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Suggests which perceptions and realities of the complex economic relationship between the United States and Japan are most important. Questions the use of opinion surveys to understand perceptions of U.S. and Japanese citizens about the economic relationship. Discusses characteristics of each nation's economy that inhibit successful economic relations. (DK)

Recent trends that affect the U.S. system of industrial relations are examined. The most important of these is internationalization. The U.S. industrial relations system is compared with that of Europe and Japan, and suggestions for improving our competitiveness in international markets are made. (Author/RM)

Discusses the influence of Japan on educational reform in the United States. Identifies economic self-interest and global competitiveness as the motivations for increased U.S. instruction about Asia and the Pacific region. Expresses concern that such a competitive outlook is unlikely to produce a global perspective. (DK)

Japan is known to have an exceptionally low level of inward foreign direct investment (FDI). The promotion of inward FDI is one of the policy goals of Abenomics structural reforms. This present paper studies the accumulation of Japan's inward FDI stock during the first 3 years of Abenomics (2012-2015), and finds no evidence that Japan's inward FDI stock increased more than the trend before Abenomics started would have predicted. A comparison of the main policies for promoting inward FDI that have been implemented to the real and perceived impediments to inward FDI reveals that it may be advisable to shift the emphasis of the policy to address more regulatory and administrative issues and to reduce the cost of doing business in Japan. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This article reexamines the conventional wisdom that characterizes Sino-Japanese energy relations as predominantly competitive, but views Sino-Japanese environmental relations as essentially cooperative. Using sociological theories of risk, it is argued that Sino-Japanese cooperation is more likely in both the energy and environmental areas when common risks are perceived and relative gains are minimized. Despite their many conflicting strategic, political, and economic interests, as energy importers who are vulnerable to supply interruptions in the Middle East and competitors for global energy supplies, China and Japan share common risks to their energy security. Consequently, there actually may be increasing opportunities for China and Japan to address their common concerns through bilateral and multilateral cooperative practices, such as common positions on pricing or energy conservation initiatives. Although one would expect China and Japan to highlight their mutual interests in tackling environmental problems such as air pollution, in fact relative gains often impede cooperation. Japan increasingly views China as an economic competitor and is reducing environmental aid, while China continues to set a priority on economic growth, which sets limits on the use of costlier Japanese green technologies. By examining a selection of scholarly articles, reports and newspaper articles by Chinese and Japanese analysts, as well as material from interviews in Beijing and Tokyo in May-June 2007, the paper shows how environmental and energy issues in Sino-Japanese relations may be framed as threats, requiring counter-measures, or common risks, which can be addressed through cooperative practices. Lastly, the paper discusses the possibility of the development of an energy security 'risk community' as cooperative practices develop between China and Japan. Nonetheless, conflicting political interests, strategies, and self-images, accentuating relative gains, may provide obstacles to their cooperation in both energy security and environmental protection. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines US, Japanese, and European political economy approaches to China, and their effect on US-Japan and US-EU relationships. Great powers with a greater security concern in dealing with another major country care more about power while those with less of a concern are preoccupied with calculations for wealth. China's rise and its actions have posed a far greater security challenge to the United States and Japan and are driving the two countries closer together. The political economy game involving China reveals a dominant welfare motive among the advanced market economies. The ambition to transform China politically has diminished. China's integration into the global market makes a relative gains approach difficult to implement. Globalization simply limits the ability of a state to follow a politics-in-command approach in the absence of actual military conflict, which explains why the political economy approaches of the United States, Europe, and Japan are not that different in the scheme of things. China's own grand strategy to reach out to the world to outflank the US-Japan alliance has also contributed to a divergent European policy toward China although there are severe limitations to Beijing's ability to drive a wedge between the United States and Europe. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The integrated system of political-economic relations that has prevailed in the Pacific since the September 1951 treaty of peace with Japan, known here as the San Francisco System, is distinctive in comparison with subregional systems elsewhere in the world. This paper outlines key defining features, such as (1) a dense network of bilateral alliances; (2) an absence of multilateral security structures; (3) strong asymmetry in alliance relations, both in security and economics; (4) special precedence to Japan; and (5) liberal trade access to American markets, coupled with relatively limited development assistance. After contrasting this system to analogous arrangements elsewhere, especially in the Atlantic, it explores both the origins and the prognosis of this remarkably durable political-economic entity. Complementary domestic political-economic interests on both sides of the Pacific, reinforcing a brilliant original Japan-centric design by John Foster Dulles, account for persistence, it is argued, while forces for change center on the dynamic emerging role of China. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Focuses on the international business cycle repercussions between Japan and the United States using a vector error correction model (VECM). Role that interdependency between the economic activities of nations play in the modern world economy; Description of an alternative approach to VECM.

The aim of this paper is to delineate and assess three key approaches to the implications of Japanese involvement in Great Britain and to suggest an alternative to the so-called 'Japanization' school in its various incarnations. Far from seeking to provide anything approaching a definitive account of the full range of participants involved in the discussion over the nature of Japanese inward investment in Great Britain, let alone the character of the debate at an international level, my main priority is to attempt to draw out some basic themes by assessing the continuities and discontinuities in the various positions delineated. These are broadly conceived, far from definitive and of course open to elaboration and debate. The range of material drawn is thus deliberately limited so as to focus primarily on the key participants, if progenitors, mostly in Great Britain.

