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The seasonal variability of production shrinks during a boom, not only at the industry level, but also at the plant level. Since this relationship is significant especially among plants with high capacity utilization, our finding is consistent with the capacity constraint hypothesis.

In this paper we consider an oligopolistic market in which one firm can be monopolist on her residual demand function and derive implications on the shape of her profit function, which we show may not be concave in price. We propose a simple price-capping rule that induce the pivotal operator to compete for quantity instead of taking advantage of her monopoly. Then, we analyze the bidding behaviour of the dominant electricity producer operating in the Italian wholesale power market (IPEX). This firm is vertically integrated and in many instances she acts as a monopolist on the residual demand. We find that, contrary to expectations, this pivotal firm refrains to exploit totally her unilateral market power and, therefore, bids at levels well below the cap. We discuss such a behaviour and derive implications for the setting of the price cap.

International audience; This paper explores the impacts of Protected Designation of Origin (PDO) certification on the costs and profits of firms as well as consumers’ and total welfare. The paper argues that PDO labels are different from other common labeling schemes, as they involve technological and capacity constraints that influence their economic efficiency. Using a theoretical model of endogenous quality choice,which incorporates vertical differentiation with the costs constraints linked to the PDO label, we explore the way producers can signal their quality either by certifying their product through PDO or by investing in a collective private common label. Results show that even if PDOs are efficient from a producer perspective, a society might be better off with less stringent techniques of quality signaling, relying on private collective certification.

Today's highly competitive business environment forces supply chain managers to maintain high service levels while keeping inventory-related costs as low as possible. Therefore, placing the right amount of safety stock at the right places in the supply chain is an important aspect of effective inventory management. This safety stock placement problem, for which some solution strategies have been proposed in the case of uncapacitated supply chains, becomes much more complicated when, in addition to the variability of the demand, capacity constraints also come into play. In this paper we propose a model to locate safety stocks in a capacitated supply chain with the objective of maintaining the required service level. The underlying relationships linking excess capacity, demand variability, and service levels are analysed to gain deeper understanding of the safety stock placement problem in capacitated supply chains. Based on these relationships a solution approach for the problem is proposed and is tested with Monte Carlo simulation

Producers submit offer curves to a procurement auction, e.g. an electricity auction, before uncertain demand has been realised. In the supply function equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the offer curve that maximises its expected profit, given the offer curves of competitors. The equilibrium is given by a system of differential equations. In practice, it has been very difficult to find valid SFE, i.e. non-decreasing solutions, from this system, especially for asymmetric producers. This paper shows that valid SFE can be calculated by means of a shooting algorithm that combines numerical integration with an optimisation procedure that searches for an end-condition. Multiple/parallel shooting is used for ill-conditioned cases.

Consider a market where producers submit supply functions to a procurement auction — e.g. an electric power auction — under uncertainty, before demand has been realized. In the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE), every firm commits to the supply function maximizing his expected profit given the supply functions of the competitors. The presence of multiple equilibria is one basic weakness of SFE. This paper shows that with (i) symmetric producers, (ii) inelastic demand, (iii) a reservation price, and (iiii) capacity constraints that bind with a positive probability, there is a unique symmetric SFE.

The experience of countries in transition from a planned to a market-oriented economy has varied greatly. The clearest differences are between the East Asian countries, China and Vietnam, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the former Soviet Union (FSU). China and Vietnam have contained inflation and benefited from continued high growth in GDP since the beginning of their reforms, while all CEE and FSU countries have experienced large declines in output, and most have experienced hyperinflation. But even in CEE and the FSU, differences are marked. Some countries have lost over half of their GDP, and growth performance in a number of countries is still poor, while others are growing strongly. Some are still suffering from high inflation while others have successfully reduced annual inflation. What determines this divergence of outcomes across transition countries? No study so far has analyzed the interaction of all factors, including initial conditions, political change, and reforms, in a unified framework including CEE, the FSU, China, and Vietnam. The authors examine these broader interactions, but focus first on the role of initial conditions, such as initial macroeconomic distortions and differences in economic structure and institutions, which have been emphasized less in the literature. They find that initial conditions and economic policy jointly determine the large differences in economic performance among the 28 transition economies in the sample. Initial conditions dominate in explaining inflation, but economic liberalization is the most important factor determining differences in growth. But reform policy choices are not exogenous. They depend, in turn, on both initial conditions and political reform, with political reform the most important determinant of the speed and comprehensiveness of economic liberalization. Other findings provide additional insight into these relationships. Results show that liberalization has a negative contemporaneous impact, but a stronger positive effect on performance over time. The results also show that macroeconomic and structural distortions are negatively related to both policy and performance. Regarding the former, unfavorable initial conditions discourage policy reforms but do not diminish their effectiveness once they are implemented. The authors find some evidence that the influence of initial conditions diminishes over time. This is in part because many of the initial conditions are themselves modified in the course of transition. Monetary overhangs are dissipated through inflation, industrial overhang is eroded as plants shut down, and market memory returns through experience.