Search

Family firms are one of the most ubiquitous forms of business organizations worldwide. Their survival and growth are thus not only crucial for the firms themselves but also for the overall economy. One of the factors that influence their survival and development are their financing decisions. These decisions are generally described through the pecking order theory. However, not much is known about the applicability of this theory in private family firms. Given the shortcomings (both theoretically and empirically) of the current literature, we analyze 1087 incremental financing decisions from 277 family firms to develop and test a specific family firm pecking order. We integrate the elements of the socioemotional wealth perspective to theoretically explain the preferred order and introduce family capital into the pecking order model. Our findings indicate that family firms first prefer internal financing, next debt financing, followed by family capital, and last external capital. We also find that SEW considerations play a role in this financing decision. Especially the retention of control over the firm and the aim to pass the firm to the next generation appear to play an important role in determining this order. These dimensions ensure that family firms try to avoid extra capital. However, when it is needed, they will opt for family capital over external capital. This paper thus provides more insight into the reasoning behind financing decisions in private family firms.

PurposeThe topic of dividend policies of private family-controlled firms has aroused the interest of corporate finance and governance scholars and practitioners alike. However, a lot of questions concerning the dividends in privately held family firms remain unanswered. The purpose of this paper is to examine whether a private family firm’s dividend payout is influenced by its degree of professionalization.Design/methodology/approachThe hypotheses are tested on a sample of 492 small to medium-sized Belgian family-controlled businesses with Tobit regression models.FindingsThe results show that professionalized family-controlled firms pay higher dividends to their shareholders than do less-professionalized firms. In particular, the use of financial control systems, non-family involvement in governance systems, and the use of human resource control systems have a positive significant impact on the average level of dividend payout.Practical implicationsThis study may be of interest to family business consultants and (potential) investors, as the results contradict the assumption that family businesses (especially those privately held) will always have a no or low dividend policy.Originality/valueInvestigating dividend payout in the context of other components than family ownership (in this case, professionalization) can broaden our understanding of dividend payout.

Intra-familial principal–principal conflict are a relevant agency problem in privately held family firms. These conflicts of interest commonly occur between active and passive family shareholders, and require remedies different from those that deal with principal-agent conflicts. This article empirically examines whether or not firms use dividends as instruments to cope with conflicts of interest between active and passive family shareholders and how family governance practices moderate this relationship. The results show that the existence of an intra-familial conflict of interest results in a higher propensity to pay dividends and that the use of family governance practices strengthens this relationship. Additionally, the findings suggest that using family governance practices leads to a more efficient dividend policy.

Although classical agency theorists claim that pay-for-performance is not relevant in the context of private family firms, the authors provide empirical evidence of the opposite, using a sample of 529 privately held U.S. family firms. The results suggest that objective performance-based measures play a significant role in CEO compensation. Additionally, the authors find that in private family firms CEO compensation is more responsive to firm performance in firms with low ownership dispersion and in the controlling-owner stage. Furthermore, the positive pay-for-performance relation is slightly stronger for nonfamily CEOs than for family CEOs.