(ProQuest: ... denotes formulae omitted.)1. IntroductionUnderstanding the nature and effects of corporate diversification has long been a fundamental issue in both the management literature and corporate policy. However, there is still no consensus on whether corporate diversification destroys or enhances firm value (Erdorf et al., 2013; Rudolph & Schwetzler, 2013). The literature tends to show that managers seek to benefit themselves at the expense of firm shareholders through their corporate diversification strategies rather than pursing investments that would enhance firm value (see Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Amihud & Lev, 1981 ; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Denis, Denis & Sarin, 1997; Aggarwal & Samwick, 2003). Similarly, most companies do not diversify efficiently, which has an adverse impact on shareholders' wealth (Martin & Sayrak, 2003).Inefficient corporate diversification also gives managers a chance to increase their nonpecuniary benefits, the cost of which is borne by the firm's shareholders (McConnell, McKeon & Xu, 2010). These personal or nonpecuniary benefits include empire building (Jensen, 1988), increased managerial compensation, which depends on firm size (Jensen & Murphy, 1990) and self-preservation, which is achieved by utilizing their personal skills (Shleifer & Vishny, 1989). A number of studies underline this corporate diversification-value destruction stance of agency theory, noting that a significant discounted value is associated with firms that are more diversified (see Lang & Stulz, 1994; Berger & Ofek, 1995; Lins & Servaes, 1999; Denis, Denis & Yost, 2002; Hund, Monk & Tice, 2010; Hoechle et al., 2012). These results have led researchers to assume that diversification destroys firm value - this is known as the agency effect of corporate diversification.However, the information effect of corporate diversification assumes there is not necessarily a conflict of interest between managers and shareholders when it comes to strategic decisions such as corporate diversification (Fox & Hamilton, 1994; Davis, Schoorman & Donaldson, 1997). In case of asymmetric information, shareholders may not be able to gauge managers' ability to make efficient decisions (Gomez-Mejia & Wiseman, 2007) and the latter's diversification decisions may be mistaken for value-decreasing strategies by outside shareholders (Seyhun, 1986). This is the information effect of corporate diversification.Ataullah et al. (2014) compare the effects of corporate diversification (agency and informational) for a sample of British firms. They argue that, when managers implement diversification strategies to benefit themselves rather than to increase firm value, they are less likely to purchase their own firm's shares in the open market (agency effect). Even if managers happen to be pursuing an efficient diversification strategy to enhance the firm's value, the prevailing information asymmetries may keep outside shareholders from perceiving this. In this case, managers are likely to purchase their firm's shares in the open market more actively (information effect).Although there is a vast body of literature on the corporate diversification-value relationship in developed countries, these studies tend to neglect the issue in relation to developing countries. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first attempt to empirically investigate the corporate diversification-value relationship under asymmetric information and insider trading with reference to developing countries. Ataullah et al. (2014) raise two questions in this context. First, do insiders follow strategies for corporate diversification primarily to benefit themselves? Second, do outside investors believe that managers use diversification strategies solely to pursue personal benefits?We conjecture that the results obtained by Ataullah et al. (2014) for the UK market do not necessarily apply to developing countries where financial markets are characterized by weak corporate governance/control and inadequate disclosure, which enhance agency problems, information asymmetries and insider trading. …