Search

In the last two decades, there have been two influential papers in empirical economic growth, Becker and Woessmann (2009) and Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001), which explicitly or implicitly claim that Weber's thesis has been refuted by empirical evidence. This paper argues that their alleged refutation of Weber is achieved by serious distortions and reductions of Weber's thesis combined with a sequence of unsubstantiated extrapolations.

Almost two years ago, China and the United States instigated a trade conflict which has had serious international effects, a situation since exacerbated by the Covid-19 pandemic. What has truly made a solution to this conflict elusive, however, is that its origins lie well beyond questions of trade deficits and fair competition, and are instead based on the looming question of a power transition between to the two states. The effects of this divergence are beginning to be observed in several economic realms, including the financial and the technological. Many other actors in the global economy have begun to experience the side effects of this completion, and may now have to face difficult choices about how to balance between these two emerging poles in the current fragile global economy.

• While market access quotas have generated high levels of rents for traders and exporters in Namibia, Botswana, Norway, and offshore entities in the UK, their developmental benefits are diffuse, unclear, and difficult to unpack; • The consolidation of trade between small supply (Namibia, Botswana) and demand markets (Norway) provides some unique advantages for trading parties, given the former’s efficiency and scale disadvantages in international trade, and the latter’s desire to actively manage its food imports; • However, such a strategy is not necessarily replicable or scalable, as it entails both high entry costs for access and high risks from the over-reliance on a limited number of markets and the specter of animal disease incursions.

The COVID-19 crisis represents not only an unprecedented economic disruption but also an opportunity for Central Asia. A specific economic policy response may trigger either game-changing reforms that can facilitate the development of full-fledged market institutions or lead to a protracted crisis that would jeopardize almost 30-year long market economy transition progress. As it is rather unclear where the recovery pendulum will make its final swing, the current situation provides fruitful soil for various assumptions. This paper proposes and examines four scenarios of economic response strategies for the region as a whole, and for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan in particular, that result in unique development trajectories. The paper employs the foresight methodology to build four scenarios related to the situation after the lockdown is fully lifted. The scenarios serve the purpose of helping decision makers to embark on informed decisions while shaping anti-crisis measures and better understand causality mechanisms behind their policy choices.

50 years since the first astronauts stepped foot on the moon, it would be easy to be complacent about human space exploration today. After all, humans have not ventured out of low-earth orbit since 1972. Achievements in space since the Apollo missions have flown under the radar for most of the regular public. However, the world is actually in a very different place now than it was 50 years ago, when the Soviet Union and United States were the sole spacefaring powers. Today, 72 countries have space programs, 14 have launch capability, and six have highly developed space capabilities (China, Europe, India, Japan, the US, and Russia). Space agencies, private commercial entities, international organizations, amateur space enthusiasts, multi-national corporations, and public-private partnerships comprise the diverse landscape of actors involved in space today. The total global space economy is estimated to be well over $383.5 billion.1 In particular, the European space industry is one of the largest in the world, and contributes around €53-62 billion to the European economy. Manufacturing is a significant part of this, with European companies producing around one-third of the world’s satellites.2 Within 10 years, it is expected that there will be a thriving low-earth orbit eco-system, space tourism, a permanent moon base, and shortly thereafter, a manned trip to Mars. 50 Years After the Moon Landing:Why Europe Should Lead the Next 50

This report provides an overview and analysis of some key issues pertaining to the political economy of Ethiopia in a historical perspective. The continuous rule of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since 1991 has advanced a revolutionary democracy founded on the idea that the EPRDF itself should be the vanguard party both representing and leading the people. This form of central dirigisme has produced a developmental state with authoritarian features and opaque boundaries between the party and the state system. The strong and assertive party, having its clear vision of the developmental objectives and means, has produced a self-determined state apparatus that seldom yields to internal or international pressure. It has also produced impressive economic results over the last decade and a half, especially in the central and urban areas, and now aspires to become a middle-income country by 2025. Against this economic performance, there are critical concerns regarding democracy, human rights, uneven distribution and growing inequalities. The political space has gradually narrowed since the contentious 2005-elections, and there are currently no opposition parties with parliamentary representation. The invocation of a ten months state of emergency following the popular anti-government protests in 2015 and 2016, is just one expression of how human rights are being truncated, the lack of an open political space and the regime’s authoritarian features. Despite this, international actors maintain their relations to Ethiopia and continue to provide development assistance. This is partly due to the government’s performance in other domestic areas, but also a recognition of Ethiopia’s important regional role in providing stability in the Horn of Africa. The government has known to capitalize on the international actors’ need for a stable partner in the region, which has provided leeway for both its domestic and international affairs. It is thus unlikely that Ethiopia would be challenged by any other regional state or combination of states. Nor is it expected that any of its international partners would challenge Ethiopia, for instance by putting conditions pertaining to domestic political and human rights issues before the concern for regional stability. Any challenges to the regime and political stability are more likely to emerge from within – whether in the form of further popular political unrest, or disagreements within the EPRDF government or its coalition parties.

