1. Are Energy Executives Rewarded for Luck?
- Author
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Davis, Lucas W. and Hausman, Catherine
- Subjects
Petroleum industry -- Human resource management ,Executives -- Compensation and benefits ,Petroleum -- Prices and rates -- Influence ,Company pricing policy ,Company personnel management ,Business ,Economics ,Petroleum, energy and mining industries - Abstract
In this paper, we examine executive compensation data from 78 major U.S. oil and gas companies over a 24-year period. Perhaps in no other industry are the fortunes of so many executives so dependent on a single global commodity price. We find that a 10% increase in oil prices is associated with a 2% increase in executive compensation. This oil price effect holds for both CEOs and non-CEOs and separately for several different individual components of compensation, including bonuses. We find that the oil price effect is larger in companies with more insiders on the board, and asymmetric, with executive compensation rising with increasing oil prices more than it falls with decreasing oil prices. We then discuss potential mechanisms drawn from the broader existing literature on executive compensation. Keywords: Pay-for-Luck, Executive compensation, Principal-Agent problem, Rent extraction, Performance pay, 1. INTRODUCTION From January 2014 to January 2016, oil prices fell from nearly $100 per barrel to just over $30 per barrel. In those same two years, the CEOs of [...]
- Published
- 2020
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