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This paper proposes a general theory of individual-level heterogeneity in economic voting based on the perspective that the strength of the relationship varies with factors that influence the relevance of the economic evaluation to the vote choice. We posit that the electoral relevance of the economic evaluation increases with the strength of partisanship as well as political sophistication. Given the strong correlation between partisanship and sophistication, this theoretical perspective casts doubt on extant evidence that more sophisticated voters are more likely to hold the incumbent party electorally accountable for macroeconomic performance since this result might be an artifact of failing to control for the economic evaluation being more relevant to the vote choice of stronger partisans. Our statistical investigation of this question finds no significant evidence that sophistication conditions the economic voting relationship once the conditioning effect of partisanship is included in the model. This finding suggests that individual-level heterogeneity in the strength of the economic voting relationship is largely due to stronger partisans voting more consistently with their national economic evaluation than to more sophisticated voters being more policy-oriented by holding the incumbent party more electorally accountable for macroeconomic performance.

In this paper, we investigate partisan rationalization in valence politics by trying to better specify the direct and indirect effects of the economy on government support. To do so, we examine how income levels moderate the influence of objective economic conditions on perceptions of which party is the best manager of the economy during a period of economic crisis, 2004–2010, in the United Kingdom. We find that low-income voters are more responsive in their assessments of the incumbent Labour government based on unemployment, as are high-income voters in terms of inflation. In addition, high-income voters tend to behave in a manner consistent with partisan rationalization, while low-income voters do not. These conclusions offer important implications for the effectiveness of electoral control of government policy, as well as the quality of representation.

Empirical findings concerning economic voting differ according to the level of analysis employed. A widely accepted explanation for the inconsistency between macroand microlevel evidence of economic voting is the high degree of random variation that plagues survey data. According to this explanation, aggregation purges individual-level "noise" from mass opinions on policy issues and outcomes. Building on the research of Bartels (1996), we debate the validity of this explanation by demonstrating that public evaluations of the national economy vary systematically with information, media exposure, political attitudes, personal experiences, and demographic characteristics. Furthermore, we show that these sources of subjective heterogeneity produce systematic biases when national economic evaluations are aggregated. These findings challenge a widely accepted notion that because "error" in individual-level measures (or expressions) of preferences is random, the aggregation of these individual measures ensures that they correctly represent the collective preference. mpirical findings concerning the influence of the economy on political behavior differ depending on the level of analysis employed. Using aggregate-level data, numerous studies have established a statistical relationship between economic conditions and election outcomes or executive popularity (e.g., Kramer 1971; MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). On the basis of the macro-level evidence alone one would have little reason to doubt that the economy matters. In contrast, individual-level studies using survey data have produced only mixed evidence that voters consider economic conditions when evaluating the incumbent government and its leaders (e.g., Fiorina 1978, 1981; Kinder and Kiewiet 1979, 1981). Moreover, the strongest survey evidence of economic voting suggests that voters primarily care about national economic conditions not their personal financial situation. This finding contradicts the egocentric theory posited by early macro-level research that national economic indicators matter because they are correlated with personal financial circumstances. The micro-macro dichotomy in economic voting research reflects a similar dichotomy in research on voter sophistication and representation. Aggregate-level studies tend to indicate that voters are reasonably well informed about the economy and make forward-looking, rather sophisticated voting decisions (e.g., Alesina, Londregan, and Rosenthal 1993; Suzuki and Chappell 1996; Palmer and Whitten 1999). These studies infer that mass political decisions conform to rational expectations, or at least limited information rationality (e.g., MacKuen, Erikson, and Stimson 1992). In contrast to this macro-level image of the voter, individual-level survey research has shown that the public in general has low levels of political sophistication, lacking much knowledge of and interest in politics (e.g.

Students of economic voting have recently made substantial progress in their understanding of when the economy is and is not likely to impact election outcomes. Our knowledge of the lower level dynamics that drive these aggregate results remains fairly murky. In this paper we test competing theoretical claims about how individual level orientations toward political economy lead to observed aggregate trends in support for incumbent politicians. We do this with models of support for the Labour Party in the United Kingdom before and during the recent global economic turndown.

This article examines the differences in the distributional effects of economic growth. While all incumbents are incentivized to create economic growth in order to win reelection, they use a diverse variety of policies to achieve this growth. These policy choices are often congruent with the demands of the core constituent groups of the respective parties. This suggests that economic growth is not equally shared by all, but that some groups are more or less benefited from the sets of policies chosen by the incumbent parties to stimulate growth. We test this proposition by investigating the effects of economic growth on stock market performance and unemployment. Our results show that economic growth under Republican presidents has a stronger effect on stimulating stock market performance, while economic growth under Democratic presidents has a stronger effect on reducing unemployment. Overall, these results highlight the partisan differences in macroeconomic policy and illustrate one of the causal mechanisms behind the substantial and rising economic inequality in the USA.

