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This article is an attempt to comprehend deindustrialisation and the impact of plant downsizing and closures in Scotland since the 1970s through listening to the voices of workers and reflecting on their ways of telling, whilst making some observations on how an oral history methodology can add to our understanding. It draws upon a rich bounty of oral history projects and collections undertaken in Scotland over recent decades. The lush description and often intense articulated emotion help us as academic “outsidersˮ to better understand how lives were profoundly affected by plant closures, getting us beyond statistical body counts and overly sentimentalised and nostalgic representations of industrial work to more nuanced understandings of the meanings and impacts of job loss. In recalling their lived experience of plant run-downs and closures, narrators are informing and interpreting; projecting a sense of self in the process and drawing meaning from their working lives. My argument here is that we need to listen attentively and learn from those who bore witness and try to make sense of these diverse, different and sometimes contradictory stories. We should take cognisance of silences and transgressing voices as well as dominant, hegemonic narratives if we are to deepen the conversation and understand the complex but profound impacts that deindustrialisation had on traditional working-class communities in Scotland, as well as elsewhere.

A significant point of controversy where the legacy of Margaret Thatcher and neoliberalism more broadly are concerned is the fate of Britain's manufacturing base, with critics alleging her policy's destructiveness, and supporters denying the diminution of Britain's position. Examining that base's performance relative to other countries over the 1979-2019 time frame (in particular aggregate and per capita output, the share of manufacturing in British GDP and the British trade balance in manufacturing), and other quantitative and nonquantitative data (like British consumption and production of machine tools, and the character of foreign investment in Britain), it concludes that Britain's manufacturing base has indeed suffered in significant ways next to its past position, and the positions of other advanced industrial countries, without real parallel among them. It also argues that not only has this protracted and severe decline occurred in a context of neoliberal policy, but that specific aspects of this policy (the monetary reforms of the early '80s, and government passivity toward the industrial sector's erosion since) can plausibly be connected with the problems of the country's manufacturing sector as discussed here.

This paper shows evidence that manufacturing sector maintains a dynamic process that stimulates growth in European economies, despite its apparent deindustrialization process, reflected in the fall of manufacturing employment and reduction in manufacturing sector share in total GDP. The static and dy-namic econometric analysis of the Kaldor-Verdoorn Laws for a panel data of 9 European countries from 1960 to 2014 shows that this is mainly explained by the growing influence of labor productivity in the manufacturing sector. On the contrary, despite a greater correlation between primary sector and services with GDP, these do not influence a sustained dynamic growth due to their decreasing productivity.

We use a new trade dataset showing that nineteenth century sub-Saharan Africa experienced a terms of trade boom comparable to other parts of the “global periphery.” A sharp rise in export prices in the five decades before the scramble (1835–1885) was followed by an equally impressive decline during the colonial era. This study revises the view that the scramble for West Africa occurred when its major export markets were in decline and argues that the larger weight of West Africa in French imperial trade strengthened the rationale for French instead of British initiative in the conquest of the interior.

This article examines conceptions of social justice and economic fairness with regard to employment. It does so through an analysis of the management of deindustrialization in the Scottish coalfields between the 1940s and 1980s. Emphasis is placed on the historical roots and social and political constitutions of labor market practices. The analysis is grounded within Karl Polanyi’s Great Transformation; industrial relations within coal mining are conceived through an ongoing conflict between commodifying, liberalizing market forces and a “counter-movement” of worker and community resistance and state regulation, which works to embed markets within social and political priorities. E. P. Thompson’s moral economy provides the basis for an understanding of the formulation of communal expectations and employment practices that acted to mitigate the disruption caused by pit closures. The analysis grounds the historical roots of the moral economy within Poalnyi’s counter-movement and illuminates the operation of specific practices of a Thompsonian character within the nationalized industry, which maintained individual and collective employment stability. This is constructed utilizing interviews with former mineworkers and members of mining families. These are supplemented by archival sources that include the minutes of Colliery Consultative Committee meetings, which took place before pit closures. They reveal the moral economy was fundamentally centered on the control of resources, collieries, and the employment they provided rather than simply elements of financial compensation for those suffering from labor market instability. Resultantly procedure centering on collective consultation was fundamental in legitimating colliery closures.

