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A self-review of Teoria della classe disagiata (Minimum Fax, 2017)

A self-review of Teoria della classe disagiata (Minimum Fax, 2017) Main Content

This article conducts groundwork for a discussion of Marx's influence through examining the boundaries of the specifically Marxian school of economics. This Marxian school extends well beyond the bounds of the self-identified Marxian school. Marx's influence, Marxian themes and effectively Marxian theory can be found in several important heterodox traditions of economics, though this is often unacknowledged. A consideration of the proper boundaries of the Marxian school of economics is essential for a full understanding of Marx's legacy and could contribute to the emergence of a more unified heterodoxy in economics. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

In this article, I provide a detailed examination of Thorstein Veblen’s conception of instincts, what he believed were the “prime movers in human behavior.” I outline the meaning of his division of instincts into simple and complex forms, and also document his account of their operational function and evolutionary origins. I then evaluate this understanding in relation to the new field of evolutionary psychology, and demonstrate how Veblen conceived of these instincts as interacting with habits and institutions. Finally, I illustrate one method of how the bio-cognitive level of behavioral reality could be integrated with the socio-institutional level of behavioral reality, and how an intermediate-interactive level between these two could have been generated. By doing so, I emphasize the need for scientifically accurate cognitive foundations to evolutionary-institutional economics (EIE) [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The question I pose in this article is just why, from its egalitarian foundations, inequality first arose. There is good information regarding how inequality has been defended over the millennia, but no answer as to why, from an egalitarian ideological foundation, some began to assert a superior position, while others — the vast majority, in fact — accepted this. In this historic process that leads to the current period, it appears that those asserting a superior position are of an “honorable” nature. That is, they tend to be mass murderers, fundamentally dishonest, hypocrites, and generally anti-social. Just why is this? Why are these “honorable men” of the Brutus type at the top of the social hierarchy? While Thorstein Veblen and Karl Marx have developed cogent analyses of inequality itself, neither has explained the origins of inequality in its break and separation from the original state of equality. I propose that this is a task for institutionalists, basing their argument on Veblen’s understanding of “institutions.” [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

A review of the book by Erik S. Reinert & Francesca Lidia Viano (eds.), Thorstein Veblen. Economics for an Age of Crises. (London: Anthem, 2012)

It has been suggested that economics could benefit greatly from recent developments in evolutionary game theory. In fact, key authors in the study of the role of ethical norms in economic behavior like Amartya Sen argue that evolutionary game theory could contribute much to the study of social norms and behavior. Others have suggested that evolutionary game theory could be most helpful for formalizing the work of classic authors in evolutionary and institutional economics like Thorstein Veblen. Here I discuss the behavioral assumptions of evolutionary game theory models, and Jörgen Weibull’s approach in particular. I will argue that Weibull’s models, and evolutionary game theory in general, pose overly strong restrictions on the explanation of human behavior, which limit the potential of evolutionary explanation. I also suggest Tony Lawson’s population-variety-reproduction-selection (PVRS) model as an alternative evolutionary framework that can successfully accommodate developments in behavioral economics, while also providing a solution to important critiques of Darwinian evolutionary analysis made by Richard Nelson, among others. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Brazil’s political-economic structure has rapidly evolved over the past decade, shedding its shallow policy alignment with neoliberalism of the 1990s. Brazil’s large, diversified industrial base was painfully constructed over the course of the twentieth century. A major and sustained political realignment, which began in 2003, has resulted in two essential thrusts in development policy: (i) a “growth with equity” strategy that has dramatically reduced poverty and inequality; and (ii) a state-led “industrial policy” designed to upgrade manufacturing and direct the accumulation process toward specific sectors, highlighting and consolidating the National Innovation System (NIS). Nonetheless, as a result of the commodity boom that swept through Latin America, Brazil’s natural resource sector achieved outsized growth from 2002 to 2012. One result has been a shift toward resource intensive activities and a broad opening to low-cost Chinese manufactures. Utilizing an institutionalist framework and method, this article analyzes the cohesion of the NIS and the emergence of the “deindustrialization” debate. Also, it assesses the instrumental nature of the “growth with equity” strategy. The article hypothesizes the viability of an endogenous “neo-developmentalist” strategy, while acknowledging the emergence of fundamental exogenous forces and structural ceremonial/institutional factors that have impeded the consolidation of a Brazilian social structure of accumulation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Thorstein Veblen’s work undoubtedly has a place within the field of institutional economics but he has been a relatively marginal figure within the discipline of sociology. If Veblen is discussed at all within contemporary sociology, it is almost without exception in relation to his first major work The Theory of the Leisure Class and his principal contribution to our understanding of modern social life is considered to flow from observations on consumer conduct and associated practices and predispositions. While The Theory of the Leisure Class is a significant work, it by no means exhausts the contemporary relevance of Veblen’s oeuvre. It is argued in this article that in a series of subsequent interconnected studies which embed economic matters in their social and political context, Veblen proceeded to develop a powerful critical analysis of business enterprise and pecuniary culture, one that bears comparison with aspects of Karl Marx’s work. Veblen’s early twentieth-century critical political economy, his references to social and economic dilemmas and tensions as well as his identification of the potential scope for change or ‘reconstruction’ arising from substantial conflicts of interest between ‘the established order of business’ preoccupied with maximising profit and ‘the underlying population who work for a living’ are of considerable contemporary significance, as is his recognition that what is good for business is not good without reservation, not necessarily good for the community or ‘the common man’. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

