Search

This article recounts China’s renminbi (RMB) internationalization experiences since the 2009 RMB cross-border trade settlement initiative. In the first few years, the RMB made inroads into global financial markets and had a few remarkable accomplishments, including the Special Drawing Right currency status. Since the 2015 market turmoil, RMB internationalization has levelled off – possibly due to changes in both domestic and geopolitical conditions. The RMB is currently under-represented in the global market. China’s deliberate and schematic policies will elevate the RMB’s global stature in a gradual manner but there will not be a leapfrogging in the near term

China has long been the world's second largest economy, with the largest foreign exchange reserves and the second largest share in world trade. However, its position in the global economy has long been recognized, but this recognition has not been accompanied by the international monetary significance of the yuan. Despite China's economic significance, the political importance and the voting power in the International Monetary Fund (IMF) cannot be compared to that of the U.S. because the U.S. has over 17% of the votes, whereas China has 3.8 %. Owing to that, the U.S., together with its allies, gets to block decisions and tailor global economic policy. Striving to establish the world's reserve currency, China has been leading comprehensive economic and trade policies while strengthening the yuan convertibility. As a result, effective October 1, 2016, the yuan has become a reserve currency in the basket of special drawing rights along with the dollar, the euro, the yen, and the British pound. China has been supporting the IMF reform while establishing new institutions aimed at redefining the current international policy under the strong influence of the U.S. The paper analyses the channels of Chinese authorities' actions and the prospect of recomposing the international monetary system and reducing the global U.S. influence, with the aim of identifying whether it is likely that the Chinese currency will obtain the status of the world currency.

Triangular arbitrage in the foreign exchange market of a group of countries exists whenever it is possible to make profit by buying and selling their currencies using the spot exchange rates. Working in the framework of the Aitchison geometry, and using characterizations of the absence of triangular arbitrage, we present two applications to the currencies of Brazil (Real), the European Union (Euro), Great Britain (Pound Sterling), and the United States of America (US Dollar). The first application refers to the Special Drawing Rights, an asset created by the International Monetary Fund to provide liquidity to the member countries. The exchange rates matrix is projected onto the subspace of no-arbitrage exchange rate matrices, and its only eigenvector, associated with a non-null eigenvalue, is demonstrated to be compositional and close to the Special Drawing Rights. The second application studies the relative exchange rate bubbles among the countries. It uses the closest no-arbitrage matrix of an exchange rate matrix and the purchasing power parity values for the fundamental exchange rates to analyze the dynamics of those bubbles. These applications show the potential the compositional approach has for the matrices of exchange rates.

This chapter considers how a strengthened IMF could play a more central role in the international monetary system by reforms in its financial and operational responsibilities. The chapter examines, in particular, the changes that could be made to allow the IMF’s global reserve asset (SDRs or Special Drawing Rights) to become over time the principal reserve asset of the international monetary system, as intended when the Bretton Woods Agreement was revised in 1978. The chapter notes that this kind of reform would require strong agreement among the major shareholders in the Fund to overcome likely resistance on the part of the United States.

Since the foreign reserve is endogenously determined by each country, its identification is challenging. To overcome this difficulty, we utilize the special drawing rights (SDR) allocation of USD 650 billion by the International Monetary Fund to combat the coronavirus disease pandemic. Given the stylized fact that a sudden stop is likely to depreciate foreign exchange in a very short period, it is natural to expect the SDR allocation to mitigate the risk of devaluation, especially for emerging countries, which typically face a liquidity constraint. According to our empirical results, the increase in foreign reserves by the SDR allocation appreciates the exchange rate among emerging countries while depreciating foreign generally.

The Frankel-Wei regression framework measures the comovements between currencies, and assumes that all foreign exchange rates share a common numeraire. The International Monetary Fund's (IMF) Special Drawing Right (SDR) is a regular choice for the common numeraire. However, the five-currency basket of the SDR lacks diversification, which results in significant positive comovements between the basket currencies and the SDR currency basket. Consequently, the estimator of the regression coefficient is biased away from its true value. We suggest that the common numeraire be a large well-diversified currency basket, rather than a small undiversified currency basket, such as the five-currency SDR.