Michael Colliery in east Fife was the largest National Coal Board (NCB) unit in Scotland when it closed in 1967, following a disastrous fire which killed nine miners. The NCB, operating within the constraints of the Labour government’s policy framework, decided not to invest in Michael’s recovery, although this would have secured profitable production within five years and access to thirty-plus years of coal reserves. This outcome, which had major local economic implications, demonstrates that deindustrialization is a willed and highly politicized process. The Labour government ignored workforce entreaties to override the NCB’s decision and invest to bring the pit back into production, but made significant localized adjustments to regional policy that within a year attracted a major employer to the area, the Distillers Company Limited. The article relates the closure to moral economy arguments about deindustrialization. It shows that coal closures in the 1960s, while actually more extensive than those of the 1980s, were managed very differently, with attention to the interests of the workers and communities affected, and an emphasis on cultivating alternative industrial employment.

Numerous scholars have suggested that nineteenth-century industrial decline in the global “periphery” was driven by externally wrought global forces that promoted cash-crop agriculture and dis-incentivized local industry, particularly strong global demand for tropical agricultural commodities and increasing competition with imports of cheap, factory-produced manufactures from industrializing regions. To what extent did global market forces affect production choices, and to what degree did local forces guide outcomes? The deindustrialization process is investigated through a case study of Malawi’s Lower Shire Valley, where the Mang’anja cloth industry declined – and cash-crop production began – in the second half of the nineteenth century. I demonstrate that changing production choices were not directly motivated by global market opportunities. Indeed, other cloth-producing sub-Saharan African regions faced nineteenth-century global forces but did not deindustrialize. Rather, economic change in the valley was stimulated by local factor-endowment shifts precipitated by both global and local forces. Labour declined sharply due to slave raiding and famine, while supplies of fertile land increased due to environmental change. Within this altered context, Mang’anja villagers responded by abandoning labour-intensive cloth production in favour of cash-crop cultivation. In more labour-abundant African regions, on the other hand, cloth production continued to thrive alongside cash-crop exports. The mechanisms behind deindustrialization can only be understood through careful local-level examination of the local contexts that influenced responses to broader global processes.

India was a major player in the world export market for textiles in the early 18th century, but by the middle of the 19th century it had lost all of its export market and much of its domestic market, primarily to Britain. The ensuing deindustrialization was greatest c1750–c1860. We ask how much of India’s deindustrialization was due to local supply-side forces—such as political fragmentation and a rising incidence of drought, and how much to world price shocks. An open, three-sector neo-Ricardian model organizes our thinking and a new relative price database implements the empirical analysis. We find local supply side forces were important from as early as 1700. We then assess the size of Indian deindustrialization in comparison with other parts of the periphery.

Muhammad Ali, who ruled Egypt between 1805 and 1849, intervened in Egyptian markets in an attempt to foster industrialization, especially between 1812 and 1840. Like a modern marketing board, the state purchased agricultural commodities (cotton and wheat) at low prices and sold them on world markets at much higher prices, a policy equivalent to an export tax. Ali also replaced tax farming with his own land taxes. The revenues so derived were used in part to finance manufacturing investment and to build irrigation canals. In addition, Ali supplied flax and cotton at those cheap purchase prices to domestic textile manufacturing, thus subsidizing the industry. He also used non-tariff barriers to exclude foreign competition from domestic markets. Were Ali's state-led policies successful in fostering industry? The answer is no easier to extract from this phase of Egyptian history than from that of other poor countries at that time. This is because Egypt faced the same terms of trade boom typical of most poor commodity exporters, which was causing de-industrialization everywhere else in the poor periphery. Ali picked a very difficult time to pursue his agenda, but we show that his policies were successful.

