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How much is hegemony and how much is self-determination in the higher education systems in Southeast Asia? This paper argues that while the question of centre and periphery is still relevant to the analysis of international university systems, the analytical frameworks from which it has arisen may lose viability in the long term. Southeast Asian states are making use of higher education to act in ways that will contribute to the altering of their peripheral position in the global economic and political system. While changes in Southeast Asian higher education are closely tied to global markets and follow what sometimes appears to be a dependent pattern of adaptations driven by Western developed economies, the paper argues that there is also a significant amount of resistance. As Southeast Asian countries adapt in ways that help embed economic globalisation within their national landscape, the manner in which the adaptation occurs is more selective, open, and democratic than before. Moreover, while global communication with core (centre) university systems has been more open and transparent, the system is closed to direct intervention from the outside, making hegemony a less plausible explanation for the manner in which the system is reacting within the new global environment of financial interdependency.

The article presents the "White Paper on International Economy and Trade 2006," in Japan. Structural changes to which the country must adapt includes globalization, a rising Asia and an aging society. Strategies must be taken to deal with such changes and ensure sustainable economic growth. An index is needed to measure the levels of economic prosperity.

Eleven theme articles focus on serving rural youth in the International Youth Year and describe vocational agricultural education in developing nations, new models for international agricultural education, and goals and objectives of the Association for International Agricultural Education. (SK)

This article cites a variety of sources and synthesizes a number of studies on the social implications of technological innovations (microelectronics). These studies were related to six European and Asian countries and were also concerned with the international division of labor. (SSH)

This paper explores the opportunities presented by the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) to Japan to revitalize its trade policy, bolster economic growth, and increase participation in regional multilateral fora for the 21st century. Despite its strengths, Japan has continued to face problems caused by its economic, political, and strategic policies. The Japanese economy has been stagnant for the last several decades, and Japan needs to take bold steps to ameliorate this situation. Politically, domestic political paralysis has had a negative impact on Japan's alliances and partnerships and eroded Tokyo's ability to act as a major player in the increasing vital and important Indo-Pacific region. Connected to this, it is imperative for Japan to engage itself deeply in Asia in ways that increase strategic trust. This paper will also highlight the necessary reforms Japan must undertake to take full advantage of the benefits of the TPP, as well as what the TPP might mean for its relationship with both the US and other regional partners. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

This paper examines the impact of 'the rise of China' on the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and its implications for Japan. Japan has traditionally enjoyed a dominant position in the Bank, as it has enjoyed a dominant position in Asia. However, with the balance of power in the region tipping in China's favour, one might expect that this would be reflected in the ADB as well. This paper argues that despite the worsening Sino-Japanese relationship, the ADB has facilitated the development and maintenance of shared expectations between the two parties over the future direction of development assistance, representing an oasis of liberal institutionalism in a relationship increasingly characterised in realist terms. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Over the last decade, essentially since the Asian crisis of 1997-98, the economic integration of Northeast Asia has been marked by three overarching trends. Economic relations have become: 1) more institutionalized; 2) more "Asian;" and 3) more China-centric. These macro-trends are demonstrated and analyzed in the paper. But by way of anticipation, numerous counter-cutting facts need also to be kept in mind. In essence, recent trends, notable as they are, have by no means reversed three counter-realities: 1) economic ties are still largely driven, less by governments and formal arrangements, than by corporations in search of profits and production efficiencies; 2) despite growing economic interdependence across Northeast Asia and between that sub-region and Southeast Asia, Japan, China and South Korea remain heavily linked to global, and particularly US, markets; and 3) though China is an ever important hub in Northeast Asian trade and investment, Japan remains by far the most powerful economic player in the region. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The main objective of this paper is to overview the developments of Japan's ODA and assess, in a quantitative manner, their economic impacts on Asian countries. The benefits of two alternative measures—one from capital formation by Japan's ODA loans and the other from import liberalization in the Japanese market—are compared. Those economy-wide impacts of aid and trade on six Asian countries—China, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam—are estimated by a CGE model of global trade, incorporating a certain mechanism of dynamic capital formation. Japan's ODA loans are effective for economic growth in the countries. Real GDP gains range from 0.1 to 1.6% annually. Trade liberalization is efficient to improve economic welfare. Utility gains range from 0.2 to 1.9%, which exceed those on account of Japan's ODA. Variations in those economic impacts are much more significantly observed when examined by sector. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The purpose of this paper is to explore the manner in which Australian policy in matters of international trade is set. The author finds a number of puzzling features. First is the lack of detailed scrutiny given to the policy mechanisms employed by the countries of North-East Asia which have recently been so outstandingly successful in furthering their international trade and economic interests. There can be no valid reason for failing to give close attention to the means whereby others have succeeded. Second is the apparent separation in Australia, unlike Japan, between international trade policy and other, broader economic objectives such as the identification and support of new high value industries with global export potential. If we lack national objectives of this latter kind it is legitimate to ask whether this lack is for the best. Third is the extent to which policy appears to assume, without more ado, that through the liberation of market forces we shall largely resolve our international competitive and trade problems. This is a truly heroic assumption which should be clearly recognised for what it is. Fourth and perhaps most puzzling of all is the extraordinarily low level of community debate, even of interest group debate, over precisely where our 1990s international trade and economic development interests lie. If the current GATT round should largely fail, which is quite likely, clear thinking about where our best interests lie will suddenly become urgent. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

