1. Information Sharing in a Competitive Microcredit Market
- Author
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Jaap W.B. Bos, Ralph de Haas, Matteo Millone, RS: GSBE Theme Data-Driven Decision-Making, RS: GSBE Theme Sustainable Development, and Finance
- Subjects
IMPACTS ,Economics and Econometrics ,media_common.quotation_subject ,overborrowing ,Banks ,Depository Institutions ,Micro Finance Institutions ,Mortgages ,Financial system ,Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ,g21 - "Banks ,Mortgages" ,CREDIT ,d04 - "Microeconomic Policy: Formulation ,Implementation ,Evaluation" ,TERMS ,Margin (finance) ,Accounting ,MICROFINANCE ,Economics ,Asymmetric and Private Information ,Mechanism Design ,BANKING ,media_common ,CONTRACTS ,Information sharing ,POLICY ,d82 - "Asymmetric and Private Information ,Mechanism Design" ,g28 - Financial Institutions and Services: Government Policy and Regulation ,Interest rate ,Loan ,Microeconomic Policy: Formulation ,Evaluation ,information sharing ,SURVIVAL ,Default ,credit registry ,MATCHING ESTIMATORS ,LEVEL EVIDENCE ,Finance - Abstract
We analyze contract-level data on approved and rejected microloans to assess the impact of a new credit registry in Bosnia and Herzegovina, a country with a competitive microcredit market. Our findings are threefold. First, information sharing reduces defaults, especially among new borrowers, and increases the return on lending. Second, lending tightens at the extensive margin as loan officers, using the new registry, reject more applications. Third, lending also tightens at the intensive margin: microloans become smaller, shorter, and more expensive. This affects both new borrowers and lending relationships established before the registry. In contrast, repeat borrowers whose lending relationship started after the registry introduction begin to benefit from larger loans at lower interest rates.
- Published
- 2021
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