David Graeber Debt: The First 5,000 Years, Melville House Publishing, New York, 2011; 534 pp: 9781933633862, US$37 (hbk) David Graeber The Democracy Project: A History, a Crisis, a Movement, Allen Lane, London, 2013; xxi + 326pp: 9781846146633, 14.99 [pounds sterling] (pbk) These two books are important, bur not in the way their author intended. Together, they reveal as clearly as need be the seductions and pitfalls awaiting those who announce that they, finally, have the answers to hitherto elusive questions about revolutionary practice--the 2011 Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement in Zuccotti Park --and the anarchist theory about debt and democracy that informs it. 'In one year,' declares Graeber (2013: 149), 'Occupy managed to both identify the problem--a system of class power that has effectively fused finance and government--and to propose a solution: the creation of a genuinely democratic culture.' These claims are unpersuasive, largely because of an approach which refuses to commit to a political and economic programme. Graeber harks back to an era of industrial capitalism, seen by him as a golden age, and about which he appears to have little to say in terms of criticism. No longer able to regard themselves as middle class, a status Graeber equates (2013: xix, 66-67, 70, 142) with a perception of the police and credit providers as being 'basically on your side', Americans 'from solidly middle-class families' support OWS because they are unable to repay loans taken out to educate themselves, being either unemployed or in poorly-paid jobs. Graeber fails to note that while such mobilisation is certainly radical, it is not necessarily leftist: in the 1930s, opposition by 'solidly middle-class families' not to capitalism bur to 'money power' ('financialization') generated support for the political right. Contrary to his belief that questioning the role of money automatically constitutes a 'challenge to the very nature of the economic system,' therefore, implicit in much grassroots bourgeois anger at finance and the power of money is the view that, once banks are reformed, a benign/kind capitalism can be recuperated. Indeed, data provided by Graeber (2013: 93) showing that 'a plurality still prefer capitalism' undermines his assumption that OWS support equals a desire to change the economic system. Questioning whether neoliberal 'financialization' is actually still capitalism, Graeber (2013: 78-79) misunderstands the changes that have occurred in the world economy, as a result of which he interprets accumulation in national, not international terms. Like others (Hardt & Negri 2001; Harvey 2003), therefore, he seems to think that what we have now is no longer capitalism but some form of non-capitalist 'financialization'. Real industrial capitalism, Graeber maintains, is now located only in the BRIC economies (China, India, Brazil). In the USA, by contrast, what we have is akin to 'feudalism'. This misinterpretation overlooks two things. First, and most importantly, that capitalism is now global: one cannot separate European and US deindustrialization from the BRIC economies, since the latter are where European and US multinational corporations outsource production. These businesses are still capitalist enterprises, and are still part of a capitalist system that is now global in scope, in which they extract surpluses in order to accumulate. And second, within Europe and the USA, manufacturing still takes place, albeit in a different form. Production hasn't vanished so much as been decentralized and downsized: a lot of it takes place in small-scale units--sweatshops--that have replaced large-scale factories. In other words, it too has been outsourced, only nationally, not internationally. The analysis of debt--which according to Graeber (2011) informs OWS practice--is also lull of inconsistencies, not least in the claim that it has spotted developments of which no one else was aware. …

Following World War II, executives from the General Motors Corporation (GM) implemented a sweeping corporate growth plan that centered on the suburbanization of manufacturing. As part of this agenda of metropolitan capitalism, company officials shifted resources and jobs away from the city of Flint, Michigan—GM’s international manufacturing headquarters. However, these capital migrations were not examples of corporate abandonment. Rather, the company’s investment decisions were part of a larger effort to expand Flint’s boundaries and create a regional government. Although suburban opponents ultimately defeated the proposal for a “New Flint,” GM’s support for metropolitan government belies the notion of capital flight at the heart of most literature on the “urban crisis.” Emphasizing the local struggles that unfolded over GM’s postwar investment strategy, this case study posits metropolitan capitalism as a new framework for explaining urban deindustrialization and, more broadly, the processes of suburban development.

This study assesses the possibility that deindustrialization has been contributing to the persistently high unemployment rates experienced by most affluent countries since the mid-1970s. Combining insights from Lilien’s (1982) “sectoral shift” thesis and the literature on deindustrialization, the authors assert that the decades-long contraction of the manufacturing sector has been a significant source of high unemployment in affluent countries. This assertion is tested against the literature’s existing explanations for unemployment using data from 16 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development countries over a recent 34-year period. Two-way, fixed-effects regression models suggest that deindustrialization has not only contributed to unemployment in these countries, but that it has been one of the more important causes of this phenomenon. These findings are robust across various model specifications and estimating strategies. The study concludes by suggesting further ways to investigate this important topic.

