Search

Do immigrants ever catch-up with native Australians on housing outcomes? Are there any barriers that inhibits them closing the gap? This thesis aims to document the gap in homeownership between immigrants and natives in Australia and examine the sources behind the gap. Using 30 years of Census data, I document life-cycle housing profiles for immigrants and natives and find that the homeownership rates of for both these groups have been decreasing as birth cohorts get younger. My pseudo-panel analysis shows that early-life differences in homeownership between birth cohorts are not completely eliminated in later stages of the life cycle. I also find that immigrants only partially make up the deficit in homeownership to natives over time. Then, using an Australian micro dataset, I assess the determinants and driving forces behind homeownership and how they differ between immigrants and natives. I find that despite having similar observed characteristics, natives are still more likely to be homeowners. This suggests possible discrimination towards immigrants, or weaker preferences for homeownership amongst immigrants in Australia.

The world is in the early stages of a paradigm transition toward a global green economy. In this article, we propose the notion of green windows of opportunity, highlighting the importance of institutional changes in the creation of new opportunities for latecomer development. We emphasize how demand and mission-guided technical change influence the directionality of latecomer development and highlight the important role emerging economies may attain in the global green transformation. We provide important insights regarding opportunities for green development in emerging economies, how these opportunities emerge in different renewable energy sectors and their implications for the global green economy.

Global sustainable development critically depends on a fundamental transformation of our current energy systems. This paper looks at how countries develop different types of renewable energy technology to achieve this transformation. We highlight the place-dependence in the global innovation systems of renewable energy technologies by focusing on how countries benefit from local and global knowledge. We show that both the relatedness of a country’s knowledge base, and international knowledge spillovers contribute to the development of renewable energy technologies. For low- and middle- income countries, domestic markets for renewables play a crucial role in absorbing and utilising these international knowledge spillovers. The results provide a better understanding of how countries can acquire new knowledge in renewable energy technologies.

This paper addresses the issue of catching and convergence at the level of firms, and investigates whether Korean firms tend to converge toward mature firms represented by the US firms in terms of their behavior and performance as well as firm-level innovations systems. It conducts regression analyses of several behavior and performance variables, using the data of the Korean and US firms during the 1990s, the 2000s, and 2010s. It finds some evidence of convergence, such that Korean firms become more profitability- rather than growth-oriented, borrowing and investing less, and thus being less indebted. However, they have not changed much in terms of their behavior toward firm values and dividend tendencies. Further analyses, using the patent-derived, innovation system variables, also confirm some aspects of convergence, compared with the early results, for which self-citations become significant and positive for firm values, furthermore, the variable of cycle time of technology is no longer significant for profitability, which is consistent with the results from the US firms. Meanwhile, changes in corporate governance associated with the rise of foreign shareholder are also shown to have resulted in higher profitability but insignificant change in firm values. An emerging conclusion is an ongoing but partially completed process of convergence.

The role that emerging economies, and China in particular, play in the global energy transition appears to be transforming. Transition literature to date characterizes the formation of cleantech sectors in emerging economies as being heavily dependent on foreign inputs of knowledge and other key resources. This article argues that in the, currently unfolding, next phase of the global energy transition, Chinese actors may play a more central role in global niche development for high-tech industries, including in constructing innovative and effective socio-technical configurations. This argument is illustrated with a case study of the Chinese Concentrated Solar Power industry, which is found to have developed largely independently of foreign resources. The case is used to highlight a number of specificities of the Chinese environment that set it apart from niche formation environments in OECD countries, and may allow China to open up technological trajectories unlikely to develop in those OECD countries.

Change in industrial leadership is often explained in terms of technological and costs advantages. However firms in emerging economies not only have to produce high quality, cost-competitive goods, but also win the resistance of consumers in the world market, who are often adverse to purchasing products from countries that yet have to build a reputation. We argue that this country-of-origin bias significantly influences the chances of leadership change. A model that aims at capturing the endogenous dynamics of demand building and leapfrogging is proposed. We show that in sectors with high monopoly power acquiring a superior technology is not sufficient for a latecomer country to become leader, unless a significant share of consumers is aware of the quality of its products. An extension of the model to multiple sectors shows that a latecomer country remains specialized into low-value undifferentiated goods, even after overtaking the technology of the leading country.

