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This study examines the impact of SEC enforcement actions on the turnovers of culpable CEOs and CFOs named in the enforcement actions, following their violations of the SOX provisions. We compare the impact on CEO turnover with that on CFO turnover. The impact in the pre-SOX period and that in the post-SOX period are also compared. Findings of this study provide evidence that the SEC enforcement actions are associated with the probabilities of turnovers of CEOs and CFOs named in the SEC enforcement actions for violations of SOX 303 and SOX 305. Specifically, CEOs sanctioned by the SEC are likely to lose their positions when they violate SOX 305. In contrast, CFOs sanctioned by the SEC for violating SOX 303 are likely to be forced to resign. When CFOs are named as mastermind by the SEC, they are likely to lose jobs. However, when both CEO and CFO are named as masterminds in fraudulent financial reporting, CFOs are less likely to be removed. In addition, CEOs and CFOs are likely to lose their jobs when firms face bankruptcy and restate earnings and when they face criminal charges, especially in the post-SOX period.

This study examines whether firms that primarily use stock of their companies to pay for acquisitions manipulate real activities in the year preceding the merger announcement to inflate earnings. Using post-SOX data of mergers and acquisitions completed between 2003 and 2013, the findings of this study show that acquiring firms in stock-for-stock mergers inflate earnings by cutting discretionary expenses, manipulating sales to increase revenue, and overproducing goods to reduce the cost of goods sold.

This study investigates how the stock market reacts to the publications of the Wall Street Journal's “Inside Track” columns in two distinct time periods, 1988 to 1993 and 2002 to 2004. It first examines the stock return behavior during the trading period, the filing period, and the publication day for firms appeared in the Inside Track columns in the period of 1988 to 1993 and then provides a validity test with a sample from 2002 to 2004. The evidence indicates that the market tends to under-react to the insider trading information and insiders tend to be information-motivated traders. The significant filing period returns along with significant publication period returns are consistent with the gradual price adjustment argument. The study also finds that market reactions to the publications are significantly related to insider trading when the trades involve the board chairman.

Recent scandals at Enron, WorldCom and Global Crossing have put the ethical spotlight on corporate malfeasance as never before. However, these are the situations in which management knew that they made the wrong choice. As professor Joseph Badaracco of Harvard Business School points out, the real ethical dilemmas arise when people must choose between right and right — where both choices can be justified, yet one must be chosen over the other. Whether or not to reprice stock options represents one such ethical dilemma. Repricing can help exodus of talented employees and motivate them to improve firm performance. However, it alienates shareholders and other workers of the company who are left unprotected from the adverse economic consequences of a stock price decline. In this paper we examine the ethics and the economics of stock option repricing. We find that repricing runs counter to two key tenets of business ethics — distributive justice and ordinary decency. To examine the economics of repricing, we draw upon agency theory to identify situations where repricing has the potential to benefit shareholders. However, a survey of empirical research reveals that these benefits do not translate into reality. Repricing does not improve employee retention or firm performance. In addition, managers benefit by opportunistically timing the repricing. Due to weaknesses in corporate governance such as lack of independence and conflicts of interest, the current repricing practice seems to be at odds with the objective of shareholder wealth maximization, and at a more fundamental level, a violation of board's fiduciary duty to shareholders. We offer suggestions that mitigate the ethically undesirable effects of repricing in the wider context of prevailing corporate governance and regulatory environment. We believe that these suggestions, if properly implemented, can transform repricing from a greed-inspired evil to a valuable compensation tool to retain employees, boost their morale, and enhance stockholder wealth.

This study examines how political risk events affect the value of foreign investing firms. A unique event, the Tiananmen Square Incident, is selected to examine this issue because we believe this incident exacerbated the political risk of doing business in China. We examine the impact of the incident on the stock returns of U.S. firms with joint ventures in China. The results show that this incident indeed had a significant impact on U.S. firms with joint ventures in China, and the market had reacted to this event in an efficient manner. The results also indicate that the impact of this incident on U.S. firms was relatively small in magnitude. Further, the sharp increase of joint ventures after the incident and the significant results in high-risk group vs. the insignificant results in low-risk group provide evidence suggesting that the effect of this incident was temporary rather than long-term and regional rather than national.

Finance ethics have drawn increasing attention from both government regulators and academic researchers. This paper addresses the issue of insider trading ethics. Previous studies on insider trading ethics have failed to provide convincing arguments and consistent results. In particular, the arguments against insider trading are based primarily on moral and philosophical grounds and lack empirical rigor. This study intends to establish and examine the relationship between the ethical issue and economic issue of insider trading. We argue that the ethics of insider trading is in essence an economic rather than a moral issue. It is so far not clear to what extent insider trading may increase or decrease shareholders wealth. Until then, we must take care to avoid over-regulating insider trading.

The findings of this study indicate that although the overall announcement effect of equity offerings is negative on the issuing firms' common stock prices, 23 percent of the sample firms have a positive two-day announcement period stock abnormal return (CAR). Further tests show that firms in the positive CAR group have significantly higher research and development (R&D) and profitability than firms in the negative CAR group, while the average leverage ratio of firms in the positive CAR group are significantly lower. Results of the regression analysis suggest a positive relation between the price effect and R&D as well as the profitability ratio. It also is found that only in the sample of large R&D firms is the magnitude of R&D significantly associated with the magnitude of announcement effect.

Announcing a layoff decision could trigger either an increase or decrease in firm value, depending upon whether adverse market conditions or efficiency improvement are motivating it. Layoff announcements often contain information that indicates the motivation. This article finds that the layoff announcement is a useful signal for investors. There are significantly positive (negative) abnormal stock returns around the announcement date for firms that cite efficiency improvements (demand declines) as the reason for the layoffs.