The stock of Target balances is recorded in the national accounting systems in the same way as international fiscal credit. A country’s Target claim is part of its net foreign asset position, and the increase of this claim is recorded as a public capital export. Intra-Eurosystem interest on Target balances is booked in the country’s current account in the same way as ordinary international interest payments. Target balances resemble not only the ISA balances of the US Federal Reserve System but also the special drawing rights of the IMF, Keynes’ bancor currency, Soviet transfer rubles, stocks of foreign currency in fixed exchange rate systems and the sovereign wealth portfolio accumulated by the Central Bank of Switzerland.

This article examines China’s participation in the trade, monetary and development assistance fields and concludes that China’s rise does not undermine the centrality of the Bretton Woods institutions or Word Trade Organization (WTO) in global economic governance. Whereas China’s participation in the WTO presents some challenges to the long dominance of the United States and the European Union, it reaffirms the central role of the WTO. China’s monetary strategy also indicates the continuing importance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in the international monetary regime. Whereas the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) introduces some competition to the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB), China’s efforts in establishing new multilateral development banks are mainly driven by its frustration with stalled reforms of the Bretton Woods institutions. By and large, China’s economic emergence does not challenge, but reaffirms, the post-World War II global economic architecture.

This article focuses on the political economy that shaped the Special Drawing Right (SDR) by examining the three drivers of reform that influenced the creation of the SDR and resulted in changes in the international monetary system (IMS) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The three factors examined are, first, informal intergovernmental forums working outside the framework of the IMF; second, the eclipse of the IMF as the central institution of the IMS; and finally, the lack of reference to the private sector in the discussions, even though capital movements were the central cause of strains in the IMS. The article concludes that the resulting limitations of the SDR solution—an institutional change brought about by the compromise between parties to the discussions—meant that major imperfections in the IMS remained unresolved.

We present a general equilibrium model of the world economy where sovereigns face idiosyncratic risks and can default on their debt. In this model, the world interest rate is determined through the global financial market equilibrium, the amount of safe asset is endogenous and determines international risk sharing. Non-trivial multiple equilibria naturally arise, due to the endogeneity of the interest rate. These equilibria can be ranked according to their aggregate welfare, such that equilibria with a higher quantity of safe assets correspond to higher welfare. Due to a shortage in the safe asset supply, even the equilibrium with the highest welfare is not constrained-efficient. Finally, we prove that a world fund issuing a safe asset can reach the constrained-efficient aggregate welfare. With a standard calibration, the size of the fund is found to be around 4.1% of the world GDP. Its relationship with the Special Drawing Rights of the IMF is discussed.

In November 2008 the G20 became the premier forum for international economic and financial affairs. As a result, the international monetary system has come to reflect the transformation of the global economy brought about by China’s emergence as the second largest economy and major exporter, and by the related limits of international governance, especially of the so-called Bretton Woods institutions. This article argues that Zhou Xiaochuan, governor of the People’s Bank of China, started an international debate about the shortfalls of the international monetary system in March 2009, after which China pursued the internationalization of its own currency, the renminbi, to turn it into one of the key international currencies. To this purpose, China has put together a policy framework that facilitates the international use of the renminbi without opening domestic capital markets - a requisite for a fully convertible international currency. This article discusses the renminbi’s trajectory over the last five years and suggests that it has become more regionalized rather than internationalized. It also discusses the challenges that Chinese authorities experience as they try to put the renminbi in the pockets of foreign investors and at the same time maintain control - “managed convertibility” - of capital flows in and out of the domestic market. The article concludes that the decision to include the renminbi in the International Monetary Fund’s basket for its special drawing rights reflects expectations that the international monetary system will shift from a dollar-dominated to a multi-currency system. However, this will take several years; in the meantime, international governance will continue to reflect the influences of the issuers of the key international currencies.

After the 2008 financial crisis, the International Monetary Fund realises that reforms are needed to reduce the reliance on the US dollar as the only international reserve currency. It began to nurture super-sovereign reserve money where SDR (Special Drawing Rights) is the most favourable candidate. Joining SDR will push forward China’s exchange rate reform to meet the standard of a real international reserve currency, which requires more skilful domestic and international policy coordination.