This paper examines the effects of different public policies (strengthening capability building, favouring firms’ learning, protectionism and support of entry of new domestic firms) on the catch-up of a latecomer with respect to an incumbent country in changing and uncertain technological environments. The effects of these policies are analysed with a simulation model first separately and then jointly to assess possible complementarities. We reach several results. First, we confirm that capability building and firms’ learning are important drivers of catch-up. Second, we find that when a large technological discontinuity takes place, entry support favours catch-up while protectionism has the opposite effect. Protectionism favours catch-up only when no technological discontinuity opens up. Third, we find that depending on the technological conditions, different policy complementarities exist; therefore, different policy mixes should be at the base of a country catch-up strategy. These results add to the previous literature on public policy and catching up by developing countries in an industry by distinguishing the different effects of various types of public policy and relating them to the technological conditions that are present in an industry.

This study proposes a framework that aims to explain why successive changes in industry leadership (called also the catch-up cycle) occur over time in a sector. In catch-up cycles, latecomer firms and countries emerge as international leaders, whereas incumbents lose their previous positions. New leaders are then dethroned by newcomers. To identify factors at the base of catch-up cycles, this article adopts a sectoral system framework and identifies windows of opportunity that may emerge during the long-run evolution of an industry. This study proposes three windows related to the specific dimensions of a sectoral system. One dimension is related to changes in knowledge and technology. The second dimension pertains to changes in demand, and the third includes changes in institutions and public policy. The combination of the opening of a window (technological, demand, or institutional/policy) and the responses of firms and other components of the sectoral system of the latecomer and incumbent countries determines changes in industrial leadership and catch-up. Sectors differ according to the type of windows that may open and the responses of firms and other components of systems. Empirical evidence of catch-up cycles is presented from six sectors, namely mobile phones, cameras, semiconductors, steel, mid-sized jets, and wines.

Using a panel data set covering 139 countries over the 1970 - 2009 period, we empirically investigate the role of foreign direct investment on growth through dif- fusion of technology and innovation. Using an otherwise standard growth regression and regressions on productivity growth, we introduce a direct effect of foreign di- rect investment, which may be proxying for innovation, and an indirect effect, to capture the role of technological catch-up. We find that these two mechanisms have a positive effect on productivity growth and on GDP growth. These results are consistent with an open economy model, in which foreign direct investment affects growth through diffusion of technology and innovation., COMPETE; QREN; FEDER; Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT)

The paper argues that Thailand’s economic and social development from the late 19th century to the early 21st century presents a puzzle. For much of the period from 1870 to 1940, the country’s economic growth was slow, and the economy remained agricultural, with little diversification into modern industry or services. It was the only Southeast Asian country to escape direct colonization, and yet it did not use its relative freedom from colonial control to embark on a programme of accelerated economic, social and political modernization. The contrast with Meiji Japan has been made by several Thai and foreign scholars, but Thailand’s growth was also slow in comparison with several neighbouring countries under colonial control. Only in the late 1950s did economic growth start to accelerate and by 1996, per capita GDP was well ahead of other ASEAN countries except Malaysia and Singapore. The paper explores the reasons for the accelerated growth, looking particularly at the role of government. The paper also examines the reasons for the growth collapse of 1997/1998, and the slower economic growth since then.

The paper complements the scarce literature on knowledge economy (KE) in Africa by comparing KE dynamics within Africa in order to assess best and worst performers based on fundamental characteristics of the continent’s development. The five dimensions of the World Bank’s Knowledge Economy Index (KEI) are employed, notably education, information and communication technology, innovation, economic incentives, and institutional regime. The empirical evidence is based on a five-step novel approach with data from 53 African countries for the period 1996–2010. Limitations of the beta catch-up approach are complemented with the sigma convergence strategy. Based on the determined fundamental characteristics, computed dynamic benchmarks, policy syndromes, and syndrome-free scenarios, we establish that landlocked, low-income, conflict-affected, Sub-Saharan African, nonoil-exporting, and French civil law countries are generally more predisposed to lower levels of KE, whereas English common law, openness to sea, absence of conflicts, North African, and middle-income countries are characteristics that predispose certain nations to higher KE. Broad and specific policy implications are discussed in detail.

In the 1960s, Norway lagged behind its Scandinavian neighbors in the aggregate value of economic production per capita, as it had for decades. By the 1990s, Norway had caught up with and forged ahead of Denmark and Sweden. When and why did Norway catch up? The discovery and extraction of oil in the early 70s is usually suggested as the explanation. But oil alone cannot explain Norway's growth since Sachs and Warner (2001) show that resource-gifts often reverse growth, making oil a curse not a blessing. Moreover, there is the possibility of contracting the Dutch Disease, which involves a rapid and substantial contraction of the traded goods sector. This article explains how deliberate macroeconomic policy, the arrangement of political and economic institutions, a strong judicial system, and social norms contributed to let Norway escape the Resource Curse and the Dutch Disease for more than two decades. Intriguingly, it appears that Norway in the late 90s may show some symptoms. Norway experiences reversed relative growth compared to Denmark and Sweden and a contraction of industrial activity. This article explores the political economy behind this recent slow-down.

