,” we instead focus on the positive properties of intangibles. Specifically, intangibles must be stored, so characteristics of the storage medium have important implications for their value and use. These properties include non-rivalry, allowing the intangible to be used simultaneously in different production streams, and limited excludability, which prevents the firm from capturing all the benefits or rents from the intangible. We develop these ideas in a simple way to illustrate how outcomes such as scalability and distribution of ownership follow. We discuss how intangibles can help to understand important trends in macroeconomics and finance, including productivity, factor shares, inequality, investment and valuation, rents and market power, and firm financing.

In recent years, measured TFP growth in the US has declined. We argue that two forces contributed to this decline: the mismeasurement of intangible capital, and rising markups. Markups affect input shares, while intangibles omitted from measures of investment affect measured capital growth, each potentially generating downward bias in measured TFP growth. Most importantly, when both forces are simultaneously present, their effects reinforce each other and amplify the downward bias in measured TFP growth. Using input-output data, we estimate that this mechanism could account for one-third to two-thirds of the decline in measured TFP growth.

Increasing investment is often recommended as a prescription for increasing productivity, stoking demand, and addressing other causes of low growth or prospective crises in the U.S. economy. Yet an examination of investment suggests that it is not poised to fill this role. Private sector investment has undergone a slow transformation, shifting from structures and equipment investment, with the latter enjoying a long trend of falling prices, to a rising role for intellectual property, software, and other intangible capital. The high depreciation rate associated with this new capital imposes a drag on net investment and hence on capital accumulation. Public investment remains mostly focused on infrastructure but has fallen in half as a share of GDP since its peak in the 1950s. These trends emphasize the potential importance of new types of private capital and their implications for growth, as well as the declining role of public investment, including federal R&D.

Emi Nakamura is the 2019 recipient of the John Bates Clark Medal from the American Economic Association. Emi is an empirical macroeconomist whose work has studied the nature of price-setting and the effects of monetary and fiscal policies, among other issues, and has been notable for using less aggregated data, while addressing central questions about the macroeconomy. We describe Emi's key research contributions, with particular emphasis on those identified by the Honors and Awards Committee of the American Economic Association in her Clark Medal citation, as well as her broader contributions to the field of economics.

As the cost of education rises and student debt reaches new highs, more research has focused on financing the acquisition of human capital. Most research has had a positive focus, examining the effect of debt on student choices and outcomes. However, because education financing involves many public policy choices, normative questions have become more prominent. We discuss the trade-offs involved in these choices and propose simple models to help shape these questions. We first develop an overlapping generations framework of student debt to examine the macroeconomic impact of shifting from a parent-funded to a student debt–based financing system. We then consider a framework that includes the supply-side response to different funding regimes; that is, how do enrollment and tuition decisions of schools respond to changes in education financing? We show that shifting from parent-based funding to a student loan program can lower aggregate savings, although welfare still improves if education has a higher return than physical capital investment. A public student loan program also tends to promote enrollment at the cost of higher tuition at for-profit schools and deteriorating loan performance, paid for by taxpayers. Alternative contract designs, with school participation in the lending program, tend to ameliorate these issues.

Consumption, income, and home prices fell simultaneously during the financial crisis, compounding recessionary conditions with liquidity constraints and mortgage distress. We develop a framework to guide government policy in response to crises in cases when government may intervene to support distressed mortgages. Our results emphasize three aspects of efficient mortgage modifications. First, when households are constrained in their borrowing, government resources should support household liquidity up-front. This implies modifying loans to reduce payments during the crisis rather than reducing payments over the life of the mortgage contract, such as via debt reduction. Second, while governments will not find it efficient to directly write down the debt of borrowers, in many cases it will be in the best interest of lenders to do so, because reducing debt is an effective way to reduce strategic default. Moreover, the lenders who bear the credit default risk have a direct incentive to partially write down debt and avoid a full loan loss due to default. Finally, a well-designed mortgage contract should take these considerations into account, reducing payments during recessions and reducing debt when home prices fall. We propose an automatic stabilizer mortgage contract which does both by converting mortgages into lower-rate adjustable-rate mortgages when interest rates fall during a downturn—reducing payments and lowering the present value of borrowers’ debt.