Haiti is governed by a small economic elite and the majority of its poor and marginalized population has no access to power. This report analyses the historical roots of the deep socio-economic and political cleavage in Haiti and the consequences of repeated cycles of foreign interference, economic liberalization policies, increased food insecurity and natural disasters. The report reveals that the elections in 2010/2011 and 2015/2016 only served to exacerbate this cleavage. The elections in 2016 had a record low participation of 17.3%. Many of Haiti’s poor abstained from voting due to lack of confidence in the elections, as well as due to extremely difficult socio-economic conditions post-earthquake in 2010/2011, and post-Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Since the earthquake in 2010, there has been a heavy presence of international actors in Haiti. Whereas several of these actors put pressure on Haiti to hold elections relatively short time after the disaster, most of the foreign actors, and particularly the United States and the EU, showed little concern about fraud and low voter turnout. The elections brought President Michel Martelly to power in 2011 and President Jovenel Moïse to power in 2016, both of them representing the economic elite in Haiti. They invested in agribusiness and special economic zones benefiting the economic elite, but further marginalizing small-scale farmers. These two presidents also succeeded in reestablishing the Haitian Army, an institution with extremely bad reputation in Haiti, due to its past severe human rights violations. Haiti: A Political Economy Analysis

International trade offers a wealth of opportunities for low-income countries to reduce poverty and achieve growth in today’s global economic landscape. In such an environment, customs administrations play a critical role not only in border security, combatting illicit transactions, and collecting revenue, but also in facilitating cross-border trade. For many poor countries, however, maintaining a modern and capable customs office remains a difficult endeavour. As a result, many multilateral organisations have responded with providing external financial assistance and technical support to build capacity within customs offices in the developing world. This report provides an end-review of the project “Customs Capacity Building for WCO Members 2012–2015,” funded by the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (Norad) and implemented by the World Customs Organization (WCO). This project aimed not only to develop the knowledge and skills of customs officers, but likewise to assist the customs administration in applying modern management and customs practices. Beneficiaries of this project consisted of customs offices in the following seven countries: Liberia, Rwanda, Customs Capacity Building for WCO Members 2012-2015

This report provides an overview and analysis of some key issues pertaining to the political economy of Ethiopia in a historical perspective. The continuous rule of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) since 1991 has advanced a revolutionary democracy founded on the idea that the EPRDF itself should be the vanguard party both representing and leading the people. This form of central dirigisme has produced a developmental state with authoritarian features and opaque boundaries between the party and the state system. The strong and assertive party, having its clear vision of the developmental objectives and means, has produced a self-determined state apparatus that seldom yields to internal or international pressure. It has also produced impressive economic results over the last decade and a half, especially in the central and urban areas, and now aspires to become a middle-income country by 2025. Against this economic performance, there are critical concerns regarding democracy, human rights, uneven distribution and growing inequalities. The political space has gradually narrowed since the contentious 2005-elections, and there are currently no opposition parties with parliamentary representation. The invocation of a ten months state of emergency following the popular anti-government protests in 2015 and 2016, is just one expression of how human rights are being truncated, the lack of an open political space and the regime’s authoritarian features. Despite this, international actors maintain their relations to Ethiopia and continue to provide development assistance. This is partly due to the government’s performance in other domestic areas, but also a recognition of Ethiopia’s important regional role in providing stability in the Horn of Africa. The government has known to capitalize on the international actors’ need for a stable partner in the region, which has provided leeway for both its domestic and international affairs. It is thus unlikely that Ethiopia would be challenged by any other regional state or combination of states. Nor is it expected that any of its international partners would challenge Ethiopia, for instance by putting conditions pertaining to domestic political and human rights issues before the concern for regional stability. Any challenges to the regime and political stability are more likely to emerge from within – whether in the form of further popular political unrest, or disagreements within the EPRDF government or its coalition parties.

