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This paper proposes a central fiscal capacity for the euro area that generates transfers in response to euro area, country, and region-specific shocks. The main novelty of this fiscal capacity is that it allows a joint response to these three types of shocks within a single scheme. Based on NUTS3 regional data over the last two decades and regional fiscal multiplier estimates, our analysis shows that - with a limited risk of moral hazard - substantial stabilisation could have been achieved in response to the eurozone and regional shocks, while country-specific shocks were on average less severe and therefore needed less stabilisation.

While the EU recovery plan provides a useful step in alleviating the economic effects of the coronavirus crisis and achieving further European integration, a permanent fiscal stabilization capacity dealing with major crises is still missing. Such a EU-wide stabilization function would be in accordance with the subsidiarity principle, enshrined in the Treaty of Maastricht, as the risk-sharing that it provides can only be conducted at the supranational level. We envisage a mechanism to semi-automatically respond to region- and country-specific shocks via a central fiscal stabilization fund (CFSF). A simple model incorporating hysteresis, cross-border externalities and moral hazard, is deployed to illustrate the optimal responses of the CFSF to these shocks. A well-designed CFSF has the potential to improving welfare not only in crisis-hit member countries, but also in the union as a whole.

Recent debate has focused on the introduction of a central stabilisation capacity as a completing element of the Economic and Monetary Union. Its main objective would be to contribute cushioning country-specific economic shocks, especially when national fiscal stabilisers are run down. There are two main potential objections to such schemes proposed so far: first, they may lead to moral hazard, i.e. weaken the incentives for sound fiscal policies and structural reforms. Second, they may generate permanent transfers among countries. Here we present a scheme that is relatively free from moral hazard, because the transfers are based on changes in world trade in the various sectors. These changes can be considered as largely exogenous, hence independent from an individual government's policy; therefore, the scheme is better protected against manipulation. Our scheme works as follows: if a sector is hit by a bad shock at the world market level, then a country with an economic structure that is skewed towards this sector receives a (one-time) transfer from the other countries. The scheme is designed such that the transfers add up to zero each period, hence obviating the need for a borrowing capacity. We show that the transfers generated by our scheme tend to be countercyclical and larger when economies are less diversified. In addition, since transfers are based on temporary changes in world trade, the danger of permanent transfers from one set of countries to the other countries is effectively ruled out. Finally, we show that transfers are quite robust to revisions in the underlying export data.

The literature presents evidence that spending-based fiscal consolidations tend to have more benign macro-economic consequences than revenues-based consolidations. Several explanations have been put forward. By directly comparing ex-post data with consolidation plans, we offer a new explanation based on robust evidence of systematically-weaker follow-up of spending-based consolidation plans. Systematically over-optimistic growth forecasts can explain a substantial part of the differences in follow up. Next, using a newly developed dataset on consolidation announcements, we indeed confirm that follow-up in actual revenues is substantially better than in actual spending and that, consistent with a Keynesian setting, spending-based consolidations produce more benign macro-economic effects. An advantage of our dataset is that we control for confidence effects that can occur immediately after new fiscal information becomes available. Consistent with the ensuing course of the economy, confidence falls (is unchanged) upon announced revenue increases (spending reductions). Under a counterfactual in which the confidence channel is suppressed, announcements of revenue-based consolidations have a substantially less negative effect on the economy.

We explore voluntary participation in pension arrangements. Individuals only participate when participation is more attractive than autarky. The bene??it of participation is that risks can be shared with future generations. We apply our analysis to a pay-as-you-go system, a funded system without buffers and a funded system with buffers. Buffers play a particularly interesting role, because they raise the sensitivity of the contributions to the asset returns. In particular, compared to a system without buffer requirements, they require higher contributions when asset returns are low. Moreover, individual contributions may be increasing or decreasing in the size of the young cohort, depending on whether the fund has more or less reserves than required. We con??ine ourselves to recursive settings and study equilibria characterised by thresholds on the contribution that young generations are prepared to make assuming that the future young apply the same threshold. For standard parameter settings two such equilibria exist, of which only the one with the higher threshold is consistent with the initial young being prepared to start the system. Finally, we explore the social welfare maximising policy parameter settings for various levels of uncertainty and risk aversion.

We briefly review the theoretical and empirical consequences of discretionary fiscal policy changes, after which we provide our own estimates for the EU countries. A fiscal expansion raises output and consumption and reduces the trade balance. Moreover, the stimulating effect of higher government purchases is weaker and the trade balance reduction is larger for more open EU economies, consistent with larger leakage effects. Further direct estimates suggest that fiscal expansions in large EU economies have non-negligible consequences for economic activity in the main trading partners. This provides a rationale for the concerted fiscal expansion recently initiated by the European Commission.

The paper proposes a theoretical analysis illustrating some key policy trade-offs involved in the implementation of a rules-based fiscal framework reminiscent of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). The analysis offers some insights on the current debate about the SGP. Specifically, greater "procedural" flexibility in the implementation of existing rules may improve welfare, thus increasing the Pact’s political acceptability. Here, procedural flexibility designates the enforcer’s room to apply well-informed judgment on the basis of underlying policies and to set a consolidation path that does not discourage high-quality policy measures. Yet budgetary opaqueness may hinder the qualitative assessment of fiscal policy, possibly destroying the case for flexibility. Also, improved budget monitoring and greater transparency increase the benefits from greater procedural flexibility. Overall, we establish that a fiscal pact based on a simple deficit rule with conditional procedural flexibility can simultaneously contain excessive deficits, lower unproductive spending and increase high-quality outlays.

We explore the implications of monetary unification for real interest rates and (relative) public debt levels. The adoption of a common monetary policy renders the risk-return characteristics of the participating countries more similar, so that the substitutability of their public debt increases after unification. This implies that the average expected real return on the debt increases. Also, the share of the unionwide debt issued by relatively myopic governments or of countries that initially have a relatively dependent central bank increases after unification. This may put the political sustainability of the union under pressure. A transfer scheme that penalizes debt increases beyond the union average is able to undo the interest rate effect of unification, but magnifies the spread in relative debt levels.

We use a Vector Auto Regression (VAR) analysis to explore the (spill-over) effects of fiscal policy shocks in Europe. To enhance comparability with the existing literature, we first analyse the effects of these shocks at the national level. Here, we employ identification based on Choleski decomposition and a structural VAR, both of which lead to the same results. Then, we turn to study the cross-border spill-overs of fiscal shocks via the trade channel. Fiscal expansions in Germany, France and Italy lead to significant increases in imports from a number of European countries. In order to mimic the case of monetary union, we also shut off the effects via the short-term interest rate and the nominal exchange rate and find a slight strengthening on average of the cross-country spill-overs from a fiscal expansion. These results suggest that it may be worthwhile to further investigate the possibility of enhanced fiscal coordination.

The combination of discretionary monetary policy, labor-market distortions and nominal wage rigidity yields an inflation bias as monetary policy tries to exploit nominal wage contracts to address labour-market distortions Although an inflation target eliminates this inflation bias, it creates a conflict between monetary policy and discretionary fiscal policy if fiscal policy is set at a higher frequency than nominal wages are. To avoid the associated excessive accumulation of public debt, ceilings on public debt are called for. If countries differ substantially in terms of structural distortions or economic shocks, uniform debt ceilings must be complemented by country-specific debt targets in order to prevent decentralised fiscal authorities from employing debt policy strategically.