The best predictor of current investment at the firm level is lagged investment. This lagged-investment effect is empirically more important than the cash-flow and Q effects combined. We show that the specification of investment adjustment costs proposed by Christiano et al. (2005) predicts the presence of a lagged-investment effect and that a generalized version of their model is consistent with the behavior of firm-level data from Compustat.

We derive a closed-form solution for Tobin's Q in a stochastic dynamic framework. We show analytically that investment is positively related to Tobin's Q and cash flow, even in the absence of adjustment costs or financing frictions. Both Q and investment move in the same direction as expected revenue growth, so changes in expected revenue growth induce Q and investment to comove positively. Similarly, shocks to current cash flow, arising from shocks to the user cost of capital in our model, cause investment and cash flow per unit of capital to comove positively. Furthermore, we show that this alternative mechanism for the relationship among investment, Q, and cash flow delivers larger cash flow effects for smaller- and faster-growing firms, as observed in the data. Moreover, the empirically small sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q does not imply implausibly large adjustment costs in our model (since there are no adjustment costs). Calibrating the model generates values of Q similar to those in the data; investment is more sensitive to cash flow than it is to Q, and both responses are of empirically plausible magnitudes. Copyright 2011, Oxford University Press.

Heterogeneity is ubiquitous in firm-level and sectoral data. Equilibrium models, how-ever, typically assume a representative firm, as in Andrew B. Abel and Olivier J. Blanchard (1983). The representative firm paradigm leaves no role for the distribution of capital. We model capital reallocation in a general equilibrium model with two sectors. Capital adjustment costs capture illiquidity in our model, similar to Hirofumi Uzawa’s (1969) capital installation technology. We follow Fumio Hayashi (1982) in assuming that the production technology is linearly homogeneous, which allows us to focus on the sectoral distribution of capital, separately from the level of total capital. The two sectors may have different levels of productivity, and we show that the distribution of capital between the two sectors is the single state variable gov-erning investment, growth, and valuation in the economy.We analytically characterize prices and quan-tities, including investment, growth, the interest rate, and the price of capital (Tobin’s

�Inattentive agents update their information sporadically, and thus respond belatedly to news. We generate optimally inattentive behavior by assuming that to observe the value of his investment portfolio the consumer must pay a cost that is proportional to the portfolio’s contempo raneous value. It is optimal for the consumer to check his investment portfolio at equally spaced points in time, consuming from a riskless trans actions account in the interim. The riskless transactions account that finances consump tion guarantees that funds are never unwittingly exhausted. � We show that the optimal interval of time between consecutive observations of the value of the portfolio is the unique positive solution to a nonlinear equation. Quantitatively, even a small observation cost (one basis point of wealth) implies a substantial (eight-month) decision interval under conventional parameter values.

When investment decisions cannot be reversed and returns to capital are uncertain, the firm faces a higher user cost of capital than if it could reverse its decisions. This higher user cost tends to reduce the firm's capital stock. Opposing this effect is the irreversibility constraint itself: when the constraint binds, the firm would like to sell capital but cannot. This effect tends to increase the firm's capital stock. We show that a firm with irreversible investment may have a higher or a lower expected capital stock, even in the long run, compared to an otherwise identical firm with reversible investment. Furthermore, an increase in uncertainty can either increase or decrease the expected long-run capital stock under irreversibility relative to that under reversibility. However, changes in the expected growth rate of demand, the interest rate, the capital share in output, and the price elasticity of demand all have unambiguous effects.

We characterize a firm's optimal factor adjustment when any number of factors face “kinked” linear adjustment costs so that all factor accumulation is costly to reverse. We first consider a general non-stationary case with a concave operating profit function, unrestricted form of uncertainty and a horizon of arbitrary length. We show that the optimal investment strategy follows a control limit policy at each point in time. The state space of the firm's problem is partitioned into various domains, including a continuation region where no adjustment should optimally be made to factor levels. We then consider two specific model classes and exploit their special structure to derive expressions for their continuation regions.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D92, E22, E24.