To estimate the currency composition of China’s foreign exchange reserves and assess its effectiveness of management, the constrained least square method and variance sensitive analysis are utilized, respectively. Based on portfolio accounting identities, the change of foreign exchange reserves was decomposed into the net purchase change and the non-purchase change. The newly constructed non-purchase change was used to estimate the latent currency composition. Empirical results show that by the end of 2015Q1, China held about 63.6% of its reserves in the U.S. dollar, 19.6% in the euro, 3.09% in the Japanese yen, 4.89% in the pound sterling, 2.22% in the Canadian dollar, 2.03% in the Australian dollar, and 0.09% in the Swiss franc. Although the currency composition kept relatively stable, more attention had been paid to the emerging international currencies. China decreased the U.S. dollar share during the subprime crisis, while resorted to the portfolio rebalance strategy since 2011. The euro shar...

The objective of this paper is three-fold. First, the monetary and exchange rate regimes of the Asian countries are described and analyzed. The degrees of flexibility in exchange rates and capital controls vary across countries. Some countries have adopted a flexible inflation targeting framework, while others have pursued exchange rate targeting. The paper presents a new result of a tradeoff between price stability and exchange rate stability in the hyperbolic relationship of Asian countries. Second, a framework that analyzes and quantifies the degree of currency internationalization is proposed and applied to the RMB. In every indicator, the RMB’s weight in private-sector international finance has grown in the last several years, both in the private and public sectors. In the settlement role of currency, the RMB is ranked 8th in the BIS survey and 7th in SWIFT usage. This paper exploits data of a recent period when the RMB became de-pegged from the USD and show some of the emerging Asian currencies co-moving with the RMB, more so than the USD. In the official sector, RMB is also increasing its weight. The Chinese central bank has extended the currency-swap agreements with 30-some countries, so that the RMB can be used for trade finance and liquidity assistance. The RMB is adopted as a composition currency of the Special Drawing Rights (SDR), effective in October 2016, with 10.92%, ranking number 3, surpassing the JPY and GBP. Finally, potential impending changes in the Asian monetary and exchange rate regimes in Asia are discussed. Projecting the growth of the Chinese economy into the future, the weight of the RMB in the financial markets will increase globally as well as in Asia.

The impact of currency reserve accumulation is controversially discussed since reserve accumulation potentially destabilises the international financial system and causes crises due to higher systemic risk. The main aim of this paper is to put the macroeconomic role of currency reserve accumulation for four Asian economies under closer scrutiny. The key question is whether accumulating currency reserves is beneficial from a long†run perspective. Based on a vector error correction approach, we start by analysing long†run steady†state relationships between currency reserves, exchange rates against the US dollar, real GDP and interest rates. Our findings show that cumulated currency reserve shocks significantly affect real GDP. A likely explanation for our finding is that accumulation of reserves has supported growth through providing liquidity and supporting the development of the financial sector for the economies under observation.

In the postcrisis period, some foreign policymakers accused the Federal Reserve of engaging in “currency wars” and inadvertently creating “financial spillovers,” arguing that these were especially consequential given the dominant role of the U.S. dollar in international trade and finance. This lecture analyzes these critiques, and argues: (1) little support exists, either theoretical or empirical, for the currency wars claim; (2) the United States and its trading partners should use nonmonetary tools for dealing with spillovers; and (3) the benefits of the dollar standard to the United States and the world are considerably more symmetric than in the Bretton Woods era.

Despite the spread of budget initiatives for gender equality following the Beijing Declaration of 1995, resources allocated for eliminating gender inequalities remain inadequate. This paper proposes to create a Global Fund for Women through Innovative Finance (GFWIF) with the ability to raise funds through innovative sources of finance on a scale more appropriate to the estimated requirements of making reasonable progress toward gender equality (US$31–107 billion per year in constant 2014 dollars). It builds on previous calls by feminist economists for the establishment of such funds through global forms of taxation. Since donors’ commitments only meet the lower bound, the GFWIF could scale up funding for gender equality interventions commensurate with country needs. Global resource mobilization through innovative mechanisms, including allocations of new Special Drawing Rights, currency transaction taxes, and carbon taxes, have the potential to provide the necessary financing at a much faster pace...