We present an institutional comparison of 13 major Asian business systems—China, Hong Kong, India, Indonesia, Japan, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, Thailand and Vietnam—with one another and five major Western economies—France, Germany, Sweden, the UK and the USA. We find five major types of business systems in Asia: (post-)socialist, advanced city, emerging Southeast Asian, advanced Northeast Asian and Japanese. With the exception of Japan, all Asian forms of capitalism are fundamentally distinct from Western types of capitalism. We conclude that the Varieties of Capitalism (VOC) dichotomy is not applicable to Asia; that none of the existing major frameworks capture all Asian types of capitalism; and that Asian business systems (except Japan) cannot be understood through categories identified in the West. Our analysis further suggests a need for the field to invest in further research on social capital, culture, informality and multiplexity. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

The demographic structure of Asia is expected to change rapidly from around 2020 up to around 2050. Following Japan, which is already at an advanced stage of aging and birthrate decline, China, South Korea, Thailand, and Singapore will also witness a further decline in their birthrates and an aging of their populations. Next in line will be the remaining countries of the Association of South-East Asian Nations as well as India. Such changes, accompanied by a decline in the labor force, will not only adversely affect economic growth, but also have a major impact on voting structures, savings rates, and social security systems. Moreover, the process of demographic aging in Asia will be faster than in Japan, and its extent will be substantial, both of which exacerbates the negative effects. On positive side, these trends will give rise to the emergence of new markets. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Describes the economic development of Asia and the history of Japanese industrial policy. Initiatives launched by the Japanese government to increase its international presence in the late 1980s; Support given by the World Bank to Japan; Role of the Japanese foreign aid program in bailing out Japanese industry from the effects of the high yen.

Large, extensively diversified pyramidal business groups of listed firms dominate the histories of developed economies and the economies of developing economies. While such groups (called zaibatsu in Japan) are thought to have provided coordination for big push growth successfully in pre-second-world-war Japan after a state-run big push failed, it is still being debated whether such a pyramidal business group driven big push coordination exists in developing countries elsewhere in Asia. We hypothesize that pyramidal business groups can be private-sector mechanisms for coordinating big push growth, provided that first, competition between rival groups induces a sufficiently high level of coordination efficiency, and second, conditions exist for maintaining economic openness and basic infrastructure and legal institutions. Another condition that must be satisfied for a country to sustain economic growth after its big push phase is complete is a timely demise of business groups. Where these criteria are not met, growth stalls and the few pyramidal business groups become too powerful to dislodge. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Based on annual data from Japan for the period 1960 to 2010, we investigate the government expenditure–economic growth relation in Japan by using the autoregressive distributed lag test for threshold cointegration developed by Li and Lee (2010). In particular, we evaluate the validity of Wagner’s view and the Keynesian view in the case of Japan. The empirical results presented herein indicate that of these two classical economics perspectives, only Wagner’s view holds for Japan. The findings also demonstrate that the adjustment process towards its long-run equilibrium is asymmetric. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan’s postwar contribution to international political affairs is often described as limited, primarily due to Japan’s focus on reconstructing and expanding its economy. However, this article argues that since the 1970s, Japan has played an active role in shaping the post-Vietnam War order in Southeast Asia. The Japanese actively sought to address the regional power vacuum that had been left by the diminished American presence and the Sino-Soviet attempts to fill it. To do so, in 1977, Japanese Prime Minister Fukuda Takeo announced a foreign policy initiative, the so-called Fukuda Doctrine. One of its pillars was Japan’s commitment to promoting coexistence and cooperation among ASEAN nations and their communist Indochinese neighbors. Based on declassified documents and other primary sources, this study demonstrates the strategic nature of the Fukuda Doctrine and sheds light on its political, geopolitical, and security objectives. This includes the realization of a Southeast Asian order in which Japan could maintain a position of influence and, through it, enhance its international political role. The strategic implications of this approach explain why Japan continued to pursue the doctrine despite increased regional and global tension following the 1979 outbreak of the Cambodian conflict and renewed Cold War tensions in the early 1980s. [ABSTRACT FROM PUBLISHER]