Empirical research in comparative politics has largely demonstrated that favorable economic conditions improve the electoral fortunes of incumbent government parties. Thus, in parliamentary democracies in which the government can choose when to call an election there is an incentive for government parties to act strategically by calling early elections when economic conditions are favorable. Alesina, Cohen and Roubini, however, cast doubt on this proposition, finding only weak evidence of a relationship between economic factors and election timing. In this paper, we reconsider the relationship between economic conditions and endogenous election dates using new data, controlling for political factors, and applying more appropriate econometric techniques. From analyses of twelve parliamentary democracies, we find that macroeconomic performance and political context exert significant influence on election timing. All other factors being equal, better performances in terms of economic growth, inflation, and unemployment will make a government more likely to call an early election. Controlling for government ideology, we find that right-wing governments are more sensitive to inflation performance while left-wing governments are more sensitive to the level of unemployment.

Research on the presence of consumer racial discrimination in the baseball labor and memorabilia markets has produced contradictory empirical results. While studies of baseball salaries find no evidence of discrimination, Nardinelli and Simon (1990) and Andersen and La Croix (1991) use data from the baseball card market to show that the price that consumers pay for a card depends on the player’s race. In this paper, we reconsider the evidence of consumer discrimination in the baseball card market. Our study improves on previous research by applying more appropriate econometric methods and using a data set in which card supply is constant and incentives for speculative demand are weaker. In contradiction to the aforementioned studies, we find little evidence of racial discrimination. This result proves robust across variable specifications and econometric models.

The present paper replicates and extends Powell and Whitten's study of comparative economic voting (Powell, G. Bingham and Whitten, Guy D. (1993) A Cross-National Analysis of Economic Voting: Taking Account of the Political Context. American Journal of Political Science 37, 391–414). We extend Powell and Whitten's research in three ways. First, we have developed a theoretically more appealing method for dividing our cases according to the clarity of government responsibility. Second, we consider whether the electoral effect of economic growth varies with government composition, with large coalitions focusing on the consensual goal of improving economic growth. Third, 40 new cases have been added to the original 102 analyzed by Powell and Whitten. Using a more appropriate methodology and an expanded data set, we find strong confirmation of the results presented in Powell and Whitten's study. We also find evidence that supports our theory about coalition governments and economic growth.

While there is strong evidence that a libertarian-authoritarian dimension exists in Great Britain, there is only weak evidence that it contributed to the Conservative Party's electoral victories in 1979, 1983, and 1987. The present paper addresses this empirical divergence by presenting new evidence. Using a multivariate statistical analysis of British respondents in the 1979–1987 Eurobarometers, the paper estimates the impacts of political values and class-based demographic characteristics on individual-level support for the Conservative and Labour parties. The multivariate model is estimated separately for each year in order to compare the explanatory variables' effects over time. The paper's findings demonstrate that authoritarian and libertarian values significantly influenced party support, with the strongest effects occurring in 1983 and 1984. In addition, they show that class-based support was negatively correlated with value-based support during 1979–1987.

Much of the research on the European Community focuses on elites and institutions and as a result downplays the importance of the mass public in determining the direction of European integration. A common justification for this viewpoint is that members of the public provide a stable reservoir of strong support for European integration. Recent political events, however, raise doubts about this depiction of a ‘passive public’. Consequently, there is a need for a fuller understanding of European attitudes. We specify a number of hypotheses dealing with the effects of international trade interests, security concerns, and demographic characteristics on cross-national and cross-sectional variations in public support for European integration. Using Eurobarometer surveys and OECD data on EC trade from 1973–1989, we investigate these hypotheses in a pooled cross-sectional model. Our statistical results reveal that an individual's level of support is positively related to her nation's security and trade interests in EC membership and her personal potential to benefit from liberalized markets for goods, labour, and money.

To explore systematic differences in economic reasoning and what might account for them, we investigate how sociocultural conditions affect transitions to market economies in the West African country of Benin. We probe the importance of several factors: basic economic norms, utility maximization behavior, individual-level personal capital, and individual-level social capital. The evidence, based on experiments embedded in an opinion survey, indicates that Beninese citizens widely share commitments to the basic foundations of economic interaction, e.g., property rights. The nature of social capital varies across cultural and political contexts and accounts for cross-contextual variation in the costs associated with cooperative behavior and in utility maximization behavior.

As the research methodology more closely approximates the causal process being analyzed, the inferences and predictions derived from that methodology will better represent actual behavior. Statistical models were specified on the basis of accepted theories of voting behavior and political cleavages in the Netherlands and Great Britain. We hypothesize that multinomial models provide a more accurate characterization of voting behavior in countries with more than two political parties competing for votes. Binomial logit, multinomial logit, and nested multinomial logit models of voting behavior are estimated on Dutch and British National Election Study data. Compared to binomial methods, we find that multinomial models of voting behavior produce results that are more congruent with accepted theories of Dutch and British politics.