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This paper provides a synthetic overview of the link between food insecurity and conflict, addressing both traditional (civil and interstate war) and emerging (regime stability, violent rioting and communal conflict) threats to security and political stability. In addition, it addresses the various attempts by national governments, intergovernmental organizations, and civil society to address food insecurity and, in particular, the link with conflict. It begins with a discussion of the various effects of food insecurity for several types of conflict, and discusses the interactions among political, social, and demographic factors that may exacerbate these effects. It then discusses the capabilities of states, international markets, intergovernmental organizations, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to break the link between food security and conflict by focusing on mechanisms that can shield both food consumers and producers from short-term price instability. Finally, it discusses projected trends in both food insecurity and conflict and concludes with some brief comments on policies that can build resilience in light of projections of higher and volatile food prices and a changing climate.

Regulatory reform has emerged as an important policy area in developing countries. For reforms to be beneficial, regulatory regimes need to be transparent, coherent, and comprehensive. They must establish appropriate institutional frameworks and liberalized business regulations; enforce competition policy and law; and open external and internal markets to trade and investment. This report analyses the institutional set-up and use of regulatory policy instruments in Uganda. It is one of five reports prepared on countries in East and Southern Africa (the others are on Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda and Zambia), and represents an attempt to apply assessment tools and the framework developed by the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in its work on regulatory capacity and performance to developing countries.

This report is an output of the Better Regulation for Growth Program between the Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the UK Department for International Development (DFID) and IC, the Investment Climate Advisory Services of the World Bank Group. The reports identifies a set of minimum requirements for a well-functioning Ria light system that is tailored to the requirements of developing countries. Embracing the overall objectives and relevance of RIA, the paper explores the fundamental set of building blocks and activities required to establish and maintain a RIA light system, taking into account what it is considered as good practice. The paper argues that the following five basic criteria have to be in place for a functioning RIA system, which is referred to as "RIA light": 1) political commitment to establish and operate an effective and self sustaining RIA process; 2) a unit or group of regulatory reformers - preferably based in a central area of government - which oversees, comments and reports on the quality of regulatory proposals before decisions are made about regulation; 3) clear and consistently applied criteria and rules employed to screen regulatory proposals; 4) a transparent regulatory policy development process, which includes consultation with stakeholders; and 5) a capacity building program, involving preparation of guidelines; training of officials preparing RIA and facilitating the required cultural changes, and establishing monitoring, evaluation and reporting systems.

The purpose of this paper is to provide an overview of the literature on the political economy of policy instrument choice and relate it to the experiences in agriculture. The paper is therefore organized as follows. The second section provides a ranking of policies as to their transfer efficiency and determines the standard of evaluation, given that no policy is perfect in achieving its goals. The third section explores why political competition does not ensure that an efficient policy instrument is chosen. The following two sections explain the two key theories: enforcement and commitment problems in section four, and information and agency problems in section five. Section six presents the important Grossman-Helpman model of inefficient policy choice that falls outside these two general theories. Section seven describes how policy instrument choice in agriculture is often a discrete outcome in response to a crisis and therefore becomes path dependent, resulting in a status quo bias. Section eight describes how trade agreements can affect policy instrument choice. The final section gives some guidance as to the outstanding issues.

This paper outlines the methodological issues associated with the task of measuring that actual delivered direct protection or taxation to individual agricultural industries, as well as the direct protection or anti-protection to non-agricultural sectors. It begins with a guide to what elements in principle could be measured. There are two key purposes of the distortion estimates being generated by this project are: 1) to provide a long annual time series of indicators showing the extent to which price incentives faced by farmers and food consumers have been distorted directly and indirectly by own-government policies in all major developing, transition and high-income countries, and hence for the world as a whole; and 2) to attribute the price distortion estimates for each farm product to specific border or domestic policy measures, so they can serve as inputs into various types of partial and general equilibrium economic models for estimating the effects of those various policies on such things as national and international agricultural markets, farm value added, income inequality, poverty, and national, regional and global welfare.