Growth studies show, counter to intuition, that the discovery of a natural resource may be a curse rather than a blessing since resource-rich countries grow slower than others. But it has been suggested that the curse will not afflict rich countries and that, e.g. Norway is an exception to the curse. This article addresses both issues, and introduces a new diagnostic test. Neighbor countries Denmark and Sweden are used to highlight Norway's relative development and to test for curse presence. I employ a structural break technique to demonstrate that Norway started an acceleration in the early 1970s, after having discovered oil in 1969, and did not experience a pronounced retardation for the next 25 years. Instead, after first catching-up with its neighbors, Norway maintained a higher pace of growth. Norway might have escaped the curse. However, data suggest a slow-down at the end of the period, opening the possibility of a late onset of the curse. If so, rich countries are not immune.

We investigate the sources of convergence across the Spanish regions. We develop and estimate a descriptive growth model that allows for factor accumulation, technological diffusion, rate effects from human capital and unobserved regional factors. Our results indicate that technological catch-up, the equalization of educational levels and the redistribution of employment across regions account for most of the observed reduction of regional disparities. We also find that there remain very significant cross-regional differences in estimated TFP levels that point to the omission of important variables and to the need for a more disaggregated analysis. © 2002 Elsevier Science B.V. All rights reserved., This paper was written as part ofa research project cofinanced by the European Regional Development Fund and Fundación Caixa Galicia. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Education (through DGICYT grants nos. PB95-130 and SEC99-1189) is also gratefully acknowledged.

This thesis has three self-contained articles. Economic growth and trade in human capital: A salient empirical pattern in the East Asian “miracle” is a large increase in output and factor accumulation despite only a modest increase in TFP. I develop and calibrate a model of growth and catch-up to provide a possible explanation. A novel element of the model is a globalized education market allowing human capital transfer from frontier to developing economies – an assumption motivated by the experience of countries like Korea and Taiwan where domestic universities employed graduates of Western universities to provide advanced training. The political economy of urban bias in dictatorial regimes. In many developing countries, public resource allocation is often biased against the rural population – a policy that hurts the vast majority of the poor living in rural areas. This paper develops a dynamic political economy model of urban bias in a dictatorial regime. A novel result of the model is that urban bias can emerge in predominantly agrarian economies even if there is no bias in political power toward urban residents. The empirical evidence from a recently compiled country-level panel dataset on agricultural taxes/subsidies is consistent with the prediction of the model. Does agricultural growth cause manufacturing growth? Empirically assessing the impact of agricultural growth on manufacturing growth is challenging because of endogeneity concerns. This paper attempts to circumvent the identification challenge by using weather variations to instrument for agricultural growth. The IV estimations show that agricultural growth has a significant positive impact on manufacturing growth, and it is larger than the OLS estimates. I discuss the empirical implications for agricultural policies, efficiency of the manufacturing sector, and for the role of agricultural growth in Africa's industrialization.

The August 15th 2013 Shanghai Academic Rankings of World Universities (ARWU) should leave policy makers wondering about whether the impressive growth experienced by 'latecomers in the industry' has moved hand-in-hand with contribution to knowledge by means of scientific publications. Against this background, we model the obituary of scientific knowledge monopoly in 99 countries using 21 catch-up panels from 6 regions (South Asia, Europe & Central Asia, East Asia & the Pacific, Middle East & North Africa, Latin America & the Caribbean and, Sub-Saharan Africa). The findings broadly show that the obituary of scientific knowledge monopoly by developed countries is not in the near-horizon. Advanced nations that have mastered the dynamics of knowledge monopoly will continue to lead the course of knowledge economy. Justifications for the patterns and policy implications are discussed.