The long-running deindustrialization in the Scottish coalfields, the consequence of political decisions, took place in three distinct periods analyzed here: “restructuring,” 1958–1967, when, in response to union activism, a large number of closures was offset by government and industry initiatives to provide or stimulate alternative employment; “stabilization,” 1968–1977, when closures were minimized as the broader industrial economy slowed; and then “accelerated contraction,” 1978–1987, within the larger program of economic restructuring engineered by Margaret Thatcher's Conservative UK governments. Moral economy arguments shaped the debate about deindustrialization in the first two phases: closures were legitimate only where agreed to by the workforce, who would in turn receive guaranteed economic security. These factors did not apply in the final phase, when closures were enforced and redundant miners had limited employment alternatives.

The diesel engine manufacturer L. Gardner and Sons saw two long strikes in 1968 and late 1972, after which a militant shop-steward leadership emerged. In 1980 a high-profile strike and occupation against mass redundancies at the height of the manufacturing recession won significant concessions. The organization exhibited by the Gardner workforce was remarkable and represented a partial victory in a period when strikes were declining and increasingly difficult to organize. However, a countermobilization by the company led to the erosion of the gains: established practices based on ‘mutuality’ (where working times and work organization were agreed between unions and management) were eroded, with managerial control reasserted through regular redundancies. The erosion of the concessions won by the 1980 strike and occupation demonstrates the fragility of gains achieved through trade-unionism. It also demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining strong workplace organization in the face of recession, deindustrialization and counter-mobilization by employers and the state in Britain in the 1980s.

Financialization is a process often viewed askance, not least on the left of British politics. Yet in the 1970s elements of the left wing of the Labour Party developed the idea that financialization, in the form of growing middle and working class contributions to life insurance and occupational pensions, also offered an opportunity. With deindustrialization setting in, the Labour Left argued for the nationalization of banks and insurance companies, and the channelling of the funds flowing through insurance schemes and pension funds, into a new drive to boost manufacturing investment. The article examines the rise of these proposals and the reasons for their rejection using documents from the Labour Party archives. As such it makes contributions to the debates on deindustrialization in Britain and on the emergence of financialization.\ud Keywords: Financialization, Deindustrialization, Nationalization, Labour

En este artículo se analiza el efecto de la apertura comercial sobre la producción manufacturera, y se detecta que este proceso causó un cambio estructural en las exportaciones e importaciones industriales, y creó una diferenciación en el comportamiento de estas, después de la década de los noventa. Por tanto, con el ejercicio econométrico de datos panel fue posible deducir que el impacto sobre la producción manufacturera fue superior después de la apertura comparado con los años anteriores, y esto permitió concluir que dadas las condiciones de desindustrialización ya existentes, la apertura contribuyó a profundizar este descenso, evidenciando una menor producción en los subsectores que generan un alto valor agregado.

Using growth curve modeling techniques, this research investigates whether military spending improved or worsened the economic well-being of citizens within the American states during the post-Vietnam War period. We empirically test the military Keynesianism claim that military spending improves the economic conditions of citizens through its use by politicians as a countercyclical tool to reduce the negative effects of economic downturns. However, due to deindustrialization and the emergence of the "new military," there are reasons to believe that military spending will not effectively improve economic well-being during the post-Vietnam War era. Using longitudinal data we find that states with high levels of military spending are better equipped to stave off the deleterious effects of economic recession than are states with lower levels of military spending.

This study examines the effects of the first globalization on the late period Ottoman economy as well as the impact of the second globalization on the Turkish economy for the last three decades. Since the demand of Western industrial countries for Ottoman agricultural products was high, the production and export of such goods increased. Improved terms of trade had some positive short term impact on the exporting agricultural sector, but resulted in a massive deindustrialization all around the Empire. Again during the second globalization, Turkish foreign trade has increased, and a few manufacturing sectors have shown improvements because of the global competitive forces. However, Turkish agriculture has suffered, and trade and current account deficits have grown persistently, with foreign debt displaying certain similarities with the infamous Ottoman public debt.