In recent years, China become the second largest economy in the world. Therefore, China has an important role in the Asia and Global Economy. China’s rapid economic growth is the reason why Renminbi (China currency) becomes an international currency. On October 2016, Renminbi was recognized by International Monetary Fund (IMF) as an international currency by including it in global reserve currency (Special Drawing Right). Furthermore, Renminbi is in the top 10 traded currencies in the world even in Asia. In global trade, China has trade relation with various country, so it can provide benefit for country that have economic relations with China especially countries in Southeast Asia which is a member of ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA). The purpose of Renminbi Internationalization is to increase China’s economic growth and spillover from China to ASEAN. China’s economic spillover to ASEAN has been growing in the few past years through financial linkage and trade linkage. This paper examines China’s economics spillover to ASEAN-6 (Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Philippines, Indonesia and Laos) before and after Renminbi internationalization through both trade and financial linkage. We use ratio of ASEAN-6’s exports and imports to China to its total exports and imports as a proxy of trade linkage and ASEAN-6’s Stock Price Index as a proxy of financial linkage, while we use claim and share of Renminbi in global foreign exchange reserve as moderator variable to find out whether the Renminbi internationalization can strengthen China’s economic spillover to ASEAN-6 or not. Thus, we use Moderated Regression Analysis and Panel Least Square method in 6 ASEAN countries from 2012:Q1-2018:Q4. The result indicate that Renminbi Internationalization can strengthen China’s economic spillover to ASEAN-6 economies that can be seen through trade linkage with an increase in imports and through financial linkage with an increase in Stock Price Index.

Financial crisis is nothing new in the annals of history of the capitalistic path of economic development; it is a part of the business cycle. The theoretical basis is well entrenched in the concept of ‘Keynesian Cross’. The tale of crisis, dating back centuries, has taken a new turn with the call for more globalization—liberalize trade and open up the financial sector. This has made many nations vulnerable to crises that are likely to be repeated, perhaps frequently. Based on recent experience, warning signs can be read from the dollar-centric exchange rate, the mainstay for the stability of the current global financial system. To a careful observer, fatigue in the system cannot be overlooked.

The analysis of powers and order of monetary issue by the Central Bank of Russia in the system of the relations of the state sovereignty is carried out. Is considered contradictions of independent position of the Central Bank and the Government of the Russian Federation in questions of the state economic policy. Is defined that the fiat monetary system is based only on the authority of the Central bank and government whereas cryptocurrency – on the system of own safety and a way of its generation: blockchain. Is defined that in the independence and activity of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation can not consider “wishes” and plans of the government and Senate of Russia. Positive and negative properties of cryptocurrency in a modern financial system are considered. The cryptocurrency is considered out of communication with a monetary system, but only as subject to financial manipulations. It is necessary to change ideology of monetary issue. Non-cash money, special drawing right and so forth are considered as cryptocurrency prerequisites, but controlled by the currency center. Whereas the sense of cryptocurrency consists in its decentralization. The release of money has to be provided with a national product. The offer on establishment of legal bases of regulation of process of monetary issue is made.

This article examines the geopolitics, legal nuances and monetary policy which inform Carney's proposal. Part I sets out the application of block-chain technology in the context of payment systems, and discusses the geopolitics of Libra and the shift in focus to Central Bank Digital Currencies ('CBDCs'). It suggests that state-backed cryptocurrencies are more likely than their private sector counterparts to fit the role of true digital currencies, at least on a domestic level. Part II explains the legal distinctions between the cryptocurrency models proposed by Facebook and others, and CBDCs. The former fulfils the main functions of money by granting a claim to the holder, whereas the latter does so as an 'object' of monetary policy. A Global Stablecoin ('GSC') such as the SHC does not necessarily fall into either camp, but its success as a global reserve currency may hinge upon the fine details of its legal construction. In Part III, one conception of the SHC, based on the 'claims model' is set out. Whilst the use of block-chain technology is undoubtedly novel, there are significant similarities between this version of the SHC and previously rejected reforms to the 'Special Drawing Rights' (SDR) allocated by the International Monetary Fund ('IMF'). It is argued that the extent of the similarities indicates that the claims model is likely to face the same hurdles which stymied the campaign to develop the SDRs into a global reserve currency. This begs the question, however, of why Carney would propose the SHC if the odds in monetary policy were already so firmly stacked against it. Part IV considers the 'objects model' as applied to a SHC. It tentatively concludes that the features of the objects model which distinguish it from the claims model greatly improve its prospects of success. Specifically, the generation of network effect value, as a substitute for the convertibility value of SDRs, may be the decisive contribution of block-chain technology to a truly international currency. The article concludes that a claims-based SHC would, to a great extent, be an attempt to reinvent SDRs in a digital age, and that the advantages of block-chain technology will be insufficient to surmount well-established US monetary policy. The objects model, whilst more ambitious in some respects, constitutes a radically novel proposal which may, for that reason amongst others, gain global traction.

