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Using new survey data on quantitative growth expectations of firms in Germany, we show that firms resort to local information when forming expectations about aggregate growth. Firms extrapolate from the economic situation in their county, industry growth and their individual business situation. The effect is particularly strong for small firms and explains part of the high expectation dispersion across firms. Furthermore, we show that growth expectations are correlated with employment and investment decisions of firms, highlighting that differences in expectations do indeed seem to lead to differences in actual firm decisions. Our results confirm predictions of theoretical models with rational inattention.

Expectations are highly relevant for macroeconomic dynamics. Yet, the empirical evidence about properties of corporate macroeconomic expectations is scarce. Using new survey data on quantitative growth expectations of firms in Germany, we show that expectations are highly dispersed. The degree of dispersion depends on firm size and on how important the general economy is for the business of firms, supporting theories of rational inattention. Firms seem to extrapolate from local economic conditions and business experiences to aggregate growth expectations. Differences in growth expectations are associated with di erences in firms' Investment and labor demand. Not Reviewed

Using European Commission real-time data, we show that potential output (PO) estimates were substantially and persistently revised downwards after the Great Recession. We decompose PO revisions into revisions of the capital stock, trend labor, and trend total-factor productivity (TFP). Initially, trend TFP revisions contribute most to the overall PO revisions while all three components are almost equally important in the longer run. Revisions of the capital stock happen quickly while revisions of trend labor, mainly driven by revisions of the non-accelerating wage rate of unemployment (NAWRU), are made gradually. The relative contributions of the components to overall PO revisions differ systematically across countries. This suggests that heterogeneous policies are needed to push different countries back to their previous growth paths.

We analyze when and how much OECD estimates of potential output are revised after recessions and which factors explain the size of these revisions. Inter alia, we find that following a recession, the OECD substantially revises downwards potential output, those revisions are larger than what is to be expected under the assumption of no hysteresis, and the recession depth, the primary balance, and the current account balance are predictors of post-recession revisions of potential output.

This paper analyzes how the OECD revises potential output (PO) estimates after recessions. We show that downward revisions are substantial and mostly driven by supply shocks while PO estimates do not significantly react to demand shocks. In addition, revisions are partly caused by avoidable mismeasurement of PO before recessions. In particular, we show that the length of the preceding boom and pre-recession values of the current account balance and credit volumes are predictors of post-recession PO revisions. Our results call for improved methods for estimating PO and provide evidence against the existence of substantial hysteresis effects of demand shocks.

We analyze the international transmission of financial stress and its effects on economic activity. We construct country specific monthly financial stress indexes (FSI) using dynamic factor models from 1970 until 2012 for 20 countries. We show that there is a strong co-movement of the FSI during financial crises and that the FSI of financially open countries are relatively more correlated to FSI in other countries. Subsequently, we investigate the international transmission of financial stress and its impact on economic activity in a Global VAR (GVAR) model. We show that i) financial stress is quickly transmitted internationally, ii) financial stress has a lagged but persistent negative effect on economic activity, and iii) that economic slowdowns induce only limited financial stress.

In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the accuracy, unbiasedness, and the efficiency of professional macroeconomic forecasts. We analyze a large panel of individual forecasts that has not been analyzed in the literature so far. We provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for all G7 counties and for four diffierent macroeconomic variables. Our results show a high degree of dispersion of forecast accuracy across forecasters. We also find that there are large diffierences in the performance of forecasters not only across countries but also across diffierent macroeconomic variables. In general, forecasts tend to be biased in situations where forecasters have to respond to large structural shocks or gradual changes in the trend of a variable. Furthermore, while a sizable fraction of forecasters seem to smooth their GDP forecasts significantly, this does not apply to forecasts made for other macroeconomic variables.

Using the Consensus Economics dataset with individual expert forecasts from G7 countries we investigate determinants of disagreement (crosssectional dispersion of forecasts) about six key economic indicators. Disagreement about real variables (GDP, consumption, investment and unemployment) has a distinct dynamic from disagreement about nominal variables (inflation and interest rate). Disagreement about real variables intensifies strongly during recessions, including the current one (by about 40 percent in terms of the interquartile range). Disagreement about nominal variables rises with their level, has fallen after 1998 or so (by 30 percent), and is considerably lower under independent central banks (by 35 percent). Cross-sectional dispersion for both groups increases with uncertainty about the underlying actual indicators, though to a lesser extent for nominal series. Country-by-country regressions for inflation and interest rates reveal that both the level of disagreement and its sensitivity to macroeconomic variables tend to be larger in Italy, Japan and the United Kingdom, where central banks became independent only around the mid-1990s. These findings suggest that more credible monetary policy can substantially contribute to anchoring of expectations about nominal variables; its effects on disagreement about real variables are moderate.

Between 1995 and 2005, the German economy has experienced a phase of weak economic growth. We analyze whether this weak growth performance can be attributed to the stance of monetary conditions during that period. We show that the real effective exchange rate did have almost no dampening effects on growth. On the contrary, the introduction of the euro and the single monetary policy for the euro area seems to have contributed significantly to the low trend growth rate in Germany between 1999 and 2005.

During the ongoing financial crisis the analysis of similar historical crises has gained more and more attention among economic researchers and forecasters. Existing studies, however, do not tackle the immense heterogeneity that is present in cross-country samples in a formal and consistent way. In this paper, we propose a standardization approach to estimate the typical impact of economic crises. We show that our approach leads to estimates that are much less dependent on the sample used to estimate the typical shape and, hence, should give more reliable information about the typical macroeconomic impact of economic crises.

In this paper, we use survey data to analyze the rationality of professional macroeconomic forecasts. We analyze both individual forecasts and average forecasts. We provide evidence on the properties of forecasts for all the G7-counties and four different macroeconomic variables. Furthermore, we present a modification to the structural model which is commonly used to model the forecast errors of fixed event forecasts in the literature. Our results confirm that average forecasts should be used with caution, since even if all individual forecasts are rational the hypothesis of rationality is often rejected by the aggregate forecasts. We find that there are not only large differences in the performance of forecasters across countries but also across different macroeconomic variables; in general, forecasts tend to be biased in situations where forecasters have to learn about large structural shocks or gradual changes in the trend of a variable.

In this paper we analyze the power of various indicators to predict growth rates of aggregate production using real-time data. In addition, we assess their ability to predict turning points of the economy. We consider four groups of indicators: survey data, composite indicators, real economic indicators, and financial data. Almost all indicators are found to improve short-run growth forecasts whereas the results for four-quarter-ahead growth forecasts and the prediction of recession probabilities in general are mixed. We can confirm the result that an indicator suited to improve growth forecasts does not necessarily help to produce more accurate recession forecasts. Only composite leading indicators perform generally well in both forecasting exercises.