From the late eighteenth century, economics revolved largely around the market. At the end of the nineteenth century, the everyday activities of developing corporations modified the usual field of economic investigations. However, economists were slow off the mark and seemed reluctant to give a proper place to this new player in their theoretical schemes. In particular, they had difficulties to grasp the managerial nature of the firm. Thorstein Veblen and John Commons offered the first comprehensive history of the modern business company. Little interested in the anatomy of the corporate leviathan, they rather analysed its double-sided spirit, both pecuniary and industrial. By doing so, they cast important thoughts on the business firm as an institution to be taken into account by economists. Yet, they failed to shift economic theory from its prevailing market orientation and to acknowledge the growing effects of the managerial rationality within the economic realm. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Thorstein Veblen asked in 1898 why economics is not an evolutionary science; he also proposed a Darwinian paradigm shift for economics. Among the implications reviewed here was his claim that Darwinian principles applied to social entities as well as to biological phenomena. It is also argued that economists have additional reasons for taking Darwinian evolution seriously. Recent work on the evolution of altruism, cooperation and morality show that we are on the brink of developing an evolutionary-grounded theory of human motivation that breaks from the selfish utility-maximizer lambasted by Veblen. This new theory accepts a biological as well as a cultural foundation for moral dispositions. As noted here, the neglected British institutional economist John A. Hobson - who was an acquaintance of Veblen - foreshadowed this approach. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines how the general systems theory informs institutionalism, a strand of heterodox economic theory founded by Thorstein Veblen that is marked by a critical attitude towards the operation of real-world markets. Focusing on Laszlo's systems philosophy and Bogdanov's Tektology, the paper shows that the general systems theory supports the institutionalist critique of the market but is more explicit about the significance of the market in ensuring the material self-provisioning aspect of society. In line with the institutionalist critique, both Bogdanov and Laszlo share the concern that the market may not deliver the appropriate level of systemic integration within society, nor between society and the encompassing nature. However, both Bogdanov and Laszlo are shown to moderate the institutionalist critique by emphasizing the market's stabilizing and protective role, which is needed to safeguard the maintenance of social and technological complexity. Copyright © 2011 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Corporatism in the academy continues to invite controversy just as it did nearly a century ago. Thorstein Veblen articulated many of the early concerns in Higher Learning in America ([1918] 1965). Many current commentaries on the subject echo Veblen's sentiments but appear to be oblivious of his tremendous intellectual legacy. This sad state of affairs may be a product of the severe reaction of early critics to Higher Learning followed by years of scholarly indifference. Nevertheless, the modern critiques of corporatism in the academy attest to the remarkable prescience of Veblen and his unique evolutionary perspective. Furthermore, critical opinion to the contrary, Higher Learning lacks neither logical consistency nor methodological integrity. Instead, Veblen's thoughts on the limits of pragmatic utilitarianism offer valuable insight into the ongoing controversy surrounding corporatism and higher learning. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper explores Veblen's analysis of technological change. I claim that, rather than succumbing to the traditional criticisms, his approach founders due to his failure to fully articulate a social ontology. Whilst Veblen's analysis of his own time remains in many ways compelling, this failure creates a gap between meta-theoretical promise and current theoretical results. I show how work in the social studies of technology has successfully avoided the ontological problems associated with Veblenian economics. This success is tempered by the fact that the field has not yet provided an appropriate framework to systematise the ways in which technical innovations transform social relations in ways that are beyond conscious control and manipulation. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Each major work of Veblen is a theoretical step taken further towards the solution of the problem already posed in The Theory of the Leisure Class: the continuity of the habit of invidious comparison that renders humans self-centric agents. Veblen, by juxtaposing "engineers" to the pecuniary class, sought to illustrate a contingency for the negation of invidious comparison, which may eradicate the legitimacy of business ideology and its reckless and futile end of accumulation of personal wealth. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article presents some pacifist ideas developed in various economists' works since the origins of economic thought. The Classicals considered international peace to be a normal result (as well as a necessary condition) of economic development and human progress. Such a conception is also shared by other schools of thought, such as Utopian socialism or institutionalism. Some economists were active in the development of the pacifist movement before the First World War, which led to the organization of several international Peace Congresses. During the Cold War, certain economic studies on military expenditure and the arms race contributed to the denunciation of an excessive militarism. However, the post-Cold War disarmament highlighted the costs of the necessary peace investment. There is a substantial research agenda and a need for more academic economists to undertake analytical and empirical work in this important field. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