The Civil Code of Ukraine there are no specific rules governing contractual relationship currency bank account, and existing norms in the national legislation does not reflect the specificity, complexity bank currency relations; regulations that regulate banking operations in foreign currencies, in some cases inconsistent, uncoordinated and even contradictory; In addition, some based on somewhat outdated today philosophical position, affecting the development bank currency civil relations. Problems about the determination of the legal nature of the contract currency bank account, studied and continue to study the eminent jurist scholars, among which highlight G.F. Shershenevich, C.A. Fleyshyts, I.B. Nowicki, M.N. Agarkova, A.S. Ioffe, N.S. Kuznetsov, I.A. Bezkluboho etc. Purpose of the article – the definition of the legal nature of the contract currency bank account, as well as research and analysis of major scientific debate on the subject. Given the inextricable link between the two elements of a bank account without connectivity relations on the account balance on any loan or of storage, believe that the bank account agreement today is an independent civil - legal contract.

Purpose The purpose of this paper is to consider the implicit effect of the underlying foreign currency exposure on the performance characteristics of country exchange traded funds. Design/methodology/approach To arrive at an overall estimation of the exchange-traded fund (ETF)’s tracking error, the mean of the three measures of tracking error was calculated for both the hedged (r_LC) and unhedged (r_NAV) return series. Since tracking error does not capture all the risk inherent in a country index fund, the study extends the analysis using the Sortino and Modified Sharpe ratios. Findings The decision to hedge currency risk should not be taken on the sole basis of historical volatilities. The investor must also factor in transactions costs, the possible roll of futures contracts and prevailing interest rate differentials. If the rate on the foreign currency is greater than the dollar (euro) rate, the investor will pay for the hedge. If the rate on the foreign currency is less than the dollar (euro) rate, the investor will gain on the trade. Given that hedging entails additional costs, in cases where the neutralization of currency volatility only reduces risk modestly, it would be advisable to leave the exchange rate risk unhedged. We propose two metrics for ETF investors deciding whether to hedge a country ETF’s underlying currency risk. Originality/value The results highlight a key finding: while the majority of country funds accurately track the performance of the underlying foreign index when measured in the local currency, returns in the fund currency can be much more volatile. In breaking down the sources of country fund volatility, the paper demonstrates the impact of the underlying currency movements on overall fund risk. In cases where the currency impact has a significant impact on fund tracking errors, an index-oriented investor benefits from neutralizing the exchange rate effect. Additionally, as the Sortino and Modified Sharpe measures suggest that the underlying currency exposure offers in most cases a better risk-adjusted return for country exchange-traded funds (ETFs) in the listing currency, we also calculate the risk minimizing foreign currency exposure for each fund and propose a decision rule based on the net currency variance to decide whether to hedge the ETF’s currency risk. The optimal hedge ratio indicates that US-based investors should only partially hedge the underlying currency risk while European-based investors are better off fully hedging currency risk.

This study examines the determinants of gold demand in central bank's foreign exchange reserves portfolio by using a panel data set of over 100 nations for 1998–2014. I find gold's US dollar and inflation-hedge properties as well as higher exchange rate risk and monetary policy instability to significantly increase central bank's gold holdings while higher economic growth and financial development to reduce such share. Moreover, the recent global financial crisis caused central banks to increase this share. The results imply the rationale for holding gold in central banks’ reserves is actually not different than hedge fund managers or individual investors.