Japan was Asia's leading generator of international tourism in the 1980s and 1990s. Japanese tourists make up over 30% of all international tourists to Taiwan and they have been the highest ranking tourist source market since the early stages of the island's tourism development in the 1970s. However, the Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) outbreak in 2003, the most catastrophic disaster in the past 100 years in Taiwan, had a huge impact on Japanese inbound tourism to the island. The purpose of this study is to evaluate how Japanese inbound arrivals have been affected by the SARS outbreak. A SARIMA with intervention model is used to assess the impact of the epidemic on inbound tourism from Japan to Taiwan in the aftermath of the SARS outbreak. The empirical results indicated that inbound tourism from Japan was devastated by the crisis, particularly during the first 5 months after the SARS outbreak. This study provides some helpful insight for the tourism industry to respond to the impact of exogenous shock. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

Macro-analysis and East-West encounter are shown through consideration of objective yet subjective constructed concepts for the international system and international economy in the 21st century. Three paradigms are considered, namely the 21st century as the 'Pacific Century', as 'China's Century' and as the 'Asian Century'. Overlaps are shown between these three paradigms, as also developments in time, and gradually shift in geographical location. The 'Pacific Century', and its associated Rimspeak, was the paradigm emerging in the late 1970s, knitting together America's West Coast and the Japanese economy. By the late 1980s this was already shifting to talk of the 21st century likely to be an 'Asian Century' model, mark-1, based on the Pacific Asia dynamism shown by the 'Asian Tigers' and Japan. However, the Asian financial crash of 1997-8, and the economic downturn in Japan, meant that such an 'Asian Century' seemed premature as the 21st century arrived. Instead, it was China's economic growth that seemed most evident, and with it the concept of the 21st century as 'China's Century'. However, in turn that has already been modified during the first decade of the century by India's arrival as a rapidly growing economy. Consequently the 21st century as 'China's Century' and as 'India's Century' has been combined into talk of an 'Asian Century', mark-2. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

For much of the late twentieth century, the twenty-first was anticipated as the coming 'Asian Century'. Japan's economic woes and the broader financial crisis of 1997-98 put a dent in those expectations. The information revolution adds another complication; because of it, Asian economic development in this new century is likely to resemble a disorganised game of leapfrog. The information revolution makes 'leapfrogging' possible because it alters the conventional categories of 'developed', 'developing', and 'underdeveloped' nations. Rapid technological change can push yesterday's losers forward, and burden some more 'advanced' economies with the weight of yesterday's technological infrastructure. In social terms, a pernicious 'digital divide' is emerging. The significant growth in computer ownership and usage has been concentrated within certain income levels, educational backgrounds, demographic groups and geographical areas. This digital abyss is a daunting problem for India, China and Japan, despite their governments' continuing efforts to keep up with and exploit the opportunities offered by information technology. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

The article discusses cases, comparisons and contrast between Japan and the rest of Asia. The leaders of Japan were aware what was going on in rest of world. They leaned of Western scientific achievements and economic changes. They knew the great new economic and military power of England, the United States, and of other Western countries. Japan's own economic organization had already undergone an evolution of lesser degree but of the same kind as that which preceded the coming of the factory system in several Occidental countries. Japan already had a fairly elaborate division of occupations, based on handicraft, both retail and wholesale. A large urban population had grown up in the castle towns, especially at the Shogun's capital in Tokyo. These economic conditions did not differ too widely from those prevailing in other parts of Asia, especially in parts of India and China. There, too, were native merchants and workers, considerable production for near and some distant sale, and facilities for loaning and transferring money. Those countries also had considerable foreign trade. The difference lied in the industrialization and modernization in Japan, which was not there in any other part of Asia.