This study analyses the participation of the Norwegian economy in global value chains in 2000-2014, following the gross exports decomposition framework in Koopman, Wang and Wei (2014) and using the World Input-Output Database (WIOD). The analysis shows that Norway increased its participation in global value chains through both backward and forward linkages, but the latter is more dominant and re ects Norway's endowments in natural resources. Moreover, the study reveals that services exports increased substantially during the period analysed and are even higher than manufacturing exports if measured in value-added terms rather than gross terms. This highlights the key role of services in global value chains as well as the relevance of measuring trade in value-added terms.

Haiti is governed by a small economic elite and the majority of its poor and marginalized population has no access to power. This report analyses the historical roots of the deep socio-economic and political cleavage in Haiti and the consequences of repeated cycles of foreign interference, economic liberalization policies, increased food insecurity and natural disasters. The report reveals that the elections in 2010/2011 and 2015/2016 only served to exacerbate this cleavage. The elections in 2016 had a record low participation of 17.3%. Many of Haiti’s poor abstained from voting due to lack of confidence in the elections, as well as due to extremely difficult socio-economic conditions post-earthquake in 2010/2011, and post-Hurricane Matthew in 2016. Since the earthquake in 2010, there has been a heavy presence of international actors in Haiti. Whereas several of these actors put pressure on Haiti to hold elections relatively short time after the disaster, most of the foreign actors, and particularly the United States and the EU, showed little concern about fraud and low voter turnout. The elections brought President Michel Martelly to power in 2011 and President Jovenel Moïse to power in 2016, both of them representing the economic elite in Haiti. They invested in agribusiness and special economic zones benefiting the economic elite, but further marginalizing small-scale farmers. These two presidents also succeeded in reestablishing the Haitian Army, an institution with extremely bad reputation in Haiti, due to its past severe human rights violations.

Recent decades have witnessed a strong globalization process. This has been so for international trade and international capital markets, but also in the field of Intellectual Property Rights (IPRs). IPRs were formerly in the domains of nation states. International treaties have dictated convergence in IPR institutions across the world. This paper gives a short overview of these developments. Incentives for IPRs are stronger for more innovative countries. Therefore, innovative countries traditionally had stronger IPR than less innovative countries. A negotiated global treatment (like the TRIPS agreement) is likely to be a compromise between the needs in innovative and less innovative countries. Such agreements may therefore be complemented with additional agreements among innovative countries. The European Patent Office (EPO), and the planned European unitary patent are examples. IPRs are also incorporated into new preferential trade agreements. Many believe that this trend will result in convergence of stronger IPRs across countries, to the benefit of innovative countries, but at the cost of less innovative countries.

This report is an integrated political economy analysis of Nepal. The main finding is that economic growth and poverty reduction have been steady in Nepal since the mid-1980s independently of a number of political upheavals, including ten years of civil war. The growth has been driven by remittances and an upward pressure on wages in local labor markets. As a result, poverty has declined and social indicators have improved. Despite the availability of private capital and increases in wages for the poor, there is still a massive need for public investments in infrastructure, agriculture, health, and education. In the political domain the recent local elections will reintroduce local democracy after 20 years. Elected local politicians are expected to boost local development efforts. The leading political forces in Nepal are the political parties. There are close links between politicians and business leaders, the political parties control the trade-unions, have links to civil society organizations, and the parties select high-level government officials. The civil war and the post-war ethnic uprising led to demands for an ethnic based federal republic. A compromise federal map was decided in 2015, with provincial elections scheduled for the fall of 2017. There are concerns that the ethnic agenda may escalate ethnic conflicts, and it will be essential for all parties to work for participation of all social groups within the recently established local units, as well as in the economy at large.

Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs This report provides a comprehensive analysis of the current state of South Sudan. A main argument is that its political economy is fundamentally atypical: achieving independence in 2011 and dissolving into renewed civil war in 2013, South Sudan is suffering the crisis of a weak, neo-patrimonial guerrilla government, with fragmented military-political systems that stretch across its extensive borderlands. This report locates the current crisis within a longer and deeper context, and explores the power dynamics and centrifugal destructive forces that drive patterns of extractive, violent governance. These forces underpin today’s economic and state collapse, civil war, famine, the flight of its people, and their local tactics of survival. Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs December 2017

In 2017, Mozambique was at its most critical moment since the end of the civil war, in a crisis-like cocktail of political, economic and social problems. This report uses a political economy analysis to shed light on some of the paradoxes that characterize Mozambique by mid-2017: Entrenched poverty, the resuscitated armed conflict/war, the trust crisis between the Mozambican (Frelimo) government and its development partners, the spiralling debt and the party-state. They are paradoxes, since just a few years ago Mozambique received praise as frontrunner to overcome those problems. Mozambique defaulted on its foreign debt in 2016. Western donor countries demanded an international forensic audit of the ‘secret’ borrowing of US$ 2 billion, which destination and beneficiaries remain unclear, yet rendering the state indebted. The ‘secret’ loans explain a smaller part of the new debt, while heavy international and domestic borrowing and public spending after the discovery of large new mineral resources drove up the debt levels. The economy unhinged not by a full-blown resource curse, but rather by the mere prospect of large future income from the offshore LNG gas and coal, a phenomenon dubbed the “presource curse”. The discovery of large natural resources enhanced the already existing tendencies of the political-economic elite towards unproductive rent-seeking behaviour, and it further weakened the Frelimo-state's institutions.

This paper reviews two strands of literature. The first is on Information and Communication Technology (ICT) and growth. The increasing role of ICTs came together with stagnating growth rates in many countries. This has been denoted the Solow paradox. During the dot-com era from the mid-1990s, many believed that the paradox was solved. Growth rates increased and the internet became pervasive. The great recession has been followed by lower growth in Europe and in the United States and a return of the Solow paradox. Evidence indicates that the share of internet users in a population had a positive effect of growth in the 1990s, but that this effect vanished for developed countries after 2000. The second strand of literature is a heterogeneous research tradition that relates ICT not to income and growth, but to human well-being. That literature indicates positive (as well as some negative) effects of ICT and the internet on people’s happiness. Some new evidence indicate that the share of internet users in populations in a panel of countries is positively related to average happiness.

Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs This report uses a political economy analysis to shed light on some of the paradoxes that characterize Mozambique mid 2017: Entrenched poverty, the resuscitated armed conflict/war, the trust crisis between the Mozambican (Frelimo) government and its development partners, the spiralling debt and the party-state. Since 2017, Mozambique is arguably at one of its most critical moments since the end of the civil war, in a crisis-like cocktail of political, economic and social problems. By the time of writing, the Mozambican authorities only released the content of the Kroll report (an independent forensic audit of the ‘secret’ loans taken up in 2013) in summary form. Mozambique defaulted on its foreign debt in 2016, which has become unsustainable for the immediate future. The ‘secret’ loans explain a smaller part of the new debt, while heavy international and domestic borrowing and public spending after the discovery of large new mineral resources drove up the debt levels. The economy unhinged not by a full-blown resource curse, but rather by the mere prospect of large future income from the offshore LNG gas and coal, which we dubbed the “presource curse”.

Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs Report commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs

Master's thesis in Finance In this paper, I examine how investing in innovation affects economic growth in Norway. I attempt to conduct an empirical study using regression to examine the relationship between investing in innovation using R&D data and economic growth with GDP. The analysis is based on time series data for the period 1970 to 2011, which is accumulated from two well known sources; Statistics Norway and the Norwegian Research Council. The results reveal that not all the assumptions for OLS are met; consequently the relationship between innovation and economic growth in Norway is not confirmed. Several explanations to these results are suggested, and even though the relationship was not empirically confirmed, one still believes in a positive relationship between innovation and economic growth

In small and open economies, absorption of foreign knowledge through international trade often plays a more important role for domestic innovation and growth than investment in domestic R&D. This suggests that trade policies can increase knowledge spillovers from abroad. Public support to R&D can be motivated both by positive internal knowledge externalities and by its ability to expand absorptive capacity. This dynamic, empirical, general equilibrium analysis models these interplays between R&D, trade and productivity. It compares public R&D support and export promotion of R&D based products with respect to long term growth and welfare impacts. We find that export promotion is inferior to R&D support in spurring R&D. However, it is not outperformed in terms of welfare generation. The reason is that existing and politically persistent policy interventions create inefficiencies that can be counteracted by R&D-based export promotion as a second-best policy. Keywords: absorptive capacity; computable general equilibrium (CGE) model; endogenous growth; research and development; international spillovers