The relationship between major East Asian economies' international reserves and internationalization of their currencies presents a seeming paradox in international finance. While large international reserves may be expected to foster more widespread global use of a currency, strong growth of international reserves has been associated with very low Asian currency internationalization. Using the generalized method of moments (GMM) estimator we show the overall size of the Bank of Japan's international reserves, as well as the ratio of its foreign exchange reserves to international reserves, are negatively related to yen internationalization, while gold reserves and special drawing rights are positively related.

The purpose of the paper is to analyze theoretical and practical aspects of the features of the IFI influence on transformation of national currency systems of such organizations’ member states. Defining features of interaction policy among national economies and IFI in the monetary sphere, considering countries’ socio-economic parameters of development, will allow monetary authorities to achieve the optimum level of development of its economy. Methodology. Theoretical base of the study are the provisions of general scientific theory of knowledge studied phenomena and processes, in particular: methods of induction and deduction (in determining classification criteria of IFIs impact on national currency system), analysis and synthesis (in determining the features and priorities of national currency system), comparisons, associations and analogies (the justification of characteristics of advantages and disadvantages of IFI). The information base for scientific research is scientific papers and publications of domestic and foreign scientists-economists, materials of scientific-practical conferences, legislative and normative documents, the IMF, World Bank and Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank materials. Results. Theoretical approaches to the definition of the national currency system and international financial organizations, including its classification, are proposed. It is proved that the IMF makes active impact on national currency policy formation through regulation and supervision, while the World Bank and AIIB are related in a passive way. The IFI regulation trends are to implement floating exchange regime, liberal currency transactions, cancel currency restrictions in member countries. Although it refers to all countries, some of them with large population, trading, underdeveloped institutions of democracy could avoid some IFI pressure. Practical implications. The study accents attention on the specifics of the IFI activity in terms of changing the currency policy of member countries. Comparison of priorities among national currency policy and IFI recommendations could be applicable for national authorities in performing national currency policy. Value/originality. Despite the existing studies in the field of international monetary policy, there is a gap in theoretical definition of interaction between IFI and national monetary authorities in the field of national currency policy forming at present. This article brings new approaches to the IFI classification and approaches to the definition of IFI characteristics in terms of impact on currency policy of member country.

This article analyses the relationships among the unit of account and means of exchange functions of an international currency, on the one hand, and its store of value in official use, on the other hand. Historical evidence links the currency composition of reserves to currency movements. The currency composition of reserves is strongly related in the cross-section to both currency movements and the currency denomination of trade. Data limitations make it hard to distinguish these two factors. A panel analysis of 5 countries from central and Eastern Europe shows that both trade invoicing and currency movements drive changing official reserve composition. Implications are suggested for the prospects for the renminbi enlarging its current small portion of official foreign exchange reserves.

The paper analyses the official use of international currencies as reserve currency (store of value) and anchor currency (unit of account). Examining the role as a reserve currency we note that the US dollar is the main reserve currency even if it recorded a decline given the decrease of the value of the US dollar reserve holdings and the gradual diversification of the currencies used. Since 2010, the euro's share decreased continuously may be due to the Eurozone crisis and the euro's depreciation against the US dollar. Then we show that the US dollar dominates as an anchor currency, though it was temporary abandoned during crisis time, having more than a regional dimension. At the same time, the use of the euro in exchange rate arrangements appears mainly in the regions that have close links with the euro area. Over the last few years, we have witnessed a gentle orientation towards a multimonetary world, especially regarding the use of the international currencies as reserve currency given the diversification of the currencies in which central banks understand to hold international reserves and the increasing share of the nontraditional currencies in total foreign exchange reserves.