This paper derives closed-form solutions for the investment and value of a competitive firm with a constant-returns-to-scale production function and convex costs of adjustment. Solutions are derived for the case of irreversible investment as well as for reversible investment. Optimal investment is a non-decreasing function of q, the shadow value of capital. Relative to the case of reversible investment, the

Investment is characterized by costly reversibility when a firm can purchase capital at a given price and sell capital at a lower price. We derive an explicit analytic solution for optimal investment by a firm facing costly reversibility. In addition, we derive a local approximation to the solution which highlights the effects of the parameters of the problem on the triggers for investment. More generally, we extend the Jorgensonian concept of the user cost of capital to the case of uncertainty and define cU and cL as the user costs of capital associated with the purchase and sale of capital, respectively. Optimality requires the" firm to purchase and sell capital as needed to keep the marginal revenue product of capital in" the closed interval [cU,cL]. This prescription encompasses the case of irreversible investment as well as the standard" neoclassical case of costlessly reversible investment. Finally, quantitative analysis suggests" that even when the difference between the purchase and sale prices of capital is small user costs associated with purchasing and selling capital are closer to those applicable under" complete irreversibility than to those applicable under costless reversibility."

Capital investment decisions must recognize the limitations on the firm's ability later to sell off or expand capacity. This paper shows how opportunities for future expansion or contraction can be valued as options, how this valuation relates to the q-theory of investment, and how these options affect the incentive to invest. Generally, the option to expand reduces the incentive to invest, while the option to disinvest raises it. We show how these options interact to determine the effect of uncertainty on investment, how these option values change in response to shifts of the distribution of future profitability, and how the q-theory and option pricing approaches to investment are related.

This paper tests an optimal (S, s) rule in household durable purchases and examines directly the resulting aggregate expenditure dynamics. The observed decision rule responds to income uncertainty and growth as predicted by an (S, s) model resulting from transactions costs. Tests against liquidity constraints find that about half the households purchase according to an optimal (S, s) rule. Aggregating the (S, s) rule over households produces a cross-section distribution of durables holdings. The empirical distribution is similar to that predicted theoretically, as is its response to aggregate shocks. Furthermore, simulations of aggregate expenditure based on the household distribution exhibit dynamics consistent with those observed in the 1980s. Copyright 1994 by University of Chicago Press.

Recurrent intervals of inattention to the stock market are optimal if consumers incur a utility cost to observe asset values. When consumers observe the value of their wealth, they decide whether to transfer funds between a transactions account from which consumption must be financed and an investment portfolio of equity and riskless bonds. Transfers of funds are subject to a transactions cost that reduces wealth and consists of two components: one is proportional to the amount of assets transferred, and the other is a fixed resource cost. Because it is costly to transfer funds, the consumer may choose not to transfer any funds on a particular observation date. In general, the optimal adjustment rule---including the size and direction of transfers, and the time of the next observation---is state-dependent. Surprisingly, unless the fixed resource cost of transferring funds is large, the consumer's optimal behavior eventually evolves to a situation with a purely time-dependent rule with a constant interval of time between observations. This interval of time can be substantial even for tiny observation costs. When this situation is attained, the standard consumption Euler equation holds between observation dates if the consumer is sufficiently risk averse.

We develop a model in which the opportunity for a firm to upgrade its technology to the frontier (at a cost) leads to growth options in the firm's value; that is, a firm's value is the sum of value generated by its current technology plus the value of the option to upgrade. Variation in the technological frontier leads to variation in firm value that is unrelated to current cash flow and investment, though variation in firm value anticipates future upgrades and investment. We simulate this model and show that, consistent with the empirical literature, in situations in which growth options are important, regressions of investment on Tobin's Q and cash flow yield small positive coefficients on Q and larger coefficients on cash flow. We also show that growth options increase the volatility of firm value relative to the volatility of cash flow.