For Japan in 2021, COVID-19-related disruption was again the dominant storyline. Its impact transcended societal consequences to affect Japan’s economy, politics, and foreign affairs. It frustrated Japan’s economic recovery and, for the second time in as many years, contributed to a prime minister’s premature resignation. Yet the year also witnessed major positive developments, including the '2020” Tokyo Olympics/Paralympics; an (eventually) successful vaccine rollout; public health outcomes vastly better than those of any other G7 member; an expected return to economic growth; and a smooth national election. On October 31, new prime minister Kishida Fumio led the ruling LDP–Komeito coalition into Japan's first general election since 2017. Despite losing a few seats, it retained a comfortable lower-house majority, ensuring that a subplot for Japan in 2021 was-again-relative continuity in national politics and foreign affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Much has been written about Japanese law within the context of Japan. Less is known about the application of Japanese legal models outside Japan. A prevailing view among some commentators is that Japanese law scholarship does not offer insights that are useful beyond Japan-based legal studies. Other scholars challenge this perception by invoking Japan's legal development aid projects in the Mekong subregion of ASEAN--especially in Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. These projects have been in operation for over twenty years and aim to foster the economic growth of host countries. This article aligns with the view that Japanese law exists beyond, and is influential outside, Japan. It calls for further action by legal specialists to reexamine and re-assess the corresponding influence of Japanese positive law in these countries, both in improving the transparency of those legal systems and enhancing communication among local, comparative and Japanese law experts. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Japan's leaders began 2020 with grand ambitions to make it a historic year. Tokyo was set to welcome the world for the Summer Olympics, Japan's first since 1964, and Abe Shinzo?, the powerful prime minister, planned to realize his party's 65-year-old dream: revising Japan's never-amended, US-drafted 1947 constitution. By spring, however, it was clear that COVID-19 had other plans. Despite public health outcomes better than in any other G7 member, daily life was severely disrupted, and the domestic political and economic fallout for Japan was significant. By late summer, circumstances were improving, but both Abe's popularity and his personal health had suffered. He resigned in September, ending the longest prime-ministership in Japanese history. Though COVID-19 and the end of the Abe Era were the major storylines of Japan in 2020, a subplot was, paradoxically, remarkable continuity in national politics and foreign affairs. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses ways in which difficult changes in Eastern Europe have allowed Japan to become an economic power. Eastern Europe's financial crises have arisen due to troubles transitioning to free markets and capitalism. American policy makers who have acknowledged the financial problems of countries such as the Soviet Union or Germany have also realized they can implant Japanese money in the place of European money. In the same time that communism is on the verge of extinction as a viable species of government, Japan has undergone changes nearly as significant to international relations as those of the Soviet bloc. Advantages to Japan's economic involvement in Western markets are discussed.

The article discusses the impact of Japanese cross-investment on its economic rivalry with the U.S. Since the 1980's Japan has profited from a continuous trade surplus with the U.S. In 1984 manufactured exports from Japan jumped 395 from the previous year to claim approximately $57 billion in the U.S. market. This meant that every American spent an average of $243 on Japanese imports. Between 1979-1984 Japanese direct investments in the U.S. rose to over 33% annually. This rate of increase easily outpaced investments made by every other foreign nation.

This article analyzes how Japan financed its World War II occupation of Southeast Asia, the market-purchased transfer of resources to Japan, and the monetary and inflation consequences of Japanese policies. Occupation was financed principally by printing large quantities of money. While some Southeast Asian countries had high inflation, hyperinflation hardly occurred because of a sustained transactions demand for money and because of Japan's strong enforcement of monetary monopoly. Highly specialized Southeast Asian economies and loss of Japanese merchant shipping limited resource extraction. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

South Korea is Japan's most logical ally in East Asia. Both nations share the same primary military benefactor, the United States. Their geographic proximity makes them natural allies in offsetting China's growing power and unknown intentions. In spite of the many reasons to ally, relations remain strained, primarily because of Japan's historical occupation of Korea. In this article, the authors examine the political issues that must be resolved for Japan and South Korea to work together and the potential for such reconciliation in light of South Korea's on-again/off-again drift away from the United States and Japan's open embrace of U.S. protection and occasional political distancing. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Exploring the factors influencing the balancing item of balance of payments accounts has seldom been a subject of research in international economics. Following Brooks and Fausten (1998), and using Japan's data, this study has empirically examined the influences of economic openness on balancing item. The results of subset VAR (Vector Autoregression) approach, Granger causality test, impulse responses function, and variance decomposition have showed that, to a certain extent, economic openness does influence the behaviour of Japan's balancing item. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article offers information on economics and national strategy of the United States. It is posed that this country needs a national strategy that responds to the central post-cold war political, economic, and military realities. Moreover, in theory , a U. S. national strategy would start with a structure of private activities based on the operation of free markets and then provide a framework for enhancing the use of the nation's resources to gain national objectives derived from enduring national interests. It is also identified that the world's new political structure focuses on a triangle of competing regions that have gained economic growth. These regions are Europe, North America, and Japan.

The article offers information on the responsibilities that Japan needs to play in response to the substantial structural changes that the world economic system has underwent. In line with this, the author explores the Japan's role in the evolution of the world economic system. He also examines the economic frictions and options on the United States-Japan bilateral relations for an effective management of the problems. It is noted that resolving process of the U.S.-Japan bilateral problems in itself will pave way to a world economic system revolution.