With globalization and financialization, exchange rates could be sensitive to oil price shocks. Due to differences of exchange rate policy, oil-dependence status, and other factors, the responses of exchange rates to oil price shocks could be either similar or heterogeneous. Therefore, in this paper, we integrate a hybrid research framework to investigate the co-movement of responses to oil price shocks of four major exchange rate of currencies included in the Special Drawing Rights basket from January 2000 to September 2018 from a time varying aspect and considering the asymmetric effect of the oil price shocks. The main results are as follows, compared with the general oil price shocks, unexpected oil price shocks could have greater influence on currency markets over time, with the asymmetric effect happening only when extreme market situations and unexpected oil price shocks appear simultaneously; pairwise exchange rates tend to move in either a negatively or a positively similar way, rather than in an unrelated manner; in 50% of the sampled market time, the co-movement situation of exchange rates' response could be captured by specific small numbers of co-movement modes, with the Euro/US dollar (USD) and Great British Pound/USD tending to co-move in more stable manner and having the potential to serve as an early warning of risk, while other pairwise exchange rates are characterized by time varying features.

The implementation by the People’s Republic of China (PRC) of the measures concerning the development of the sphere and the scale of the international use of its national currency provided the inclusion of the yuan since October 2016 together with the US dollar, euro, pound sterling and Japanese yen into the basket of currencies (Special Drawing Rights). In the article on the basis of the theoretical justification of the necessity of creation of all economic, institutional and organizational conditions of the internationalization of a currency factors that allowed achieving the contemporary level of the international use of the Chinese monetary unit as standard of value, unit of account and reserve currency are analyzed. The reasons contributing to the increase of the international status of the yuan in 2010–2015 are characterized. The determinants impeding the future growth of the demand for the national currency of China from the part of non-residents are discovered.

The International Monetary Fund’s decision in 2015 to add the Renminbi to its Special Drawing Rights currency basket has in effect granted the Chinese Yuan the international reserve currency status. This study revisits China’s five exchange rate regimes in 2005-2015 and investigates the relationships among the currencies of the Chinese Yuan, the U.S. Dollar and the Euro. The Log-Periodic Power Law Singularity model is proposed as a generic parameterization to capture the super-exponential behavior in the tetrad of exchange rates of these currency pairs. The transient non-sustainable faster-than-exponential acceleration of the “CNY against USD” from August 2005 to July 2008 suggests the existence of an apparent bubble with an under-valuation. The clustered signals of LPPLS Confidence indicators for the “CNY against USD” from May 2011 to March 2012 suggest the termination of its long-term growth. The signals for the “EUR against USD” and “CNY against EUR” emerging from January 2014 to August 2015 show a tightly coupled relationship among these currency pairs. Moreover, the empirical estimates of the most possible critical time by the standard Ordinary Least Squares method and the Quantile Regression method for the time series of “CNY against USD” tends to be later than that of “CNY against EUR” in the five regimes.

Статья посвящена вопросу появления китайского юаня в корзине специальных прав заимствования Международного валютного фонда. В статье отражены причины включения юаня МВФ в корзину СПЗ, а также последствия, которые могут иметь место в будущем.

A controversy has been triggered by the Chinese exchange rate regime shift from a single currency peg to an alleged basket peg. The controversy is about the specification of the model used to represent the basket as three models have been used: levels, log levels and first log differences. It is suggested that one way to confirm the validity or otherwise of a model is to use data on the special drawing rights exchange rate since the currency weights are known. The results show that the estimated weights are almost identical no matter which model and which numeraire is used. However, nonnested model selection criteria show that the best model is that written in levels, simply because this is what is used in practice by central banks adopting basket pegs.

Since the financial crisis hit in 2007, the US dollar privilege has not only become “exorbitant” but “extortianate.” Countries such as China are no longer willing to allow the USA to exercise this extortionate behavior. The potential geopolitical implications of a US dollar decline are immense. The USA would lose its privileged seigniorage position and with that the ability to achieve permanently higher returns on foreign assets than the returns paid to foreigners who invest in the USA. The global economy is already close to operating with three regional exchange rate anchors: the US dollar; the euro; and, increasingly, the renminbi. Hence, the transition to a tripolar system could occur sooner than many assert. Nevertheless, given the importance of financial deepening and integration in the internationalization of currencies, any shift will still be gradual.