With a predilection for market solutions, neoliberalism upholds that the individual is generally the best judge of his or her interests. Yet markets are never universally applied as a mechanism of allocation and there are reasons, in principle, why capitalism will always have “missing markets.” Concentrating on the application and appropriateness of neoliberal theory to the workplace, this article argues that firms are not markets, despite some tendencies in modern theory to conflate the two. The employment contract is a key characteristic of modern firms, but neoliberal theory is often silent on the distinction between an employment contract and a contract for services, and largely ignores the asymmetrical rights of authority within contracts of employment. Furthermore, the social nature of knowledge represents a challenge to neoliberal theory and policy, because it sometimes makes it more difficult to define individual property rights. Accordingly, with the growth of the knowledge economy, neoliberalism to some extent is an anachronism. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper develops a two-tier concept of rationality which broadens the orthodox notion of instrumental rationality in economics. In the first section, I conceive the idea of "background rationality" to consist in the ability to act normally, i.e., according to social conventions appropriate to the context. Background rationality is a necessary condition for the exercise of its instrumental counterpart. Implications and applications of this for economic phenomena are investigated in Section II. The third section draws parallels between the approach to rationality developed in this paper and Thorstein Veblen's notion "habits of thought". I argue that a viable concept of rationality must itself be subject to explanatory scrutiny and justification and not merely posited as given. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

A century ago Thorstein Veblen argued that knowledge, which is produced and possessed by the community as a whole, is the foundation on which the productivity of "capital" rests. Orthodox economists chose to ignore Veblen and instead accepted John Bates Clark's definition of capital and the marginal productivity theory that goes with it. Recently, however, mainstream economists working on the "New Growth Theory" have rejected Clark's approach and have redefined capital so as to emphasize the importance of knowledge as well as its social character. Nevertheless, they still have an important lesson to learn from Veblen about growth, namely that technological development is nothing less than a process of cultural transformation. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Existing theories of capital, neo-classical as well as Marxist, are anchored in the material sphere of production and consumption. This article offers a new analytical framework for capital as a crystallization of power. The relative nature of power requires accumulation to be measured in differential, not absolute, terms. For absentee owners, the main goal is not to maximize profits, but rather to 'beat the average' and exceed the 'normal rate of return'. The theoretical framework builds on Thorstein Veblen's separation of industry from business and on Lewis Mumford's dichotomy between democratic and authoritarian techniques. Extending their contributions, we argue that capital is a business, not an industrial category, a human mega-machine rather than a material artefact. Indeed, it is the social essence of capital which makes accumulation possible in the first place. Capital measures the present value of future business earnings, and these depend not on the productivity of industry as such, but on the ability of absentee owners strategically to limit such productivity to their own differential ends. Introducing the twin concepts of the 'differential power of capital' ( DPK ) and the rate of 'differential accumulation' ( DA ), we examine the non-linear and possibly negative link between industrial growth and accumulation in the USA. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]