By the 1960s, the urban crisis in the United States was well underway. Structural trans-formations in the postwar economy and accelerating deindustrialization contributed to high rates of unemployment in many cities in the nation's old industrial core. During the 1970s and 1980s, the urban crisis worsened. This article argues that the macroeconomic policies of Presidents Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, and Ronald Reagan fueled urban decline. Responding to the waning hegemony of the United States in the global economy as well as to a domestic corporate crisis of profitability, the presidents pursued macroeconomic agendas that prioritized the revitalization of American economic dominance. Macroeconomic policy decisions in combination with white-backlash pressures constrained the range of urban policies the presidents could pursue and often compelled privatization. The federal-level decisionmaking had devastating consequences in Baltimore, Maryland, the city discussed in this article. The macroeconomic and urban policies had racialized and gendered outcomes that plunged the city into the most acute phase of the urban crisis.

This study reexamines the relationship between economic globalization and manufacturing employment in affl uent democracies. After reviewing past research, including the wellsupported Rowthorn model, we propose a differentiation-saturation model that theorizes that globalization has a curvilinear relationship with manufacturing employment. Using two different techniques, we analyze the most comprehensive sample of 18 affl uent democracies from 1960-2001. We examine 12 globalization measures and provide the fi rst analysis of the curvilinear relationship between globalization and manufacturing employment. We fi nd that some aspects of globalization have linear effects on manufacturing employment, most of which are positive. We fi nd more evidence, however, that globalization has a curvilinear, inverted U-shaped relationship with manufacturing employment. The evidence for the Rowthorn model is mixed. GDP per capita and its square do not have robust effects, but agricultural employment is one of the most important causes. Including globalization in the model weakens the evidence for the Rowthorn model. There is some evidence that globalization has different effects across different varieties of capitalism, regions and historical periods. Ultimately, our analyses partially support both the Rowthorn model and our differentiation-saturation model. One of the most dramatic social changes of the past half-century has been the decline of manufacturing employment in affluent democracies. As Figure 1 shows, manufacturing employment as a share of the labor force declined substantially from 1960 to 2001 in the 18 affluent democracies in our study. In the early 1960s, manufacturing employment averaged nearly 40 percent across these countries. In addition, the maximum value countries (Germany and Switzerland) approached 50 percent. Even Ireland, the least industrialized in 1960, had more than 22 percent employed in manufacturing. By 2001, massive deindustrialization had occurred across all 18 affluent democracies. The most industrialized country had fallen to less than 30 percent manufacturing employment, the average was below 25 percent, and the least industrialized country was below 20 percent. Certainly, the widespread decline of manufacturing was not uniformly linear. From 1960 to 1975, the least industrialized countries experienced growth in manufacturing employment – the minimal value rose from 22.2 in 1960 to 28.7 in 1973. During that period, heavily industrialized countries reached a plateau. The maximum value remained above 48 percent until 1971. Partly driven by manufacturing growth in the less industrialized among these countries, the mean peaked slightly above 38 percent in 1965 and remained above 36 percent through

Pre-Famine Ireland is perceived to have undergone a process of deindustrialization as a result of trade with Great Britain. This article presents evidence that manufacturing output growth was positive and sufficient to keep pace with or exceed population growth. The textile industry in which the bulk of the manufacturing labour force was employed performed relatively poorly, though this was largely due to an internal shock in the form of technical and organisational change in the linen industry rather than trade with Britain. Concentration on the performance of the textile sector has distracted attention from the good performance in other sectors.

Most studies of labor politics in the United States focus on those politics as they are embedded within larger electoral and national party politics. In this article, we investigate how the relationship between the United Steelworkers of America (USWA) and steelmanufacturing firms shaped the political economy of the Rust Belt. We show that the 1959 steel strike and subsequent collective bargaining agreements between the USWA and the ten largest steel manufacturers in the United States reshaped institutional labor politics and led to a greater emphasis on negotiated pension and unemployment benefits. In turn, these institutional commitments profoundly shaped deindustrialization. Pension and severance benefits motivated firm managers to sustain relatively large, antiquated steel plants and to close smaller plants in order to avoid enormous legacy liabilities. Using theoretical insights from economic studies of auctions, as well as historical and quantitative data, we show how the labor agreements shaped the choices concerning, and the timing of, mill shutdowns. We conclude that these choices help explain important variance in the fortunes of steel towns in the Rust Belt. [End Page 676]