The paper focuses on the influence of upstream competition for productivity outcomes in downstream sectors. This relation is illustrated with a neo-Schumpeterian theoretical model of innovation (Aghion et al., 1997) with market imperfections in the production of intermediate goods. In this context, upstream market imperfections create barriers to competition in downstream markets and upstream producers use their market power to share innovation rents sought by downstream firms. Thus, lack of competition in upstream markets curbs incentives to improve productivity downstream, negatively affecting productivity outcomes. We test this prediction by estimating an error correction model that differentiates the potential downstream effects of lack of upstream competition in situations close and far from the global technological frontier. We measure competition upstream with regulatory burden indicators derived from OECD data on sectoral product market regulation and the industry-level efficiency improvement and the distance to frontier variables by means of a multifactor productivity (MFP) index. Panel regressions are run for 15 OECD countries and 20 sectors over the 1985-2007 period with country, sector and year fixed effects. We find clear evidence that anticompetitive regulations in upstream sectors have curbed MFP growth downstream over the past 15 years. These effects tend to be strongest for observations (i.e. country/sector/period triads) that are close to the global technological frontier. Our results suggest that, measured at the average distance to frontier and average level of anticompetitive regulations, the marginal effect of increasing competition by easing such regulations is to increase MFP growth by between 1 and 1.5 per cent per year in the OECD countries covered by our sample. Our results are robust to changes in the way MFP and the regulatory burden indicators are constructed, as well as to variations in the sample of countries and/or sectors.

This paper analyses the forces determining per capita income levels of nations over the past millennium and the prospects to 2030. In the year 1000, Asian countries were in the lead. By 1820, per capita gross domestic product in Western Europe and the USA was twice the Asian average. The divergence had grown much bigger by 1950, but by the 1970s, several Asian countries - Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore - had achieved considerable catch-up. Since then, there has been a major surge in China and the beginning of a similar phenomenon in India. As a result, the Asian share of world income has risen steadily and, by 2030, will be fairly close to what it was in 1820. I conclude by comparing my projections for 2030 with those of Goldman Sachs, Perkins and Rawski, and Fogel.

The EU25 Member States’ GDP per capita levels converged in 1994-2005. Convergence occurred at an average speed of approximately 1.5 percent per year. In the first part of this paper unconditional convergence is analyzed by looking at both β- and σ-convergence and the performances of the catch-up economies are compared, discussed and related to the convergence definition. In a second stage, the catch-up performances are analyzed in relation to theory of economic integration. Substantial increases in labor productivity explain a great deal of the catch-up for poorer economies such as the Baltic states, while increases in employment have been relatively more important for the less poorer economies such as Spain, Portugal and Slovenia. Labor productivity is further elaborated and it is found that both FDIs and internal savings have been consistently higher for the catch-up economies than the non-catching-up economies. FDIs are also assumed to have indirect effects such as promoting incorporation of technology.

We draw upon historical evidence from several countries and contemporary studies of national innovation systems to argue that indigenous systems of academic training and public research have been in the past important elements of the institutional structures supporting a country's economic catch up. Recent changes in the international economic environment, and the growing scientific basis for contemporary technologies, will make those systems even more important in the future. The contributions of universities and public labs to the development of indigenous technological capabilities have taken different forms in different countries and economic sectors. However, we note that, in contrast with current emphasis on university-based embryonic inventions and fundamental research, effective research programs have predominantly occurred in the application-oriented sciences and engineering, and have been oriented towards problem-solving, and the advancement of technologies of interest to a well-defined user-community.

This paper provides an empirical analysis of energy-productivity convergence across 56 developed and developing countries, in 10 manufacturing sectors, for the period 1971–1995. We find that, except for the non-ferrous metals sector, cross-country differences in absolute energy-productivity levels tend to decline, particularly in the less energy-intensive industries. Testing for the catch-up hypothesis using panel data confirms that in all manufacturing sectors energy-productivity growth is, in general, relatively high in countries that initially lag behind in terms of energy-productivity levels. At the same time, cross-country differences in energy-productivity performance seem to be persistent; convergence is found to be local rather than global, with countries converging to different steady states and several failing to catch up. Finally, we find that country-specific factors, such as energy price and investment ratio, do explain the observed cross-country differences in energy-productivity performance, but only to a very limited extent.

This article analyzes the "escape from competition effect" in a step-by-step framework in which a succesful firm may either leapfrog the previous leader or catch-up its technology. Innovation and growth are affected by both the intensity of competition and the probability of leapfrogging., Cet article analyse l'incitation à innover pour échapper à la pression concurentielle dans le cadre d'un processus d'innovations à pas successifs dans lequel une firme innovante peut soit dépasser le leader précédent, soit rattraper son niveau technologique. L'intensité de la concurrence et la probabilité de dépassement affectent l'innovation et la croissance.

Convergence concerns poor economies catching up with rich ones. At issue is what happens to the cross sectional distribution of economies, not whether a single economy tends towards its own steady state. It is the latter, however, that has preoccupied the traditional approach to convergence analysis. This paper describes an alternative body of research that overcomes this shortcoming in the traditional approach. The new findings - on persistence and stratification, on the formation off convergence clubs, and on the distribution polarizing into twin peaks of rich and poor- suggest the relevance of a class of theoretical ideas, different from those surrounding the production-function accounting traditionally favoured.