We analyze how the role of different national currencies as international reserves was affected by the shift from fixed to flexible exchange rates. We extend data on the currency composition of foreign reserves backward and forward to investigate whether there was a shift in the determinants of the currency composition of international reserves around the breakdown of Bretton Woods. We find that inertia and policy-credibility effects in international reserve currency choice have become stronger post-Bretton Woods, while network effects appear to have weakened. We show that negative policy interventions designed to discourage international use of a currency have been more effective than positive interventions to encourage its use. These findings speak to the prospects of currencies like the euro and the renminbi seeking to acquire international reserve status and others like the U.S. dollar seeking to preserve it.

Following the global financial crisis (GFC) in 2007, questions have been raised regarding the prospect of the US dollar continuing its dominance as the principal reserve currency. The increased volatility of the US dollar exchange rate and the uncertain sustainability of the US economic growth since that time have created pressure for central banks around the globe to shift their US dollar reserve holdings to other currencies. Amongst the major reserve currencies, the euro has been considered by a number of central banks to be an alternative currency to the US dollar. In light of the above considerations, this paper aims to present an empirical analysis on the different transaction factors that affect the currency composition holding of the reserve currencies held by the central bank of Australia, the Reserve Bank of Australia (RBA).

Advocates of a more pluralistic international monetary and financial system seek to reduce reliance on a single national currency and to bring international liquidity under collective control. One recently revived proposal would transform US dollar official reserves into claims denominated in the IMF's key currency basket, Special Drawing Rights (SDRs). Drawing on new archival evidence and simulations, this article highlights issues that derailed earlier agreement on such an account and shortcomings of design and ambition revealed by subsequent developments. One design issue was account losses if US dollar yields failed to exceed SDR yields enough to offset dollar depreciation. In fact, uncovered interest parity did not hold and could well have left the account persistently insolvent. Another shortcoming was ambition: the proposed account proved simply too small to achieve the desired lowering of the dollar's share of foreign exchange reserves. Any new proposal needs to address these shortcomings.

The OIC intra-trade reached 17% in 2012 and the member countries have committed to increase it to 20% by 2015. The 5 th OIC Consultative Group Meeting on enhancing OIC intra-trade recommended the establishment of Trade Finance Support Schemes, as one of the driving factors, to accelerate the dynamic of the OIC intra-trade. Meanwhile, the United Nations World Economic and Social Survey (2012) considered that issuing new SDRs constitutes one of the solutions for the international community to mobilize additional resources for Development Finance. In this paper, we suggest the creation of Trade-based Special Drawing Rights (T-SDRs) among the OIC member countries to be issued by a dedicated regional financial institution on a regular frequency and according to a special mechanism. We discuss the allocation mechanism and its practical implementation among which the option to assign the role of issuance and clearing house to the Islamic Development Bank.

In this paper we analyzed the effect of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves to economic growth in emerging countries. In order to empirical estimates of the impact of foreign exchange reserves to economic growth in emerging countries, were collected annual data on real GDP per capita, share of investment in GDP and population from the database of the International Monetary Fund (IMF WEO) in October 2013, while data from the level of foreign exchange reserves statistics collected from the relevant central banks. For a balanced panel data for Brazil, China and Russia, for the period from 1993 to 2012, estimated the relationship between economic growth and changes in foreign exchange reserves by applying the method includes the ONK with fixed individual effects. The empirical results in this paper suggest that the increase in foreign exchange reserves causes the growth of GDP, while in the opposite direction causality has not been proven. Exchange rate depreciation that occurs as a result of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves is not inflationary because it is a one-time, non-persistent shock, unlike the sudden depreciation of the exchange rate that occurs as a result of maintaining an overvalued exchange rate in the long term and leads to currency crisis. The accumulation of foreign exchange reserves does not lead to inflation if the rate of accumulation of foreign exchange reserves does not exceed the rate of economic growth. Slightly higher inflation is not necessarily harmful, particularly for developing economics and emerging economics.

The collapse of the international monetary system of Bretton Woods ended the period of common use of unified exchange rate system. Current, so-called non-system, is not providing stability in currency relations, which is mainly due to the high volatility of exchange rates. Implementing changes is inevitable. While the unification of exchange rates on an international scale appears to be currently impossible, alike the return to the gold standard, noteworthy is the idea of implementing a global currency, which would be an effective replacement for the US dollar as an international currency. SDRs, based on the rearranged currency basket that include the currencies of developing countries, could successfully play the role of such currency.