odern judgements on the effects of the Act of Union on the Manufacturing sector of Irish industry are influenced by two widely held propositions. The first is that the pre-Famine economy experienced deindustrialization. The second is that Irish manufacturing industries were unable to withstand competition from British producers. MacDonagh states that the creation of a free trade area within the British Isles 'perhaps ultimately determined the ruin of the Irish economy'.2 O'Malley argues that the introduction of free trade with Britain and the inability to impose tariffs was significant for Ireland's industrial decline.3 0 Grada is more sceptical about the impact of the Union, characterizing it as a lubricant rather than a prime mover of deindustrialization: 'industrial decline and rising food exports had a common origin: the dramatic industrial expansion taking place in Britain. The abolition of separate British and Irish customs duties and the assimilation of the two currencies could only accentuate trends that were evident earlier.'4 Similarly, Mokyr emphasizes the impact of a prosperous and industrializing Britain, rather than the freeing of trade, on Irish manufacturing industry: 'the industrial revolution in Britain and-to a much lesser extent-in Ulster, had a devastating effect on the incomes of the hundreds of thousands of rural and semi-urban spinners, weavers, and other workers who made their living in part from domestic nonagricultural activities.'5 Both are doubtful that protective tariffs could have rescued the situation.6 An alternative view is presented by Johnson and Kennedy. They accept that Ireland experienced a decline in industrial occupations in the pre-Famine period but argue that it may have been due to labour-saving technical change.7 Cullen heavily qualifies the view that deindustrialization

The American economy underwent wrenching changes in the decades after 1970, events that in the longer perspective are likely in the future, as they are today, to seem a "watershed." For the quarter century before 1970 the American economy strode supreme on the world stage, with the dollar at a fixed exchange rate and dominating the exchange of value across national boundaries, American companies developing or enhancing multinational strategies to reach out powerfully into other economies, and American prosperity the envy of the world. At home, in spite of ups and downs in the business cycle that worked hardship on individuals and their families during recessions, the general trends were upward: higher and higher standards of living, an expanding middle class, high wages for factory workers, confidence in the future, and security in the present. Politically, American businesses in communications, finance, and transportation functioned profitably in the security of government regulation. Then, after 1970, it all began to unravel. The changes included more serious recessions, the growth of foreign competition, deindustrialization in some communities and regions, the shrinking of opportunity for citizens with poor skills, the insecurity of accelerating inflation during the 1970s, energy shocks in 1973 and 1979, the shrinking of the middle class with growing inequality in the distribution of wealth and income, and, for some Americans, the growth of feelings of social malaise and pessimism about the future. Other peoples reached and surpassed the American standard of living. In terms of public policy the period also witnessed wrenching changes associated with "deregulation." There was a relationship between the larger set of forces imposing change and the transformation of government regulation aimed at particular industries, so-called "industry-specific" regulation. Industry-specific regulation never affected the largest sector of the economy

"Dass das wirtschaftliche Wachstum neben ökologischen auch an demographische Grenzen stoße, gehört in Deutschland zu den inzwischen kaum mehr hinterfragten Gewissheiten. Im Ländervergleich erscheinen diese Grenzen gleichwohl keinesfalls als unüberwindbar. Von einer demographischen Grenze des Wachstums kann jedenfalls für die angelsächsischen Länder in den vergangenen Jahrzehnten keine Rede sein. Ganz im Gegenteil sind dort sowohl die Bevölkerung als auch die Beschäftigungsraten weiterhin kräftig gestiegen. Die Mobilisierung einer wachsenden Bevölkerung auf dem Arbeitsmarkt erscheint deshalb inzwischen nicht nur als die Hauptursache für die enormen Wachstumsvorsprünge der USA, Australiens, Neuseelands und Kanadas, sondern als sozialpolitisches Verteilungsinstrument: Je höher die Beschäftigungsrate und die Zahl von Haushalten mit zwei Verdienern, desto eher können marktbedingte Ungleichverteilungen zumindest teilweise kompensiert werden. Auf dem europäischen Kontinent hat sich inzwischen gleichwohl der mögliche Segen höherer Beschäftigungsraten herumgesprochen. Der Beitrag analysiert die kausalen Zusammenhänge von Wirtschaftswachstum, Bevölkerungsentwicklung, Migration, Beschäftigungsraten, Verteilung von Markteinkommen, Deindustrialisierung, Dienstleistungsarbeit und Sozialpolitik. Der dazu entwickelte Datensatz enthält eine gepoolte Zeitreihe für 25 OECD-Länder mit (bisher) 192 Beobachtungen für den Zeitraum von 1970-2000. Panelregressionen mit verschiedenen Kombinationen zentraler Variablen zeigen, dass die möglichen Grenzen des Wachstums heute je nach betrachtetem Land sehr unterschiedlich aussehen: Während die angelsächsischen und nordischen Länder bereits eine enorme Dehnung möglicher Wachstumsgrenzen erreicht haben und möglicherweise vor neuen Grenzen der Mobilisierung stehen, ist dieser Prozess auf dem europäischen Kontinent noch nicht sonderlich weit fortgeschritten. Die Zeitreihenanalysen sollen möglichst policy-relevante Schlussfolgerungen, insbesondere zur politischen Steuerbarkeit von Beschäftigungsraten, ermöglichen." (Autorenreferat)

The Present : the Crisis (II) Burdens and Potentialities of the 1980's This article takes up an earlier hypothesis that the present crisis is of a structural nature and cannot be compared to any of the moderate recessions of the 1960's or to any of the great earlier crises (particularly that of 1929). The authors examine the possibilities of solving the crisis by a shift to a post-industrial society and/or by the development of form of dualism After demonstrating the inappropriateness of these "solutions", the article stresses the complexity of the chain of circumstances required to reach a positive outcome to the present crisis. One cannot be content with solutions drawn from the past -such as a return to a competitive capitalism endowed with mythical virtues- nor with solutions that improperly extrapolate the trend toward deindustrialization and the emergence of a two-tier wage-earning class. Indeed it is essential to define the right "New Deal" for our time : innovations in the socio political sphere are more imperative than a mechanical reproduction of the changes that solved the crisis of the 1930's., Mistral Jacques, Boyer Robert. Le temps présent : la crise (II). Pesanteur et potentialité des années quatre-vingt. In: Annales. Économies, Sociétés, Civilisations. 38ᵉ année, N. 4, 1983. pp. 773-789.

The Deindustrialization of America: Plant Closings, Community Abandonment and the Dismanding of Basic Industry by Barry Bluestone and Bennett Harrison; and Beyond die Waste Land: A Democratic Alternative to Economic Decline by Samuel Bowles, David Gordon and Thomas Weisskopf are two recent contributions to the debate on alternative economic strategies in the United States. After critically discussing their proposals, this article moves on to outline the crucial ingredients of a more internationalist alternative.

After 1980 deindustrialization was the prevailing condition in the North American automotive industry—but not in Canada. Much of that difference was due to an aggressive federal intervention that demanded investment and production from foreign automakers. Using Chrysler as a case study, the paper asserts that state policies such as the 1980 bailout and the 1965 Canada-U.S. Auto Pact actually led to a re-industrialization of the Canadian sector. The paper challenges older dependency theories that assume deindustrialization, and recent work that focuses upon worker activism, as the reason that Canada's industrial heartland did not rust., Depuis 1980, l’industrie automobile nord-américaine est caractérisée par la désindustrialisation. Toutefois, grâce à une intervention musclée de l’État, le Canada échappe à cette tendance. En effet, l’État canadien a formulé des exigences strictes quant à l’investissement et la production des fabricants automobiles étrangers. En prenant le fabricant Chrysler comme exemple, cette étude souligne que les politiques étatiques telles que le renflouement de 1980 et le Pacte de l’automobile de 1965 ont engendré une réindustrialisation du secteur automobile canadien. De ce fait, l’étude remet en question les théories plus anciennes concernant la dépendance et les travaux plus récents qui attribuent la réindustrialisation au militantisme ouvrier.

1. The origins, the agrarian context, and the conditions in the world market 2. The proto-industrial family economy 3. The structures and function of population-development under the proto-industrial system 4. Relations of production - productive forces - crises in proto-industrialization 5. Excursus: the political and institutional framework of proto-industrialization 6. Proto-industrialization between industrialization and deindustrialization.